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This work is dedicated to all those who suffer and struggle against the injustices 
associated with disability and forced migration.  It is an attempt to understand and 
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Studies of disability and of forced migration have both generated their own significant 
fields of academic enquiry.  In addition, a small body of literature brought academic 
attention to the intersectional inequalities associated with disability and forced 
migration, however, the causes and appropriate solutions to these struggles remain 
underexplored both in terms of theoretical understanding and practical response.  This 
thesis is one of the first efforts to address this gap, bringing the sectors into 
conversation with each other, to learn from the perspectives of each and to develop 
more effective alternatives to contemporary inequalities. Assuming that no social order 
is inevitable, the study investigates how hegemonic representations of the needs and 
entitlements associated with disability and forced migration in the UK are determined, 
reinforced, and contested.  
An innovative methodological approach combines elements of action research, with a 
poststructuralist theoretical framework.  Drawing on elements of the Essex school of 
discourse theory, analysis explored the discursive logics used in key policy documents 
determining current entitlements associated with disability and forced migration in the 
UK. The study then investigated how these logics are reinforced or contested by people 
with diverse subject positions in the asylum sector or disabled peoples movement. 
Broad consensus was found as to the need to address the injustices experienced by 
disabled asylum seekers. Nonetheless, respondents with diverse roles and 
responsibility framed systemic change as unachievable, with the horizon of achievable 
change limited to the ostensibly pragmatic goal of identifying individuals worthy of some 
mitigation of policy restrictions.  People with lived experience of the impact of current 
inequalities provided the central insights and motivation for this study. However, when 
survival depends on fitting hegemonic perceptions of worth, people cannot be 
responsible for leading the resistance or the development of alternatives. The action 
research element of the methodology therefore included the organisation of public 
events, bringing together the disabled people’s movement, the asylum sector, 
academics, local authority employees and others, to learn from disabled asylum 
seekers, build solidarity and collaboratively consider possible solutions.  
Recommendations include the need for:  
• a ‘social model’ of asylum, building on the social model of disability. This would 
facilitate understanding of the disabling impact of the asylum system on those subject 
to restrictions on the ability to meet human needs.  
• collaborative learning from the lived experiences of disabled asylum seekers to build 
solidarity and to challenge intersectional inequalities.  
• publicly engaged academic research to contribute to the paradigmatic shift required.  
The study concludes that the experiences of disabled asylum seekers could provide 
the impetus to develop a broad-based movement of mutual solidarity through which to 
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contest intersectional injustice and contest the distinctions of human worth which have 
become hegemonic in contemporary neoliberal society. 
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Glossary of Abbreviations and key terminology 
DPO   Disabled People’s Organisation 
ICIBI   Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration 
NHS   National Health Service 
NGO   Non-governmental organisation 
UN   United Nations 
UNCRPD  United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  
UNCSR  United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, commonly known 
as the ‘1951 Refugee Convention’ 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
VPRS  Vulnerable Person’s Relocation Scheme 
Disability - I use the term Disabled People as the preferred terminology of the 
disabled people’s movement in the UK (See for example: Reclaiming our 
Futures Alliance Reclaiming our Futures Alliance (ROFA), 2019).  This includes:  
people with physical, cognitive and sensory impairments, people with learning 
difficulties; people who are neuro-diverse; Deaf people, deafened, hard of 
hearing people, mental health system survivors/people who experience mental 
distress and people with long term health conditions. 
Taking a social model perspective, it is argued that ‘it is the economic, social, 
cultural, physical and attitudinal barriers operating in society that disable and 
exclude people with impairments’.  Disability is, therefore, understood as a form 
of oppression, which, like other forms, can be contested.   
Migration status – People with different forms of migration status are 
referenced in this study according to categories of legal entitlement, as outlined 
by the Refugee Council (2019).  
Refugees 
People seeking asylum get refugee status if they are judged to meet the 
definition in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951): 
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
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having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it. 
People with refugee status in the UK are given five years’ leave to remain and 
are eligible to access the welfare state and health system during this time.  After 
this period, they must apply again for indefinite leave to remain or return to their 
country of origin.  People selected for resettlement, such as through the 
Vulnerable Person’s Relocation Scheme (VPRS 2014) may be granted refugee 
status before arriving in the UK.   
Asylum Seekers  
People seeking asylum in the UK have formally applied for protection under the 
1951 Refugee Convention and are waiting for a decision.  During this period, 
which may go on for years, people are subject to immigration controls, including 
possible detention for unlimited periods.   
Refused asylum seekers 
If a claim for asylum is refused, then people may lose entitlement to housing, 
financial support, and secondary healthcare.  They also become at greater risk 
of detention or deportation.  If people are judged as unable to return to their 
country of origin, then they may be entitled to limited support under section 4 (2) 
of the Immigration and Asylum Act (Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999).  
However, people assessed as eligible for community care, under the Care Act 
(The Care Act, 2014), may maintain eligibility if to remove them would be a 
breach of human rights (No Recourse to public funds network (NRPF)). 
In addition, people who are forced to flee their country of origin but do not seek 
asylum are commonly referred to as ‘undocumented’, ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ 
migrants.  In this study, unless distinctions of entitlement are relevant, I make 
generic reference to forced migration.   
Intersectional experiences of disabled asylum seekers and refugees 
This study focuses on intersectional (see for example: Crenshaw, 1989) 
experiences, adopting the terms disabled asylum seekers and refugees to 






I’m disabled… we are in the same boat, kind of… they tell me things to do as a disabled 
person, you can go here, do this, do that… But at the end of the day, I’m an asylum 
seeker, it changes everything.   
(Manjeet Kaur, cited in: Yeo and Bolton, 2013, p.49) 
‘It makes no sense’, a disabled migrant repeatedly lamented as he faced the prospect 
of eviction and becoming street homeless.  Speaking anonymously in a short film made 
for local Councillors, he spoke of the toll homelessness would take on his physical and 
mental health: ‘they push you to be crazy man… They want me to become dirty, nasty 
and crazy’  (Yeo and Spencer, 2018).  He was aware that after becoming ‘crazy’, he 
might again become eligible for housing.  
This person is not alone in facing such disabling restrictions meeting human needs as 
to make life a struggle for survival.  Before starting this doctoral research, I worked 
closely with a group of seven disabled asylum seekers (Yeo and Bolton, 2013) as part 
of a wider project with UK Disabled People’s Council.  This group taught me of the 
relentless and systematic restrictions hindering access to the services and support 
necessary to meet basic human needs.  At the time of writing, seven years later:   
• one has been murdered, after unsuccessfully seeking police protection.  
• two have died of cancer, having delayed seeking medical advice in the 
knowledge that secondary healthcare is unavailable to people without legal 
migration status. 
• one has disappeared, having been excluded from multiple support organisations 
for disruptive behaviour related to mental distress. 
This study is designed to understand what determines and perpetuates such injustice 
that appears to ‘make no sense’, and how it is being, or could be, effectively contested. 
I investigate the key government policies determining the services and support 
available to disabled asylum seekers and refugees in the UK.   Assuming that no social 
order is inevitable, I explore how hegemonic representations of the needs and 
entitlements associated with disability and forced migration become reinforced, or 
contested by people with diverse roles and responsibilities in the asylum sector and 
disabled people’s movement. Most importantly, my focus and motivation is to 
understand how the situation could be otherwise.  I therefore investigate responses to 
current inequalities and consider how a moment of more fundamental political 
contestation might be achieved.  
Existing literature on disability and forced migration 
This is not the first study to consider the experiences of disabled asylum seekers.  A 
seminal study by Jennifer Harris and Keri Roberts (2001) brought the existence and 
injustices faced by disabled asylum seekers in the UK to academic attention. This was 
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followed by a small body of studies highlighting different elements of the injustice 
experienced (Ward, Amas and Lagnado, 2008; Burns, 2017; Yeo, R., 2017a).  This 
evidence of injustice does not, however, appear to have resulted in significant 
improvement to lived experiences of disability and forced migration.   
In addition to the specific work regarding disabled asylum seekers, this study builds on 
previous analysis of the contingency of social relations.  This is not a study in political 
theory, however, elements of political philosophy facilitate understanding of the 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers.  The concept of hegemonic common-sense, 
developed by Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1971) and interpreted by many 
others (including: Simon, 1982; Crehan, 2016), helps explain the persistence of the 
inequalities shaping the contemporary social order.  Gramsci argues that, without 
analytical intervention, the interests of the ruling class become hegemonic, shaping 
public understanding or ‘common-sense’ perceptions of the existing social order and 
possibilities for change.  In the contemporary UK context of capitalism, financial profit 
is prioritised, and human worth is hegemonically assumed to be associated with 
economic contribution.  Economist, Richard Swedberg, explains: 
what is unique about capitalism, as compared to economic systems based on 
redistribution or reciprocity, is that it alone is primarily driven by the profit motive (2005, 
p.7). 
As disability scholars have analysed, the result of this prioritisation of profit is that 
people with impairments which limit economic productivity face structural barriers 
meeting human needs (Russell and Malhotra, 2002; Oliver and Barnes, 2012; Clifford, 
2020).  The intersectional restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum 
seekers may be hegemonically perceived as inevitable but are contingent on wider 
constructions of worth.  Awareness of the contingency of current injustice highlights the 
possibility of change and forms the central motivation of this study.  This study is 
designed to contribute to the development of more effective resistance and contestation 
of the restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum seekers and 
refugees.   
Motivation and Positionality 
My motivation and political perspective are further shaped by my lived experiences, 
which therefore require more specific consideration.  I became disabled more than 20 
years before starting this study.  For more than ten years I was unable to use my arms, 
walk, stand, or sit for long periods and for a relatively short period I was unable to talk 
or chew.  The onset of this condition was rapid, which meant I experienced a sharp 
contrast between life as a young, non-disabled adult living an active city life, and 
becoming a disabled person, unable to continue with ‘normal’ life as I had known it, 
reliant on friends and disability services to meet daily needs.  I became acutely aware 
of disabling barriers resulting from society being structured to prioritise the needs of 
non-disabled, economically productive individuals.  These barriers were not new, but 
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the prioritisation had previously worked in my favour.  I also became aware of the 
potential transformation stemming from a change in theoretical perception, such that I 
remember where I was when I read Alan Sutherland’s (1981) book, Disabled We Stand.  
His analysis introduced me to thinking of the existence of disabling barriers as a social 
construction which could be contested, rather than as the inevitable result of a tragic 
impairment.  Subsequently, I experienced and learned from the power of solidarity and 
resistance provided by the disabled people’s movement.  I continue to live with chronic, 
albeit now more manageable pain, but my life now fits more easily within hegemonic 
assumptions of normality.  Nonetheless, these lived experiences of disability frame my 
political position, my perceptions of possibility, and this study.      
Beyond experience of disability, my personal motivation for this study is shaped by my 
understanding of forced migration.  I am the daughter of a refugee and grew up with 
stories of the associated struggles, injustices and need for resistance.  These stories 
were so integral to my upbringing as to shape what I observe, consider important and 
how I respond.  In the wake of the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999), as hegemonic 
public discourse appeared increasingly focused on the need to reduce the apparent 
burden of migration, I began volunteering in a charity working with asylum seekers and 
refugees.  I met people seeking asylum who had lost the right to access the welfare 
state or to choose where to live.  People were forcibly dispersed, away from friends 
and support networks, to areas of cheap accommodation around the country.  
However, I was struck by the low expectations of this charity.  The objective of their 
work appeared to be how to support people to navigate the system, to reduce the 
negative impact of these restrictions and to maximise potential for individuals to be 
framed as an exception, worthy of support.  This charity response left the hegemonic 
notion that some humans are a burden, unworthy of support, effectively uncontested.  
By this time, my lived experience and ongoing involvement with disability politics meant 
that collective responsibility to address the access barriers faced by disabled people, 
had become the ‘common-sense’ by which I understood the world.  I was employed in 
a charity working with disabled people.  When I began volunteering in the asylum sector 
I was surprised by the disjuncture.  Meetings were held in inaccessible venues.  There 
appeared to be little awareness of the existence of disabled people or collective 
responsibility to consider access needs and remove disabling barriers.  As I learned 
more about the asylum system, I became similarly frustrated by the apparent lack of 
consideration in the disabled people’s movement of the experiences of disabled asylum 
seekers.  Almost a decade later, welfare reforms introduced in the wake of the 2008 
financial crash resulted in drastic cuts to services and support, disproportionately 
impacting disabled citizens (Cross, 2013; O'Hara, 2014).  Protestors initially came 
together under the banner ‘the hardest hit’ (Gentleman, 2011).  Commonalities with the 
restrictions imposed on asylum seekers since 1999 (Immigration and Asylum Act, 
1999) were thereby concealed.  I became aware of the enduring division between 
disabled citizens and asylum seekers, despite increasing commonalities of experience.  
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The study is in part motivated by the quest to understand how such segregation could 
be overcome and effective intersectional resistance could be realised.    
Outline of purpose and methodological approach 
With the personal motivation and positionality that I have outlined, I designed my 
research to enable improved understanding as well as to contribute to addressing 
ongoing injustices associated with disability and forced migration.  I investigate how the 
restrictions and inequalities associated with disability and forced migration in the UK 
are determined, reinforced, and are, or could be, effectively contested?  For this 
purpose, I build on existing literature and analyse the perspectives of people with 
diverse subject positions. 
Assuming that the current social order, like any other, is changeable, I adopt a 
poststructuralist theoretical framework in which contingency is core to the analysis.  
This framework is combined with elements of action research, bringing together the 
perspectives of people with wide-ranging roles and responsibilities in the asylum sector 
and disabled people’s movement.  My analysis was informed by elements of the 
poststructuralist Essex school of discourse theory, particularly drawing on elements of 
the logics approach to critical explanation developed by Jason Glynos and David 
Howarth (2007).  I began by investigating what are the dominant discursive struggles 
determining government policies which shape the current entitlements associated with 
disability and forced migration?   As political theorist Carol Bacchi (2009) argues, policy 
cannot be understood without examining the problem it is designed to address.  I 
therefore investigate representations of the ‘problem’ on which these policies are 
focussed.  I then turned to investigate how hegemonic discourse is reinforced or 
contested by people with different subject positions?  This included people with roles 
and responsibilities for implementation of formal and informal entitlements.  To 
understand the impact of this policy and practice relies on the expertise of people with 
lived experience.  The injustices experienced by disabled asylum seekers and refugees 
are the motivation for the study and must be central to solutions.  I therefore include 
examples of these lived experiences throughout the analysis.  
Having analysed representations of the problem to be addressed, my attention turned 
to how these representations frame current responses and how a moment of more 
fundamental political contestation might be achieved?  To answer this question, I draw 
on the  distinction made by French philosopher Jacques Rancière (1999) between: a 
moment of politics in which those who previously had no part, claim a part, resulting in 
substantive hegemonic contestation of social relations; and policing, whereby attention 
is focused on pragmatic adjustments rather than systemic contestation.  The action 
research approach was designed to increase understanding and contribute to a 
process of change.  This was achieved through specific attempts to bring the voices of 
disabled asylum seekers and refugees to a wider audience.  When considering an issue 
that has received so little attention, it may appear as if simply raising awareness of 
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ongoing injustice is itself a means of contestation.  However, if issues of disability and 
migration are hegemonically framed as burdens on the wider population, then evidence 
of disadvantage on affected people appears unlikely to result in significant change.  
Therefore, analysis focused on how effective contestation might be realised and 
alternatives developed.  
Map of thesis 
The thesis is made up of seven chapters.  These are summarised, before beginning 
the more substantive discussion.     
Chapter 1 
To develop a conceptual framework from which to make sense of the experiences of 
disabled asylum seekers, the study draws primarily from the disciplines of disability 
studies, migration studies, and intersectionality. However, this literature must be 
understood in the context of wider social and economic relations.  The chapter therefore 
starts by investigating literature regarding hegemony. This serves to explain the 
process by which it becomes ‘common-sense’ for some people’s needs to be prioritised 
above others.  The concept of hegemony facilitates understanding of the contingency 
of existing restrictions associated with disability, forced migration and intersectionality.  
Normative representation of non-disabled citizens of the nation-state frame 
intersectional experiences such as those faced by disabled asylum seekers as, 
perhaps unfortunate, but as an insignificant minority within a minority (Harris and 
Roberts, 2001).  As argued by scholars of international development (Wood, 1985; 
Zetter, 1985), the imposition of labels of ‘other’ reinforces distinctions of power.  Labels 
may determine which characteristics are made visible, what commonalities are 
highlighted, and thereby shaping perceptions of the problem to be addressed.  Where 
the existence of disabled asylum seekers is referred to at all, euphemistic labels of 
‘vulnerability’ often replace reference to being disabled.  Such labelling obscures 
commonalities with the wider disabled peoples movement (Yeo, R., 2019). 
Furthermore, it locates the problem with the individual, rather than with the barriers that 
are faced.  As such it undermines previous achievements of the disabled people’s 
movement,  including the focus of the social model of disability (Oliver 1983) on the 
collective need to address systemic barriers.  The chapter finishes by exploring wider 
literature regarding the contingent nature of the social order, thereby highlighting the 
possibility of change on which this study is based.  
Chapter 2 
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework.  A poststructuralist approach is 
adopted, drawing particularly on the Essex school of discourse theory.  The 
contingency exposed by this approach is core to the development of alternative forms 
of social organisation.  The analytical approach of this study draws on elements of the 
logics of critical explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007).  In addition, analysis of forms 
of contestation draws on the distinction made by Rancière (1999) between policing the 
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ongoing system, and a moment of politics whereby those with no part take their part.  I 
choose this framework as most appropriate for the objectives of my investigation, 
however, the chapter ends by exploring possible weaknesses of poststructuralism.  
Chapter 3 
The theoretical framework underpins methodological choice and rationale.  Discourse 
theory was combined with elements of action research and phenomenology, privileging 
the expertise of lived experience.  This chapter lays out the research questions and the 
four-stage process of investigation.  My intention is to privilege the perspectives of 
disabled asylum seekers; however, I do not seek to quantify or to prove the existence 
of injustice.  Instead, I analyse what underpins current injustice and how it could be 
effectively contested.  For this purpose, stage 1 of this study is not to investigate lived 
experience, but to analyse the dominant discursive logics (Glynos and Howarth 2007) 
shaping the government policies which determine current restrictions associated with 
disability and forced migration in the UK.  In Chapter 3, I list the specific documents 
subject to analysis and explain the rationale for this choice.  Stage 2 of the study 
investigates the perspectives of people with responsibility for implementation of policy 
and practice.  This includes people with diverse roles and responsibilities in the asylum 
sector and disabled people’s movement.  Stage 3 explores how hegemonic discourse 
is reinforced or contested by disabled asylum seekers and refugees, with lived 
experience of the impact of current intersectional policy and practice.  As contributors 
to this study explained to me, the immediacy of struggles for survival prevents people 
from building resistance.  The development of alternatives therefore depends on 
solidarity.  The final research stage focusses on the results of bringing together people 
with diverse subject positions to discuss the nature of the problems experienced and 
how these could be addressed.  
After outlining the methodological states of investigation, the chapter turns to logistical 
considerations, including sampling, use of interpreters and ethical matters.  These first 
three chapters form the theoretical basis for the empirical analysis.  
Chapter 4 
This first analytical chapter focuses on the dominant discursive logics (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007) adopted by the key policy documents determining current intersectional 
entitlements.  More specifically, the investigation considers the UK government 
legislative White Paper, Fairer, faster and firmer (1998), which formed the basis for the 
Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) and continues to shape the restrictions experienced 
by disabled asylum seekers.  This is followed by analysis of discursive representations 
underpinning the resettlement of refugees labelled as ‘vulnerable’ following conflict in 
Syria.  These policy documents highlight distinctions between people framed as worthy 
of support, and a wider migrant population framed as inherently burdensome.  These 
distinctions are central to understanding the inequalities faced by disabled asylum 
seekers.  In relation to disability, analysis begins with the Beveridge lecture given by 
then Prime Minister Tony Blair (1999) in which he summarised his vision for welfare 
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reform.  The discursive basis of these reforms is replicated in later policy, implemented 
by the Coalition government and subsequent Conservative governments.  These 
ongoing welfare reforms reduce provision of state services and support, with a shift 
from collective to individual responsibility. Analysis of the discursive logics underpinning 
policy form the basis for analysis in subsequent chapters of how the hegemony of elite 
discourse is maintained, adjusted, or contested by people with different subject 
positions.   
Chapters 5 and 6 
Analysis then turns to the perspectives of people with different subject positions 
regarding the problems associated with disability and forced migration.  Chapter 5 
focuses on the perspectives of people with a wide range of roles and responsibilities 
for implementing policy and practice in the asylum sector and disabled people’s 
movement.  This is followed, in Chapter 6, by analysis of the perceptions of disabled 
asylum seekers themselves.  Both chapters consider how discursive representations 
reinforce or contest the hegemonic discourse.  Broad consensus was found among 
contributors to this study, that current restrictions associated with disability and forced 
migration are unjust.  Assuming the contingency of the social order, the questions 
become why the current situation remains, and how effective alternatives can be 
developed.   
Chapter 7 
The final chapter turns to analyse how representations of the problem in previous 
chapters shape perceived solutions. Analysis focuses on existing and proposed 
initiatives regarding issues of disability and forced migration.  Analytical distinctions are 
drawn between initiatives that reinforce, reflect, or contest the hegemony.  Several 
initiatives have been adopted by the Home Office focusing on the needs of people 
labelled as ‘vulnerable’ (Great Britain. The Home Office and The Rt Hon James 
Brokenshire MP, 2014; Shaw, 2016; Bolt, 2019; Office, 2019), the criteria of which 
include disability.  These measures were endorsed by voluntary sector contributors to 
this research.  However, I argue that such initiatives adopt and reinforce hegemonic 
distinctions of entitlement between those framed as worthy of support and those who 
are not.  
In addition to Home Office initiatives, I analyse broad categories of discursive solution 
presented by the asylum voluntary sector.  Such action may mitigate the impact of 
systemic restrictions for some people, however, in assuming the value of pragmatic 
consensus, these efforts fail to contest hegemonic discourse of inequality underpinning 
ongoing distinctions of entitlement.  Finally, my analysis turns to initiatives organised 
as part of this study, designed to contest hegemonic distinctions of entitlement and to 
build a broader resistance, bringing together the disabled people’s movement and the 
immigration sector.   
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The sequence of these chapters enables focus on the process by which discursive 
distinctions become hegemonic such as to appear inevitable.  It is however important 
that this research focus and methodological choice does not result in relegating the 
apparent significance of lived experience.  My call for contestation of hegemonic 
inequalities is not to obscure the urgency of addressing immediate struggles for 
survival.  I therefore include examples of the impact of current policy and practice 
throughout the thesis.  
This investigation reveals that the injustice faced by disabled asylum seekers is 
underpinned by hegemonic discursive logics such that some people are framed as 
unworthy of support.  As a result, far from ‘not making sense’, denial of entitlement to 
meet basic human needs is the direct and logical result.  However, this analysis 
highlights the contingent nature of any social order.  If response is limited to pragmatic 
adjustments, replicating hegemonic common-sense inequalities, then systemic 
distinctions of entitlement remain unscrutinised.  The current absence of systemic 
contestation does not mean that it is impossible.  As Frances Ryan (2019, p.200) 
argues in relation to the injustices faced by disabled citizens: ‘How things are is not 




Chapter 1.  Literature review: The construction and 
contingency of hegemonic distinctions of human 
worth regarding disability, forced migration and 
intersectionality.  
There are always too many of them.  ‘Them’ are the fellows of whom there should be 
fewer – or better still none at all.  And there are never enough of ‘Us’.  ‘Us’ are the folks 
of whom there should be more.  
(Bauman, 2004, p.34)   
This study investigates the causes and possible solutions to the restrictions and 
inequalities associated with disability and forced migration in the UK.  For this purpose, 
a multi-disciplinary approach is taken, predominantly bringing together literature from 
the disciplines of sociology and political theory associated with disability and migration, 
as well as building on a small body of work specifically focused on the intersectional 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers.  This chapter reviews the primary literature 
on which the study is based, before turning to the theoretical framework and the 
empirical analysis in subsequent chapters. 
The injustices currently experienced by disabled asylum seekers cannot be understood 
in isolation from the wider social order.  The chapter therefore starts, not with specific 
focus on disability or forced migration, but by investigating hegemonic constructions of 
normality and common-sense, drawing on the insights of Gramsci (discussed by: 
Simon, 1982; Thomas, 2010; Crehan, 2016).  The apparently common-sense basis of 
what is considered normality obscures its constructed and contingent basis, with overt 
labelling reserved for those categorised as ‘other’.  Literature regarding the nature of 
labelling is therefore considered, before turning to academic discussion of the impact 
on three more specific constructions of ‘othering’: disability, migration status, and 
intersectionality.  The small body of literature regarding the experiences of disabled 
asylum seekers is considered in the context of these wider debates.  The social 
construction of difference highlights the contingency of contemporary structures of 
inequality.  This chapter, therefore, finishes with an exploration of literature associated 
with contingency and the possibility of alternatives, focusing on debates regarding how 
inequalities are, or could be, contested.  This discussion introduces principles of the 
poststructuralist theoretical framework to be investigated in the next chapter.  
1.1 Hegemonic narratives of normality and ‘other’   
Hegemonic narratives of normality shape the restrictions and inequalities associated 
with disability and forced migration.  I therefore begin by exploring the meaning and 
impact of hegemonic assumptions of normality and associated processes of othering.  
The term hegemony originates from ancient Greek, describing the state, or hegemon, 
with political and military advantage.  It was developed by Gramsci (1971) to explain 
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why Marxist predictions of communist uprising had not taken effect, and has become 
widely discussed since then.  Gramsci argues that a person’s perspective is 
‘mechanically imposed’ (Crehan, 2016, p.52) depending on their subject position.  
According to Gramsci, the power of the Greek hegemon has been replaced by what he 
refers to as cultural hegemony, whereby the needs of the dominant social class become 
‘common-sense’.  Access to information is controlled by the media, educational and 
political bodies, such as to promote modifications of behaviour and perceptions of 
possibility.  The resultant inequalities are not necessarily condoned, but subjugation is 
perceived as ‘a fixed and unchangeable reality it would be futile to oppose’ (Crehan, 
2016, pp.51-52).  If the dominant social order appears inevitable, then to rebel is as 
nonsensical as seeking to halt the tide, as King Canute famously showed (Raglan, 
1960).  According to Kate Crehan (2016), Gramsci’s notion of common-sense does not 
have the normative dimension which it holds in English.  Rather, it is what Roger Simon 
(1982) describes as the ‘uncritical and partly unconscious way in which people perceive 
the world’.  In this thesis, I argue that common-sense assumptions of inevitability are 
core to understanding the persistence of contemporary inequalities associated with 
disability and forced migration.  
Hegemonic constructions of normality and ‘other’ are critically significant to this study.  
The concept of ‘othering’ stems from post-colonial studies, most notably the work of 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), who herself draws on Gramsci’s notion of the 
‘subaltern’, referring to people ruled by the dominant social class (Crehan, 2016, p.51).  
Spivak argues that Eurocentric approaches constitute colonial populations as if they 
cannot speak.  In a lecture entitled ‘Vulnerability and resistance’, gender theorist Judith 
Butler (2014) develops Foucauldian principles, arguing that ‘Few struggles are more 
important than those that question so-called common norms’.  She focuses on gender; 
however, her analysis is applicable to struggles associated with disability and forced 
migration.  Normative constructions of normality construe the ‘other’, according to 
Nathalie Grove and Antony Zwi, ‘as a point of deviance’ (2006, p.1933).  Situating 
certain groups as ‘other’ enables inequalities of perceived human worth and associated 
entitlement.   The concept of entitlement is used in this thesis to mean what Brenda 
Major (1994) describes as legal rights to services and support, as well as less formal 
assumptions of moral imperative, legitimacy, and status. The othering of disabled 
asylum seekers may result in peoples’ needs being disregarded or being judged as 
exceptionally worthy of generosity.  Either way, this categorisation of difference is 
relational and asserts the superiority of the apparent norm.    
It is not new for hegemonic constructions of normality to be exclusive.  The assumed 
nature of ‘normality’ changes through history and geography (Link, 2006).  Focusing on 
nineteenth century USA, legal historian Barbara Young Welke (2010, p.63), argues that 
the notion of ‘people’ was assumed to mean ‘able, white and male’.  In a different 
context, the fascist policies of Nazi Germany constructed normality on the basis of more 
specific notions of Aryan traits. Disabled activist and researcher Liz Crow (2009) 
documents how disabled people were among the first to be framed as ‘abnormal’ and 
22 
 
to become targets of genocide.  Mainstream contemporary discourse now presents 
these policies as monstrous, abnormal, and associated with one of the ‘evil periods’ of 
history (Mondon and Winter, 2020).  However, then, as now, government policies are 
implemented not by monsters, but by ‘normal’ people.  In her famous essay on the trial 
of Adolf Eichmann (a chief architect of the Nazi Holocaust), the philosopher Hannah 
Arendt (1964, p.276) refers to him as ‘terribly and terrifyingly normal’.  This reference 
to normality provoked criticism from those who understood normality to carry a 
normative judgement of acceptability, and for whom Nazi practices could be attributed 
to a monstrous ‘other’.  However, Arendt was not excusing Eichmann, but asserting 
that evil can take place within constructions of normality.  It was then that she coined 
the phrase, ‘the banality of evil’.  Her analysis highlights that normative dimensions of 
assumed normality facilitate the lesser entitlement of the ‘other’.  Despite the different 
historical and geographical context, Arendt’s perspective facilitates my analysis of the 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers, returned to in Chapter 6.   
The social order is shaped by normative conceptions of normality associated with 
ableism (Campbell, 2009, 2012), citizenship (Marshall, 1950; Pisani, 2012), and 
whiteness (Eddo-Lodge, 2018).  These multiple dimensions of assumed normality 
intersect to frame disabled asylum seekers as an insignificant ‘other’ within the ‘other’.  
Notions of normality may be sufficiently hegemonic as to appear natural or ‘common-
sense’ and thereby avoid scrutiny.  The precluding of public debate to specific issues 
of contestation is described by Rancière as political aesthetics (2004, p.8).  The result 
is to limit public dissent to adjusting definitions of ‘other’, rather than contesting 
definitions of normality and distinctions of human worth.    
Hegemonic constructions of normality not only relate to categories of people, but also 
to wider societal structures.  Significant shifts have taken place regarding hegemonic 
assumptions of the ‘normal’ location of responsibility in political discourse since World 
War Two. These shape contemporary distinctions of entitlement associated with 
disability and forced migration, and therefore require investigation.  When founding the 
National Health Service (NHS), Labour Party politician Aneurin Bevan (1952) asserted 
collective responsibility to provide healthcare for all in order to address the fear and 
misfortune associated with illness.  By the 1980s, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
asserted a shift to individual responsibility.  This formed part of a package of principles 
described as neoliberalism, analysed by David Harvey (2007).  Rather than collective 
responsibility to support those experiencing individual misfortune, individuals became 
constructed as architects of their own misfortune.  According to Henri Giroux (2008, 
p.594), in neoliberal capitalist society, there is little collective responsibility for ‘the 
losers’.  Writing together with Brad Evans, he describes the impact of this shift in the 
assumed location of responsibility: 
Imagine a world where those who live on the margins … are condemned for their plight, 
while those who control the political process prosper from those very policies that bring 
about social abandonment … Imagine a world that has lost all faith in its ability to 
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envisage – let alone create – better futures, condemning its citizens instead to a 
desolate terrain of inevitable catastrophe … we can imagine this world all too easily … 
a world that has become normalised and for which there is no immediate alternative – 
a world we understand as neoliberalism. (Evans, B. and Giroux, 2015, p.1) 
Neoliberalism may result in ‘inevitable catastrophe’ however, these principles shape 
contemporary hegemonic understandings of normality.  If responsibility is located with 
the individual, collective resistance is hindered.  Instead, apparent solutions become 
focused on dreams of individual salvation through hard work, luck, and the grasping of 
opportunities for survival or betterment.  Philosopher Ernst Bloch (1986, p.18) 
describes how individualised conceptions of escape hinder collective organisation.  
Without apparent systemic alternatives, as Bauman (2004, p.99) explains, people do 
not want to ‘think of our unhappy condition’; instead people seek ‘the agitation that 
takes our mind off it and diverts us’.  As will become apparent in subsequent chapters, 
the persistence of hegemonic distinctions of entitlement relies on this lack of perceived 
alternatives.  If contestation is limited to seeking to adjust definitions of ‘other’ with 
associated entitlements and thereby to frame individual escape as the only feasible 
goal, then the systemic basis of inequalities remains intact.  Yet, as Rancière (1999, 
p.16) explains, ‘no social order is based on nature’. The location for effective 
contestation requires analysis of the contemporary political context framing hegemonic 
understanding of normality and other. 
Normality in a contemporary liberal democratic context 
The othering of certain groups is not necessarily an aberration but may be within the 
perceived normal functioning of a social order.  In her analysis of US history, Welke 
asks:  
How long can we dismiss persistent exclusions as simple steps yet to be taken in the 
long road to achieving the liberal ideal?  ... Might we consider the troubling thought that 
borders of belonging … are constituent elements of the ‘liberal’ state? (2010, p.156) 
In the contemporary UK context, ’persistent exclusions’ appear within the liberal 
democratic state.  According to political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2005b, p.4), the 
rhetorical conjoining of liberalism and democracy attempts to combine paradoxical 
traditions: ‘democratic logics always entail drawing a frontier between “us” and “them”, 
those who belong to the “demos” and those who are outside it’.  The ‘democratic’ rights 
of those who ‘belong’ are prioritised over those who do not, thereby creating an intrinsic 
contradiction within the assumed individual liberty of liberalism.  Similarly, Rancière 
(2006, p.74) argues that liberal democracy fails to respect individual liberty when it 
‘relates to the protection of borders and territorial security’.  More specifically referring 
to contradictions between liberal democracy and asylum policy, Vicki Squire (2009, p.5) 
explains that ‘the articulation of asylum as a security issue necessitating intensified 
border controls undermines the very freedoms that are central to a liberal democratic 
way of life’.  If the democratic unit of legal authority determining eligibility to services is 
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centred on the nation-state, then there are associated assumptions of the need to 
control who enters and leaves the state.   
Regular elections of political representatives are core to hegemonic conceptions of 
liberal democracy.  As Rancière  (2006, p.73) explains, ‘the ballot boxes are generally 
not rigged and one can verify it without risking one’s life’.  However, when democratic 
involvement is focused on elections, ‘the same dominant personnel is reproduced, 
albeit under interchangeable labels’ (ibid).  Assumptions of synonymity between 
elections, democracy, and citizenship may be particularly disadvantageous to asylum 
seekers, who are systematically disenfranchised by lack of entitlement to vote or 
influence public decision making.  Maria Pisani  (2012, p.189), refers to ‘the political 
clout of the illegal ‘other’ as non-existent’.  The sense of being unrepresented and 
alienated from political decision making is not, however, unique to illegal ‘others’.  In a 
previous study, disabled asylum seekers used public art to convey their key messages 
(Yeo and Bolton, 2013).  As shown in Figure 1, people described relentless struggles 
to overcome barriers meeting basic needs.   
 
Figure 1: Mural conveying the key messages of disabled asylum seekers, (Yeo 
and Bolton, 2013) 
Despite the particularly acute barriers faced by disabled asylum seekers, passers-by, 
seeing the mural, expressed surprise at commonalities with the inequalities shaping 
their own lives.  Contemporary inequalities are clearly not exclusively determined by 
disability or migration status.   
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This study focuses on the experiences of disabled asylum seekers, without suggesting 
that the associated inequalities are unique.  This reflects an ethical as well as an 
academic position.  As Bevan (1952, p.177) warns, to focus on the plight of any group, 
risks promoting ‘indifference to others’.  In opposition to normative conceptions of 
majoritarian priority, Bevan argues that ‘not even the apparently enlightened principle 
of the “greatest good for the greatest number” can excuse indifference to individual 
suffering’ (1952, p.178).  Without hegemonic goals for equality, struggles for relative 
entitlement are central to the survival of marginalised individuals.  In the context of 
neoliberalism, Arjan Appadurai (2006, p.6) writes of the ‘intolerable anxiety’ created by 
the retraction of state responsibility, whereby ‘entitlements are frequently directly tied 
to who “you” are and thus who “they” are’  rather than to meeting human needs or 
creating equality.  
Contestation requires a target beyond a broad sense of injustice.  Recognition of 
systemic injustice associated with capitalism or globalisation fails to provide a tangible 
target for blame, instead, Appadurai (2006, p.44) argues that minorities provide this 
target.  The sense of injustice may be increased if a small minority is perceived as 
disrupting the assumed majority and prime legitimacy of citizens of the nation-state.  
According to Appadurai  (2006, p.53), ‘the smaller the number and the weaker the 
minority, the deeper the rage about its capacity to make a majority feel like a mere 
majority rather than a whole and uncontested ethnos’.  The struggles faced by 
marginalised minorities thereby highlight the fragility of the perceived majority.  Asylum 
seekers, and particularly disabled asylum seekers, may thereby be framed not as an 
irrelevant minority in the context of the inequalities of international capitalism, but as an 
illegitimate burden, and therefore responsible for wider perceived injustice.   
The British electoral system is predicated on assumed correlations between democracy 
and majority decision making.  In an earlier project in which I focused on the 
perspectives of employees in the immigration sector, the lack of attention paid to 
disabled asylum seekers was explained by interviewees as the result of minority status 
(2015b).  The implication is that focusing on majority needs is normal and 
democratically justified.  However, according to Nicos Poulantzas  (2008), it is common 
for a minority elite to use democracy to constitute their interests as those of the majority.  
The lack of entitlement and power of disabled asylum seekers may therefore stem not 
so much from minority status but from the fragmentation and disempowerment of the 
numerical majority.  With this conception of the social order, contestation might be more 
effectively achieved by highlighting the commonalities between disabled asylum 
seekers and the wider population rather than persuading the minority elite to provide 
for a specific set of needs.   
Many political and sociological analysts explore inequalities of entitlement to services 
and support, within current political structures, albeit without reference to the 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers.  Research by Mackenzie et al. (2017, p.227) 
exposes the inequalities in service provision beyond formal policies. They cite an 
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interviewee explaining that at all levels of service provision ‘from the receptionist to the 
GP and the practice managers’, patients are favoured if it is ‘easy for you to be helped’.  
The capacity for the provider to notice progress and to feel good about their contribution 
appears paramount.  The complexity of the barriers faced by disabled asylum seekers 
may therefore compound the denial of support.  
Beyond issues of minority status or electoral power, the disadvantage experienced by 
asylum seekers within current political structures appears to be associated with 
hegemonic assumptions of the legitimate and inevitable prioritisation of citizens of a 
nation-state.  Yet, despite hegemonic assumptions of normality associated with nation-
states, as Eric Hobsbawm (1975, p.105) writes, ‘there is nothing logical’ about their 
creation.  Instead, they are based on what Benedict Anderson (1983)  refers to as an 
‘imagined community’.  In her doctoral research, Ruth Garbutt (2003) investigates the 
lack of citizenship rights afforded to disabled people.  Her unexamined normative 
assumption is that disabled citizens should be treated like non-disabled citizens, not 
that non-citizens should be treated as citizens.  The greater moral and legal entitlement 
of citizens appears so natural as to be unquestioned.  
The denial of access to services and support for certain groups can be further linked to 
neoliberal focus on individual responsibility and economic productivity.  The goal then 
becomes removing people framed as a burden on the wider population.  According to 
Bauman (2004, p.59), the process is akin to Michelangelo’s description of designing a 
sculpture as simply removing the unwanted parts.  UK government policies restricting 
the entitlements of asylum seekers will be examined in detail in Chapter 4, for now, 
suffice to note that the explicit purpose is to remove unwanted migrants or to deter 
people from entering the UK (UK Parliament, 1999).  Yet, as Bauman (2004) explains, 
the creation of ‘wasted lives’ and ‘wasted products’ is intrinsic to the capitalist system.  
Similarly, Giroux (2008, p.594) refers to the ‘disposable’ lives of people framed as 
economically unproductive, describing the power of neoliberalism ‘to define who 
matters and who doesn’t, who lives and who dies’.  In this context, sociologist, Imogen 
Tyler describes how: 
public anxieties and hostilities are channelled towards those groups within the 
population … who are imagined to be a parasitical drain and threat to scarce national 
resources. (2013, p.9) 
If the overriding framework is not common humanity but the prioritisation of profit in a 
capitalist economy, then the needs of those framed as a burden are of marginal 
importance.  Hence, as I will argue, the experiences of disabled asylum seekers are 
the logical conclusion of hegemonic conceptions of normality within the context of 
liberal democratic capitalism.  
Attention now turns to academic discussion of labelling associated with othering, before 




Labelling of the ‘other’  
Understanding processes of othering is essential to effective contestation.  All labels 
imply distinctions between those with, and without, associated characteristics.  In her 
analysis of Gramscian notions of the subaltern, Crehan explains that: 
privileged women of the global North have found themselves continually having to 
perform scripts written by men, they too, at least in this respect, inhabit a subaltern 
reality.  Living in a world where the dominant scripts on offer have not been written by 
people like you is one of the defining characteristics of subalternity.  Subalterns live in 
a common-sense world rooted in the narratives of those who dominate them. (2016, 
p.61) 
Gramsci’s concept of subalternity was not limited to a particular social class.  The 
distinction that he made was between ‘oppressed rather than oppressing’ (Crehan, 
2016, p.185).  It is the structures of oppression which create the subaltern, or the 
oppressed ‘other’.   
Notions of universalism may appear to contest processes of othering.  Bill Ashcroft 
(2008, p.235) defines universalism as a ‘hegemonic view of existence by which the 
experiences, values, and expectations of a dominant culture are held to be true for all 
humanity’.  However, this approach has been widely criticised by post-colonial scholars.  
Writing with regard to universal approaches to understanding of disability, Shaun Grech 
(2009, pp.771-772) warns against ‘the exportation of ideas and models from north to 
south, together with inferences from the western context about the presumed situation 
of disabled people in developing countries’.  Nonetheless, highlighting the common 
barriers faced by disabled people could help build the solidarity needed for effective 
contestation. Focusing on distinctions of national context may obscure the 
commonalities of human need, encapsulated in Abraham Maslow’s (1943) famous 
hierarchy.  As he outlines, human needs include physiological (including food, shelter, 
and security), psychological (sense of belonging, friends, and intimacy), as well as self-
fulfilment and sense of achievement.   As a theory of universal human motivation, his 
hierarchy obscures cultural differences and the myriad of distinctions in people’s 
priorities, however, the commonalities in human needs are important.  In this study, I 
assume that the problems experienced by disabled people and asylum seekers are 
located with the barriers experienced, rather than with distinctions of need.  
Labels of identity may obscure commonalities of human need.  According to sociologist, 
John Holloway (2010), labels imply that ‘the other is not part of us and we are not part 
of the other’.  With regard to refugee experiences, Roger Zetter (1985, p.101) is 
similarly critical, arguing that labels impose ‘differentiation, perhaps even stigma’.  He 
writes of the inherent inequalities between the labelled and the labeller.  The power and 
ideological persuasion of the labeller determine who or what is labelled as ‘other’, which 
by implication reinforces the assumed inverse status of ‘normality’.  Such distinctions 
are reiterated by Grech (2009, p.226) in the context of international development, 
arguing that ‘however “participatory” processes may claim to be, it is ultimately 
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professionals who make up definitions’.  Labels of administrative entitlement risk 
obscuring wider commonalities and thereby exacerbating divisions.   
Beyond formal distinctions, labels can affect how a person is seen and sees 
themselves.  Butler (2015b) describes the ‘performative effect’ of labels of identity.  As 
she explains, ‘The names we are called are just as important as the names we call 
ourselves… the speech act can animate us in embodied ways’.  This builds on Frantz 
Fanon’s (1967) account of racism, ‘Black Skins, White Masks’, in which he argues that 
systemic oppression results in people adopting aspirational identities other than their 
own.  This theme is taken up by Holloway (2010, p.216) who argues ‘take away the 
mask and you find a face that has been distorted by the mask and by resentment of the 
mask’.  However, the nature and impact of a label are contingent on wider social 
relations. 
Labels are not inherently oppressive.  According to Geof Wood (1985, p.3), labels are 
an inevitable part of the management and understanding of the social world.  They may 
be a tool for governance, determining entitlement to services and support.   This may 
create false distinctions, however labels may also be a means of acknowledging shared 
experience, building peer support, solidarity, and resistance.  Miriam Ticktin’s (2011, 
p.166) anthropological work is centred on the ‘sans-papiers’ movement in France, a 
group she describes as heterogeneous, brought together through ‘a label they claimed 
as a means to emancipation’.  The potential for emancipatory impact may depend on 
the degree of individual choice.  Audre Lorde (2018, p.41) writes, ‘If I didn't define 
myself for myself, I would be crunched into other people's fantasies for me and eaten 
alive’.  Shared experience and identities are core to emancipatory movements, as 
outlined in the aptly titled article by Fran Branfield: ‘What Are You Doing Here?  “Non-
disabled” people and the disability movement’ (1998).  According to her (1999, p.299), 
‘to claim “I am disabled” is a political statement.  It is to align oneself with other disabled 
people in a struggle for equality’.  Labels may thereby be a means of facilitating 
resistance to a social order.   
In this study, reference to ‘disabled asylum seekers’ is potentially problematic as it is 
not necessarily a label chosen by those affected.  However, the term is used as a 
means of focusing the investigation.  Furthermore, the label may also contribute to 
asserting a ‘logos’ or common identity which may serve to assert existence, such as to 
raise wider awareness of intersectional barriers.  Rancière describes a:  
symbolic distribution of bodies that divides them into two categories: those that one 
sees and those that one does not see and those who have logos – memorial speech, 
an account to be kept up – and those who have no logos. (1999, p.22)  
This ‘logos’ may be the basis for organising resistance and therefore be an essential 
prerequisite in the political struggle for equality.  The label ‘disabled asylum seeker’ 
could facilitate location of people’s struggles in the context of wider, ongoing struggles 
associated with disability and migration status.  To this purpose, attention now turns 
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more explicitly to academic discussion regarding labels of disability, forced migration, 
and intersectionality.  
1.2 Construction and contestation of entitlement associated with 
labels of disability 
Academic analysis of disability highlights how labels may be used to build oppression, 
charity, solidarity, or resistance.  Changing representations of disability result in 
different understandings of the problem and appropriate policy solutions.  In the 1970s, 
the UK-based Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) began to 
challenge hegemonic representations of disability as an individual tragedy to be solved 
by charitable relief (the charity model), or by medical intervention (the medical model).  
They asserted the ground-breaking claim that ‘it is society which disables physically 
impaired people’, stressing that ‘we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full 
participation in society’ (1976, p.4).  UPIAS fundamentally challenged previously 
hegemonic understanding of disability from an individual issue requiring medical 
attention or charity, to a collective issue requiring the removal of barriers.  The 
restrictions and inequalities faced by disabled people were presented as a socially 
constructed response to an impairment, rather than an inevitable consequence of a 
medical condition. 
This intervention resulted in long-lasting challenge to theoretical and political 
understanding of disability.  The hegemonic contestation initiated by UPIAS (1976)  was 
developed and promoted by disabled sociologist and activist Michael Oliver (1981) 
among others, to become the ‘social model of disability’.  This became an ontological 
explanation of social and economic relations, as well as a framework for personal and 
collective liberation.  Like many disabled people, Crow describes the transformational 
impact of the social model: 
My life has two phases: before the social model of disability, and after it.  Discovering 
this way of thinking about my experiences was the proverbial raft in stormy seas.  It 
gave me an understanding of my life … enabled me to confront, survive and even 
surmount countless situations of exclusion and discrimination … It has played a central 
role in promoting disabled people's individual self-worth, collective identity, and political 
organisation.  I don't think it is an exaggeration to say that the social model has saved 
lives. (1996, p.55) 
The appeal of the model stems partly from the affective dimension of shifting focus from 
the impasse of an individual’s medical condition to the collective responsibility and 
solidarity required to address the socially constructed, and therefore more clearly 
changeable, nature of society.   
Beyond personal liberation, the social model explains the oppression of disabled 
people as inextricably linked with capitalist modes of production.  If society is structured 
to prioritise economic profit (Nee and Swedberg, 2005), then people with impairments 
that limit productivity become framed as a burden.  In a compilation of writing by 
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members of UPIAS (2018, p.45), former anti-apartheid activist from South Africa, Vic 
Finkelstein, argues that ‘the maximum-profit motive’ must be transcended to address 
the marginalisation of disabled people.  Developing these principles further, Oliver 
writes:  
if the game is possessive individualism in a competitive and inegalitarian society, 
impaired people will inevitably be disadvantaged, no matter how the rules are changed. 
(1996, p.35) 
He argues that to challenge such individualism requires challenging capitalism.  
Similarly, disability activist Ellen Clifford argues that lack of provision for disabled 
people is integral to the capitalist quest to maximise profit.  As she explains, providing:  
services for family, work and health contributes towards the maintenance of a healthy 
workforce and, through that, to productivity.  Expenditure on disabled people does not.  
(2020, pp.47-48) 
This anti-capitalist understanding of disability was not confined to UK-based analysis.  
In the US, Marta Russell and Ravi Malhotra (2002, p.212) describe disability as a 
‘socially-created category derived from labour relations, a product of the exploitative 
economic structure of capitalist society’. This thesis builds on the analysis of these 
writers, understanding the disadvantage associated with disability as directly 
attributable to capitalist relations of production.  
 
The language of the social model of disability became increasingly hegemonic during 
the 1990s, however, the anti-capitalist analysis was increasingly obscured.  Social 
model rhetoric was adopted by government and voluntary sector, including major 
disability charities (Oliver and Barnes, 2012), some of whom, according to Oliver (2013, 
p.1025) began to ‘act as if they invented it’.  The New Labour government led by Tony 
Blair expressed commitment to the social inclusion of disabled people, establishing the 
Disability Rights Commission in 1999.  However, the focus was on collective 
responsibility to remove the barriers faced by disabled people, rather than to address 
the structural oppression created by capitalism.  A public awareness campaign used 
billboards stating: ‘see the person, not the disability’.  Disabled academics Tom 
Shakespeare and Nick Watson (2001) recall that this campaign was widely opposed 
by activists, asserting that the solution is to address the oppression not to conceal the 
disability.  Referring to similar struggles in the representation of disability in the US, 
Russell and Malhotra criticise:  
the ‘minority’ model of disability, which views it as the product of a disabling social and 
architectural environment. In this view the fundamental source of the problems 
encountered by disabled persons is prejudicial or discriminatory attitudes, implying that 
by erasing mistaken attitudes society will accept ‘difference’ and equality will flourish. 
This approach diverts attention from the mode of production and the concrete social 
relations that produce the disabling barriers, exclusion and inequalities facing disabled 
persons. (2002, p.212) 
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The co-option of the social model may have reduced the original anti-capitalist basis.  
Nonetheless, hegemonic representation of disability shifted from an individualised 
issue of medical tragedy to a collective focus on the need to remove barriers.   
Contemporary understanding of disability does not, however, end with the co-option of 
the social model.  As neoliberalism became more entrenched, the focus of government 
policy shifted from the collective responsibility on which the NHS had been founded 
(Bevan, 1952), to wider focus on reducing government expenditure and increasing 
individual responsibility.  The nature and implications of this shift are discussed in 
Chapter 4, however, here it is necessary to outline academic analysis of these broad 
developments.  The quest to reduce government expenditure on welfare provision had 
been a gradual process since its post-war inception.  A significant shift towards 
individual responsibility was introduced in 1979 by Conservative Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher (Gregg, 2008).  Support for these goals by New Labour Prime 
Minister Tony Blair (1999) forms part of what Mouffe (2005b, p.6) describes as giving 
up the ‘traditional struggle of the left for equality’, thereby removing the quest for 
equality from mainstream political discourse.  However, the starkest reduction in the 
welfare state took place in the wake of the 2008 financial crash (O'Hara, 2014; Patrick, 
2017), in the form of the Welfare Reform Acts (UK Parliament, 2009, 2012).  The 
resultant shift to a focus on individual responsibility was incompatible even with the co-
opted version of the social model of disability.  
Change to hegemonic understanding of disability was required to enable policy change.  
The biopsychosocial model was developed by academics Gordon Waddell and Mansell 
Aylward (2009) from the Centre for Psychosocial and Disability Research at Cardiff 
University, with funding from Unum, the US insurance company with a key role in 
implementing UK Welfare reform (Jolly, 2012).  This model was originally developed by 
George Engel (1977), combining social, psychological and environmental factors 
alongside biological understanding of health and disease. It was adopted by the World 
Health Organisation (2002) as part of their classification of functioning, disability and 
health designed to provide holistic understanding of health and impairment.  However, 
Waddell and Aylward (2009, p.1) developed it further, bringing together elements of the 
‘medical model, various social models and the role of personal and psychological 
factors’.  According to these academics:  
People with common health problems … bear personal responsibility for their actions: 
they must answer to whether their health condition is such that it would be unreasonable 
to expect them to seek or be available for work. (Waddell and Aylward, 2009, p.6)  
The motivation and impact of this ostensibly theoretical policy have been challenged 
by activists (Jolly, 2012) as well as by academics themselves critical of the social model 
of disability (Shakespeare, Watson and Alghaib, 2016).  However, it continues to shape 
elite discourse and particularly, welfare reform policies.   
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Beyond government contestation, there has been wider debate: it has been suggested 
that the social model fails to recognise the impact of an impairment (Shakespeare and 
Watson, 2001).  Without diminishing her support for the social model, Crow stresses 
that:  
we have one fundamental difference from other movements, which we cannot afford to 
ignore.  There is nothing inherently unpleasant or difficult about other groups' 
embodiment: sexuality, sex and skin colour are neutral facts.  In contrast, impairment 
means our experiences of our bodies can be unpleasant or difficult … for many disabled 
people personal struggle related to impairment will remain, even when disabling barriers 
no longer exist.  (1996, p.4) 
However, as she also argues, the social model of disability does not deny the impact 
of impairments.  Instead, the focus is on contesting associated distinctions of human 
worth and enabling people to meet human needs irrespective of an impairment.  
There are problematic issues associated with the labelling of disability irrespective of 
which model an individual adopts.  If stigma is associated with disability, as Paul Hunt 
(1966) argued prior to establishing the disabled people’s movement, then it may appear 
irrational to voluntarily identify as disabled unless associated entitlements, or a counter-
narrative, can be asserted.  According to Shakespeare and Watson (2001, p.20) many 
people with impairments do not identify as disabled. Instead, they ‘downplay the 
significance of their impairments and seek access to a mainstream identity’.  This 
tendency may be particularly strong for people in the precarious situation of waiting for 
a decision on their asylum claim.  Identification as a disabled person may also depend 
on how disability is perceived in a person’s country of origin.  Drawing on postcolonial 
literature, Grech (2009) criticises what he perceives as attempts by UK activists to 
impose the social model of disability on the wider world.  However, if the disadvantage 
associated with disability is understood to result from capitalism, then the country of 
origin is not as significant as the economic system.  Reluctance to adopt labels of 
disability may relate to ongoing assumptions of incompatibility with normality.  Bill 
Hughes (2019, p.842) refers to ‘the approbation of non-disability as a proper way of 
being-in-the-world’.  Unless such assumptions are contested, the stigmatising impact 
of labels of disability remains.  An alternative to binary labels of disabled and non-
disabled is proposed by Fiona Kumari Campbell’s (2012) notion of ableism.  This refers 
to the social structures which systematically exclude people with impairments.  A focus 
on ableism enables a shift from potentially unhelpful competition between marginalised 
groups which can result from identity politics.  There is little need for people to 
individually adopt a label if the focus is on contesting structural barriers.  However, this 
may weaken the potentially emancipatory power of claiming a label as a focus for 
contestation.   
The discursive struggles in the framing of disability are core to understanding the 
intersectional experiences of disabled asylum seekers as will be examined, but first, it 
is necessary to consider constructions of migration.   
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1.3 Construction and contestation of entitlement associated with 
migration status 
To understand the origins of inequalities associated with disability and forced migration 
it is necessary to understand distinctions of migration status as well as disability.  As 
outlined in the glossary, there are multiple categories of migrant, including ‘asylum 
seeker’, ‘refused asylum seeker’ or ‘refugee’, with associated differences in entitlement.  
Such categorisation is not constant.  The 1951 Refugee Convention entitled people 
seeking protection from persecution to the same rights as citizens.  The term ‘asylum 
seeker’ first entered the Oxford English Dictionary in 2001, distinguishing between 
those awaiting a final legal decision on their claim for protection and those granted 
refugee status.  The greater legal entitlement associated with refugees may explain 
governmental reluctance to grant such status (Sabates-Wheeler and Feldman, 2011, 
p.27).  Asserting objection to political inference of questionable legitimacy associated 
with people awaiting a legal decision, Tom Vickers (2012), p.1) rejects the term ‘asylum 
seeker’, instead using ‘refugee’, ‘to encompass all those who have come to Britain 
seeking refuge, whatever the status currently accorded them by the British state’.  
Similarly, Markard (2017) argues that a person becomes a refugee when fleeing their 
country of origin, not when this status is recognised by the host country.  Differences in 
entitlement associated with migration status are not universal.  As anthropologist Didier 
Fassin (2016) observes, in ‘the Global South, people are collectively considered to be 
refugees based simply on their being a fugitive from a war zone’ whereas, in the ‘North’, 
the term asylum seeker delineates those whose credibility as a fugitive awaits individual 
assessment.  The legal status associated with the label is a measure of a person’s 
entitlement, but not their need for support.  The distinction in entitlement obscures 
commonalities of needs and may shape a person’s chance of survival.  As Maya 
Goodfellow (2019, p.35) writes, ‘by crossing a border, you can cease to be a human 
being to the people around you, becoming an (“illegal”) immigrant or a (“bogus”) asylum 
seeker’.  The dehumanisation and stigma associated with different labels are integral 
to the restrictions experienced.  As Tyler (2020, pp.124-125) asserts: 
it is only when publics no longer see those seeking refuge as human beings that state 
governments can openly and unashamedly engage in practices of segregation, 
incarceration, expulsion, and torture. 
Whatever the label, distinctions of entitlement associated with migration status are 
politically constructed, rather than innate to experiences of seeking sanctuary.  
The complications do not end with distinctions between refugee and asylum seeker.  
Barrister Jon Holbrook explains that legal distinctions between lawful and unlawful 
migration are neither determined by levels of need nor are they static: 
The man fleeing a war-torn country is a lawful migrant; the man fleeing grinding poverty 
isn’t.  The lesbian fleeing a homophobic state is a lawful migrant; the woman fleeing in 
search of the medicine that would save her life isn’t. (2016 online) 
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The criteria for lawful migration change over time and space with resultant change in 
people’s perceived options and behaviour.  In a previous study (2015b), a voluntary 
sector employee explained to me that as the system becomes increasingly punitive, 
increasing numbers of migrants avoid claiming asylum and, instead, seek informal 
means of existence.  The need to remain clandestine may avoid immigration 
enforcement procedures, but also prevents use of health care or social services and 
may therefore be particularly problematic for disabled people.   
Dominant terminology regarding categories of migration carries normative implications.  
Squire defines irregular migrants as ‘those who enter … or … reside within a nation-
state without authorisation’ (2009, p.4).  She dissociates her definition from those who 
‘describe forced migrants as illegal migrants’, believing that this ‘would appear to 
criminalize those who have no choice but to migrate’ (2009, p.188).  This suggests a 
normative perception of legality, reflected in efforts to avoid the term ‘illegal’ in migration 
literature.  A flier from the Institute for Research into Super Diversity (IRIS) at the 
University of Birmingham states that their aim is to explore ‘opportunities for legal and 
irregular migration’ (2015, emphasis added).  Avoidance of the word ‘illegal’ risks 
obscuring the multiple barriers to ‘legal’ migration channels and the increased 
criminalisation of people without legal migration status (UK Parliament, 2016; UK 
Government, 2018a).  The logic of denying reference to illegality is questioned by 
Bridget Anderson (2013), who criticises attempts to emphasise that migrants are ‘NOT 
criminals, NOT benefit dependents, NOT sex workers, NOT single mothers’.  As she 
continues, insistence that immigrants are not criminals carries: 
normative assumptions about both immigrants (‘good guys’) and criminals (‘bad guys’).  
It implicitly claims that the migrant belongs in the community of value, in contrast to the 
criminal who does not. (2013, p.118)  
Most importantly in terms of prospects for social change, Anderson argues that 
differentiating immigrants from what she calls ‘failed citizens’ or ‘bad guys’ creates 
unnecessary divisions.  This may hinder recognition of intersectional commonalities 
and prospects for collective political contestation.  
The concept of migration is reserved for international travel, premised on the assumed 
existence of a system of nation-states.  At a rational level, states are little more than a 
means of organising representation and dividing responsibility.  However, as Benedict 
Anderson (1983, p.55)  argues, perceived commonality of identity associated with the 
‘imagined community’ of a nation-state is such as to motivate people to die ‘for their 
country’.  This diverts attention from wider forms of oppression.  As Holloway asks, 
‘How many times has the scream against oppression been diverted into the assertion 
of national identity?’ (2002, p.73).  Citizens’ entitlement relative to ‘outsiders’ is 
fundamental to the construction of migration and shapes the experiences of disabled 
asylum seekers, as analysed in this study. 
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Determination to avoid repetition of atrocities of World War Two resulted in the 1951 
Refugee Convention.  Similar determination resulted in racism based on biological 
difference becoming increasingly taboo outside the political far right (Mondon and 
Winter, 2020).  Legislation outlawing racial discrimination in Britain was introduced in 
1965.  This is not to argue that the post-war period was without racism or hostility to 
migrants.  Instead, as Sivanandan (1990, p.65) argues, ‘Racism does not stay still; it 
changes shape, size, contours, purpose, function’.  Anti-racism legislation resulted in 
what Martin Barker (1981) refers to as ‘new racism’ avoiding legal repercussions.  
Rather than overt racism, Michael Billig (1991, pp.123-124) describes how policies 
became ‘phrased in such a way that race is never mentioned.  Other criteria are used, 
and it is, as if by magic, that these “fair-minded” criteria result in the exclusion of non-
whites’.  Opposition to immigration thus became couched in terms of cultural 
incompatibility and economic burden rather than skin colour or race.  As Mondon (2015) 
explains, the claim became that ‘it is not the “other” who is to blame, but its effect on 
“us” and “our” society’.  This is the basis for successive governments’ immigration 
policies.  Without overtly challenging the 1951 Refugee Convention, these policies are 
predicated on a notion that immigrants, and particularly asylum seekers, are a ‘burden’ 
on citizens who have greater legitimacy (Traynor, 2015). Such an approach has a long 
history (Anderson, B.L., 2013; Goodfellow, 2019)  but was made explicit by Theresa 
May’s stated intention to create a sufficiently ‘hostile environment’ (Kirkup, 2012) such 
that migrants leave the UK.  With this goal, the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts 
restricted access to services, including healthcare, housing, and banking (see for 
example Steele et al., 2014; Hiam, Steele and McKee, 2018; Liberty, 2018; Goodfellow, 
2019).  A separate ‘crimmigration control system’ (Bowling and Westenra, 2018) was 
established, distinct from the wider criminal justice system. The goal became explicitly 
to control migration, rather than to facilitate access to services. 
The rationale for immigration policy may be clarified by exploring the rationale for 
Immigration Removal Centres, commonly known as detention centres (Welch and 
Schuster, 2005; Bosworth, 2008).  The use, and therefore the cost, of detention for 
asylum seekers, as well as a wider category of people without legal migration status, 
has risen markedly (Silverman and Hajela, 2015).  This increased use occurs despite 
wider public spending reductions, evidence showing the lack of impact on deterring 
migration (Flynn, 2016), and the detrimental impact of detention on physical and 
psychological health (Health Professionals Against Immigration Detention, 2016).  As 
Tyler observes, despite multiple: 
reports about the degrading and inhumane treatment of migrants within private for-profit 
detention centres … the tenders granted to these companies by the government have 
continued to mushroom. (2013, p.94)  
She concludes that immigration policy is designed not for welfare, or cost-saving, but 
that the ‘marketisation of asylum created a precedent for the further outsourcing of … 
state accountable services’ (ibid).  If detention is a profitable element of what Rubén 
Hernández-León (2008) refers to as the ‘migration industry’, then the well-being of 
36 
 
detainees is irrelevant to its function.  Furthermore, as Tyler (2013, p.94) expands, 
asylum seekers are used as ‘experimental subjects in a programme of neoliberal 
economic reform’.  Such reform may have been introduced through the immigration 
sector, however, as will be analysed in Chapter 4, there are many commonalities with 
more recent welfare reforms.   
Hegemonic framing of immigration as problematic is not inevitable.  Immigrants can be 
labelled as valuable sources of new skills and ideas, as people deserving sanctuary 
from the ‘problem’ of capitalism (Vickers, 2012), or as people with similar needs to any 
other human.  Anderson (2013, p.69) explains that framing immigrants as burdensome 
serves to ‘homogenise the migrant who is turned, literally into a figure’.  As she 
continues, because of the ‘normative content, like crime, immigration statistics have 
always been too high’ (2013, p.9). The construction of immigration as inherently 
problematic, may be ubiquitous but such construction is not therefore inevitable.  
In addition to legal instruments, immigration policy is visibly asserted through physical 
border control.  Chris Bertram explains there is a  distinction between territorial or 
‘perimeter’ defences and internal ‘social boundary’ defences (2014, p.131).  Access to 
resources may be controlled by the latter without the need for physical border controls.  
However, as Ruben Andersson (2014) argues, the uncontrolled movement of people is 
perceived as a threat to state control, irrespective of the numbers: physical border 
controls marking a country’s territory may provide states with visible control but are 
ineffective controls on migration as greater numbers of people arrive by air.  Such 
controls may not be intended to reduce the number of migrants, but to control who 
enters.  Nicolas De Genova (2016) describes borders as filters.  The function is to 
control who is worthy of entering.  In a similar manner to discourse of disability, if 
contestation is focused on who should be included within conceptions of worth, this 
simply adjusts the borders of normality, but does not assert the commonalities of 
human need, or facilitate systemic contestation.  This debate as to the effective focus 
for contestation of injustices associated with migration status is core to this study.  
Labels of migration status, like those of disability, are socially and politically 
constructed.  The contingency of such labelling may not lessen its impact but does 
highlight the possibility of contestation.   
Having discussed the construction of labels of disability and migration status, it is 
necessary to consider the construction of intersectional labelling.  
1.4 The compound nature of intersectional oppression 
Although not much academic study has focused on disability and migration, I build on 
a wider body of work on intersectionality.  In their work focused on the experiences of 
black women, Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) and Patricia Hill Collins (1990) explain that 
gender and race cannot be understood as ‘mutually exclusive categories of experience 
and analysis’.  Intersectional oppression is not simply one form of oppression added to 
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another, but a compound experience.  Building on their analyses, intersectional barriers 
associated with racism and migration status have been documented (see for example 
Vickers, Craig and Atkin, 2012), as have barriers associated with race, gender and 
impairment (Begum, 1994; Butt and Mirza, 1996; Daley, 2017).  With particular 
relevance to this study, Sarah Woodin (2014, p.89) analyses intersectional experiences 
in the disabled people’s movement, observing that ‘black disabled people may be 
marginalised by the disabled people’s movement due to racism and the anti-racist 
movement due to disablism’.  Some citizens from black and minority ethnic groups have 
also experienced the additional pressures of the UK asylum system.  Much of the 
analysis of different forms of intersectionality is equally applicable to disabled asylum 
seekers, who may experience oppression associated with racism, sexism, as well as 
migration status and disability.   
For people experiencing intersectional oppression, labels may be an important tool of 
empowerment and resistance, facilitating collective organisation and means to assert 
existence within a wider movement. Hill Collins describes the need to define oneself 
and ‘resist objectification as the Other’ (1990, p.101) as core to Black feminist 
epistemology.  She stresses the importance of safe spaces for the exclusive use of 
those with shared identity such as black women.  She points out that ‘such spaces 
would become less safe if shared by those who were not Black and female’ (1990, 
p.110).  These spaces provide peer support and facilitate collective organisation based 
on shared intersectional experiences.  Safe spaces could play a similar role for disabled 
asylum seekers.  In addition, many asylum seekers face the additional need for relief 
from the ever-present threat of detention and deportation. Peer support may be 
available through refugee community organisations or disabled people’s organisations.  
However, as illustrated in the opening citation, a wheelchair-user explained to me that 
seeking asylum  ‘changes everything’ and therefore reduces shared experiences with 
disabled citizens (2013).  Intersectional barriers associated with impairment, language, 
and struggles for survival may be distinct from those faced by the broader community 
of either disabled citizens or asylum seekers.  These barriers hinder the ability of 
disabled asylum seekers to find out about each other, to define themselves, or to come 
together in safe spaces.   
With similarities to the co-option of the social model, the notion of intersectionality 
emanates from radical routes of black feminist activism but became increasingly 
adopted as a simile for more hegemonic concepts of diversity.  It can then become a 
means to validate neoliberal capitalism by showing that people with diverse 
backgrounds are involved.  As Myra Marx Ferree (2013) argues, intersectionality has 
moved from being ‘a moment of resistance’ to become an element of ‘diversity’, 
understood as a ‘neoliberal approach to social inclusion’.  If intersectionality is focused 
on the oppression of particular people within wider groups, the problem may appear as 
if located in group relations rather than the systemic exploitation inherent in capitalism.  
Sara Salem takes a similarly critical approach, explaining that:  
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within studies of identity and identity politics, social identities are seen as intersecting 
and as reinforcing one another.  However, this view does not often extend into an 
analysis of structural inequalities and power relations nor does it identify capitalism as 
the context in which these social identities are constituted.  This is because identity is 
often theorized as result of ‘diversity’, as outside of, or pre-existing power. (2016, p.414) 
Salem argues that the value of debates regarding intersectionality depends on the 
wider framework.  Without interrogating overarching hegemonic assumptions of 
neoliberalism, intersectionality may become a tool to extend capitalism to ever-wider 
populations.  However, Salem argues that intersectionality can be useful if embedded 
in an anti-racist, post-colonial framework and if it ‘addresses relationships of power’ 
(2016, p.415). These arguments extend to issues of disability and migration status.  
The appropriation of notions of intersectionality can be likened to attempts to include 
disabled people within the existing social order, or to modifications of the definition of 
‘normality’ without contesting the exclusionary impact on those who remain defined as 
‘other’.  
Developments of the disabled people’s movement are highly relevant to the asylum 
sector.  As Barnes (1996) writes, the politics of disablement is about ‘challenging 
oppression in all its forms’.  Yet, intersectional issues of disability and migration appear 
to be given little consideration among statutory and non-statutory stakeholders in either 
sector.  An NGO employee explained to me in a previous project, the Home Office pay 
little consideration to experiences of disability in the asylum system.   Furthermore, 
several employees in the asylum sector expressed confusion as to definitions of 
disability, frequently assuming that mental distress is a separate issue (2015b). The 
result is to confirm perceptions of disability as a minority concern.  This is particularly 
significant in the context of high prevalence of mental distress among asylum seekers 
(Bhui et al., 2003; Turner et al., 2003; Warfa et al., 2006; Lawlor, Sher and Stateva, 
2015; Giuntella et al., 2018).  It is not new, or radical, to include mental health in 
definitions of disability.  The UK Disability Discrimination Act (1995) defines disability 
as a ‘physical or mental impairment’.  The UNCRPD (2006) includes those with 
‘physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others’.  The extent to which confused definitions matter, depends perhaps more on 
the practical response rather than on labels used.  But if definitions shape entitlements, 
then appropriate definitions become fundamentally important. 
1.5 Intersectional experiences of disability in the UK asylum system 
There is a small body of work focused on the existence and marginalisation of disabled 
asylum seekers, on which I build.  The study by Harris and Roberts (2001) was followed 
by research focusing on the London area (Ward, Amas and Lagnado, 2008).  My initial 
work with disabled asylum seekers was as part of a study exploring the experiences of 
disabled people living in a wide range of circumstances (Yeo and Bolton, 2013). All 
these studies convey experiences of deprivation and injustice.  If such inequalities were 
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caused by oversight, they might have been remedied in line with recommendations 
from previous studies.  Yet, when I began these investigations the receptionist of a 
major NGO working with refugees stated that disabled asylum seekers do not exist 
(2015a).  As Clara Straimer (2011, p.538) argues, invisibility is not due to people’s 
absence, but ‘due to the discrimination asylum seekers with disabilities are likely to 
face’.  Some studies assume a causal association between minority status and 
marginalisation.  Harris and Roberts (2004, p.13) provide a list of 25 ‘self-reported 
conditions/impairments’, suggesting that for example less than 1% of disabled Somali 
migrants identify as having had a stroke.  They conclude that the population of disabled 
asylum seekers is ‘extremely diverse’ and that ‘this diversity contributes to the 
invisibility of disabled refugees and asylum seekers’ (ibid).  Yet I am unaware of any 
evidence that the medical conditions of UK citizens would be less diverse than those 
of asylum seekers.  Taking a more international focus, Mary Crock, Christine Ernst and 
Ron McCallum (2012, p.736) also assume that barriers faced by disabled asylum 
seekers relate to a person’s impairments.  However, if these studies focused on the 
socially constructed barriers meeting human needs, then different conclusions might 
be reached.  Applying Bacchi’s (2009) analysis: the way a research problem is shaped, 
determines the methodology, the findings, and ultimately the policy recommendations.   
Acknowledgement of the existence of disabled people in the asylum system has 
undoubtedly increased during the period of this investigation, with several initiatives 
directed at these issues, as will be discussed in Chapter 7.  However, widespread 
avoidance of the word ‘disabled’, and the substitution with reference to people as 
‘vulnerable’, conceals commonalities with the wider disabled people’s movement and 
obscures the relevance of the UNCRPD (2006).  The use of such euphemisms, 
therefore, requires further consideration.   
Euphemisms of vulnerability 
Labels of vulnerability have become frequent determinants of exceptional status 
associated with discretionary entitlement.  Examples of such policies are discussed in 
Chapter 4, including the VPRS (2014); Shaw report (2016); and the Independent Chief 
Inspection on Borders and Immigration (2019).  In addition, labels of vulnerability are 
used in wider UK discourse of welfare reform ‘to highlight distinctions between people 
who deserve protection and those who do not’ (Smith, K. and Waite, 2019, p.2289), 
creating what Kate Brown (2012, p.41) refers to as ‘binary oppositions about the 
“deserving” and “undeserving”’.  This discursive framing is not restricted to the UK.  
Ticktin’s (2011, p.31) work with undocumented migrants in France found that notions 
of victimhood or vulnerability, particularly associated with sickness, facilitated access 
to support.  As she explains, ‘those who hope to be regularised must prove to be the 
exception – those who fit into the norm will remain undocumented’ (ibid).  In this context, 
to be labelled as ‘vulnerable’ is to be labelled as deserving.  Similarly, the situation on 
the Greek refugee camp Moria is referred to by Daniel Howden and Metin Kodolak 
(2018) as a ‘Vulnerability Contest’.  They explain that ‘the only way to escape Moria 
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while your claim is being processed is to be recognized as a “vulnerable” case’.  Such 
recognition, and therefore a person’s survival, may depend on what Smith and Waite 
(2019, p.9) describe in relation to the UK context, as a need for vulnerability to be 
‘performed’.  Vulnerability becomes a means to mitigate the impact of some restrictions 
of immigration policy.    
To label certain individuals as ‘vulnerable’ locates the problem at the level of the 
individual, obscuring systemic barriers and undermining the collective responsibility 
advocated by the social model. This label is not distinct to the migration context.  
Disabled activist and writer, Jenny Morris (2015) argues against such labelling in the 
wider disability context.  Drawing on the work of Christian Lahusen and Maria Grasso 
(2018), a distinction is made between charitable support based on gifts, and solidarity, 
based on the political assertion of equal rights.  Labels of vulnerability evoke one-sided 
charitable support, whereas solidarity builds a movement and can be reciprocated.  
Vulnerability is a euphemism for helpless, granting minor exemptions to neoliberal 
assumptions that individuals are architects of their own misfortune.  State officials 
become cast as benevolent protectors of those deemed worthy, while relegating those 
not labelled as ‘vulnerable’ to the ranks of the undeserving.  Yet, vulnerability is intrinsic 
to the human condition (Fineman and Grear, 2013; Yeo, R., 2019).  Anybody prevented 
from meeting human needs is equally vulnerable.  
Beyond the individualising of systemic problems, labels of ‘vulnerability’ affirm a moral 
regression towards Hobbesian sufficientarianism (see for example Frankfurt, 1987; 
Gosseries, 2011) whereby the goal is to reduce the risk of imminent death, rather than 
to enable equality.  Such minimal objectives are affirmed by what Amy Shuman and 
Carol Bohmer (2016, p.21) refer to as ‘a discourse of rescue’ underpinning political 
asylum.  Providing for the needs of people beyond citizens of the nation-state is framed 
as an act of benevolence, rather than an obligation or an issue of common humanity.  
Discourse of rescue and labels of vulnerability as determinants of entitlement to support 
are counter to the collective responsibility of the social model and the UNCRPD (2006), 
thereby separating asylum seekers from the potential mutual solidarity of the disabled 
people’s movement.  Such representation is compounded by assumptions that 
entitlement depends on distinctions of human worth, drawing parallels with the more 
recent imposition of the biopsychosocial model of disability (Waddell and Aylward, 
2009).  The commonalities between euphemisms of disability in the asylum sector and 
wider welfare reform are investigated further in Chapter 4.  
Potential contestation of gifts or rights 
People labelled as ‘vulnerable’ may sometimes be framed as worthy of less restrictive 
conditions, albeit based on discretionary gifts rather than rights.  The key distinction is 
that rights can be contested, whereas gifts cannot.  Instead, unreciprocated gifts may 
become a form of social control (Schwartz, 1967).  The 1951 Refugee Convention gave 
people the right to seek sanctuary from multiple forms of persecution.  However, it is 
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not only in the context of disability that these rights have become diluted.  As Fassin 
(2016) explains, ‘whereas many European states once regarded asylum as a right, they 
now increasingly treat it as a favor’.  He refers to the selection of refugees for 
resettlement in Australia, USA, and Canada as ‘nothing less than a market of 
compassion’.  The implication is that governments may give protection to people it 
chooses, rather than that people have the right to claim it.   
Attempts to address individual examples of human rights abuse fail to address systemic 
injustice.  In contrast to asylum seekers, Pakistani schoolgirl, Malala Yousafzai, was 
positively welcomed to the UK after being shot and injured while campaigning for girls’ 
education (Yousafzai and McCormick, 2014).  Providing for the needs of certain victims 
of human rights abuses may stem from what O’Dwyer refers to as the ‘cult of the hero’ 
(1980).  Saumel Moyn’s analysis (2014) highlights that human rights abuses are 
integral to neoliberal inequalities, yet as Robert Meister (2011, p.31) argues, to focus 
on these abuses rather than systemic injustice may relieve the conscience of people 
benefitting from the current social order without contesting ongoing inequalities.  This 
situation is not unique to issues of migration.  Referring to broader humanitarian 
response, Michael Maren (2002) argues that priorities are shaped by the needs of 
donors rather than recipients.  Support for selected individuals may be motivated by 
the need to do something tangible.  A fundraising appeal by Help Refugees (2016) to 
support migrants in Dunkirk counterposes the complexity of arguments regarding 
migration, with the simplicity of the need for ‘support to fellow human beings’.  Providing 
for selected people is thereby framed as beyond politics.  This approach may provide 
immediate support through which greater awareness of systemic injustice may be 
achieved; however, such framing of the problem does not contest causal injustice.  
In contrast to those people considered exceptional and worthy of philanthropic gifts, 
disabled asylum seekers, particularly those whose asylum claims have been rejected, 
face a struggle for basic survival.  At this point, people might be described as having 
what Giorgio Agamben (1998) refers to as ‘homo sacer’, or having ‘bare lives’.  There 
is, however, some difference of opinion among academics as to the potential power of 
those who, according to Arendt (1951) have lost everything.  According to her, it is only 
at such times that the focus turns to human rights.  However, as Butler (2014) explains, 
the absence of legal protection associated with a ‘bare life’ does not necessarily 
constitute lack of political agency.  Hunger strikes, naked protests, and lip sewing (see 
for example Fiske, 2016) have all been used to deliberately evoke vulnerability, or what 
disability scholar Rob McRuer (2017) refers to as ‘a tender site of resistance’ used to 
contest denial of access to human needs.  For people with no rights, such methods 
may be a means to assert their power.  As Rancière explains (1999, p.11), ‘the struggle 
between the rich and the poor is not social reality, which politics then has to deal with.  
It is the actual institution of politics itself’.  Lack of rights may be conceived not as a 
cause for benevolent charity but as a call for mobilisation with the potential for political 
transformation.  However, as I will explain in my final analysis, rights to access existing 
services do not automatically create equality.  
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Discursive distinctions between gifts and rights appear central to the restrictions and 
inequalities faced by disabled asylum seekers and refugees.  If a social model 
perspective were applied to asylum seekers, interventions could focus on the removal 
of systemic barriers.  However, labels of individual vulnerability frame the issue as one 
of discretionary support to those deemed worthy, thereby reverting to discourse 
reminiscent of the charity model.  As such, intersectional discourse of disability and 
migration has the potential to transform debate in progressive or regressive directions.  
This highlights the contingency of current restrictions and inequalities. 
1.6 The contingency of current inequalities and alternatives  
This chapter began by exploring hegemonic conceptions of normality, arguing that the 
current social order is maintained by common-sense assumptions of inevitability.  
However, attitudinal change alone would not address causal inequalities.  As 
Sivanandan (1990, p.65) writes: 
people’s attitudes don’t mean a damn to me ... the acting out of prejudice is 
discrimination and when it becomes institutionalised in the power structure of this 
society, then we are dealing not with attitudes, but with power.  
Attitudes may not ‘mean a damn’ in themselves, however, awareness of the 
contingency of the existing situation is an essential precursor for effective contestation 
of power. 
Analysis of contingency is central to the capacity for change.  As Oliver and Barnes 
(2012, p.79) argue, ‘the hegemony that defines disability in capitalist societies’ is 
constituted by ‘individualism … medicalisation, normality’, with the core assumption that 
‘able-bodied/mindedness’ is “normal”’ (2012, p.88).  If ‘able-bodied/mindedness’ is 
portrayed as normal within the ‘imagined community’ of the nation-state (Anderson, B., 
1983), then migrants and disabled people become the intrinsically problematic ‘other’.  
This provides the implicit justification for inequalities of entitlement between the ‘other’ 
and the ‘norm’.  Access barriers become assumed to result from an individual’s ‘special 
needs’, rather than from ableist structures (Campbell, 2012).  Similarly, migrant 
disadvantage becomes framed as inevitable, obscuring the contingency of the nation-
state and its right to defend internal and external borders.  Goodfellow writes: 
borders seem as natural as day and night; firming up territories by demarcating where 
the nation-state begins and ends.  We tend to treat them as if they’ve always been there 
and always will be.  But borders are created and recreated. (2019, p.35) 
Borders, like other elements of the social order, are the result of what Mouffe (2007, 
p.2) refers to as ‘sedimented hegemonic practices’.  When something is presented as 
if natural, or common-sense, then contestation is hindered.  Awareness of contingency 
assists in the recognition of alternative means of organising society and distributing 
resources.  As Mouffe also explains:  
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Things could always be otherwise and therefore every order is predicated on the 
exclusion of other possibilities.  It is in that sense that it can be called 'political' since it 
is the expression of a particular structure of power relations. (2005b, p.17) 
When one way of framing a problem becomes dominant, it indicates that alternatives 
are marginalised, not that they do not exist.   
If the existing social order is unjust, then it is necessary to understand how it can be 
contested.  As such, I investigate what underpins current relations, with the objective 
of facilitating contestation.  This approach is likened to the stated purpose of Tyler’s 
(2013, p.4) book ‘Revolting Subjects’: ‘to induce revulsion about the forms of 
disenfranchisement it describes, as well as to provoke the desire to do something about 
it’.  More specifically related to disability, Oliver and Barnes (2012, p.1), describe the 
objective of their book as a contribution to the struggle to replace capitalism.  The 
injustice of the current system may be exemplified by the experiences of disabled 
asylum seekers but there are many other manifestations.  Reduced public funding, 
together with neoliberal dislocation of the rights and collective responsibility on which 
the welfare state was founded, result in increased inequality for the wider population 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Dorling, 2014).  This highlights the inevitable contingency 
of any social order, including the injustices experienced by disabled asylum seekers.  
The challenge is to determine, not whether, but how progressive change can be 
realised.  Although there is not a large body of literature specific to addressing 
intersectional injustices of disability and migration, there is more substantial work 
regarding wider issues of minority rights.  
Normative conceptions of minority: majority relations 
In addition to awareness of contingency, effective contestation requires a vision of 
alternative.  Academic analysis of minority / majority relations brings important insight 
to this study.  The UPIAS (1976) goal of ‘participation in society’ implies that society is 
a static entity with the options limited to binary choices of inclusion or exclusion.  The 
denial of disabled people’s rights is generally referred to as marginalisation or 
‘exclusion’, with the solution posited as ‘inclusion’ (see for example Oliver and Barnes, 
1998).  The Alliance for Inclusive Education (Allfie) advocate inclusion, which they 
define as ‘a commitment to removing all barriers to the full participation of everyone as 
equally valued and unique individuals’ (2016). This is distinct from integration, defined 
as attempts to get disabled people to ‘fit in with pre-existing structures, attitudes, and 
an unaltered environment’ (ibid).  Despite Allfie’s definition, notions of inclusion do not 
automatically bestow equality.  Indeed, Ruth Lister argues that goals of ‘social inclusion’ 
form part of a paradigm shift from goals of equality (1998, p.215).  The binary opposition 
of discourse regarding inclusion and exclusion obscures disadvantageous forms of 
inclusion.   Referring particularly to issues of international development, Sam Hickey 
and Andries du Toit (2007) warn of the dangers of adverse incorporation whereby 
people can be included in disadvantageous circumstances.  
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The notion of integration is commonly presented as an objective of successful 
immigration policy (see for example Lessard-Phillips and Galandini, 2015) despite 
having been widely discredited in the context of disability.  Normative assumptions of 
integration do not extend equally to all social groups.  Social theorist, Willem Schinkel 
(2013, p.1156) argues that there is a distinction ‘between those for whom integration is 
an issue at all and those for whom it is not’.  According to Melinda McPherson (2010, 
p.546), the concept of integration assumes that migrants are ‘innately problematic’ and 
that ‘conformance by outsiders with a normative, universal, and static national citizen 
subject will facilitate social cohesion’.  Furthermore, normative pressure for immigrants 
to integrate is incompatible with the deliberate exclusion of the asylum process (Bakker, 
Cheung and Phillimore, 2016).  The UK Cabinet Office established the Social Exclusion 
Unit to tackle problems stemming from ‘unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor 
housing’ (1998).  Yet, these factors are systematically imposed on asylum seekers.  
Bakker et al. provide ‘empirical evidence of negative associations between asylum 
support systems and … mental and physical health’ (2016, p.1).  If people are granted 
leave to remain or refugee status, then more ‘inclusive integration goals’ (2016, p.2) 
may be implemented, although Rosemary Sales (2002) describes even these as 
‘limited, uneven and dependent on voluntary initiative’.  The conjoining of ‘inclusive 
integration’ suggests confusion as to the distinction.  Immigration policy explicitly denies 
the ‘equal value’ of asylum seekers necessitated by Allfie’s (2016) definition of 
inclusion.  
The potential for integration is questioned by philosopher Arendt in her famous essay, 
‘We Refugees’, written in 1943 shortly after fleeing Nazi Germany and arriving in the 
USA.  She recalls seeking to counter the ‘human truth’ that a refugee is somebody who 
has lost everything:   
once we were somebodies about whom people cared; we were loved by our friends … 
once we could buy our food and ride in the subway without being told we are 
undesirable. (1964, p.115) 
Her quest is to regain this sense of belonging.  She explains that the struggle to 
integrate is the struggle ‘to avoid anyone guessing who we are, what kind of passport 
we have’.  Similarly, a refugee community organisation ‘Borderlands’, based in Bristol 
calls for a move ‘from exclusion’ not to inclusion or integration but ‘to belonging’ 
(https://www.borderlands.uk.com).  Unlike notions of integration, belonging does not 
imply a superiority of the host community.  Normative notions of integration imply that 
newcomers can, and should, become like the host community.  As Bauman (2012) 
argues, ‘If you want to be a French citizen you have to become a Frenchman in your 
behaviour, your language, the way you act, your ideas’.  The notion that newcomers 
should become ‘integrated’ or ‘included’ implies that the host population is a 
homogenous and benign entity.  As I argue in a previous study, the ‘agenda into which 
inclusion is sought is rarely questioned’ (2006, p.74).  The extent of contingency is 
obscured by an assumed exclusion: inclusion binary.  As Schinkel explains:  
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This discourse demarcates the boundaries of society by rendering objectively 
observable the non-integrated who are considered to reside ‘outside society’. The 
image of society thereby produced is that of a morally cleansed realm: social 
problems are relegated to the domain ‘outside society’, consisting of persons in 
need of integration. (2013, p.1142)  
A focus on integration or inclusion risks demarcating whole groups as unintegrated or 
excluded by not subscribing to the dominant values ascribed to the host community.  
Distinctions in the discourse of disability and migration extend to the contrasting focus 
of scholarly contestation of ableism and racism.  In the fight against racism, the 
‘mainstreaming of the far right’ (Mondon and Winter, 2018) is presented as a negative 
phenomenon to be resisted.  The focus is on preventing the legitimisation of racism.  In 
contrast, in the fight against disability discrimination, the goal is to  ‘mainstream 
disability’ (Albert, 2006).  The ultimate objectives of resisting oppression are not 
dissimilar, yet disability discrimination is assumed to be ubiquitous, with the goal to 
overcome it such that disabled people gain access to mainstream services.  In contrast, 
the far right and racism, are assumed to be threats to be kept out of mainstream society.  
The key distinction thereby lies with the extent to which oppressive barriers are 
assumed to be already within the mainstream.  
Overt rejection of ableism remains less pervasive than that of racism.  The targeting of 
disabled people by Nazi Germany (Crow, 2009) did not lead to hegemonic rejection of 
ableism.  The 1951 Refugee Convention was adopted 55 years before the UNCRPD 
(2006).  Racism may be hegemonically represented as reduced to individual illiberal 
acts of what Tim Wise (2009, p.9) refers to as ‘old-fashioned bigotry’, from which a 
liberal mainstream can distance itself.  In contrast, the barriers faced by disabled people 
may appear less monstrous, hegemonically perceived as tragic but inevitable.  
Notwithstanding the contingency of what is assumed to be politically achievable, the 
dichotomous framing of contestation regarding racism and ableism may hinder the 
building of intersectional resistance.  
Underpinning normative assumptions of integration, inclusion or disability 
mainstreaming are wider notions of pragmatism and assumed consensus, or quests 
for wider systemic change.  Rancière writes of the way: 
consensus thinking conveniently represents what it calls “exclusion” in the simple 
relationship between an inside and an outside.  But what is at stake under the name of 
exclusion is not being-outside.  It is the mode of division according to which an inside 
and an outside can be joined. (1999, p.115) 
He further criticises consensus as resulting in ‘politics becoming a technical issue of 
finding the centre ground, rather than a forum for debate, disagreement and contesting 
oppression’ (1999, p.124).  Similarly, Mouffe (2005b, p.19) questions normative goals 
of consensus, which she argues obscure political antagonisms, implying that a ‘general 
interest of the people’ exists.  This results in ‘the maintenance of existing hierarchies’ 
(ibid).  Such questions of strategic priority are core to developing effective contestation.    
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The debate between what are perceived as pragmatic, achievable adjustments and, 
quests for systemic change are long-running.  In 1899, Rosa Luxemburg presented 
what she saw as the choice between ‘social reform or revolution’ (Scott, 2010).  With 
more contemporary focus, Holloway (2002, p.74) criticises the liberal temptation to 
focus on ‘particular issues or particular identities: struggles which aim at rearrangement 
but not an overcoming of power relations’.  More specifically in her study of disability in 
the context of the liberal state, Jasbir Puar (2017, p.15) cites Mia Mingus who observes 
that discussion is dominated by questions of ‘How do we get disabled people access 
to the current system?  Rather than thinking that the entire ‘table’ or ‘system’ might 
need to change’.  As Finkelstein (2007, p.5) explains, ‘We cannot understand or deal 
with disability without dealing with the essential nature of society itself.’  The asylum 
system provides particularly clear evidence of the problematic nature of seeking 
pragmatic inclusion within the existing system.  The negative impact of immigration 
detention, for example, is not limited to issues of disability access (Shaw, 2016).  If, as 
argued by many theorists (Holloway, 2002; Klein, 2002; Bauman, 2004; Giroux, 2008), 
the restrictions and inequalities experienced by marginalised groups are a 
consequence, not an oversight, of the current system, then the solution cannot be 
integration, incorporation or even inclusion in the current system.  Holloway criticises 
those who try to ‘smother our scream’ by asking questions like, ‘Do we not understand 
the complexity of the world, the practical difficulties of implementing radical change?’ 
(2002, p.3).  There is a need, as Badiou (2015) argues in a lecture, to ‘go outside the 
cave of capitalism’ or as Giroux (2008, p.609) writes, to ‘reveal neoliberalism as a 
historical and social construction’.  He argues that the systemic causes of lived 
experiences need to be exposed to build collective response and ‘new narratives about 
what is possible’ (2008, p.614).  To achieve the necessary change requires building 
awareness of contingency and the potential for alternative forms of social organisation.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed the key literature on which the study draws.  Assuming that 
there are infinite ways in which a social order could be structured and that the injustices 
faced by disabled asylum seekers are not inevitable, I began by exploring Gramscian 
principles of hegemony (Simon, 1982; Thomas, 2010; Crehan, 2016).  Gramsci 
provides insights as to how the assumptions and needs of the dominant class shape 
the common-sense on which the social order is built.  Drawing on this literature, I 
argued that dominant distinctions, between the entitlement of those construed as 
‘normal’ and those construed as ‘other’, stem from the prioritisation of economic 
contribution within a capitalist economy.  These principles of hegemony facilitate 
understanding of the lack of support for people with impairments that limit productivity, 
or who arrive in the UK seeking sanctuary rather than contributing resources.  People 
who meet both categorisations of difference become particularly disadvantaged.  
Literature regarding hegemony and common-sense therefore underpins this study’s 
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analysis of the restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum seekers in 
the UK.   
The chapter then reviewed more specific literature regarding constructions of disability, 
migration status, and intersectionality.  The study is particularly indebted to the small 
body of literature which brought academic attention to the restrictions and inequalities 
experienced by disabled asylum seekers in the UK (Harris and Roberts, 2001; Ward, 
Amas and Lagnado, 2008; Straimer, 2011).  However, these intersectional experiences 
must be understood in the context of wider bodies of literature regarding the social 
construction of distinctions of entitlement associated with disability and forced 
migration.  
With the quest to consider how the current situation could be otherwise, the chapter 
turned to poststructuralist literature focused on understanding the contingency of the 
social order (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2005a).  This serves to highlight the 
possibility of alternatives.  When considering the scale of injustices experienced by 
disabled asylum seekers, it may appear difficult to conceive realistic alternatives.  
However, as Holloway explains: 
the openness of uncertainty is central to revolution ... We ask, not only because we do 
not know the way (we do not), but also because asking the way is part of the 
revolutionary process. (2002, p.215)  
This research builds on these previous bodies of work, investigating what underpins 
current inequalities and how effective contestation could be realised.  Before 
considering the research design in detail, the theoretical framework underpinning this 
study requires more in-depth consideration.    
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Chapter 2.  The theoretical framework: the power of 
discursive representation to maintain or contest the 
social order.  
all social theory must be judged on three inter-related elements: its adequacy in 
describing experience; its ability to explain experience; and finally, its potential to 
transform experience.  
(Oliver, 1999) 
Having reviewed key academic literature regarding the construction and contingency 
of hegemonic conceptions of disability, migration, and intersectionality, I now turn to 
consider a suitable theoretical framework for this study.   
All actions are underpinned by theoretical assumptions regarding current reality and 
perceptions of possibility.  Some assumptions gain the power of hegemony and thereby 
appear the natural way of ordering the world.  Effective contestation of any element of 
the existing social order, therefore, relies on understanding these assumptions.  
Similarly, the way a research problem is understood, shapes the methodology that is 
used, the evidence that is found, and the conclusions that are drawn.  This research 
seeks to contribute to addressing the restrictions and inequalities experienced by 
disabled asylum seekers.  The success of this goal relies on a theoretical framework 
which facilitates understanding of what underpins current injustice and how it could be 
contested.  It is, therefore, important to interrogate the theoretical basis of this study 
from the outset.   
This chapter introduces the broad epistemological and ontological framework adopted 
in this study.  The rationale for this positioning is considered before focusing on the 
more specific application to issues of disability and forced migration.  The study builds 
on the work of disability activists and academics, particularly Oliver and Barnes (2012), 
and Clifford (2020).  However, unlike their historical materialist perspective of disability, 
I take a poststructuralist approach, assuming that the social order is not only explained, 
but also constituted, by discursive representations, and that it is inherently contingent.  
This conception of discourse is based on the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe (1985; 1987), together with the Essex school of discourse theory.  I particularly 
draw on elements of the work of Glynos and Howarth (2007), who argue that ‘all 
practices and regimes are discursive entities’.  If the structures of the social order are 
mediated by discursive representations, then effective contestation requires analysis 
of what these representations are and the impact which they have.   
The nature, implications and application of this theoretical framework are discussed, 
before turning to the wider methodological design in the next chapter.  
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2.1 Developing understanding of the ‘problem’ associated with 
disability and forced migration  
The impact of common-sense assumptions on lived experience is an issue of debate 
among social and political theorists.  French social theorist, Michel Foucault (1998) 
builds on Gramsci’s conception of hegemony, arguing that emancipatory social change 
relies on contesting the dominant narrative, which is itself the result of continuous 
discursive struggles.  He argues that contemporary liberal democracy is governed 
increasingly by what he terms ‘biopower’ (1998, p.140).  Without the overt punishment 
associated with repressive power, this form of power may be invisible but causes 
people to modify their behaviour according to the hegemonic norms of the dominant 
social class (Foucault, 1979; Oksala, 2015).  The notion of hegemony is further 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) who stress that radical political change relies 
on awareness, contestation, and replacement of the hegemonic basis of common-
sense.  In contrast to Gramsci and Foucault who assume a distinction between 
discourse and physical reality, Laclau and Mouffe argue that these are inextricably 
intertwined.  There can be no understanding of reality independent of discursive 
representation.  
Theoretical assumptions shape how a problem is understood and the solutions which 
appear appropriate.  Returning to Bacchi (2009, 2012), policy analysis relies on 
understanding what problem the policy seeks to address.  If the problems experienced 
by disabled asylum seekers are framed as exclusion resulting from oversight rather 
than deliberate policy, then the solution may appear to be inclusion, framed as what 
Mouffe refers to as ‘technical issues to be solved by experts’ (2005b, p.10).  Awareness 
of contingency and the existence of conflicting possibilities is essential to effective 
debate of political alternatives.  Political is used  here to mean ‘the contestation and 
institution of social relations and practices’ (Howarth, D., Glynos and Griggs, 2016, 
p.100). The power of hegemony lies not only in promoting the values of the ruling class 
as if they were common-sense but, as Ralph Miliband (1994, p.11) asserts, also 
contesting the idea that ‘there is no alternative’.  As he explains, ‘Hegemony depends 
not so much on consent as on resignation’.   The ‘problem’, conceived in this study, is, 
therefore, not how to include people in the existing asylum system, but to understand 
what underpins a ‘particular structure of power relations’ (Mouffe, 2005b, p.17), and 
how it could be contested.    
As explained in the previous chapter, taking a social model perspective, as developed 
by Oliver (1983), I assume that disability results from socially constructed barriers.  
Furthermore, I accept Oliver’s assertion that disability is produced by the prioritisation 
of economic contribution in capitalist society (1999, p.2).  As such, he and Colin Barnes 
(2012, p.5) conclude that ‘only the transformation of capitalist society will ensure the 
full inclusion of disabled people and indeed all socially oppressed groups’.  With a 
similar motivation, but different approach, I take a poststructuralist perspective to 
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explore the hegemonic assumptions and structures underpinning current inequalities, 
and to investigate how these could be contested.    
Assuming the inherent contingency of any social order as discussed in Chapter 1, this 
study predicates discussion of existing discursive struggles, as essential to contestation 
of hegemonic hierarchies of entitlement.  Differences in the legal entitlements of 
disabled people seeking asylum (Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999 Part VI)  and those 
selected for the VPRS (2014) suggest that the disadvantage is not solely based on 
disability, forced migration, or minority status.  Differences in informal public support 
may reflect, reinforce, or contest differences in formal entitlements.   
Without underestimating the immediacy of material and social deprivation it is 
necessary to question whether the inclusion of disabled asylum seekers would be an 
adequate response.  When the scope of political imagination becomes limited to binary 
options of exclusion or inclusion within a system of restrictions, explicitly designed to 
create a ‘hostile environment’ (Goodfellow, 2019), then reframing the problem becomes 
fundamentally important.  To ask why the entitlements of disabled asylum are lower 
than those of citizens would have greater counter-hegemonic value.  It is necessary to 
interrogate conceptions of the problem and the resultant solutions.  As Bacchi (2012, 
p.5) asks, ‘what forms of governing practice…are enabled’ if the ‘problem’ is 
hegemonically framed as poverty, rather than inequality or wealth for example?  
Representing the problem as poverty or exclusion, risks locating the problem among 
the marginalised, obscuring systemic inequalities and possible alternatives.  
Theoretical assumptions are core to the maintenance, or contestation, of systemic 
inequalities.  As Sutton and Staw (1995, p.378) explain, theory ‘delves into underlying 
processes so as to understand the systematic reasons for a particular occurrence or 
non-occurrence’.  This study seeks to understand the roots of current inequalities and 
to contribute towards creating a more just system.  These combined objectives 
distinguish research from a campaign.  However, the distinctions are not absolute.  
Alberto Melucci (1996, p.390) argues that ‘social research needs to discard the illusion 
that it in some way mirrors ‘true’ reality and move closer to a recognition … that it is a 
social activity’.  Irrespective of intention, research, like any social activity, impacts on 
the social world.  Aspirations that research contributes to change could become 
problematic if contradictory findings were ignored or the form of change were 
predetermined and imposed on research subjects.  This study therefore takes a 
retroductive (Glynos and Howarth, 2019) approach in which hypotheses are developed, 
adapted or rejected as the study develops.   
Before considering the specific details of this research, it is essential to understand the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions on which this study is grounded.   
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2.2 The social construction and contingency of reality  
The study is rooted in a social constructivist epistemological approach (see for example 
Berger and Luckmann, 1967), whereby it is assumed that perceptions of social reality 
are shaped by people’s lived experiences, subject positions and relationships.  As 
explained by Alfred Schütz: 
the world of nature as explored by the natural scientist does not “mean” anything to 
molecules… But the observational field of the social scientist – social reality – has a 
specific meaning and relevance structure for the beings living, acting, and thinking 
within it.  By a series of common-sense constructs, they have pre-selected and pre-
interpreted this world, which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. (1967, 
p.59) 
Those responsible for shaping and implementing organisational systems, replicate and 
reinforce their ‘common-sense constructs’ through the way they ‘pre-select’ and ‘pre-
interpret’ the world and their lives within it.  The approach taken by social researchers 
is, as Norman Fairclough (1989, p.5) argues, inevitably influenced ‘by their own social 
experiences and values and political commitments’.  According to Schütz (1967) and 
Fairclough (1989), subjectivity of understanding and action is inevitable.  This study 
assumes that perceptions of the world are shaped by personal experiences and access 
to information, which also influence behaviour, thereby simultaneously contributing to 
creating the world.  More specifically, inequality of entitlement is implemented through 
organisational systems which are continually replicated and reinforced, such that the 
subjective assumptions on which the system is based are obscured along with 
perceptions of alternatives. Subjectivity is inevitable, but power inequalities determining 
which perspectives shape the world, are contingent.  As Margaret Wetherell (2001, 
p.384) argues, discourse is ‘always interpretive, always contingent, always a version or 
a reading from some theoretical, epistemological or ethical standpoint’.  She espouses 
the view that there is no ‘universal truth’ (ibid).  Similarly, I base this study on the 
understanding that change is possible because any social order is inherently 
contingent.   
In relation to the social change ambitions of this work, the wider ontological approach 
also needs clarification.  Taking a critical realist perspective, Roy Bhaskar explains: 
we will only be able to understand - and so change - the social world if we identify the 
structures at work that generate those events and discourses … These structures are 
not spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events; they can only be 
identified through the practical and theoretical work. (1989, p.2) 
I share Bhaskar’s ambition to understand and change the social world.  However, unlike 
him, I adopt a poststructuralist approach and question the existence of an independent 
reality.  As Linda Graham (2005) writes, poststructuralism eschews ‘claims to objectivity 
and truth’.  Instead, perceptions of ‘reality’ and possibility are understood as contingent 
on wider experiences and power relations.  These perceptions shape a person’s 
actions and thereby also influence the wider social order.  The goal, as Glynos and 
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Howarth (2007, p.5) explain, is ‘to conceptualise the character and transformation of 
social structures, and to clarify the relationship between social structures, political 
agency and power’.  More specifically, this approach explores the ‘reproduction and 
transformation of hegemonic orders and practices’ (ibid).  This theoretical framework is 
predicated on the inherent incompleteness of all social relations.  If the social order is 
shaped by the current balance of intersecting relations and assumptions, then multiple 
alternatives are possible.  Glynos et al. (2009, p.10) explain, ‘objects of discourse are 
radically contingent constructs… they can be interpreted and understood in many 
different ways’.  This radical contingency is core to this study’s objective to contribute 
to the development of alternatives to current restrictions and inequalities associated 
with disability and forced migration.   
The meaning of poststructuralism and its application to discourse theory requires 
deeper exploration before considering the practical relevance of these theoretical 
positions to the entitlements of disabled migrants. 
2.3 Investigating the disputed nature of discourse  
Different approaches to discourse analysis are rooted in different academic paradigms.  
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an interdisciplinary approach, based on critical 
realism, distinguishing between discursive and non-discursive observations.  A 
physical entity such as a school building may be considered non-discursive, whereas 
the teaching within it is considered discourse.  The power imbalance as to who shapes 
and consumes public discourse is perceived as vitally significant to this approach.  As 
Teun Van Dijk (1993, p.9) explains ‘ordinary people are more or less passive 
participants in the many discourse types and communicative events controlled by the 
elites’.  Discourse is thereby perceived as a descriptor rather than a determinant of 
power relations.  With the aim of describing an external reality, Fairclough (2003) 
established methods of CDA composed of detailed analysis of text and language.    
In contrast to the critical realism on which CDA is based, poststructuralism assumes 
that discourse not only describes the current situation but is instrumental in the 
‘production of 'truth' and 'knowledge'’  (Ball, 2006).  As Foucault (1989, p.49) explains, 
discourses ‘do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so, 
conceal their own invention’.  He argues that any discourse must be understood in the 
context of the struggles from which it has developed.  Foucault avoids referring to this 
analysis as history, which according to him would assume a linear and rational 
development of ideas.  Instead, he refers to a genealogy or ‘archaeology of knowledge’ 
(1989).  Discourse is never static.  It builds on previous ideas with a continuous flow of 
new activity and understanding, just as the physical structure of the earth builds on 
sedimented layers.  However, like proponents of CDA, Foucault distinguishes between 
discursive and non-discursive properties of social reality.  In contrast, this study 
assumes that all perceptions of the world are always, and inevitably, discursively 
situated.   
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2.4 Poststructuralist Discourse Theory 
Poststructuralist discourse theory differs from CDA primarily in relation to the 
ontological understanding of the scope and influence of discourse.  Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985, p.108) argue that discourse shapes the totality of social reality, that ‘every object 
is constituted as an object of discourse’.  Implicitly referring to Foucauldian notions of 
the ‘archaeology of knowledge’ (1989), Glynos and Howarth describe the logics of 
critical explanation as: 
a process of archaeological bracketing that seeks to identify domain objects and 
practices in need of analysis and critique, before then providing a genealogical 
accounting that explains their political and ideological emergence. (2007, p.170)  
Unlike Foucault’s reference to archaeology, the social order is not understood as 
composed of historically sedimented and incontestable layers.  Instead, discursive 
struggles, from which policy emerges, are assumed to be characterised by radical 
contingency.  Ongoing struggles construct the limits, ‘constituting the formation’ of the 
social order (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.145).  Their approach combines Gramsci's 
focus on hegemony with poststructuralist theory of contingency, whereby the 
constitutive function of discourse makes contestation core to social change.  
Poststructuralist discourse theory does not deny the physical existence of objects, 
however, as Glynos and Howarth explain, ‘the fact that every object is constituted as 
an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to 
thought or with the realism/idealism opposition’ (2007, p.17). By way of example, 
Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis (2000) explain the impact of different discursive 
understanding of a forest, which: 
may simply represent an inconvenient obstacle impeding the rapid implementation of a 
new road system or might be viewed as a site of special interest to scientists and 
naturalists, or symbol of the nation’s threatened national heritage … its meaning 
depends on the orders of discourse that constitute its identity and significance. (2000, 
p.3) 
Representation of a forest as a symbol of national heritage results in different action 
compared with conceptions of it as an obstacle.  It is because an object exists that it 
can be conceptualised in different ways, but our actions necessarily depend on our 
perceptions.  Laclau and Mouffe (1987, p.85) observe that: 
as a member of a certain community, I will never encounter the object in its naked 
existence - such a notion is a mere abstraction; rather, that existence will always be 
given as articulated within discursive totalities.    
Different political actors may attempt to define and ‘fix the identities of objects and 
practices in a particular way’ (Howarth, D.R., Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.3). 
Furthermore, as Laclau and Mouffe (1987, p.105) explain, dominant social actors seek 
to articulate a new idea or element within previous discursive representations to avoid 
dislocation.  However, no representation is ever fixed or complete.  They describe how 
‘in our interchange with the world, objects are never given to us as mere existential 
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entities; they are always given to us within discursive articulations’ (1987, p.85).  As 
such, discursive representations determine people’s rights, opportunities, and 
distinctions of entitlement.  This is summarised by Glynos and Howarth: 
ontology is not just about what sort of things exist, but that they exist and how they exist 
… this perspective enables us to highlight the constructed and political character of 
social objectivity. (2007, p.11) 
With this conception, discursive challenge is essential to social and political change.   
The Essex school of discourse theory is a multifaceted approach with less prescriptive 
analytical methods but greater focus on contingency than CDA.  The logics approach 
to critical explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) is used in this study to investigate 
the discursive struggles shaping inequalities of entitlement.  This exposes the forms of 
contestation required to address current restrictions.   
Logics approach 
My analysis focuses on the interrelated social, political and fantasmatic logics shaping 
policy and practice (Glynos and Howarth, 2007).  This approach provides what Glynos 
(2008, p.277) describes as ‘a language with which to characterize and critically explain 
the existence, maintenance, and transformation of concrete practices’, premised on the 
inherent radical contingency of any social order.  In broad terms: social logics form the 
core, often unquestioned, basis of what constitutes social practice; political logics 
explain how social practices are instituted or transformed; fantasmatic logics explain 
why practices are, or are not, contested accounting ‘for the way particular practices and 
regimes ‘grip’ subjects’ (Howarth, D., Glynos and Griggs, 2016, p.101).  Any social 
practice is comprised of all three relational components.  It is important to stress that 
these logics may be perceived differently by people with different subject positions and 
may change over time.  As will be explained in Chapter 3, I seek input from people with 
diverse subject positions to gain multiple perspectives.  However, my analysis is 
inevitably shaped by my perceptions. 
The discursive distinctions between social, political and fantasmatic logics require 
further analysis before examining the relevance to this study.   
Social logics 
Social logics are the uncontested assumptions, or ‘the rules and norms of a practice or 
regime’ (Howarth, D., Glynos and Griggs, 2016, p.101).  These logics can be 
understood as  the ‘horizon within which some objects are representable, and others 
are excluded’ (Mouffe, 2005b, p.117).  These logics may appear inevitable to those 
who are bound by them, and may gain the status of what Gramsci terms ‘common-
sense’ (Crehan, 2016).  It is necessary to make social logics explicit if they are to be 
contested.  Yet, as researchers are usually bound by the same norms as others in the 
same society, it may be hard to discern these norms from the natural state of society.  
The perspectives of people with different subject positions may facilitate understanding 
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of the social logics underpinning current assumptions.  In the current social order 
characterised by capitalism, the need for profit maximisation can be considered a core 
social logic.  This results in common-sense assumptions that the restricted entitlements 
associated with disability and forced migration are inevitable.  This logic may relate to 
formal legal entitlements, as well as to informal assumptions of legitimacy and status, 
determining community support.  If such logics are made overt, then their contingency 
and therefore contestability becomes more apparent.  
Political logics 
Political logics are the means by which social practices are ‘instituted, contested and 
defended’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.133).  These logics form the focus of the overt 
‘conflicts and contestations’ (Glynos, 2008, p.277) shaping public discursive 
explanation.  They may prelimit the agenda for debate, to the exclusion of consideration 
of the foundational common-sense or social logics.  Political logics may be understood 
as protecting us from a perceived threat to what are framed as incontestable norms on 
which the social order relies.  For example, hegemonic political debate regarding 
immigration controls assumes the need to control or restrict numbers, thereby focusing 
debate on the characteristics of people to be allowed to enter the UK, leaving the 
assumed primacy of the nation-state uncontested.  
Fantasmatic logics 
Fantasmatic logics form the third component of the logics approach.  These logics 
complement wider logics, making political logics appear ‘compelling’ and social logics 
appear ‘natural’ (Glynos, Klimecki and Willmott, 2012, p.299),  thereby ‘covering over 
the radical contingency of social relations’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.134).  As 
Glynos (2001), p.199) argues, fantasy ‘accounts for the resistance encountered in 
making this contingency visible’.  These logics draw on Lacanian psychoanalytical 
notions of an unattainable quest for the enjoyment that would derive from 
completeness.  They result from the sense that something must be sought which is 
‘always-already lost’ (2008, p.261).  Nostalgia for an ‘imagined golden age’ (Glynos and 
Stavrakakis, 2008, p.262) of enjoyment is readily associated with blame: 
The identity of the evil ‘‘Other’’ who prevents the nation from recouping the enjoyment 
it has lost, shifts as a function of historical context. It may be a foreign occupier … 
immigrants ‘‘who steal our jobs’’… the obstacle to full enjoyment shifts depending on 
the specificity of the fantasmatic narrative at stake, but the formal logic remains the 
same. The important point is that fantasy fosters the solidarity of the national 
community, consolidates national identity, and animates national desire. 
According to Glynos and Howarth (2007, p.107), this psychological need accounts for 
‘the resilience of a host of practices and rituals’.  Most significant to this study, notions 
of collective national identity are based on fantasmatic logics of togetherness, shared 
goals and potentially also a common enemy, irrespective of the actual diversity and 
inequalities within a nation-state.  Cultural theorist Slavoj Žižek argues that: 
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a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a 
set of social practices and transmitted through national myths or fantasies that secure 
these practices.  (1993, p.202) 
Such fantasmatic, normative notions of national unity relate to Anderson’s (1983) 
conception of an ‘imagined community’, enabling the lower entitlements associated with 
migration status compared with citizens.  As Žižek explains:  
what is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing: the 
“other” wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our “way of life”) and/or it has access 
to some secret, perverse enjoyment. In short, what … bothers us about the “other”, is 
the peculiar way he organises his enjoyment... In the racist perspective, the “other” is 
either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our labour. The basic paradox 
is that our Thing is conceived as something inaccessible to the other and at the same 
time threatened by him. (1991, p.165)  
The objective basis of a threat to social logics is not as significant as the perception, 
which according to Glynos, Speed and West (2014, p.4) depends on the ‘capacity to 
mobilise affective attachments’, associated with fantasmatic logics.  In July 2015, then 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron referred to people seeking sanctuary in the UK as 
‘swarms of people’ (BBC Cameron, 2015a), thereby suggesting equivalence with 
destructive insects. The precise nature of the implied threat or which norms would be 
at risk are not explicit, nor could they be, as the comparison is manifestly fantasy.  The 
discourse serves to evoke emotional reactions, legitimising political action to secure 
what are implicitly framed as common-sense social norms.  
Fantasies of national unity may be used to justify excluding the ‘other’.  However, this 
representation is inherently contingent.  As will be discussed in Chapter 4, even within 
the confines of dominant social logics, the superiority of ‘our’ group may be affirmed by 
pride in ‘our’ generosity or by the need for defence against the perceived threat of the 
‘other’.  In contrast, perceptions of equality of entitlement to meet universal human need 
would build solidarity across borders, contesting common-sense assumptions of the 
nation-state and associated fantasies of pride.   
Logics of equivalence and difference 
No discursive logic exists in isolation.  Logics of equivalence and difference (Glynos 
and Howarth, 2007, p.145) locate any discourse in relation to wider representation.  
These may highlight or obscure perceptions of possibility.  The lack of significant 
transformation of the banking sector following the 2008 financial crash is, according to 
Glynos et al. (2012, p.313), because ‘fantasmatic and political logics have operated to 
impede such reform by marginalizing alternative diagnoses and visions’.  Discursive 
representation of the problems associated with disability and forced migration may 
foreground opposing targets for contestation or may frame the problem as if intractable.  
Logics of equivalence can liken asylum seekers to the threat posed by a ‘swarm’ of 
insects; or the problems could be represented as multiple examples of individual 
misfortune to be mitigated by acts of discretionary generosity.  In contrast, logics of 
equivalence could apply the social model of disability, outlined in Chapter 1, to issues 
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of migration.  This could foreground collective responsibility to remove socially 
constructed barriers to accessing universal needs. Analysis of discursive 
representation of equivalence enables understanding of what underpins current policy 
and practice, highlighting contingency and clarifying the appropriate focus for 
contestation. 
Identity and subject position 
Different logics of equivalence result in different perceptions of appropriate alliances.   
People with different subject positions may unite by drawing on an ‘us-them’ axis to 
highlight a ‘common negation or threat’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.144).  For 
example, an alliance of property owners and environmentalists, characterised as 
‘Volvos and vegans’ (Griggs and Howarth, 2016), with significantly different subject 
positions, became united in opposition to the expansion of Manchester airport, thereby 
foregrounding a common enemy while relegating other differences.  In relation to 
disabled asylum seekers, if the problem were represented assuming the prime 
legitimacy of citizens, then distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ relate to migration 
status.  However, focusing on barriers to meeting human needs, might frame ‘us’ as 
the movement resisting inequality.   
A person’s subject position and identity shape their perceptions and alliances.  Any 
identity is discursively situated, contingent and relational (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 
p.113).  Some positions and identities may be chosen, while others are outside 
individual control.  Foucault (1990, p.23) explains that there are always, and inevitably, 
‘heterogeneous procedures and practices at work in the production of always-
provisional “subjects”’.  However, whether an individual accepts a label associated with, 
for example, migration status, may have no greater relevance than whether an 
individual in a capitalist society considers themselves capitalist.  Without systemic 
contestation, individual rejection of hegemonic values may have little impact on the 
existence of such values.  Peter Fleming and André Spicer (2007) provide the example 
of a McDonald’s employee wearing a T-shirt denigrating the company underneath his 
uniform.  This act of rebellion may enable him to feel less subservient, however, it does 
not threaten the company.  In satisfying a need to rebel, it may even make him more 
compliant at work.  To contest a subject position requires more fundamental change 
than an individual slogan. 
The impact of a subject position may fluctuate, with different elements of identity and 
therefore alliances foregrounded according to situation.  Apparently disparate logics 
may be articulated for a specific and temporary purpose, such as the alliance of ‘Volvos 
and vegans’ (Griggs and Howarth, 2016) mentioned above.  From my own experience, 
being vegetarian does not feel significant to my daily identity, unless I am surrounded 
by meat-eaters, when different conceptions of normality become apparent.  This is not 
to say that the issue is irrelevant at other times, but that it appears to me as normal, 
therefore not worth consideration.  Howarth et al. argue that ‘how we relate to ‘our 
Thing’ will be vital for how we relate to others and their identifications’ (2016, p.102).  
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Our understanding of the world and the allegiances we create are all contingent on our 
subject positions.     
Beyond issues of personal choice, an individual’s subject position and their perspective 
are shaped by wider power relations.  As Hegel pointed out in 1807, a slave owner 
perceives the world differently from a slave (Hegel, 1977).  Using a feminist perspective, 
Dorothy Smith (1987) develops Hegel’s standpoint theory, stressing the socially 
situated and variable basis of knowledge.  She explains that the insights of women with 
marginalised positions may be different from men’s, not because of biological 
differences, but because the social norms of patriarchal society may be concealed from 
men with dominant positions.  Adapting standpoint theory, Hill Collins (1990) explains 
that the intersectional perspectives of black women provide distinct perspectives from 
those stemming from racism or sexism alone.  In relation to forced migration, the past 
traumas, current struggles for survival, and fears of future detention or deportation, 
which are routine for many asylum seekers, are largely alien to the personal 
experiences of the wider population of citizens including employees in the asylum 
sector.  These stark differences may result in observations which are concealed to 
others.  The organising slogan of the disabled people’s movement is ‘nothing about us 
without us’.  This recognises that the perspectives of people whose subject positions 
include lived experience of disability provides essential expertise in understanding 
experiences of marginalisation and associated power inequalities.  
Dislocation, articulation, and contestation 
No practical or theoretical intervention takes place in a vacuum.  Ostensibly new 
practices may contribute to the dislocation of wider logics or may be articulated within 
the existing balance.  As such, hegemony may be reinforced or contested.  Articulation 
is defined as ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.105), or as the ‘hinge that 
links contingent elements together’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.208).  In contrast, 
dislocation occurs, when, according to Glynos and Howarth (2007, p.143) ‘a sense 
emerges, however localised or diffuse this may be, that “things are not quite right”’.  
The contingency of a social order is shaped by the articulation or dislocation of 
discursive struggles.   
With or without overt contestation, a poststructuralist approach assumes that discourse 
is inherently contingent and incomplete.  In her analysis of Gramscian common-sense, 
Crehan explains that: 
only to the extent that we accept, whatever our actual social and economic location, the 
hegemonic narratives portraying the world as seen from the vantage point of those who 
hold power might we say that we inhabit a common, shared world. (2016, p.52) 
She goes on to explain that ‘fundamental social change’, relies on imagining a different 
reality, citing Gramsci’s call for ‘a new common-sense’ (2016, p.55).  With this goal, 
poststructural discourse theory facilitates analysis of what underpins injustices 
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associated with disability and forced migration, and how a ‘new common-sense’ could 
be developed.   
Politics or policing 
When considering effective forms of contestation, it is instructive to combine 
poststructuralist analysis of discursive logics with Rancière’s (1999) distinction between 
policing and politics.  According to him, the term politics is generally used to refer to: 
the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, 
the organization of the powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for 
legitimizing the distribution. I propose to give this system of distribution and 
legitimization another name. I propose to call it the police. (1999, p.28) 
In contrast, as he continues: 
Politics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of 
the part of those who have no part. (1999, p.11)  
Such a moment of politics is necessary if hegemonic change is to be achieved.  
However, as he elaborates, politics happens ‘very little or rarely’, only when the 
mechanisms of the social order are: 
stopped in their tracks by the effect of a presupposition that is totally foreign to them yet 
without which none of them could ultimately function: presupposition of the equality of 
anyone and everyone, or the paradoxical effectiveness of the sheer contingency of any 
order. (1999, p.17)  
This focus on ‘the sheer contingency of any order’ highlights that the restrictions and 
inequalities associated with disability in the asylum system are not inevitable.  If 
disabled asylum seekers are currently assumed to be among those who Rancière 
conceives as having ‘no part’, then the institution of a part would have the potential to 
dislocate hegemonic definitions of normality.  The distinction is summarised by Nikolai 
von Eggers (2013): ‘politics is what disrupts the existing order, while policing is the 
attempt to avoid such a disruption … to retain the order as it is’.  Forces of policing may 
be promoted as pragmatic adjustments to maintain the stability of the existing social 
order, however, such stability risks hindering contestation of systemic injustice.  
According to Rancière (1999, p.12), ‘there is nothing but the order of domination or the 
disorder of revolt’.  Drawing on these distinctions, the original assertion of the social 
model of disability can be considered a moment of politics, in which disabled people 
assert a part and contest structural inequalities.  However, exemplifying the 
contingency of discursive representations, hegemonic reference to the social model 
increasingly focuses on adjustments, or ‘policing’, such that greater numbers of 
disabled people are included, rather than contesting systemic inequalities.  Such 
policing is neither based on an equal part for disabled people, nor does it contest the 
causes of oppression.   
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The analytical approach of this study is summarised in Table 1.  Assuming that 
hegemonic discursive representations are never fixed, this study investigates ongoing 
discursive struggles underpinning current restrictions and inequalities.  This analytical 
approach is combined with Rancière’s (1999) distinctions between moments of politics 
and policing.    
Table 1: Discursive logics of explanation 
Social logics Social logics form rarely contested 
common-sense, defining the limits of 
discursive struggles for hegemony.   
Moment of contestation Discursive struggles are ongoing.  
These may result in policing 
distinctions of entitlement or in 
moments of politics through which 
people with no part assert their part. 
Political logics Overt struggles may be limited to 
political logics of equivalence and 
difference. 
Fantasmatic logics Discourse is underpinned by eternal 
struggles for completeness, or to 
reclaim enjoyment.   
2.5 Relating these theoretical positions to inequalities associated 
with migration and disability 
Analysis of social, political and fantasmatic discursive logics facilitates understanding 
of what underpins inequalities associated with migration and disability, as well as how 
effective contestation might be realised.  The interplay between theory and practice is 
essential to understanding the contingency of current policy and practice.  As Bacchi 
explains, theory itself is a practice that plays a key role in producing the “real”’.  With 
regard to discursive representation of immigration, hegemonic social logics reinforce 
the assumed ‘“reality” of “nation-states” (2012, p.6).  In practice, the assumed 
legitimacy of this ‘reality’ results in different rules and entitlements for members and 
non-members.  Similarly, competing theoretical understandings of disability locate the 
problem differently, with practical implications on the ‘real’ of disabled people’s lives.  
The ‘social reality’ (Schütz, 1967) of intersectional experiences combines and 
compounds socially constructed responses to disability and migration.  Lack of 
entitlement can result in people becoming so marginalised as to become either invisible 
to mainstream society or to be perceived as an immutable problem too large to be 
addressed.  The result is to frame ongoing injustice as intractable.   
To focus on the social construction of disability or migration is not to negate the physical 
and emotional pain that may be associated with having an impairment, or with fleeing 
one’s home.  People may experience pain for numerous reasons during their lives, 
however, this is not inevitably associated with either restricted access to services and 
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support, or with extra entitlements associated with being considered particularly 
‘worthy’.  This study explores the basis and impact of distinctions of entitlement, rather 
than individual embodied experiences.  If the restrictions and inequalities stem from a 
socially constructed response, then attention must be directed to the causes, impact, 
and alternatives to that response.  
2.6 Criticisms and possible weaknesses of a social constructionist 
and poststructuralist framework 
Possible weaknesses and criticisms of this theoretical framework must be considered.  
Social constructionist and poststructuralist positions have been criticised for lack of the 
objectivity required for political analysis (Bury, 1996).  Similarly, Martyn Hammersley 
(2007) questions the usefulness of research findings based on subjective assumptions 
which he suggests can claim equal legitimacy.  Such criticism misrepresents the nature 
of subjectivity.  Firstly, it is assumed here that all research stems from subjective 
perceptions, as all understanding is shaped by a person’s subject position.  The 
difference is whether subjective premises are overtly discussed and analysed.  
Secondly, the purpose of research findings is to contribute to, not substitute for debate.  
As Mouffe argues, there are always multiple options, and political debate depends on 
discussion of alternatives (2005a, b, 2007). Thirdly, exposing the contingency of the 
social order facilitates analysis of alternatives.  Political action is inevitably based on 
choices and subjective prioritisation of values.  Mouffe (2007, p.18) explains:  
What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ order - jointly with the ‘common 
sense’ which accompanies it - is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices; it is 
never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into 
being.  
The use of poststructuralist discourse theory exposes the contingent and therefore 
contestable nature of all political struggles.  It highlights the determinants of the current 
order, what is presented as ‘common-sense’, and how these impact on the 
development of alternatives.  This approach has been further criticised for paying 
insufficient attention to inequalities of access (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p.125).  
However, awareness of such inequalities is core to the motivation for this investigation.  
As will be highlighted in Chapter 3, the methodology includes specific action to ensure 
the insights of people with diverse subject positions are considered.   
Perhaps the most significant criticisms for this study are those from scholars of disability 
studies, including Oliver (1999), Oliver and Barnes (2012) and Clifford (2020).  I am 
greatly indebted to these academics and activists on whose work I seek to build.  
However, I question their rejection of poststructuralism.  Clifford argues that:  
we need to renew active links between activism and academia. The academic discipline 
of disability studies originally developed with an intention to intervene in the real world 
and to inform application in practice. The growing dominance of post-modernism/post-
structuralism weakened the link, with output becoming less accessible to disabled 
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people and less relevant to our lives. (2020, p.308) 
This comment appears to be levelled at scholars who reject the social model of 
disability with its activist roots, along with proponents of the relatively recent discipline 
of Critical Disability Studies rooted less in understanding disability as the socio-
economic consequence of capitalism and more as the result of relativist conceptions of 
normality (Goodley, 2010; Goodley, Hughes and Davis, 2012).  Without wishing to 
overly engage with this academic divide, my research is explicitly designed to assert 
links ‘between activism and academia’ (Clifford, 2020, p.308) and to be highly ‘relevant 
to our lives’ (ibid).  Whether that is achieved can be assessed in the forthcoming 
chapters.  
Conclusion 
Social constructionism and poststructuralism form the theoretical framework from which 
to explore what underpins current inequalities associated with disability and forced 
migration, and how these could be contested.  This approach assumes that all 
understanding is inherently discursively situated.  Drawing on the analytical approach 
of Glynos and Howarth (2007), this study examines the interrelated social, political and 
fantasmatic logics constituting the social order.  If current policy and practice are to be 
contested, the discursive representation on which it is based must be challenged and 
alternatives developed.  More specifically for this study, to remedy the injustices faced 
by disabled asylum seekers, there must be understanding of what underpins current 
restrictions such that contestation can be targeted at causal factors.  Rancière’s (1999) 
distinctions between policing and a moment of politics aid investigation of the initiatives 
that currently exist.  This study investigates the discursive representations on which the 
existing social order is based to enable effective contestation of ongoing restrictions 
and inequalities.   
This poststructuralist theoretical framework is combined with methodological elements 
of action research, phenomenology, privileging the perceptions of those with lived 





Chapter 3. Methodology: investigating and contesting 
inequalities associated with disability and forced 
migration 
research into others’ suffering can only be justified if alleviating that suffering is an 
explicit objective. (Turton, 1996, p.96) 
Having outlined the key literature and the theoretical framework on which this study is 
based, I now turn to the methodological design.  This chapter focuses on the research 
purpose, questions for investigation and how these are addressed.   First, the focus of 
investigation and research questions are clarified.  The development and rationale for 
the chosen combination of qualitative research methods is then discussed before 
focusing on the specific application in this study.   
The four key research stages are then discussed.  The first stage focusses on the 
discursive struggles underpinning UK government policies shaping current entitlements 
and restrictions faced by disabled asylum seekers and refugees.  The second stage 
explores how these hegemonic discursive representations are reinforced or contested 
by people responsible for implementation of policy and practice.  The perceptions of 
people with lived experience of the impact are then considered.  The final stage 
investigates how representations of the problem frame the solutions that appear 
appropriate.  This stage includes findings from the events that I organised to bring 
together people with different subject positions.  These events contributed both to the 
information gathering and action research elements of the study.   
After setting out the methodological design and rationale, I turn to practicalities, 
including recruitment of contributors, use of interpreters, methods of recording and 
analysis.  Ethical issues are core to the study.  These are discussed in relation to 
guidelines from the British Sociological Association (2017) and Economic and Social 
Research Council (2019).  The chapter finishes by returning to the inevitable influence 
of my positionality, followed by discussion of the research limitations and 
methodological conclusions.  This chapter provides the framework for the empirical 
analysis in subsequent chapters.  
3.1 Research aims and focus 
The investigation is premised on three core assumptions, which it is necessary to clarify 
before considering the research questions in greater depth.  All research is inevitably 
shaped by human assumptions.  However, where there is ‘blurring between academic 
and activist work’ (Angeles and Pratt, 2017, p.275) it is particularly important to make 
these as explicit as possible.  Firstly, building on previous literature (Harris and Roberts, 
2001; Ward, Amas and Lagnado, 2008; Yeo, R., 2017a), I assume that the restrictions 
and inequalities faced by disabled asylum seekers and refugees in the UK are unjust.  
Without denying the suffering inherent to both forced migration and many forms of 
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impairment, I draw on the distinction made by Judith Shklar (1990) between misfortune 
and injustice caused by human action or inaction.  Without denying that misfortune may 
have an impact on experiences of disability or forced migration, the focus of this study 
is on the contingent and changeable nature of injustice.  Secondly, adopting a social 
model approach (Oliver, 1983), I assume that the barriers hindering disabled asylum 
seekers from meeting human needs in the UK are socially and politically constructed 
and therefore contestable.  Thirdly, taking a poststructuralist perspective, I assume the 
current social order, like any other, is contingent on historic and ongoing socio-
economic relations.  Drawing on political theorists including Mouffe (2005b) and 
Rancière (1999), I assume that there are infinite ways that society could be organised.  
These core assumptions shape my academic and political motivation, which underpins 
this research design.   
The restrictions experienced by disabled asylum seekers are presented by some 
scholars as resulting from inadequate evidence.  Ward et al. (2008, p.11) complain that 
‘reliable data on this population remains absent, inconsistent and based largely on 
estimates’.  They claim that ‘unless reliable data is collected, it will remain difficult to 
comprehensively assess the needs of these groups and to provide concrete evidence 
to target services and leverage funding’ (ibid).  Some scholars assert that little is known 
about these issues (see for example Burns, 2017, p.1463) as if this is uncontroversial.  
However, this assumes that lack of academic study equates with lack of knowledge, 
thereby obscuring the existence of knowledge and expertise gained from lived 
experience.  This tendency is prevalent regarding wider issues of disability, as 
highlighted by Beresford (2000).  The problem may not be lack of knowledge but lack 
of respect for the knowledge and priorities of people with expertise by experience.  
The instigators of the social model, UPIAS, argue for research to contribute to social 
and political change:   
we already know what it feels like to be poor, isolated, segregated, done good to, stared 
at, and talked down … What we are interested in are ways of changing our conditions 
of life, and thus overcoming the disabilities which are imposed on top of our physical 
impairments by the way this society is organised to exclude us. (UPIAS, 1976, p.5)  
Similarly, ‘we already know’ that disabled asylum seekers experience deprivation 
(Harris and Roberts, 2001) and that the ‘hostile environment’ is explicitly designed to 
be hostile (Kirkup, 2012; Lewis, Waite and Hodkinson, 2017; Hiam, Steele and McKee, 
2018; Liberty, 2018; Goodfellow, 2019). Therefore, evidence of hostility and associated 
negative impact on ‘conditions of life’ is unlikely to prompt policy change.  As Peter 
Beresford argues, some researchers assume that: 
by telling the government how much damage its policies are doing, it will magically stop 
imposing them.  Or that if they show “the public” how bad things are, then “something 
will have to change”. (2017) 
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The lack of significant policy change resulting from previous research regarding the 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers (Harris and Roberts, 2001; Ward, Amas and 
Lagnado, 2008; Yeo and Bolton, 2013) suggests the need is not for more evidence of 
‘how bad things are’, but for understanding what underpins current inequalities and how 
effective change might be realised.  
This research was designed not just to increase knowledge but also to make a positive 
contribution to people’s lives.  The aims went ‘beyond do no harm’ (Mackenzie, C., 
McDowell and Pittaway, 2007, p.299) and beyond Jacobsen and Landau’s (2003) call 
for the ‘dual imperative’ to combine academic rigour with policy relevance.  I agree with 
those who assert the existence of a ‘triple imperative’ (Block et al., 2013, p.84) but 
reject the prioritisation of ‘capacity building’ which risks obscuring the power inequalities 
hindering the assertion of existing capacity. There is a need to acknowledge and 
respect the expertise developed through lived experience of disability and forced 
migration.  However, it takes time and energy to analyse the causes of current 
inequalities.  Therefore, responsibility to find solutions to injustice cannot lie with those 
who are most oppressed and already struggling for survival.  My ‘third imperative’ is 
therefore to contribute to the collective responsibility to address the problems asserted 
by experts by experience.  
Research questions 
Premised on these aims and assumptions, my research questions build on previous 
studies and bring together the expertise of people with different subject positions.  In 
accordance with Cindi Katz (1994, p.72), I sought to ‘frame questions that are at once 
of substantive and theoretical interest as well as of practical significance to those with 
whom we work’.  With these objectives, the primary question was to assess how 
hegemonic representations of the needs and entitlements associated with disability and 
forced immigration in the UK are determined, reinforced, or contested.  
More specifically, I analysed:  
1. What are the dominant discursive struggles determining government policies regarding 
the restrictions and inequalities of entitlement imposed on people with intersectional 
experiences of disability and forced migration?  (Chapter 4) 
2. How are hegemonic representations of these needs and entitlements reflected, 
reinforced, or contested by people with diverse roles regarding implementation of formal 
and informal entitlements?  (Chapter 5); and by people with lived experience of the 
impact of existing restrictions and inequalities?  (Chapter 6)  
3. How do representations of the problem frame current responses and how a moment of 
more fundamental political contestation might be achieved?  (Chapter 7) 
Taking a poststructuralist position, if existing assumptions and structures are 
contingent, then all hypotheses are inevitably provisional.  A retroductive approach 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.25) allows for changing hypotheses during the study.   
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3.2 Choice and rationale for research strategy 
With these research aims and assumptions, I took a qualitative approach, combining 
elements of poststructuralist discourse theory, action research and phenomenology.  
Quantitative methods were rejected for this study, despite what Raymond Lee (1993, 
p.55) refers to as the tendency to assume that producing ‘numerical estimates helps to 
fix the dimensions of a social problem’ and that ‘persuasive power’ is associated with 
numbers.  As Oliver and Barnes (1998, p.13) argue, research focused on ‘proving’ the 
numbers of disabled people failed to have a significant positive impact on disability 
policy because they ‘focused on the wrong thing; that is, they have tried to measure the 
number of disabled people rather than the effects of disabling environments’.  Similarly, 
I assume that the degree of injustice is not dependent on the number of people affected.  
In quantitative terms, the experiences of disabled asylum seekers might be considered 
statistically insignificant.  However, acknowledgement of the common humanity of 
those hegemonically framed as insignificant is core to preventing restrictions being 
extended to a wider population.   
The study was designed to investigate different perceptions of the problems associated 
with disability and forced migration, and the solutions that thereby appear appropriate.  
The adoption of elements of action research and phenomenology was intended to allow 
for the privileging of the expertise of lived experience.  However, as Glynos and 
Howarth (2007, p.13) stress:  
We cannot rely exclusively on what people say, or on their self-understandings, even 
though these views must be considered in any legitimate social explanation. 
The analytical underpinning with discourse theory is essential to break with what 
Glynos and Howarth (2007, p.102) refer to as the ‘hermeneutical tendency to reduce 
explanations to contextualised self-interpretations and the positivist tendency to 
subsume particulars under universal causal laws’.  This combined approach facilitates 
analysis of how different perspectives intersect to reflect, reinforce, or contest dominant 
hegemonic discourse.   
The rationale for these methodological approaches is considered, before turning to the 
specific methods used at different stages of the research process. 
Elements of action research adopted for study of disability and forced migration. 
The term ‘action research’ was introduced by Kurt Lewin in 1946 to describe research 
leading to social action.  He focused on research promoting the ‘independence, 
equality, and co-operation’ of minority groups (Lewin, 1946; cited by Adelman, 1993).  
The term was developed by Peter Reason and Hilary Bradbury to describe a ‘family of 
practices’ (2008, pp.3-4) characterised by ‘collaborative relationships… in which 
dialogue and development can flourish’; respecting ‘many ways of knowing’; and 
using the research process as a tool for ‘seeking to address issues of significance, 
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concerning the flourishing of human persons’.  With parallels to the retroductive 
approach of poststructuralist discourse theory, the ‘emerging nature and flexibility’ of 
action research is described as among its hallmarks (Koshy, 2011, p.8).  The ‘emerging 
nature’ is often associated with a cyclical process (see for example Kemmis and 
McTaggart, 2000, p.564).  However, as McTaggart writes: 
Action research is not a “method” … but a series of commitments to observe … a series 
of principles for conducting social enquiry. (1996, p.248) 
This study drew on principles of participatory and emancipatory action research but did 
not adopt a strictly cyclical process. 
The politics of participatory approaches   
Participatory approaches are shaped by Paulo Freire’s analysis of the role of oppressed 
people in creating change (1970).  As encapsulated in the title of Robert Chambers’ 
book Putting the Last First (1983), participatory action research can be used to 
challenge the power imbalance of traditional ‘top-down’ approaches.  This approach is 
often presented as if inevitably a ‘good thing’ with criticism limited to possible 
methodological deficiencies, rather than questioning the progressive potential 
(Beresford, 2002, p.95).  Yet, there is nothing inherently progressive about participation.  
As Sherry Arnstein (1969) argues, ‘participation without redistribution of power … 
allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were considered, but … maintains the 
status quo’.  To illustrate this, she cites the poster used during 1968 student protests in 
France: 
  
The notion that ‘they’ may profit from the participation of others highlights the potential 
for participation to reinforce, rather than contest, inequalities.  This risk is described by 
Beresford’s (2002) distinction between ‘consumerist’, and ‘democratic’, participation.  
Democratic approaches enable those taking part to shape the agenda and methods.  
In contrast, consumerist participation may be used to add legitimacy to the pre-existing 
agendas of the dominant class, by including controlled interventions from people with 
lived experience.  This distinction is encapsulated by Wood (1985, p.25), who asks 
whether the part has ‘been written before the “participants” are allowed to say their 
lines?’.  The ethics of participation are further questioned by Uma Kothari and Bill Cook 
who describe the normative pressure that ‘good’ citizens should participate, as the ‘new 
tyranny’ (2001).  If the agenda is pre-determined, then as Ferreday and Hodgeson 
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(2008, p.640) warn, participation may have a ‘dark side’, enforcing oppression and 
control.  This control is not necessarily overt.  There may be elements of Lacanian 
‘enjoyment’ (Stavrakakis, 2005), whereby ‘participants’ gain an illusion of contribution 
without real impact on the agenda or the outcome.  However, if participation is 
accompanied with real control, then it is not just a technique for data gathering but may 
fundamentally challenge existing power relationships.  
The potential for emancipatory action research  
Working with broadly similar approaches, activists and academics in disability studies, 
such as Oliver (1990, 1992, 1997) and Barnes (1996) call for emancipatory methods to 
challenge positivistic research done to disabled people.  In a similar vein to Beresford’s 
call for democratic forms of participation, they call for disabled people to have control 
over research.  Barnes (1996) argues that impartiality is impossible and that if 
researchers are on the side of the oppressed, then active and meaningful roles for 
disabled people are essential throughout the research process.  Oliver (1992, p.111) 
argues that researchers should ‘put their knowledge and skills at the disposal of their 
research subjects, for them to use in whatever ways they choose'.  This approach 
challenges wider assumptions of the expertise of the academic in relation to their 
subjects.  As Oliver (1997, p.22) explains, ‘In eschewing objectivity and neutrality and 
embracing partisanship, we were clearly confronting many of the canons of scientific 
and social scientific approaches to research’.  This contestation of the social relations 
of research production is essential if hegemonic change is required.  Gerry Zarb (1992, 
p.128) explains that participation ‘will never by itself constitute emancipatory research 
unless and until it is disabled people … controlling the research and deciding who 
should be involved and how’.  With political sympathy for these principles, I sought to 
foreground the expertise of lived experience, revising my hypotheses and research 
methods after input from disabled asylum seekers.  However, in the context of doctoral 
research, I acknowledge that ultimately it is I, not the research contributors, who 
decides ‘who should be involved and how’ (ibid).  As Priestley and Stone (1996, p.15) 
write, ‘Regardless of commitment to the emancipatory paradigm, the researcher is 
required to bow in several directions’ to meet academic demands.   
The potential for research to have emancipatory impact is unclear.  In his later 
reflections, even Oliver explained that he had come ‘to the inescapable and painful 
conclusion that the person who had benefited most from [his] research on disabled 
people's lives was undoubtedly [himself]’ (1997, p.15). This research is designed to 
benefit people other than myself, however, my focus is not so much on individual 
emancipatory change, but on contesting hegemonic acceptance of inequalities 
associated with disability and forced migration, while also highlighting their broader 
impact.  This approach draws on principles of social action research, characterised by 
non-hierarchical relationships, ‘respecting … stakeholders as “knowers”’ (Fleming, J. 
and Ward, 2004, p.165)  in the context of broader goals of social change.  For this 
purpose, action research is a useful component, without suggesting that this doctoral 
research is fully participatory.  
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To learn from the knowledge and insights of those with lived experience, it is also 
instructive to consider the literature of phenomenology. 
Phenomenological approach to learning from the contributions of people with 
different subject positions  
In conjunction with the overriding approach of poststructuralist discourse theory and 
elements of action research, I drew on aspects of phenomenology.  Insights grounded 
in the reality and urgency of lived experience are assumed to bring knowledge of 
‘lifeworlds’ (Husserl, 1936) that are commonly ignored, and which cannot be 
understood through theoretical study alone.  As Marcus Banks (2001, p.179) asserts, 
people with lived experience ‘know more about their own lives than a visiting researcher 
can ever hope to’.  Reflecting on their research exploring working class lived 
experiences, Mackenzie et al. argue that the: 
conclusion from the research conducted with our participants – few of whom would 
claim to be ‘highly educated’ … is that … not only do many policymakers and 
practitioners have something to learn from them, so too does a significant section of the 
research community – ourselves included. (2015, p.16) 
As Mackenzie et al. advocate, I seek to learn from those contributing to this study, 
particularly from the expertise of those with intersectional lived experience of disability 
and forced migration.  More specifically, this work drew on literature from disability 
studies (Barnes, 2003; Beresford, 2013) asserting the expertise gained from 
experience.    
This research design brought together contributions from people with diverse subject 
positions, assuming that perceptions are shaped by lived experiences and 
relationships.  More importantly, it is assumed that perceptions of the problem shape 
understanding of alternatives and consequent action.  Not all perspectives are, 
however, equally significant to this analysis, nor is it assumed that any lived experience 
exists in isolation.  All perspectives shape, and are shaped by, a multitude of factors 
and are inherently contingent.  As asserted by Shaun Gallagher (2012, p.7) ‘every 
instance of consciousness is already situated in some contingent circumstance’.  
Drawing primarily on methodological approaches of disability studies (Stone and 
Priestley, 1996; Barnes, 2003), the input of those with lived experience of disability and 
forced migration was privileged for three basic reasons.  Firstly, the suffering and 
injustice experienced by disabled asylum seekers is the central reason why this study 
matters.  Secondly, the quest to build alternatives to the current situation may be 
facilitated by paying attention to those who are commonly ignored.  Thirdly, the 
contributions of people with lived experience form a key role in the triangulation of 
results (see for example Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999, p.92).  For example, in an 
earlier study (Yeo, 2015b), a Home Office employee explained that asylum seekers are 
automatically referred for care assessments if there is any possibility of needing social 
care.  Input from people with lived experience made clear that such referrals are not 
routinely implemented.    
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In practical terms, a phenomenological approach most specifically informed the 
interviewing approach of this study.  If research is designed to attain comparable data 
with which to assess prevalence, then structured interviewing may be appropriate.  A 
positivist approach to research generally assumes that if a researcher asks the 
question correctly, the interviewee will provide the necessary information (Gubrium and 
Holstein, 1997).   In contrast, phenomenology does not aim for uniformity of questioning 
or data gathering. Instead, the goal is to enable exploration of topics raised by 
interviewees (Herman and Bentley, 1993).  I had planned to use semi-structured 
interviews, but soon realised that this did not allow interviewees the control and agency 
to decide what they considered important and wished to share.  My topic guide 
therefore became a loose basis for occasional prompts (Appendix 2), rather than an 
interview outline.  This unstructured approach to interviewing, positions interviewees 
as ‘constructors of knowledge’ (Klenke, 2008), facilitating more egalitarian power 
relations between researcher and researched.  The binary terms of researcher and 
participant do not fit easily with research grounded in lived experience.  As McTaggart 
(1994, p.317) argues, the distinction between academics and participants implies that 
‘theory reside[s] in one place and its implementation in another’.  He argues that such 
a view is the antithesis of a commitment to develop ‘theoretically informed practice for 
all parties involved’ (ibid).  If research is understood as social action, as Melucci (1996) 
argues, then the researcher and all those involved are part of the process. This is not 
to deny the imbalance of power inherent in doctoral research, and perhaps all funded 
research.  
The research strategy was divided into four overlapping stages drawing on these broad 
methodological components.  
3.3 Research stages investigating diverse representation of 
problems associated with disability and forced migration, and how 
these shape perceived solutions 
The investigation began by analysing the discursive logics underpinning key UK 
government policy documents determining current entitlements associated with 
disability and forced migration.  Then I explored how the hegemony of elite policy 
discourse is reinforced, reflected, or contested by interviewees with different subject 
positions.  According to Gramsci, ‘all men (sic) are philosophers’, adopting ideas which 
enable them to ‘make sense of their lives’ (cited by Simon, 1982, p.26).  With the 
assumption that a person’s experiences and relationships influence their perspective, 
attention turned to perspectives of the problem, presented by people with different roles 
regarding implementation of policy and practice associated with disability and 
migration.  This was followed by analysis of the perspectives of people with lived 
experience of disability and forced migration.  The perceptions of the ‘subaltern’ or 
those directly impacted by the hegemonic logics of government policy are also the 
people whose voices are rarely heard.  Finally, I organised a series of events to bring 
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the voices of lived experience to a wider audience and I attended many meetings 
organised by others, regarding provision for asylum seekers and refugees.  
Observations from these events were combined with wider responses to issues of 
disability in the asylum sector.  In all four stages, the discursive logics underpinning 
perceptions of the problem and associated solutions were considered.  Analysis 
focused on exploring when hegemonic logics were reflected or reinforced and how 
alternatives were articulated or caused dislocation of the dominant order.  In this 
analysis, Rancière’s (1999) distinctions between politics and policing are significant.  
Political contestation is limited to occasions when ‘the natural order of domination is 
interrupted by the institution of the part of those who have no part’ (1999, p.11).  In 
contrast, interventions which simply adjust the ‘distribution and legitimization’ (1999, 
p.28) of the existing order do not seek systemic change and are referred to as policing.  
Stage 1.  Discursive perspectives presented in elite policy documents 
Chapter 4 provides analysis of the discursive struggles shaping elite discourse 
associated with disability and forced migration.  Investigation focused on the social, 
political and fantasmatic logics of critical explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  The documents selected for analysis are listed in Table 2:  
Table 2: White Paper and key policy announcements 
The discursive struggles shaping current immigration policy. 
(1998) White Paper: ‘Fairer, Faster and Firmer - a modern approach to 
immigration and asylum’.  
(2014) Policy announcement: ‘The Vulnerable Person’s Relocation Scheme for 
Syrian Nationals’. 
The discursive struggles shaping disability policy 
(1999) The Beveridge Lecture:  Prime Minister Tony Blair, ‘Beveridge revisited: a 
welfare state for the 21st century’.   
(2006) White Paper: ‘Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for 
community services’.  
(2010) White Paper: ‘Universal Credit: welfare that works’. 
(2016) Inquiry by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
These documents do not form a comprehensive account of government policy.  They 
are selected for analysis because I argue that they are indicative of a discursive shift 
which shapes current entitlements and restrictions associated with disability and forced 
migration.  
Analysis began with the White Paper ‘Fairer, faster and firmer’ (1998) which removed 
entitlement for asylum seekers to access the welfare state.  This is not to suggest that 
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restrictions associated with disability and migration began that year.  However, in 
removing acknowledgement of the financial costs of disability, this Paper marked a 
turning point in intersectional entitlement which continues to shape current policy.  I 
then turned to analyse the introduction of the ‘Vulnerable Person’s Relocation Scheme 
for Syrian Nationals’ (2014).  The VPRS shifted hegemonic immigration policy to focus 
on selection of people framed as worthy of generosity.  Analysis of disability policy 
discourse is focussed on developments over a similar period.  The 1999 Beveridge 
Lecture given by then Prime Minister Tony Blair did not refer to the removal of support 
to asylum seekers, introduced the same year.  Instead, his vision for welfare reform set 
out the rationale for removing support from a wider group of citizens.  It appears that 
support could be removed from asylum seekers without significant public protest, 
however, his speech indicated that hegemonic contestation was needed for similar 
restrictions to be extended to citizens.  Subsequent policy documents illustrate the 
shifts which occurred.  In 2006, the White Paper ‘Our health, our care, our say: a new 
direction for community services’ ostensibly enabled disabled citizens to gain the long-
awaited demand of ‘choice and control’, but this was accompanied by a discursive shift 
to locate responsibility with the individual.  This shift was an essential precursor to the 
2010 White Paper: ‘Universal Credit: welfare that works’.  The welfare reform was 
presented as if responding to the financial crisis of 2008, state services were reduced, 
and disabled service users became framed as a burden on wider society.  This 
facilitated the removal of support from citizens in a manner reminiscent of that imposed 
on asylum seekers in 1999.   Although there had been little protest at the removal of 
rights from asylum seekers, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities contested the UK government’s actions.   
These policies reflect dominant representations of the problem and associated 
solutions.  As discussed, most people’s access to information is shaped by cultural 
hegemony, with media ‘controlled by the elites’ (Van Dijk (1993, p.8). The discursive 
representations adopted by policymakers shape hegemonic understanding.  Beyond 
this, taking a poststructuralist approach, I assume that people’s understanding shapes 
their actions and is therefore integral to the nature of the social order.  Cultural 
hegemony, as described by Gramsci (1971) is maintained through ideological control 
of information, education and cultural apparatus such that the existing system appears 
the only feasible option.  In the absence of alternative discursive representations and 
contestation, elite discourse shapes assumed common-sense and becomes 
hegemonic.   
Stage 2.  Discursive perspectives of people with different roles and 
responsibilities in the asylum sector and disabled people’s movement 
The study then turned to analysis of how hegemonic representations of needs and 
entitlements associated with disability and forced migration are reflected, reinforced, or 
contested by people with different subject positions.  Again, analysis focused on the 
discursive logics of explanation adopted by contributors.  Purposive sampling 
(Spradley, 1979; Etikan et al., 2016) was used to find contributors with diverse 
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perspectives, including people designing, implementing or campaigning against 
different aspects of current policies as outlined in Table 3:   
Table 3: Subject positions of contributors from the immigration sector and 
disabled people's movement 















Local authority  Social care 3 Resettlement 3 
 
Civil servants Home Office – asylum and resettlement.  
Department of Work and Pensions - disability 
4 
Legal professionals Immigration and community care law 3 
Politicians  Home Affairs select committee and local 
Council 
2 
All informants are referred to with anonymised references listed in Appendix 1.  The 
ethical implications of this are discussed in 3.5 below.   
Individual and organisational categories overlap and change.  At the organisational 
level, employees may change their roles.  Furthermore, blurred boundaries result from 
voluntary sector reliance on statutory funding and the outsourcing of statutory service 
provision.  At the individual level, everybody has multiple, shifting roles, relationships, 
and experiences, which shape their perspectives and actions.  It would be wrong to 
reduce analysis to binary alternatives of what Meister (2011, p.27) refers to as ‘a narrow 
class of victims (those who suffered physical torment) and a narrow class of 
perpetrators (the active tormentors)’.  Furthermore, Laclau (1996, p.92) explains ‘if the 
subject were a mere subject position within the structure, the latter would be fully closed 
and there would be no contingency’.  In other words, a person’s current position is not 
the exclusive determinant of their perspective.  
Stage 3.  Discursive perspectives of the ‘subaltern’, or those with lived 
experiences of disability and forced migration 
Specific attention was paid to perspectives stemming from lived experiences, drawing 
on a phenomenological approach outlined above.  The knowledge and expertise of 
disabled asylum seekers are systematically undervalued through what Miranda Fricker 
(2007) refers to as epistemic injustice.  This research was designed to contribute to 
redressing this imbalance, learning from the perspectives of those who are routinely 
ignored.  
There was great variety in the extent to which people contributed to this study.  
According to Reid et al. (2005), the optimum number for involvement in 
phenomenological research is between three and fifteen.  In this study, seventeen 
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people with lived experience of disability and forced migration contributed, however, 
there were very different levels of involvement.  Some contributors helped shape my 
ideas before the study began.  Some took part throughout the research process, 
including helping with event organisation, while others simply took part in a short 
interview. The diversity of the backgrounds of contributors with lived experience is 
summarised in Table 4.  Anonymised referencing is used as outlined in Appendix 1.  
















14 asylum seekers 
or refused asylum 
seekers, 3 
refugees or people 








There are disproportionate numbers of men compared with women in the wider 
population of asylum seekers.  According to Home Office statistics, in 2017 there were 
34,435 asylum applications, of whom 22,805, or 66% were male (UK Government, 
2018b).  As shown in Table 4, I spoke to more men than women.  However, among 
those most engaged with the research process, there were three women and one man.  
I did not control people’s level of involvement, instead, during the initial interview, I 
invited people to take part in a group discussion and to help plan public events.  
Feminist sociologist Ann Oakley (2016, p.196) describes how interviews between 
women may more easily ‘incorporate elements of a “transition to friendship”, based on 
shared gender subordination’.  It may be that more women chose to become more 
deeply engaged in the research process, because as a woman myself it is easier to 
build trust based on some level of shared experience. 
It was at this research stage that I realised that semi-structured interviews were 
inappropriate.  While meeting das5, he called his daughter in his country of origin to 
introduce her to me.  His embodiment of the stigma directed at refugees (Tyler, 2020) 
was such that he warned me his daughter did not know he was a refugee.  He had such 
clear evidence of persecution that he had been granted unusually rapid refugee status, 
yet he wanted his daughter to think he had migrated for work.  It is unlikely that he 
would have told me this if he had not rung his daughter.  Using an unstructured 
approach enabled space for what Janet Waters (2016) refers to as the ‘thoughts, 
feelings, images, sensations, memories’ which make up the ‘essential meaning’ of lived 
experience.  Some analysts refer to similar approaches as ‘giving voice’ to the concerns 
of participants (Larkin, Watts and Clifton, 2006, p.102).  However, this suggests that 
people did not previously have a voice, thereby locating the problem as their lack, rather 
than with systemic inequalities framing marginalised voices as unworthy of being heard.  
In contrast, as Jean-Philippe Deranty (2003, p.140) argues, ‘to learn about domination 
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and emancipation, the intellectual will have to be taught by those who suffer and rebel’.  
Gramsci (1971) used the term ‘organic intellectuals’ to apply to those from a non-
dominant class who contest the ideas of the dominant class.  I do not suggest that all 
contributors with lived experience routinely contest the hegemony, however, they do 
contribute perspectives which would otherwise be inaccessible to me.  I therefore 
consider it highly appropriate that one disabled asylum seeker (das8) agreed to be 
involved as my teacher, but not as my participant.  The unstructured approach enabled 
people to focus on issues which they considered important in ways that they controlled.  
 
The precarity of people’s existence hindered making firm commitments.  Initially, I 
sought to make appointments to meet people, however, I soon realised it was 
necessary to work in a more impromptu manner.  In the context of ongoing threats of 
detention, das8 stressed she could not make plans.  Within some logistical constraints, 
I was therefore flexible as to where we met, when, how often, and what we talked about.  
The resultant need for spontaneity was harder when I needed an interpreter.  If a future 
appointment was uncertain, I sometimes used amateur interpreters.  The problematic 
nature of this is returned to, however, the alternative would have been not to include 
these people, thereby exacerbating the impact of language barriers.   
I originally planned to use creative methods as a research tool, as advocated by Sarah 
Pink et al (2012).   However, the disabled asylum seekers I worked with, rejected the 
idea of taking photographs or drawing pictures to explain messages to a wider 
audience.  If the policies are deliberate, then echoing the perception of Peter Beresford 
(2017), das8 argued that awareness-raising is no solution.  She explained ‘if somebody 
is hungry, then eat something for you to be satisfied’.  She was scornful of the function 
of art, saying that however beautiful a picture, it will not solve the need.  I have 
previously used art in research (Yeo and Bolton, 2008, 2013) and argue that this can 
facilitate bringing people together, to discuss and convey key messages in accessible 
ways.  Nonetheless, the wishes and priorities of contributors were central to my doctoral 
research design.  There was greater interest in the use of film.  Therefore, films formed 
a key part of the action research elements of this study.  I worked with a film-maker to 
create short films of people expressing the messages which they wished to be 
understood by a wider audience.  The films were edited collaboratively, enabling people 
involved to decide what they did, or did not, want included.  To date, the films have 
been used at events organised in the final stage of this research, as well as at the 
Permanent People’s Tribunal on Migration in London (October 2018), at a conference 
on disability and migration at the University of Malta (November 2018), and on social 
media.  It is questionable how film-making is functionally different from art designed to 
convey messages, but most importantly, in research designed to contribute to social 
change, methods must be chosen according to people’s wishes. 
A core misconception in my planning was that people with lived experience would have 
a central role in developing alternatives.  I had imagined that people who have been 
dislocated from their former lives, who are less established in the existing system, 
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would have greater capacity to envisage alternatives than those whose upbringing and 
livelihoods are entrenched in the system as it currently is.  As Lorde (2017, p.16) 
famously asserted, ‘the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house…they 
will never enable us to bring about genuine change’.  With the aim of contributing to a 
process of ‘genuine change’, my expectation was that those gaining least from the 
‘masters tools’ would be in a superior position to see alternative means of dismantling 
the ‘master’s house’.  However, this plan was challenged by my first interviewee 
(das11) who explained, ‘I don’t have the energy … I myself am in a floating boat that I 
can anytime fall down’.  She explained that people in less precarious living conditions 
must take the lead in developing alternatives.  This is not to diminish the significance 
of lived experience in terms of developing a broader movement of resistance, but to 
question the leadership role I had envisaged.  This situation is not unique to disabled 
asylum seekers.  As Mary Jean Hande and Christine Kelly write, some disabled people 
in Canada spend:  
endless hours of organizing and physical and emotional labour simply to ‘get through 
the day’.  This leaves limited energy and time to focus on other political projects and 
tackle broad socio-economic processes like austerity and neoliberalism that have 
forced them into these conditions to begin with. (2015, p.970) 
This is not to diminish the significance of the insights and analysis stemming from lived 
experience.  Rather, it is to highlight the impact of deprivation of human needs.  Drawing 
on Gramsci, Crehan (2016, p.188) argues that ‘the incoherent common sense of 
subalterns’ must be developed with support from others, ‘into coherent political 
narratives’.  I do not suggest that the common-sense of lived experience is incoherent, 
but that people may lack the energy to develop and assert ideas.  The solution is not 
to ignore the voices and insights of lived experience but to provide for human needs 
such that people have the capacity to contribute to hegemonic contestation and 
development of alternatives.  
Stage 4.  The results of bringing people together 
The final stage of the research strategy drew on discursive explanations adopted by 
people attending wider events.  I organised several events to bring together disabled 
asylum seekers and citizens.  The largest of these events took place on June 29th, 2018 
(dmas1) bringing together approximately 200 disabled asylum seekers, disabled 
citizens, local authority staff, trade unionists, services providers, academics, and 
activists.  We had a formal memorial to Kamil Ahmad and Bijan Ebrahimi, both disabled 
refugees who were murdered in Bristol.  This was followed by a procession (see Figure 
2) and, finally, discussion led by disabled citizens and refugees. 
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Figure 2: Procession leaving Bristol City Hall 
In addition, I organised roundtable discussions on 28th September and 12th November 
2018 (dmas2) for local authority and voluntary sector employees, focused on the 
barriers experienced by asylum seekers accessing social care.  Finally, I co-organised 
an event on 27th July 2019 (dmas3), bringing together disabled citizens and asylum 
seekers to explore collective history and current ways forward.  All these events 
involved many planning meetings with asylum seekers, activists, and voluntary sector 
employees.  
The purpose of these events was to provide a wider forum for discussion of the 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers, to explore different perspectives of the 
problem and possible solutions, and to contribute to developing a broader community 
of resistance and solidarity.  In these ways, I sought to move away from ‘extractive, 
colonial, and elitist forms of knowledge production’ (Angeles and Pratt, 2017, p.271).  
In so doing, as Gabriel Winant (2015) describes, there is a quest to explore ‘what latent 
things do you and I share that might, if activated, endow us with ….  collective potency’.  
The equalising element of facilitating learning from disabled asylum seekers may have 
successfully contributed to building what Rancière (1999, p.22) refers to as ‘logos’ or 
‘a memorial speech, an account to be kept up’.  The events also served ‘to build 
communities of solidarity beyond the university’ (Angeles and Pratt, 2017, p.271). The 
sense of solidarity which developed particularly during planning meetings, together with 
the sense of contributing to a process of political change, became important elements 
for self-care, and therefore have ethical significance, as will be discussed.  These 
events were largely unsuccessful regarding the movement building and political 
influence I had hoped for, as will be explained in Chapter 7.  Nonetheless, the 
organisation and indeed the political failure of these events, provide useful insights for 
this study.   
During the study, I also attended many meetings and events, organised by other 
people, in response to issues of forced migration in which issues of disability were 
sometimes considered, albeit with varying degrees of ambiguity.  These meetings 
included informal gatherings, and more formal meetings of people working on issues 
of support to asylum seekers and refugees at the level of national, city, district, and 
78 
 
small town.  I estimate that I took part in over 100 hours of such activities during the 
study, however, some of these simply contribute to background knowledge.  The 
meetings that I have been involved with during the research process include the 
equalities sub-group of the National Asylum Stakeholder Forum (Nasf).  This forum is 
made up of Home Office and NGO staff working on asylum issues (referred to in this 
study as nm1).  I presented previous research to them in 2014 and then continued to 
attend regular meetings.  I also attended meetings of a District Council initiative to 
discuss issues facing migrants in the area (dcm2) as well as a small-town initiative of 
supporters of resettled Syrian refugees (lm3).  In addition, I attended several social 
gatherings of asylum-seeking communities and allies, political gatherings of activists, 
and academic conferences.  
My motivation for involvement in these meetings was in part political, to inform myself 
as well as to contribute to debate.  I took the role of contributor, or participant observer, 
rather than explicitly attending for purposes of data gathering.  At times I made 
interventions based on my political perspective and my research findings.  The 
observations referred to here, stem from my journal notes and publicly available 
meeting records, rather than verbatim transcriptions.  On the occasions where I had 
not gained clear written consent from meeting participants, I avoid citing people 
individually and change identifying features if necessary.  However, none of these 
meetings were private or confidential.   
The different objectives and methods of the four different research stages are 
summarised in Table 5:  
Table 5: Summary of research design 
Research 
questions 
Chapter Sources of information Methods 
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7 Drawing on the findings from a) 
and b). 
As above 
3.4 Research practicalities  
This research design raises some additional practical considerations which require 
more in-depth consideration.   
Recruitment  
Purposive sampling was used to seek contributions from people with diverse subject 
positions (listed in Appendix 1).  In addition, disabled asylum seekers were largely 
referred to me by word of mouth, particularly by staff of a refugee support organisation 
drawing on long-term informal connections. This sampling method, known as 
snowballing, is often used to find ‘hidden’ populations (Bloch, A., 1999).  Patrick 
Christian (2012) explains that finding people for qualitative research may depend not 
just on physical location but also on trusting relationships with gatekeepers.  As 
stressed by Jacobsen and Landau (2003), such recruitment methods are problematic 
if contributors seek their involvement to be confidential.  However, these were the most 
appropriate methods in the circumstances.   
Despite these attempts at including people with diverse experiences, there are 
undoubtedly gaps.  It is difficult for people in situations of crisis to take part.  I met one 
person (das14) just once, for less than an hour.  It was his first visit to the voluntary 
organisation where I was temporarily based.  He was highly agitated, complaining of 
insomnia caused by fear of his dreams and of being unable to focus because he had 
too much in his head.  Without any practical support to offer, this research was unhelpful 
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to him.  Furthermore, voluntary organisations with an emphasis on informal peer 
support may be inaccessible to people with such anxiety.  It should, therefore, be noted 
that the people who contributed most to this research are not necessarily those in 
greatest need.   
 
I was unsuccessful in gaining input from people with as wide a range of subject 
positions as I wished.  I tried to contact Members of Parliament with responsibility for 
disability or immigration decision-making, however, I only successfully interviewed one 
person from the Home Affairs Select Committee.  I was also unsuccessful in reaching 
people with more overt roles in the implementation of government policy.  I drew on 
contacts in trade unions as well as the Home Office, however, people may be 
particularly wary of speaking to a stranger about work that is clearly problematic.  I also 
tried multiple routes to contact disabled people selected for the VPRS, using contacts 
at national, city and small-town levels, but only one disabled refugee from this scheme 
contributed to this study.  I speculate that gatekeepers may have been wary of 
facilitating contact, as I had expressed reservations about the scheme.  This highlights 
a potential research limitation, of apparently more willing collaboration from people who 
support the research premise.  Another of the barriers to securing involvement of 
disabled asylum seekers stemmed from understanding of disability.  Different cultural 
and linguistic backgrounds may result in people not labelling themselves as disabled.  
My reliance on gatekeepers meant that I also relied on their understanding of the 
different possible manifestations of disability.  To reduce confusion, I produced fliers 
(Appendix 3) in different languages, explaining the purpose of this research, including 
some examples of impairments, and inviting disabled people to take part.   
Perceptions of the research purpose and likely consequences may shape willingness 
to be involved.  Lee (1993, p.8) describes people’s reluctance to be involved in research 
perceived to be ‘completely futile’, such as studies designed ‘to reveal that 
unemployment was an unpleasant experience’.  If potential negative consequences are 
envisaged, then consent or full engagement may be hindered.  The shared purpose 
element of action research may provide necessary incentive for people to be involved, 
however, there may need to be explicit ‘actions of reciprocity’ (Harrison, MacGibbon 
and Morton, 2001).  In research designed to respect the knowledge of those with lived 
experience, and to reduce distinctions between the researcher and the researched, it 
is inconsistent when some people respond through their employment and are, in effect, 
paid for their time, while others contribute voluntarily.  Some analysts believe that when 
working with people living in precarious circumstances, even modest remuneration may 
result in people feeling obliged to take part, so reducing capacity for informed consent 
(see Wiles et al., 2005).  However, as Wertheimer and Miller (2008, p.392) argue, ‘the 
situation of financial payment for research is no different - with respect to coercion - 
from payment for public service jobs’.  Payment is assumed to be a central element of 
employment, yet it is not generally suggested that the associated coercion creates 
untrustworthy employees.  Nonetheless, paid work is generally illegal for asylum 
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seekers (Mayblin, 2016), therefore, it is not possible to provide full financial recognition 
of people’s contribution.  Instead, people were provided with refreshments and 
expenses but not cash payments.  This may be the best solution possible in the 
circumstances, but I remain uncomfortable with the inherent inequalities between 
contributors.   
Use of interpreters 
Similar issues of positionality may apply to interpreters as to interviewers.  As Jacobsen 
and Landau (2003, p.193) describe, there is a risk when using interpreters that past 
associations transgress ‘political, social or economic fault-lines of which the researcher 
may not be aware’.  Problems securing anonymity may arise if interpreters are used 
from a small community.  These issues may be balanced to some degree if 
interviewees choose their interpreter.  In this study, das7 rejected several proposed 
interpreters.  Some interpreters also rejected proposed work because of the risk of 
being retraumatised if someone recounts experiences which are similar to their own.  
Methodological issues arising from language barriers discussed by Bogussia Temple 
and Rhetta Moran (2006) are echoed by the experiences in this study.  Additional 
communication barriers arose when interviewees’ (das1 and 6) asserted that their 
English was good enough and that they did not need interpreters.  It could have been 
undermining to insist on an interpreter, yet I struggled to understand them.  
Furthermore, contact with them was spontaneous and they may not have returned for 
an appointment with an interpreter.  
On some occasions, there may be advantages to working without interpreters, despite 
reduced accuracy of communication.  Some people appeared more relaxed and 
forthcoming without an interpreter present.  For example, communication with das5, 
was through a mixture of our combined broken French, English, and gestures.  I did not 
digitally record this contact but noted in my journal that I felt it worked well despite 
linguistic barriers.  Much communication relies on building trust, which may be easier 
without an interpreter and a recorder, however, it is uncertain whether understanding 
is accurate.  At our first meeting, I had understood das5 to say that he was too 
distressed to focus on learning English.  When I returned with an interpreter for the 
second meeting, he then said that the problem in the English class was that other 
students were too noisy.  I am unsure whether I misunderstood the first time, whether 
he did not want to refer to his mental distress in front of an interpreter, or whether these 
are simply multiple components of the barriers experienced which may be prioritised at 
different times.  Such fluctuating accounts highlight how what is learned from such 
interviews must be considered as a contribution to the development of ideas, rather 
than necessarily as objective ‘facts’.   
Facilitating and recording research contributions 
My interviews were almost all digitally recorded and transcribed.  There were a few 
exceptions: when attempted recording failed due to background noise or technical 
error; when informal conversations developed into important research contributions, 
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but when it seemed too disruptive to ask to record the interaction; or when fears of 
possible retribution if criticisms were traced, resulted in people asking for their 
comments not to be recorded.  Such requests are respected, as set out in the BSA 
ethical guidelines (2017, p.6, paragraph 26).  On these occasions, I relied on notes 
taken during the event or immediately afterwards.  Roger Sanjek (cited by Lecompte 
and Schensul, 1999, p.31) refers to short notes taken during an event as ‘mental notes 
kept ... until such time as it is possible to actually write things down’.  It is not necessarily 
immediately clear which observations may become significant.  Cindi Katz (2013, 
p.762) observes that many kinds of information and knowledge are gathered during the 
research process, ‘only some of which makes it into our texts… some materials get 
stuck, constituted as marginal, imagined as private musings’.  It is difficult to ensure 
sufficient accuracy from journal notes to use these as verbatim quotes, however, they 
are invaluable for recording ideas.   
Digital recording of interviews may facilitate accurate notetaking, but the negative 
elements of formal methods may be exacerbated.  Such recording may increase the 
tendency for what David Gauntlett (2007, p.97) describes as the ‘artificial kind of talk’ 
generated by the ‘formal contexts of an interview or focus group’.  Instead, he 
advocates prolonged informal time for conversation and reflection.  This enables people 
to tell ‘their story in their way from their point of view by their own agency’ (Christian, 
2012, p.8).  In this study, I found that the collaborative planning of events facilitated 
informal discussion in which important insights were shared.  Similar opportunities for 
reflection may be achieved through walking interviews (Lachauer, 1997; O’Neill, 2017) 
and collaborative art projects  (Yeo and Bolton, 2008, 2013). Irrespective of the method 
used, it is important to develop what Les Back (2007) calls the ‘art of listening’, beyond 
hearing the answers to pre-determined questions.  In research with asylum seekers, it 
is important to avoid methods resembling the ‘coercive scrutiny’ (Sinha and Back, 2014, 
p.474) of the immigration system, in which the ‘wrong’ answer may have fatal 
consequences.  This may preclude the use of formal recording and individual 
interviews.    
Irrespective of the methods used or my assertions of anonymity, it is assumed that 
there will be reluctance to ‘express critical or dissenting opinions’ (Berghold and 
Thomas, 2012) with potentially negative consequences. Interviewees may avoid what 
they perceive as potential damage to reputation in the community (Jacobsen and 
Landau, 2003, p.192).  This is particularly important in the context of the precarious 
circumstances in which many asylum seekers live.  However, in addition, employees 
may be similarly reluctant to criticise those on whom they depend.   Honest and open 
contribution is hindered by wider power inequalities.  
Analysis and relevance of findings 
Drawing on the poststructuralist discourse theory described in Chapter 2, analysis 
focused on the discursive logics underpinning the ‘institution, contestation and 
sedimentation of social practices and regimes’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.159).  In 
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practical terms, I used NVivo to code and organise ideas and citations from interview 
transcripts and notes into initial themes, maintaining links to the original transcript (see 
for example Waters, 2016).  I explored the diversity of ideas, including those I 
considered misguided or inaccurate.  Contradictions between different people’s 
accounts would be problematic if the purpose were to arrive at a single truth rather than 
the diversity of perceptions.    
Using interview transcripts, I explored how people with different subject positions 
represent ‘the problems’ associated with disability and forced migration, and how these 
representations shape policy solutions.  The strategy is informed by questions adapted 
from the work of Bacchi (2009) and her later work with Susan Goodwin:  
What is the problem represented to be?  
What assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’?   
Where are the silences?  Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently? 
What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’? 
How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced? (2016, p.20) 
It is reiterated that the focus of this study was on the diversity rather than the prevalence 
of ideas, however, as Jacobsen and Landau warn, data regarding marginalised groups 
such as refugees may be:  
assumed by the media or policymakers to represent the totality of a refugee population’s 
experience.  Researchers must, consequently, make a concerted effort to ensure that 
the limits of their data and analyses do not create the wrong impression. (2003, p.190) 
Therefore, it is necessary to stress that this study provides no evidence as to the 
prevalence of any experience or idea.  Glynos and Howarth make clear the objectives 
and limitations of their approach to poststructuralist discourse theory:  
naturalists offer the prospect of a causal explanation by subsuming the phenomena 
under universal laws… hermeneuticists explain via the use of particular contextualised 
interpretations, our approach conceives of explanation in terms of a critical and 
articulated assemblage of logics. (2007, p.164) 
This analysis is not focused on proving or quantifying facts, but on investigating the 
impact of hegemonic power inequalities and how they are, or could be, contested.  
Beyond the use of appropriate theories and methods for classifying data, in the light of 
the ‘triple imperative’ (Block et al., 2013, p.84), it is important to ask whether the findings 
are useful to those who have contributed.  Margaret LeCompte (2000, p.152) urges 
researchers to continually ask themselves, ‘Do I, the researcher, really understand and 
describe what I am studying in the same way that those who live it do?’.  I suggest this 
is unlikely and not my goal.  Instead, I seek to empathise with those with lived 
experience, to learn from the insights of different contributors, and thereby to improve 
understanding of current experiences and how injustices might be contested.   
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Ethical considerations  
Ethical issues were considered throughout the study.  I obtained ethical clearance from 
the University of Bath and follow the BSA (2017) and ESRC (2019) guidelines.  
However, as Marmo (2013, p.86) warns, ‘research ethics in this field of study may be 
used as a canvas that researchers can stretch to fit their purposes and needs’.   There 
are particular ethical risks associated with working with people living in vulnerable 
circumstances (see for example Sinha and Back, 2014).  The impact of interconnected 
inequalities of power and opportunity require further consideration. 
The risk of detrimental impact from involvement in research requires consideration.  I 
was concerned about causing resentment by bringing together people with different 
entitlements.  However, it may be that such disparities are so omnipresent that more 
contact makes little difference.  Perhaps a more avoidable problem is the issue of 
raising false expectations (British Sociological Association (BSA), 2017, p.6, paragraph 
23).  When first told about the event that we were organising, das8 responded that she 
could not come because campaigning involves opening oneself to hope and therefore 
also to disappointment.  This was a risk she was not able to take.  After the event, one 
person (das4) was angry that despite her contribution, nothing changed.  This highlights 
three connected issues.  Firstly, as someone who has grown up in the UK, I assumed 
it was clear that however ‘successful’ a meeting, it would not resolve an individual 
asylum claim.  Secondly, I realise that I had wrongly assumed that the interpreter would 
explain the context beyond straight interpretation of the words.  Furthermore, describing 
Gramsci’s perspective, Crehan (2016, p.64) explains, ‘every language contains the 
elements of a conception of the world and of a culture’. If someone does not understand 
the dominant language, in this case English, they may also not understand dominant 
social norms and assumed common-sense.  In this regard, the lack of language frames 
a person in the position of the subaltern.  Thirdly, as another asylum seeker (das8) 
explained to me the asylum system makes people desperate, which makes them hold 
onto any possibility of hope, however irrational this may appear to an outsider.  
Similarly, Marmo (2013, p.12) argues that if inherent power inequalities frame the 
researcher as ‘the powerful entity in charge of the outcome of the research’, then this 
‘will develop an expectation (that sufferance is alleviated)’.  The risk of raising false 
hopes is therefore not addressed simply by stating a contrary intention.   
The practicalities of informed consent require consideration.  I sought informed consent 
from all contributors to individual or group interviews (see Appendix 4) as laid out in 
paragraph 29 of the BSA ethical guidelines.  I stressed the voluntary nature of the 
interaction, that each person controls what they divulge, and that consent could be 
withdrawn.  Where there are language barriers, good interpreters are essential to 
informed consent.  However, as Mackenzie et al. (2007) point out, informed consent is 
complex when working with people living in precarious circumstances.  When asked if 
she would contribute to a meeting about immigration and disability, das11 hesitated 
before agreeing.  This person was a friend, which made it easier to probe than had she 
been a stranger.  She elaborated: 
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I feel too exhausted ... prefer to do nothing ... why don't citizens get asked to talk about 
how tough life is... when you are seeking asylum it puts you in the limelight.   
This highlights the importance of probing to ensure that the option of refusing consent 
is fully understood.    
Complications were experienced regarding consent for involvement in the films.  
Separate consent was obtained for the film, as advised in paragraph 27 of BSA ethical 
guidelines (2017, p.6) including the choice as to whether a person’s face should be 
recognisable and where the film could be shown.  One person (das3) asked for their 
face, name, and experiences to be known by as many people as possible.  However, 
the day before a public event, the voluntary sector agency supporting this person cited 
funding concerns and asked for their employee’s consent to be removed, also claiming 
that das3 now wished to be made anonymous.  It was not possible to contact this 
person directly to verify his decision.  However, if a person depends on an 
organisation’s support, then it may be difficult to counter organisational wishes.  The 
factors prompting the organisational withdrawal of consent are discussed in Chapter 7 
and highlight the impediments to overt criticism.  In response to this situation, I worked 
with others to create a protocol for collaboration between funded voluntary sector 
agencies, unpaid service users and activists.  This raised questions of the meaning of 
consent in the context of power inequality. 
The issue of anonymity raises further ethical considerations.  When working with people 
with minority identities for extended periods, it becomes likely that other people become 
aware of the involvement.  For those who chose to share their ideas in public meetings, 
the use of films enabled people to share ideas while hiding their identities.  It should, 
however, not be assumed that anonymity is necessarily advantageous.  Previous BSA 
guidelines (2002) asserted the value of ‘automatic anonymity for participants’.  Sinha 
and Back (2014, p.12) criticise an ‘unthinking default position’ of automatic anonymity, 
likening it to ‘an anxious symptom of ethical hypochondria’.  As Lorde writes, ‘your 
silence will not protect you’.  Disabled asylum seekers’ perspectives on the value or 
risk of publicity are discussed in Chapter 6.  The possibility that publicity may help a 
person’s fight for justice, means that there are ethical reasons to enable people to 
speak out if they so wish.  
Beyond the needs of research contributors, there is a need to consider ethics of self-
care for researchers engaged with traumatic issues.  The vicarious impact is 
incomparable to those for whom there is no option of removing themselves from the 
situation.  However, the potential for guilt, despair and sense of inadequacy should not 
be underestimated (Lee, 1993; Harris and Roberts, 2003).  During this study, I 
organised a support group for researchers working on traumatic issues.  This was 
facilitated by a psychotherapist from the Trauma Foundation.  The funding for this 
resulted in the sessions largely taking place while I was away and therefore unable to 
fully engage.  However, when immersed in what felt like relentless and extreme 
examples of injustice, whether in relation to the injustice experienced by disabled 
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asylum seekers, or the responses of policymakers and services providers, there were 
many times during this research process when I needed space to ‘rant’.  Supervisory 
support was invaluable in this regard.  This need may not be traditionally considered 
academic, as Holloway states: ‘there is no room for the scream in academic discourse’ 
(2002, p.3).  At a conference organised by the Trauma Foundation (2016), it was 
suggested that dealing with traumatic issues arising from a person’s work is as 
essential as miners arguing for washing to take place during work time.  If researchers 
rely on the support of family and friends, it risks distorting these relationships as well 
as raising ethical issues of anonymity.   
The injustices at the core of this research are, however, not simply part of the findings 
but also the research motivator.  As Holloway writes: 
When we write or when we read, it is easy to forget that the beginning is not the word, 
but the scream.  Faced with the mutilation of human lives by capitalism, the scream of 
sadness, a scream of horror, a scream of anger, a scream of refusal. (2002, p.1) 
Emotional responses to such work are therefore inevitable but must be channelled in 
useful directions.  Lorde (1988) asserts that ‘caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it 
is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare’.  I realise that for me ‘political 
warfare’, and the accompanying solidarity, is itself an act of self-care.  The solidarity 
and sense of engagement associated with bringing together the asylum sector and 
disabled people’s movement were essential to the research design.  These elements 
also enabled me, at least temporarily, to reject the potentially traumatic effects of being 
an impotent observer and instead to direct emotion to contributing to political 
alternatives.  However, the difficulties with political activism as a form of self-care are 
that it is time-consuming, depends on others’ engagement, and does not always 
proceed in positive directions, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
Positionality 
My core assumptions and personal background were discussed at the outset, however, 
the inevitable impact of positionality (see for example Pratt, 1997; Sultana, 2007) on 
the research rationale and design necessitates more detailed consideration.   
My combined academic/activist motivation leads me, perhaps naively, to perceive 
disabled asylum seekers as people with whom I work in solidarity, rather than as 
‘participants’ in my study.  The feasibility of such a goal requires further consideration.  
I am frustrated at my failure to maintain contact with people who contributed to this 
study.  The words of das9 reverberate for me.  He initially declined to be involved, 
saying he knew what would happen: I would ask lots of questions, get the information 
that I need, then I would disappear and forget that he ever existed.  I do not forget the 
ongoing daily injustices that are experienced, but my geographical location and wider 
responsibilities, make regular connections difficult.  It is therefore understandable if 
people felt used for my academic purposes. 
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Beyond what I perceive as personal failings to maintain these relationships, my goals 
of solidarity and equality are counter to hegemonic discursive representation of 
‘subjects’, ‘cases’ or ‘data’ to be collected in an external metaphorical ‘field’.  Such 
discourse suggests a detachment which is rarely, if ever, applicable.  As Cindi Katz 
(1994, p.67) puts it, ‘we are always already in the field’, or as Marinella Marmo (2013, 
p.96) argues, a researcher ‘is not an abstract entity but is part of this external context’.  
Discursive representation of the researcher as an impartial expert, observing ‘cases’ in 
the ‘field’, risks reinforcing the systemic othering being investigated.  Such an approach 
might obscure interconnections and the ways in which researchers may be among 
those implicated in accounts of inequalities.  Whatever the language or research 
motivations, as Marmo (2013, p.95) argues, ‘in the relationship between researcher 
and research subject, the powerless remain the asylum seekers. And the researcher is 
in the dominant position’. Such inequalities are not exclusive to the research 
relationship but are a consequence of the very injustices being observed.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, according to social constructivism, researchers’ 
assumptions need to be placed in the context of the experiences and interpretations 
which have shaped them.  My experiences of disability, migration and involvement in 
the voluntary sector undoubtedly shape my perceptions and provide some insights into 
the culture, assumptions and limitations which are faced.  However, such limited 
commonalities could become problematic if exaggerated (Worth, 2008, p.310) and if I 
believed that I had automatic insight into the ‘lifeworld’s’ (Husserl, 1936) of disabled 
asylum seekers, voluntary sector employees or anyone else.  Furthermore, lack of 
commonality is not necessarily a hurdle.  As noted by Sandhu et al. (2017, p.374) ‘some 
people do not like disclosing information to people from the same or similar cultures, 
as they may feel “judged”’.  Sometimes, ‘a sense of familiarity and rapport’ (ibid) based 
on overt commonalities between interviewers and interviewees may enable access.  
My white, British, middle-class, apparently non-disabled appearance may facilitate 
access to government institutions.  Home Office staff were initially keen to collaborate.  
In an interview in 2015, one high ranking policy officer asserted his commitment to 
improve the situation for disabled asylum seekers insofar as this can be achieved within 
the context of immigration law (Yeo, 2015b). This willingness appeared to reduce as 
the differences in our political goals became apparent.   
Human judgements shape all research including this study.  Interviewees with different 
subject positions may perceive me as the privileged ‘other’, an ignorant outsider, a 
potential risk or indeed an ally. Sometimes, judgements may be hidden or 
inconsequential, other times they frame what is divulged.  On one occasion, an NGO 
employee asked whether I have ever ‘sat in on a care assessment’.  I said no, without 
correcting her assumption that I had not had one myself.  This relates in part to Kitchin’s 
(2010, p.34), observation that, ‘disabled people will only tell partial stories to a non-
disabled researcher for fear of embarrassment or lack of empathy’.  I may have been 
more open with someone with whom I was sure of commonalities, however, my focus 
was on her perspective not asserting my own.  Yet, although I have never faced the 
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struggles for survival routine to many disabled asylum seekers, my experiences of 
professionals presuming to understand my priorities better than I did, are significant to 
my political perspective.  When I learn of disregard for other people’s needs, my anger 
is, in part, personal.  My lived experiences, like those of anyone else, shape what I 
consider worth asking, what I notice and, it can be assumed, what I consider so normal 
as to be invisible.  
Methodological limitations and conclusions  
The limitations of this research methodology should be understood in the context of the 
research assumptions and purpose.  The poststructuralist assumption that there is no 
single reality, has been criticised for allowing researchers to ‘find what they expect to 
find’ (Stubbs, 1997).  Furthermore, Jacobsen and Landau (2003, p.187) warn of a risk 
that when activist and academic goals are combined, researchers know what they want 
to say and come away from the research having ‘proved’ it.  However, research without 
activist ambitions may also risk bias in attempting to prove a researcher’s hypothesis 
correct.  A basic prerequisite of research should be that any hypothesis ‘could be 
proven wrong’ (2003, p.191).  The retroductive approach makes such bias less 
relevant, as the goal is not to prove, or disprove, pre-existing hypotheses, but to 
contribute to effective contestation.   
The action research element of this work may contribute to the ethical commitment that 
research should contribute to mitigating the problem being investigated (Jacobsen and 
Landau, 2003).  However, this may also raise false expectations of change, framing 
myself as researcher as having ‘something to offer’ (Marmo, 2013, p.15).  The relative 
power, bestowed in these ways, combines with wider inequalities associated with 
different subject positions.  The concept of power is used here in a Foucauldian sense:  
power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual … 
attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise 
and which others have to recognise in him. (1983, p.212) 
My capacity, and the way this is perceived, is inevitably shaped by my subject position 
and the associated relative power.   
The core flaw of this research methodology then becomes the failure to secure 
meaningful individual or systemic change.  As Fleming and Ward assert:  
Social action research involves a responsibility not to leave the participants and the 
stakeholders high and dry at the end of the research process… not knowing …what 
actions to take towards change. (2004, p.166)  
Together with others, I tried and failed to prevent das17 being deported away from his 
family, friends, and means of survival.  He rang me several times from detention to 
discuss what to do.  On one occasion he also asked if I could help a person, he had 
met facing similar injustice.  I refused, not because I doubted the injustice, but because 
I recognised my impotence against the ever more examples of horrendous injustice.  
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The research methodology resulted in a difficult balance between responding to the 
urgency of such needs, attempting to use the action research approach to contribute 
to change, while investigating underlying causes and possible solutions.  The failure to 
secure meaningful change can be attributed to multiple factors, as will be discussed in 
the final chapter.  However, the result remains that in this regard the research 
methodology has been largely unsuccessful at the time of writing.  
Beyond the wider research capacity, there may be limitations stemming from who was 
involved and how.  Motivation to actively collaborate may depend on a sense of 
common purpose.  I avoid overtly expressing my standpoint, aware of the need to avoid 
what Danieli and Woodhams (2005, p.290) refer to as pressure on research subjects 
to ‘tow the party line’.  However, this is not necessarily productive.  One activist (udc5) 
was reluctant to be involved before establishing my political position and objectives.  
Meanwhile, people may be less likely to actively contribute if sensing different 
motivation to my own.  However, while I would have liked to include people with greater 
variety of perspectives, it was not essential to investigating how hegemonic discourse 
could be more effectively contested.    
This research was designed to understand the causes of the injustice faced by disabled 
asylum seekers, and to contribute to improving the situation.  For this purpose, I now 
turn to investigate the discursive logics (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) used in public 
discourse and by people with different subject positions.  I analyse how policy discourse 
has become hegemonic and how it could be effectively contested.  The success of this 




Chapter 4.  UK government policies: How discursive 
representations of problems associated with 
disability and forced migration shape current 
entitlements. 
Realist policy analysis  
concentrates too much on what those who inhabit policy think about and misses and 
fails to attend to what they do not think about.  Thus, we need to appreciate the way in 
which policy ensembles, collections of related policies, exercise power through a 
production of “truth” and “knowledge”. (Ball, 2006, p.48) 
As I have explained, the purpose of this study is not to quantify or ‘prove’ the existence 
of injustices associated with disability and migration in the UK.  Nonetheless the 
motivation for this study and the reason that government policies matter is because of 
their human impact.  Therefore, before analysing government policy discourse I begin 
with a short example of the impact of current policy.  
At the end of a focus group with Home Office staff members, a senior employee asked 
for my view on their safeguarding policy.  I explained that seeking to identify people 
eligible for safeguarding does not address the cause of the problem.  I described how, 
after his asylum claim was refused, das7 attempted to take his own life.  This was not 
the result of being more innately vulnerable than anyone else, but of there being no 
apparent solution to his struggles.  The safeguarding team may, or may not, have been 
able to prevent him from jumping off a bridge, but this would not have addressed the 
cause of his despair.  The Home Office employee responded by saying that this person 
should have been informed of the potential for ‘voluntary return’.  When I last saw das7, 
he was in the process of appealing the asylum refusal.  His mental and physical health 
had deteriorated to such a degree that he needed help with daily living.  His ‘hope’ for 
appeal was based on evidence that his mother was so seriously ill in his country of 
origin, that she would be unable to care for him, if he were returned.   The potential for 
‘voluntary return’ would clearly not be a solution to his struggles.  Furthermore, these 
experiences are not the result of oversight but the result of current policy.   
Understanding the determinants of current distinction of entitlements is essential to 
developing effective contestation. The restrictions and inequalities of formal entitlement 
experienced by disabled asylum seekers and refugees in the UK are shaped by 
government policy.  This first analytical chapter draws on elements of poststructural 
discourse theory, applying the logics of critical explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) 
to investigate the discursive struggles for hegemony that underpin contemporary 
immigration policy and welfare reform.  Analysis focuses on the dominant logics of 
explanation used to represent the problem which these policies seek to address, and 
what is thereby obscured.  In this investigation, ‘immigration policy’ refers to legislation 
determining the entitlements of migrants.  Discursive representation of disability is 
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considered largely in relation to welfare reform as this is considered the most significant 
change to contemporary entitlements.  Subsequent chapters investigate how the 
hegemony of the elite discourse of policymakers is reinforced or contested by people 
with different subject positions regarding implementation of policy and practice, before 
considering the perspectives of those with lived experience of the impact.  The final 
chapter then explores how such discursive representations of the problem frame 
perceived solutions, and how current inequalities could be more effectively contested.  
This chapter begins by briefly considering hegemonic discourse following World War 
Two, regarding entitlements associated with immigration and disability, as this forms 
the context for subsequent developments.  Analysis then turns to legislative White 
Papers and political speeches, in which the arguments underpinning contemporary 
immigration policy or welfare reform are summarised.  Detailed analysis of the 
discursive struggles shaping immigration policy begins with the White Paper: ‘Fairer, 
faster and firmer’ (1998) because the resultant policy changes continue to shape 
current entitlements.  This White Paper frames asylum and immigration as a threat to 
be reduced through withdrawing access to the welfare state.  Despite the particularly 
life-changing impact of these restrictions on disabled asylum seekers, the invisibility of 
the ‘other’ is affirmed by the absence of explicit reference to disability.  The discursive 
representation underpinning this White Paper is then compared with the VPRS.  This 
scheme was introduced by James Brokenshire, Minister for Immigration and Security 
(2014) under the coalition government of Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties 
(2010-2015).  The discursive framing of these ostensibly contrasting approaches to 
immigration policy is analysed.  Both approaches highlight assumed distinctions of 
human worth, while contributing to the dislocation of logics of individual rights and 
collective responsibility, which had framed post-World War Two discourse underpinning 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee Convention.    
Attention then turns to representation of disability, focusing on key documents in the 
development of welfare reforms.  Analysis begins with a speech by then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair (1999) regarding his vision for welfare reform, in which the collective 
responsibility of the post-war era was replaced by the individual responsibility of 
neoliberalism.  The enactment of this agenda is analysed in relation to two White 
Papers considered central to contemporary welfare reform.  The first, ‘Our health, our 
care, our say: a new direction for community services’ (2006) focuses on social care 
provision and was introduced by the New Labour government led by Blair.  The second, 
‘Universal Credit: welfare that works’ (2010) focuses on financial support from the 
welfare state and was introduced by the Coalition government led by David Cameron 
and Nick Clegg.  The impact of these cross-party policies provoked investigation by the 
UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  This chapter therefore 
includes analysis of this attempted reassertion of rights.  Finally, this chapter considers 
the impact of these policy struggles on intersectional entitlements associated with 
disability and migration.   
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4.1 The historical context shaping assumed social logics of 
common-sense   
Any discursive explanation builds on what has gone before.  Therefore, I briefly 
consider the historical context in which contemporary policy was introduced.  I do not 
seek to replicate existing analyses of the historical roots of inequalities associated with 
migration (see for example: Spencer, 2002; Anderson, B.L., 2013; Goodfellow, 2019) 
or disability (Borsay, 2005; Hampton, 2016; Clifford, 2020).  Instead, I summarise the 
core developments in both sectors, focusing on the post-World War Two era, a time in 
which normative discourse of human rights became hegemonic.  I focus on the 
dominant discursive logics adopted and how these relate to discursive representations 
shaping current entitlements.,  
The political hegemony following World War Two included international agreements 
designed to prevent repetition of global conflict.  Discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’, on which 
war relies, was contested with international agreements such as the United Nations 
Charter (1945), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948) and the Refugee 
Convention (1951).  In the UK, the National Assistance Act (1948) and the National 
Health Service (Bevan, 1952) were introduced, providing support to all, free at the point 
of delivery.  These international and national agreements framed notions of human 
rights as ‘unquestionably good’ (Meister, 2011, p.20).  Beyond these agreements, the 
normative value of human rights became core to the liberal hegemony.  This is not to 
suggest a halcyon era of equality and justice.  As Moyn’s (2014) analysis indicates, the 
human rights promoted in these international agreements never extended to economic 
equality.  Furthermore, Goodfellow argues that: 
the shameful present, in which … asylum seekers are left destitute on the streets, is 
often compared to an imagined past, as activists and outraged politicians indignantly 
ask: what has this country become?  The problem is, this is the kind of place it has long 
been.  (2019, p.46) 
Human rights violations and inequalities did not disappear in the post-war era despite 
these political declarations.   
In the UK, the post-war era was also the time of the introduction of the welfare state, 
providing greater support in times of need, as proposed in the report by William 
Beveridge (1942).  However, the Beveridge report never addressed the disadvantages 
associated with disability.  Clifford (2020, p.47) explains, ‘prevailing attitudes towards 
disabled people altered relatively little after the Second World War’.  Beveridge ‘failed 
to guarantee against the poverty and financial exclusion of disabled people’ (ibid).  
Furthermore, Pat Thane argues that to attempt to explain the introduction of the UK 
welfare state: 
as a manifestation of altruism, of a desire to remove poverty … renders mysterious the 




The lack of impact on ‘those in greatest need’ may be, in part, explained by the 
maintenance of exclusions to entitlement.  
The ‘universal’ nature of the Declaration of Human Rights was neither fully 
comprehensive in its conception, nor in its national implementation.  The Declaration 
only includes cursory reference to disability, regarding the right ‘to security in the event 
of unemployment, sickness, disability’ (article 25, 1948).  The lack of consideration of 
the pervasive barriers associated with disability is reflected in UK legislation.  In his 
analysis of the development of disability policy after World War Two, Jameel Hampton 
(2016, p.53) argues that disabled people experienced ‘comparative exclusion from the 
welfare state’.  He explains that barriers to paid employment resulted in lack of National 
Insurance contributions and reduced eligibility for benefit payments, thereby 
exacerbating inequalities.  This ‘exclusion from the welfare state’ was mirrored in wider 
legislation.  The 1944 Education Act framed disabled children as distinct, with numbers 
in segregated educational institutions increasing from 38,499 in 1945 to 106,367 in 
1972 (Borsay, 2012, p.1).  The human rights of disabled children were not represented 
as equal to those of ‘normal’ non-disabled children.  
Hegemonic representation of disabled people as unworthy of human rights was, 
however, contested.  In the UK, rejection of the continued segregation of disabled 
people prompted the emergence of the social model (Union of the Physically Impaired 
Against Segregation (UPIAS), 1976; Oliver, 1983).  At an international level, campaigns 
led to several high-profile agreements, including the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Disabled Persons (1975), the International Year of Disabled Persons (1981) and later 
the UNCRPD (2006).  However, Oliver and Barnes (2012, p.148) argue that the impact 
of such rights-based discourse on individual disabled people’s lives was ‘minimal’.  
These agreements contested access barriers associated with disability, rather than 
contesting common-sense prioritisation of profit maximisation which shapes capitalist 
distinctions of human worth.  The maintenance of social logics of the primacy of 
economically productive, non-disabled, citizens shapes both contemporary welfare 
reform and immigration policy.  Restrictions and inequalities brought in after the above 
agreements, required relatively minor adjustments to political logics determining who is 
entitled to support, rather than any fundamental dislocation of common-sense social 
logics.   
The denial of entitlement to post-war rights-based discourse were initially targeted at 
disabled people rather than migrants.  However, the existence of exclusions facilitated 
the extension to wider targets.  Since the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UK has passed 
19 legislative Acts of Parliament specifically reducing the rights of immigrants.  These 
Acts discursively frame migrants as the ‘other’, a minority who threaten common-sense 
social logics, within which UK citizens constitute the majority assumed to have prime 
legitimacy.  Normative framing of minority: majority status does not exclusively depend 
on migration or minority status.  The minority of migrants who bring significant amounts 
of capital is not framed as a threat by such legislation, despite having greater capacity 
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to influence life for the majority.  Instead, as Appadurai (2006, p.48) explains, fear of 
the minority is directed at ‘the weak’.  The apparent threat is not migration per se, but, 
as Vickers (2012) asserts, migration for reasons external to capitalist prioritisation of 
profit.  As such, the othering of disabled people and migrants may not stem from being 
a numerical minority but from being perceived as a burden on the capitalist economy.    
To understand what prevented the realisation of ‘universal’ human rights, enshrined in 
the UN declarations, it is necessary to consider what underpinned these agreements.  
The immediate aftermath of war was characterised by determination to avoid further 
conflict, together with a greater capacity for imagining alternatives, resulting from the 
inherent change associated with soldiers returning from war.  This combined with 
heightened awareness of the fragility of national borders and the potential for the 
burgeoning rejection of capitalism in the Soviet Union to gain popularity in the UK.  The 
rights-based discourse of the post-war era may have stemmed from what Pat Thane 
(2013, p.3) refers to as ‘questions of political and social order’ forestalling a potential 
moment of more fundamental contestation.  However, as Glynos, Klimecki and Wilmott 
(2012, p.298) explain, ‘while the radical contingency of social reality might become 
more clearly visible in moments of crisis and dislocation, it does not follow that structural 
transformation ensues’.  The overt discursive agenda was shaped by political logics of 
rights, articulated with, rather than dislocating, ongoing social logics of the primacy of 
non-disabled, economically productive citizens.  Those framed as outside the realm of 
normality, such as disabled people or migrants, could therefore be granted lesser 
entitlement without contesting rights-based political logics.  Without assertions of 
equality or the commonalities of human need, further exclusions required only simple 
adjustments to the borders of entitlement, rather than discursive dislocation of core 
social logics. 
Contemporary discursive representation of the entitlements of disabled asylum seekers 
and refugees must be seen in the context of post-war rights-based political logics, 
complete with their uncontested common-sense exclusions.  Analysis of current 
intersectional entitlements focuses on the discursive struggles shaping key policy 
interventions.  Attention begins with immigration policy, before turning to disability and 
the intersectional impact.  
4.2 The discursive struggles shaping current immigration policy 
Analysis of discursive representations underpinning current entitlements associated 
with disability and migration focuses on two policy documents: the 1998 White Paper 
in which asylum seekers’ rights to access the welfare state were withdrawn, and the 
VPRS (2014), in which people fleeing the Syrian crisis were selected for resettlement 
to the UK based on apparent vulnerability.  In the context of UK government policy, the 
prioritisation of citizens of the nation-state, the territory over which the government has 
jurisdiction, is unsurprising.  Furthermore, in the context of a capitalist economy, it is 
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also to be expected that policies are underpinned by assumed goals of profit 
maximisation. 
My analysis of the dominant discursive logics shaping immigration policy will begin with 
the political logics shaping overt debate.  
Political logics of defence – ‘Fairer, Faster and Firmer’ 1998.  
The UK government’s White Paper, ‘Fairer, faster and firmer’ (1998) explains the 
rationale for the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) which would follow.  It was 
introduced under the New Labour Government led by Prime Minister Tony Blair.  This 
legislation forms but one element of what Goodfellow (2019, p.7) refers to as ‘decades 
of exclusionary politics’.  However, it marked a shift with particularly acute implications 
for disabled people: asylum seekers lost the right to access the welfare state, including 
compensation for disability-related costs.  In addition to reduced income, loss of 
entitlement to Disability Living Allowance removed eligibility for multiple additional 
discounts and services, from travel cards to reduced prices at sporting facilities.  
Asylum seekers began to receive support from the National Asylum Support Service 
(NASS), with provision set at lower than the minimum necessary for citizens:  
people who have not established their right to be in the UK should not have access to 
welfare provision on the same basis as those whose citizenship or status here gives 
them an entitlement to benefits when in need. (Great Britain. The Home Office, 1998, 
p.35, paragraph 8.18). 
Asylum seekers are represented as needing sufficient support such that they ‘are not 
left destitute, but which minimise the attractions of the UK to economic migrants’ (1998, 
p.3).  This sufficientarian (Frankfurt, 1987; Gosseries, 2011) goal of avoiding destitution 
contrasts with Bevan’s universalist conception of entitlement to healthcare: 
emotional concern for individual life is the most significant quality of a civilised human 
being.  It is not achieved when limited to people of a certain colour, race, religion, nation 
or class. (1952, p.177) 
Bevan warns that if ‘emotional concern’ is limited to certain people, it facilitates 
‘monstrous cruelty or at best indifference to others’ (ibid).  His warning, almost 50 years 
before this White Paper, proves increasingly prescient.  Despite espousing the value 
of integration (1998, p.17, paragraph 2.16) the White Paper established systematic 
segregation.  Asylum seekers also lost the right to choose where to live.  Instead, 
people would be dispersed to low-cost accommodation, potentially away from friends, 
family, and support networks.   
The 1998 White Paper was introduced soon after the start of the New Labour 
government (1997-2010), at a time when the rhetoric of the social model of disability 
(Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), 1976; Oliver, 1983) 
was becoming increasingly hegemonic.  The White Paper explicitly restricted access 
to services for people without citizenship.  Despite the acute relevance of the social 
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model and the life-changing implications of losing financial recognition of the costs 
associated with disability, the only reference to disability in the 1998 White Paper 
relates to what it is not: local authorities would no longer be responsible for providing 
support to ‘healthy and able bodied’ asylum seekers (paragraph 8.23).  The implication 
is that local authorities retain responsibility for the other, those who are not ‘healthy and 
able bodied’.  The existence and needs of the ‘other’ appear so insignificant as not to 
warrant direct reference. As Ball (2006, p.14) argues, realist policy analysis 
‘concentrates too much on what those who inhabit policy think about and misses and 
fails to attend to what they do not think about’.  The omission of direct reference 
reinforces the disregard for disabled asylum seekers.  The removal of entitlement to 
services is framed as a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of migration, as if unrelated to wider 
political discourse of the need to address the ‘problem’ of disabling inaccessible 
services.  Disabled asylum seekers are not only financially disadvantaged, but in terms 
of government policy,  these are people who, ‘do not count’ (Rancière, 1999).  These 
are the unmentioned ‘other’, the unreferenced side-effect of the need to reduce 
numbers of migrants and assert ‘control’.   
The overt agenda of the White Paper focuses on the political logics of the need to 
control and defend borders and resources.  These are complemented by fantasmatic 
logics of a threat posed to ‘our’ enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2005; Glynos and Stavrakakis, 
2008) of that which is rightfully ‘ours’.  Removal of entitlement to the welfare state is 
presented as a means for ‘us’ to assert ‘control’ of territorial and social boundaries 
(Bertram, 2014, p.131).  This builds on the inherent contradictions of liberal democracy 
(Mouffe, 2005a; Rancière, 2006) discussed in Chapter 1.  Entitlement based on 
citizenship contains what Amanda Nielsen (2016, p.26) describes as ‘inherent duality’.  
It may be inclusive of other citizens, but it is exclusive of non-citizens.  The removal of 
entitlement to access the welfare state for people seeking asylum assumes distinctions 
of human worth.  Hegemonic distinctions between those seeking and those granted 
refugee status are asserted, with 40 references to ‘genuine’ travellers, counterposed 
by reference to ‘abusive’ travellers, such as those moving for ‘economic betterment’ 
(1998, p.23).  Social logics of the primacy of profit are highlighted by the assertion of 
financial means as an indicator of human worth.  The Paper seeks to avoid disruption 
to ‘people travelling abroad for legitimate purposes including business, study and 
holidays’ (emphasis added, 1998, p.9).  Furthermore, a bond scheme is proposed, 
whereby a ‘sponsor would be asked to deposit a financial security’ (1998, p.24).  The 
implication is that people with money have ‘genuine’ reasons to travel, whereas people 
escaping poverty travel for ‘abusive’ reasons.  The implied equivalence between wealth 
and human worth can be explained by Bauman’s (2004) assertion of the systematic 
creation of ‘wasted lives’ within capitalism.  
The power inequalities inherent in distinctions of entitlement are affirmed by a proposed 
covenant with rules to be obeyed.  The inherent inequality and disciplinary power 
(Foucault, 1979) of rules set by an elite, for all to follow, are reminiscent of school rules 
or Bible commandments.  These rules include: ‘tell the truth’ and ‘obey the law’ (1998, 
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p.33), in no way unique to UK society, yet presented as if an indicator of ‘integration 
into British society’ (1998, p.41, paragraph 10.1).    As Schinkel (2013) argues, focusing 
on the Netherlands but with applicability to the UK, integration assumes the existence 
of a monolithic and accessible social order.  Framing integration as an issue of 
individual choice obscures the systematic segregation inherent in withdrawal of access 
to the welfare state.  If responsibility is located with the individual, then blame for the 
failure to integrate is also located with the individual.  This reinforces the framing of 
some humans as unworthy, thereby justifying lower entitlements.     
This White Paper was published half a century after the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights (United Nations, 1948) and the Refugee Convention (1951).  At this stage in the 
‘archaeology’ of immigration policy, it appears to have been necessary to maintain 
discursive reference to the political logic of rights, despite systematically dismantling 
their application.  The task is presented not as contesting the logics of ‘rights’ to seek 
refuge, but as distinguishing between who is deserving of such rights and who must be 
controlled.  There are 14 references to the assumed ‘good’ of human rights, juxtaposed 
with seven references to people without rights, thereby contradicting the universality of 
human rights.  The need to reduce the apparent burden associated with migrant 
numbers and use of services is represented as if legitimising the restrictions of rights.  
Asylum seekers are positioned as if distinct from the wider population, with the removal 
of rights thereby facilitated without requiring contestation, or dislocation, of rights-based 
logics.  Representation of racism exemplifies the inherent contradictions of this 
approach: support is removed from migrants (a disproportionate number of whom come 
from ethnic minorities), while also declaring commitment to ‘improving access to public 
services for ethnic minorities’ (1998, p.17, paragraph 2.15).  It is as if the racist impact 
of these policies could be countered by asserting objectives of race equality (1998, 
p.16, paragraph 2.13).  As Mondon and Winter (2020, p.61) explain, overt rejection of 
illiberal racism serves to perpetuate the acceptability of a system ‘built on discrimination 
and privilege’ (2020, p.6).  Lack of recognition of the systematic barriers to race equality 
inherent in migration policy is highlighted by reference to measures for ‘encouraging 
citizenship’ (emphasis added, 1998, p.17, paragraph 2.16).  The problem is thereby 
framed as if an issue of individual motivation, rather than of inequality.    
Discursive representation of the need for control is presented as if modernising, rather 
than dislocating, the rights-based logics of the 1951 Convention.  The then Home 
Secretary, Jack Straw, refers to the scale of migration having risen beyond that 
anticipated by the 1951 Refugee Convention.  There are 38 references to the need to 
modernise, while upholding a fantasmatic ‘tradition’ (1998, p.33) of generosity.  
Discourse of modernisation is also the justification for an increased role for the 
voluntary sector (1998, p.33, paragraph 8.3).  This reflects wider neoliberal shifts of 
responsibility from the state to the voluntary sector (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 
2008). This may be framed as modernising but is deeply problematic.  If the voluntary 
sector comes to rely on state support, then organisational survival may depend on 
withholding criticism.  Furthermore, reliance on charitable support builds precarity and 
98 
 
inequity into the system; rights can be demanded, whereas gifts depend on being 
perceived as worthy.  The discursive shift from rights to charity, and from statutory to 
voluntary sector, are core to understanding the restrictions faced by disabled asylum 
seekers and refugees, as becomes clear from the policy analysis in this chapter.  By 
discursively articulating proposed changes with the modernisation of the 1951 
Convention, potential contestation is implicitly framed as counter to the implied 
normativity of the modern age.  The resultant lack of public criticism may affirm 
representations of the system as incontestable or as benign, such that systematic 
inequalities are perceived as inevitable, or as oversights.  
Despite overt acceptance of the rights of refugees, the provisions of the White Paper 
dislocate their application.  The paper includes provision for occasions when ‘the 
Secretary of State considers that the circumstances of a particular case are 
exceptional’  (1998, paragraph 115).  The consequences of such unclear eligibility 
criteria will be discussed in relation to possible solutions in Chapter 7.  Further provision 
for exceptional support is alluded to in the White Paper, with reference to the need for 
‘particular care’ regarding ‘physical and mental health’ in detention policy (1998, p.49, 
paragraph 12.4).  If an asylum seeker has been tortured, detention is to be avoided, 
and ‘temporary admission’ to the country is proposed.  Notwithstanding the failure to 
systematically implement this approach (Burnett and Peel, 2001), the policy was 
discursively framed as if legitimately directing support towards those who are 
deserving.  This provision directs support to people who have been tortured, as distinct 
from people with similar needs stemming from other causes.  If eligibility for support is 
determined by factors beyond human need, the result is that potential issues of life and 
death become determined by the cause, rather than the existence of need.  The 
precarity of such distinctions of entitlement would later become core to welfare reform.  
However, it is reiterated that the significant deterioration in provision for disabled 
asylum seekers resulted from the assertion of political logics of control, and the 
extension of exclusions from entitlement to support, which had always existed.   
Before considering how such discourse is reflected in welfare reform, it is necessary to 
consider a scheme which, in relation to immigration policy, prioritised discursive logics 
of generosity towards selected people above logics of defence.   
Political logics of generosity - The Vulnerable Person’s Relocation Scheme 
(VPRS) 2014.  
It would be wrong to suggest that political logics of defence and fantasmatic logics of 
threat are consistently prominent in UK immigration policy.  The VPRS shifted 
emphasis from political logics of defence to logics of generosity towards selected 
people, framed as worthy of support.  The scheme was introduced in response to cross-
party calls to support people fleeing conflict in Syria (Smith, B., Gower and Bardens, 
2014).  Hegemonic discursive representation of migration as a threat to be controlled, 
hindered increased acceptance of refugees.  Instead, the VPRS was established as a 
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discrete project selecting people framed as worthy, based on apparent vulnerability.  
Liberal Democrat, Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg (2014) explained that priority 
would go to ‘women and girls who have experienced, or are at risk of, sexual violence; 
the elderly; survivors of torture and individuals with disabilities’.  Explicit reference to 
disability contrasts with the 1998 White Paper.  However, framing disability as an issue 
of vulnerability runs counter to the rights-based focus of the disabled people’s 
movement (Morris, 2015) and the UNCRPD (2006). Selected people became entitled 
to increased entitlement, relative to asylum seekers.  Those selected for the scheme 
would not have to navigate the defensive restrictions of the asylum system.  Instead, 
the focus was on generosity.  As Brokenshire (2014) explained, they would be:  
granted five years’ Humanitarian Protection1 with all the rights and benefits that go with 
that status, including access to public funds, access to the labour market and the 
possibility of family reunion.   
In contrast, asylum seekers remained subject to the precarity associated with actual or 
potential destitution, detention, or deportation.  Although unreferenced in Brokenshire’s 
initial statement, support provided under the VPRS would diminish from the first year 
onwards, affirming that it is a temporary gift rather than dependant on need.   In a similar 
manner to the 1998 White Paper, the focus on distinctions of individual worth and 
entitlement obscures collective responsibility to remove structural barriers, thereby 
further undermining the principles of the social model.  
The foregrounding of fantasmatic logics of pride in ‘our’ kindness towards the 
exceptional needs of selected refugees served to legitimise the small numbers of 
people relative to the more generalised response from other states.  The number of 
beneficiaries was initially therefore avoided, although Patrick Wintour (2014), writing for 
The Guardian, claimed that ‘coalition sources’ suggested it would be ‘no more than 
500’.  More than 18 months after the introduction of the VPRS,  the drowned body of 
Alan Kurdi, a Kurdish toddler found on a Greek beach on 2nd September 2015, 
‘provoked a remarkable and transnationally articulated demand for responsibility’ (Perl 
and Strasser, 2018, p.508).  Magdalena Hodalska (2018, p.210), scholar of media 
representation, argues that the change in public response towards refugees stemmed 
from the visual similarity between the image of Kurdi and ‘any other boy in Europe’.  His 
body: 
made the faraway conflict close and personal for the audience familiar with the images 
of boys dressed in T-shirts and shorts, but unfamiliar with the images of blood, debris, 
and shattered glass.   
The apparent familiarity meant this child could not be dismissed as the ‘other’.  
Furthermore, fantasmatic logics of threat appear incompatible with this image.  The 
 
1 This status was later extended to being granted immediate refugee status. 
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apparently equalising impact of this familiarity provoked such calls for change that it 
temporarily appeared as if a moment of politics (Rancière, 1999, p.11) might ensue.   
Before analysing what averted a moment of transformational politics, it is important to 
understand what did change.  Public pressure for greater UK response caused a shift 
in hegemonic discourse of migration (Szczepanik, 2016; Kirkwood, 2017; Parker, 
Naper and Goodman, 2018).  An apparent shift from political logics of defence to logics 
of generosity, complemented by fantasmatic logics of pride, was reflected in the 
language and actions of senior politicians.  As referenced, when then UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron (2015a) referred to a ‘swarm’ of migrants wanting to come to Britain, 
he was suggesting the need for defensive measures.  In contrast, on 7th September 
2015, five days after Kurdi’s death, Cameron (2015b) referred to being ‘moved by the 
heart-breaking images’, and committed to increasing the resettlement of Syrian 
refugees to 20,000 (BBC, 2015).  It is inconceivable that Cameron was unaware that 
countless migrants had died before, or would die after this child, yet the image of a 
drowned toddler, followed by the surge of public pressure, resulted in policy change, 
and was presented as a source of pride.  A civil servant (cs3) with managerial 
responsibility for the resettlement programme, explained in an interview that the criteria 
for selection were broadened, to include children, LGBTI and people with legal or 
physical protection needs.  This increasingly broad definition of vulnerability suggests 
its role as a floating signifier (Butler, Laclau and Žižek, 2000, p.305), with fluid meaning.  
In the context of people fleeing conflict, such criteria serve not to significantly limit 
eligibility, but to assert discretionary criteria for state selection, rather than the 
individual’s right to seek protection, as enshrined in the 1951 Convention.   
The discursive logics of the VPRS must be understood in the context of wider discourse 
of immigration.  The 1951 Convention enshrines legal obligations towards people 
fleeing persecution who arrive in the UK.  However, there are no such obligations 
towards foreign nationals in third countries.  The VPRS focus on selecting people 
labelled as vulnerable in third countries therefore evokes political logics of generosity, 
with the problem limited to determining who is worthy.  These logics are reinforced by 
fantasmatic logics of pride, asserting that there is something special about ‘us’.  
Reference to Britain’s ‘proud history’ is repeated by people with diverse subject 
positions, as if it were an undisputable fact.  Speaking in relation to the VPRS, Liberal 
Democrat Nick Clegg (2014) spoke of Britain’s ‘long and proud tradition of providing 
refuge at times of crisis’.  Conservative Party Home Secretary Theresa May (2015) 
made three references to pride regarding the VPRS.  Shadow Home Secretary Yvette 
Cooper (2015), also referred to Britain’s ‘proud history’, suggesting that denying 
support to refugees was not the ‘British way’.  Such cross-party hegemony is 
maintained outside Parliament.  Then Chief Executive of the Refugee Council Maurice 
Wren (2014) called for greater support for Syrian refugees, linking this with the 
assertion of Britain’s ‘proud tradition of helping refugees’.  The evocation of fantasmatic 
logics of national pride is not new or unique to the VPRS.  As Tyler (2013, p.79) 
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observes, ‘one of the most powerful British national myths is that this state has an 
ancient and proud history of granting asylum to foreign nationals’.  These myths rely on 
political logics of equivalence to an undefined period of British heroism.  Repetition of 
discursive tropes of pride evokes patriotic notions of the superiority of a national 
populace, with implicit distinctions from the ‘other’.   
In the contemporary context, notions of pride are particularly hard to justify with 
evidence.  The VPRS may be compared with Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon which 
were all hosting over a million refugees that year, according to the UNHCR review of 
Global Trends in Forced Displacement (2015).  The lack of substantive basis for 
discourse of pride obscures what Tyler (2013, p.80) refers to as the: 
double standards around the promotion of a liberal rhetoric of asylum, and the British 
government’s imperialist policies, which were producing increasing numbers of political 
and economic migrants.   
However, notions of national pride are emotional and therefore unquantifiable.  Taking 
a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective (Stavrakakis, 2005), discourse of generosity 
which merits donor pride facilitates the perpetual quest for fulfilment of enjoyment.  The 
quest for enjoyment is essential to the struggles determining hegemonic policy 
discourse which shape current restrictions and inequalities.  Scholar of forced 
migration, Alexander Betts (2017, p.74), argues that by focusing efforts on specific 
people, with tangible impact, resettlement programmes have a ‘cathartic’ role for those 
contributing.  More generally, as Bekkers and Wiepking (2007, p.32) explain, giving can 
‘alleviate feelings of guilt’, promoting positive self, or collective, image.  Acts of 
generosity towards selected individuals affirm ‘our’ goodness, and therefore the fantasy 
that ‘our’ relative privilege is deserved and to be defended.  In contrast, removing the 
barriers faced by disabled people, is less easily framed as generosity, and therefore 
provides less scope for catharsis or enjoyment.   
The foregrounding of generosity, underpinned by fantasmatic logics of donor pride, is 
inherently unequal and precarious.  Without rights, those wishing to access 
discretionary support must show gratitude by enjoying themselves enough to endorse 
our generosity and thereby facilitate our self-righteous enjoyment.  However, in 
association with references to the burden on taxpayers (UK Great Britain. The Home 
Office, 1998), if beneficiaries (whether people seeking asylum or selected for the 
VPRS) appear to be enjoying themselves too much, then it may be framed as at ‘our’ 
expense.  Stavrakakis (2005, p.77) explains that ‘The Other is hated because he is 
fantasized as stealing our lost enjoyment’.  Maureen Sugden, writing for the Daily Mail 
(25 July 2016), reported that Syrian refugees were unhappy with conditions on the 
Scottish island of Bute.  Drawing on Stravrakakis (2005), this can be framed as failing 
to enjoy a gift, and thereby ‘stealing’ our enjoyment of our generosity.  In a 
parliamentary debate regarding Syrian resettlement on 27th January 2016, Helen 
Whateley MP (2016) described Britain as having ‘a reputation as a compassionate 
country of opportunity ... Some have doubted us recently, but we should make that a 
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reality for 20,000 Syrians’.  The role of selected Syrians is therefore to facilitate 
enjoyment of ‘our’ compassion.  The apparent generosity of the VPRS was always 
explicitly limited to selected individuals, thereby assuming that ‘our generosity must 
have its limits’ (Mondon and Winter, 2020, p.51).  Heidi Armbruster (2019, p.2680) 
argues that the project was based on ‘exceptionalising a small group of Syrians as 
legitimate targets for compassion and constructing compassion itself as a rationed 
resource’.  Rather than contesting wider immigration policy, framing ‘us’ as particularly 
compassionate and generous suggests there is something to defend, thereby affirming, 
rather than contesting, the wider logics of defence.  
The articulation of logics of defence and generosity 
The VPRS (2014) was introduced and implemented alongside the Immigration Acts 
2014 and 2016.  These Acts implement the then Home Secretary Theresa May’s calls 
for the creation of a ‘hostile environment’ (Kirkup, 2012).  Access to services and 
support was further reduced, particularly for those whose asylum claims have been 
refused (Liberty, 2018), and enforcement responsibilities were extended from 
immigration officials to the wider population (Steele et al., 2014).  Targeted acts of 
generosity appear distinct from such systematic hostility.  However, Nielsen (2016, 
p.156) explains how in Swedish responses to migration, the ‘existence of two sets of 
legislation that rest on different logics was not conceived to be a problem’.  This 
unproblematic representation results from the articulation of logics of generosity with 
those of defence.  In her conference speech a month after the death of Alan Kurdi, May 
(2015) asserted that the aim of immigration policy was to ‘put Britain first’.  In her words, 
the immigration system 
is geared towards helping those most able to access it, and sometimes manipulate it, 
for their own ends – those who are young enough, fit enough, and have the resources 
to get to Britain.  But that means support is too often denied to the most vulnerable.  
She stresses that support for people selected under the VPRS is combined with ‘work 
to control immigration’.  The political logics of defence and generosity responded to 
dual political pressures (Hampshire, 2013; Hardman, 2015) to offer a humanitarian 
response towards selected people, without reneging on the pledges of successive 
governments to reduce numbers of migrants.  The VPRS was not therefore a moment 
of politics, but a means of maintaining the social logics of the primacy of the nation-
state, on which immigration policy is based. 
The discursive complementarity between defence and generosity appears to be 
bolstered by an economic agenda.  Betts (2017, p.74) argues there is remarkably little 
scrutiny of what he refers to as the 'resettlement industry' because it is ‘worth billions 
of dollars a year to the NGOs and civil society organisations that participate in it’.  The 
organisations which might be expected to lead scrutiny of government action are core 
to its functioning.  An increased role for the voluntary sector in the application of the 
VPRS enables members of the public to seek enjoyment through exercising 
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compassion towards selected beneficiaries, without contesting the wider government 
agenda.  Apparent consensus is thereby maintained. 
 
Distinctions between those from whom defence is needed and those deemed worthy 
of generosity based on apparent ‘vulnerability’ are not unique to the British immigration 
system.  Such framing is likened to what Schrover and Schinkel (2013, p.1126) 
describe as a binary portrayal of immigrants as ‘being a risk … and being at risk’.  The 
apparent need to balance humanitarian response and migration control reflects the 
inherent contradictions of liberal democracy.  If there is a territorial or social border at 
which responsibility or obligation to provide support stops, then there is a need to police 
that border.  During a federal election campaign speech, then Australian Prime Minister 
John Howard (2001) spoke of his country’s ‘fundamental right to control its border … 
We are a generous and open-hearted people … We will decide who comes and in what 
circumstances they come’.  More than a decade later, UK Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg (2014) echoed this complementary discourse of generosity and defence, 
describing the UK as one of the most ‘open-hearted countries in the world’, evidenced 
by a scheme based on selecting who would enter the UK.  The nebulous yet normative 
concept of being ‘open-hearted’ further asserts notions of ‘us’ as better than ‘them’, 
which, as Anderson (2013) argues, has been a thread of migration policy through 
history.  In this context, the VPRS reinforces distinctions between ‘us’ (the providers 
and selectors of suitable beneficiaries), and ‘them’ (the beholden recipients).  
Hegemonic debate of immigration policy thereby becomes limited to the apparent need 
to balance complementary political logics of defence and generosity.  The VPRS was 
introduced by the UK coalition government, whereas the 1998 White Paper had been 
introduced by New Labour.  No major political party contested the hegemonic shift from 
the rights-based logics of the post-war era to the political logics of defence and 
generosity of the 1998 White Paper and the VPRS.  This highlights the political 
consensus framing immigration policy. 
 
Discursive framing of entitlement associated with labels of vulnerability was extended 
from the VPRS to other initiatives, including an independent report by Stephen Shaw 
(2016), former Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales, into the 
‘Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons’ (2016), and the inspection by the 
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) into the ‘Home Office’s 
approach to the identification and safeguarding of vulnerable adults’ (Bolt, 2019).  
These initiatives frame the solution to the disadvantages associated with the apparent 
‘vulnerability’ of disabled asylum seekers, as being to identify individuals who are 
exceptionally worthy of support.  These discursive solutions are discussed in Chapter 
7.  For now, it is sufficient to note that such solutions arise from hegemonic discursive 
representation of the problem, relying on political logics of generosity complemented 
by defence, and reinforced with fantasmatic logics of pride and threat.  This discursive 
balance effectively replaces post-war political logics of rights.  However, hegemonic 
social logics of the primacy of the nation-state remained constant.   
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The dominant discursive logics adopted in these policy developments are summarised 
in Table 6.  
Table 6: Dominant discursive representations shaping entitlements associated 
with disability in UK government immigration policy 
Common-sense or rarely contested 
social logics 
Immigration framed as inherently problematic 
in the context of the assumed prime legitimacy 
of the nation-state and its citizens. 
Potential moment of politics Response to the death of Alan Kurdi 
highlighted the human impact of borders, 
causing a potential moment of political 
contestation. 
Agenda for overt debate, or political 
logics 
Overt contestation focused on apparent 
struggle to balance logics of defence and 
generosity towards selected people, thereby 
dislocating logics of rights.   
Discursive   representation reinforced 
by fantasmatic logics 
Migrants framed as a burden, or as 
beneficiaries of generosity, who threaten or 
facilitate the unrealisable quest for ‘our’ 
enjoyment. 
The discursive struggles which have shaped contemporary UK immigration policy 
appear to have taken a different path from those shaping welfare reform.  However, 
there are increasing discursive commonalities in the representations of the problems 
that current policy seeks to address.  Both forms of policy frame entitlement to support 
as dependent on distinctions of human worth rather than simply human need.    
4.3 The discursive struggles shaping welfare reform 
Before considering the discursive framing of welfare reform, it is important to briefly 
return to the context in which such reforms were introduced.  Rights-based logics of 
disability may have been achieved later than the wider post-war consensus.  However, 
this does not detract from their significance.  In contrast to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the UNCRPD (2006)  was developed by the subjects themselves.  It could 
therefore be considered a political moment in which those with no part, asserted a part 
(Rancière, 1999).  According to Crock, Ernst and McCallum (2012, p.737) it 
represented an international ‘paradigm shift in the understanding of persons with 
disabilities as rights-bearers’.  However, the focus on collective responsibility to remove 
access barriers was incompatible with the neoliberal representation of individual 
responsibility.  Reductions in state support, akin to those introduced for asylum seekers 
in the 1998 White Paper, could not be extended to disabled citizens without 
contestation of what had become the hegemonic rights-based logics of disability.   
The discursive struggles that enabled reductions in access to services and support to 
be imposed on disabled citizens now require more detailed analysis.  First the welfare 
reform speech made by then Prime Minister Tony Blair’s (1999) is considered.  This is 
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followed by White Papers associated with such reforms in 2008 and 2010.  The 2008 
financial crash resulted in hegemonic logics of scarcity which facilitated reductions in 
state support and the dislocation of rights-based logics.  Finally, attention turns to 
government response to the contestation associated with the inquiry of the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Disabled People. 
Political logics of individual responsibility- Prime Minister Tony Blair, The 
Beveridge Lecture 1999, and the New Labour agenda 
Discursive contestation of the rights-based logics underpinning the welfare state and 
the social model of disability was spearheaded by Blair’s plans for welfare reform set 
out in his Beveridge lecture (1999).  His speech had no direct legislative impact.  
However, it was selected for analysis because it conceptualises the coming hegemonic 
shift to the individual responsibility of neoliberal reform with the inherent inequality of 
service provision.  The policy restrictions imposed on asylum seekers the same year 
could not have been extended to citizens without significant discursive contestation.   
Discursive interventions are inevitably relative to what has gone before.  The 1998 
White Paper presented the removal of entitlement from asylum seekers as modernising 
the 1951 Convention in the context of increased numbers of migrants.  Similarly, Blair 
framed his proposed welfare reforms as building on, rather than replacing, Beveridge’s 
(1942) concept of the welfare state, creating a ‘modern welfare state fit for the modern 
world’, emphasising increased demand.  His contestation of rights-based logics might 
have more accurately drawn equivalence with neoliberalism (Harvey, 2007), building 
on Milton Friedman’s (1962)  analysis, and adopted by UK Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher.  However, in the context of the Beveridge lecture and in the early days of a 
Labour administration, he drew equivalence with traditional Labour heroes including 
Bevan and Beveridge.  He drew on discourse of a ‘third way’ (Giddens, 1998) between 
‘old Labour’s’ rights-based approach and Conservative attempts to cut welfare costs. 
The modernising narrative may have hindered contestation, obscuring the radical 
dislocation of previously hegemonic discourse of rights.   
Blair presented his proposed welfare reforms as if distinct from immigration policy.  
Despite the removal of asylum seekers’ entitlement to the welfare state beginning the 
same year (Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999), Blair drew neither equivalence nor 
difference with discourse of immigration policy.  Instead, he asserted that ‘any citizen 
of our society should be able to meet their needs’.  It is unclear whether he sought to 
distinguish citizens from non-citizens, or whether ‘citizen’ is used as a euphemism for 
a responsible person, drawing on what Pisani (2012) refers to as the ‘citizenship 
assumption’.  Either way, non-citizens are the unmentioned ‘other’, that requires no 
direct reference. 
At this stage in the developing discourse of welfare reform, there were significant 
differences but also growing equivalence with immigration policy.  Unlike the 1998 
Paper which framed migrants as a threat to be controlled, Blair did not primarily frame 
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welfare claimants as the problem.  Instead, he portrayed welfare dependency as 
hindering individual’s and the wider population’s capacity for enjoyment.  He sought to 
‘tackle social exclusion’ through wider service provision.  However, in contrast to the 
vision of ‘to each according to his (sic) need’ which had framed Bevan’s (1952) 
conception of the NHS, Blair (1999) spoke of support as a ‘hand-up, not a hand-out’, 
characterised by mutual responsibility, with support targeted to ‘those with the most 
need’.  This brings greater commonality with the 1998 White Paper’s focus on 
conditionality.  He sought to ‘root out fraud and abuse’, thereby locating the problem 
with claimants rather than societal barriers.  Also, like the 1998 White Paper, he called 
for the voluntary sector to play a greater role in the delivery of welfare services.  Again, 
this marked a shift from statutory services provided by the state, to discretionary or 
voluntary generosity.  
Blair presented political logics of responsibility as complementary to logics of rights: 
‘Social justice is about mutual responsibility.  It insists that we all accept duties as well 
as rights’ (1999).  The discursive trope, ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Owen and 
Harris, 2012), would become increasingly dominant in future policy.  Logics of 
responsibility were further combined with notions of meritocracy: ‘social justice is about 
merit.  It demands that life chances should depend on talent and effort’, and that ‘if you 
work hard, you will not be in poverty’ (ibid).  The corollary of this is that poverty is an 
individual’s responsibility; that those who do not work are without ‘merit’ and are 
therefore undeserving.  This implicitly contests Bevan’s (1952) universalist approach, 
as well as contesting the collective focus of the social model and the UNCRPD on 
addressing socially constructed barriers.  The discursive equivalence between merit 
and hard work would form the context for withdrawing the ‘right to work’ from asylum 
seekers’ in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002), thereby affirming ‘them’ 
as being without ‘merit’.  The divisive impact of different representations of work is 
returned to in Chapter 7.  
The conditionality associated with meritocracy brings increasing equivalence between 
welfare reform and immigration policy.  As in the 1998 White Paper, the problem 
becomes framed as distinguishing between those who are worthy of support and those 
who ‘abuse’ the system, rather than to assert rights or the apparently more radical 
alternative of equal entitlement to meet human needs.  Despite the modernising 
narrative, Blair’s (1999) agenda was not simple reform, but what he described as ‘a 
quiet revolution’.  In effect, he presented the discursive framework for subsequent 
welfare reform, which would have increasing discursive equivalence with the 
conditionality of immigration policy.  Understanding these developments is therefore 
core to understanding current restrictions and inequalities associated with disability and 
forced migration.   
It is important to consider what impeded contestation of Blair’s initial proposals for 
welfare reform.  The proposed shift from state to individual responsibility, included 
disabled people gaining greater control, a long-sought demand of the disabled people’s 
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movement.  This was a time of increased government consultation on disability issues, 
however, as Oliver and Barnes (2012) explain, disabled people’s organisations lacked 
capacity, leaving big charities ‘only too willing to step in and fill the void’ (2012, p.155).  
In so doing, the ideas of the disabled people’s movement were ‘adapted and adopted’ 
(ibid).  Oliver (2018) referred to this change, as the shift from disability activism to 
‘disabling corporatism’, with the goal becoming incorporation rather than transformation 
of the mainstream political agenda.  The discursive shift to individual responsibility had 
no obvious or immediate policy impact.  It was a speech rather than legislation.  
Furthermore, the significance was masked by wider attention to issues of disability, as 
will be explored.  
Political logics of equivalence, promoting ‘Choice and Control’ - White Paper 
‘Our health, our care, our say: a new direction for community services’ (2006) 
The reforms proposed by Blair (1999) formed the framework of subsequent policy 
changes, including the personalisation of social care.  The White Paper ‘Our health, 
our care, our say: a new direction for community services’ (2006) formed the basis of 
the Health and Social Care Act (2008).  As alluded to in its name, responsibility for 
decisions regarding preferred support services shifts from the state to the individual.  
Expectations that all disabled people would attend the same day centres were replaced 
with an individual right to choose from an array of possible providers.  The increased 
role of voluntary services (UK 2006, p.28) and the reduction in state services were 
presented as inconsequential side-effects of fulfilling disabled people’s long-awaited 
demands for ‘choice and control’ over services.  Similarly, the promotion of individual 
responsibility was referred to not as a threat but as the promotion of ‘health and well-
being’ (UK 2006, p.24).  Contestation was hindered by the discursive framing of 
equivalence between government policy and the demands of the disabled people’s 
movement.  More specifically, discourse of ‘choice and control’ was articulated with 
neoliberal focus on individual responsibility.  Vic Finkelstein (2007, p.13) was among 
the few activists who warned that the shift from collective to individual responsibility 
was a ‘capitalist dream come true’.   In contrast, discourse of personalised services 
was largely welcomed by the disabled people’s movement until the implications 
became more apparent.  In her retrospective analysis, Karen West (2012) observes 
that the ‘ideological grip’ of ‘choice and control’ masked the reduction of state services.  
The distortion of the original meaning of ‘choice and control’ fitted with New Labour’s 
agenda.  However, as Morris (2011, p.3) observes ‘in engaging with the dominant policy 
agendas – we have … unintentionally, contributed towards a steady undermining of 
collective responsibility’.  This was not the only occasion when the implications of 
reforms were recognised too late.  Iain Ferguson (2017, p.128) argues that neoliberal 
ideology repeatedly appropriates ‘progressive sounding ideas’ to use ‘for less than 
progressive ends’.  The promotion of individual responsibility and the reduction of state 
services can, retrospectively, be understood as the precursor to the austerity measures 
introduced ostensibly in response to the 2008 financial crash.   
108 
 
Fantasmatic logics of disabled people as a burden - 2010 White Paper ‘Universal 
Credit: welfare that works’  
Analysis now turns to the discursive developments regarding the entitlements of 
disabled people, set out in the White Paper ‘Universal Credit: welfare that works’ 
(2010), and subsequent Welfare Reform Act (2012).  This agenda was presented as 
responding to the need for austerity following the financial crash of 2008 and the 
accompanying discourse of scarcity.  The crash could be considered the ‘shock’ (Klein, 
2007) necessary for the imposition of austerity, characterised by ‘neoliberal 
“marketisation moves”’ and ‘steep spending cuts’ (Glynos, Speed and West, 2014, p.6).  
The impact of austerity, introduced by Prime Minister Cameron as part of the coalition 
government, has been analysed elsewhere (see for example O'Hara, 2014), with its 
disproportionate impact on disabled people (Roulstone, 2015; Ryan, 2019) and mental 
health service users (Barr et al., 2016).  This was a moment of political contestation, 
but in contrast to Rancière’s (1999) conception, it further removed the rights of the 
population with no part.   
The White Paper (2010) has discursive commonalities with the welfare reform agenda 
envisaged by Blair (1999) a decade earlier.  In a similar manner to Blair, the 2010 White 
Paper presented the key problem as ‘welfare dependency’, with the solution presented 
as promoting ‘personal responsibility’ (2010, p.6).  During a House of Lords debate 
regarding this legislation, Lord Boswell of Aynho criticises the White Paper, warning of 
the detrimental impact of framing someone as an ‘architect of their own distress’ or as 
‘morally unworthy’ (Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2012 17th January, 
Column 468).  In response, Lord Freud (2012, 17th January,  Column 482) stresses 
that ‘we are trying to direct scarce resources, at a very difficult time, to the people who 
need them most’.  The biopsychosocial model of disability (Waddell and Aylward, 2009) 
is referenced by Freud, asserting the need for ‘personal effort’ to ‘overcome’ (sic) 
disability (Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, 2012).  The transfer of 
responsibility from the state to the individual was no longer framed as facilitating 
individual ‘choice and control’, but as reducing the burden on government finances.  
This evoked similar discursive justification as had been applied to asylum seekers in 
1998.   
Austerity must be understood in the context of ongoing discursive struggles for 
hegemony.  Welfare reform (2010) and the wider austerity agenda were premised on 
individual responsibility and the conditionality of entitlement, further dislocating the 
post-war discursive logics of rights and universal entitlement on which the NHS had 
been founded (Bevan, 1952).  The reduction in state services, ostensibly in response 
to the 2008 financial crash, formed part of a gradual but far-reaching hegemonic shift.  
As Oliver and Barnes argue: 
the immediate post-war consensus on the need to ensure access to legal, civil, and 
social rights for all … has gradually given way to the monetarist doctrines of the 
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neoconservatives or New Right … [S]tate-sponsored welfare systems are said to have 
discouraged individualism, self-reliance, voluntary action and private initiatives. (2012, 
p.122) 
This discursive development was facilitated by the failure of the Beveridge report (1942) 
to embed disabled people’s rights in the welfare state.  As in the 1998 White Paper, 
entitlement to support became framed as not simply dependent on need, but as 
conditional on individual attributes, including evidence of apparent responsibility.  The 
removal of services and support was framed as a response to the need to reduce the 
burden on public finances, with consequent loss of life (Ryan, 2019) an unmentioned 
side effect.  The disjuncture between human need and entitlement to support is central 
to further developments.  
In the context of discursive reference to crisis and the need to reduce expenditure, 
austerity directed public resentment at those perceived as disproportionate users of 
state support.  Users of state services, including disabled citizens, became presented 
as a burden, or, in Lacanian terms, as stealing the ‘enjoyment’ (Stavrakakis, 2005; 
Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008) of the legitimate majority.  Without referring to disabled 
people per se, Glynos et al. (2012, p.306) refer to the apparent rage evoked by ‘the 
idea that their enjoyment comes at our expense’.  The problem to be addressed by the 
legislation was framed as distinguishing between those people who are an 
unnecessary burden and those who are worthy of generosity.  Referring to the impact 
of welfare reform, then Prime Minister Cameron (2015a) stated that ‘we will stand by 
my promises to protect the most vulnerable – including the most disabled who cannot 
work, because that’s the sign of the compassionate country I believe in’.  This discursive 
representation of eligibility being dependent on compassion towards those labelled as 
‘vulnerable’ draws on similar distinctions as immigration policy (UK Great Britain. The 
Home Office, 1998; Great Britain. The Home Office and The Rt Hon James Brokenshire 
MP, 2014).  Those disabled people framed as ineligible became labelled as 
‘scroungers’, or a burden on the state (Garthwaite, 2011; Patrick, 2016).  Negative 
constructions of dependency were evoked to legitimise the end of a 'something for 
nothing culture' (Patrick, 2012, p.309).  Social model assertions of collective 
responsibility to address disabling barriers had been dislocated, with focus placed 
instead on individual responsibility.  
Poststructuralist discourse theory assumes that discursive struggles are necessarily 
unfinished and contingent.  As Glynos et al (2012, p.299) explain, ‘structures are 
inherently incomplete’, resulting in continual potential for ‘contestation and 
mobilization’.  The restrictions imposed on asylum seekers in 1999 were incompatible 
with what was then largely hegemonic recognition of the collective responsibility evoked 
by the social model to remove disabling access barriers for citizens.  Gradual discursive 
challenge took place after Blair’s speech in 1999, including the 2006 personalisation 
agenda of ‘choice and control’ (UK 2006, p.6), and the development of the 
biopsychosocial model (Waddell and Aylward, 2009), before the deliberate restrictions 
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imposed on asylum seekers could be extended to citizens.  The discursive struggle is 
always and inevitably incomplete.  However, despite the more gradual shift and the 
less absolute removal of entitlement to the welfare state, there has been greater 
resistance to the removal of support from disabled citizens than there was to the 
removal of rights from asylum seekers.   
Attention now turns to complaints by disabled people’s organisations, which resulted in 
an inquiry by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2016).  The 
logics of individual responsibility underpinning welfare reform were contested with 
attempted reassertion of logics of rights.  
Attempted reassertion of logics of rights – Inquiry by the UN Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2016) and the UK government response 
The UK government’s Welfare Reform should have been in line with state obligations 
under the UNCRPD.  According to Theresia Degener (2017, p.3), ‘state parties do not 
understand the profound change in disability policy and law that is embedded in the 
CRPD’.  However, assessing UK compliance with the UNCRPD, the UN Committee 
(2016, paragraph 83) described welfare reforms as resulting, not from 
misunderstanding, but from deliberate prioritisation of reducing state expenditure.  The 
committee described the disproportionate impact of austerity policies on disabled 
people, resulting in ‘grave and systematic’ abuse of disabled people’s rights, arguing 
that the potentially beneficial impact of personalisation (UNCRPD, 2006) was 
unrealisable in this context.  Government officials were criticised for making 
unsubstantiated accusations that disabled people were ‘committing fraud … being lazy 
and putting a burden on taxpayers’ (2016, paragraph 85), thereby encouraging 
negative media discourse and public hostility.  The government was advised that 
disabled people ‘should not be perceived as mere recipients of support, but as rights-
holders’ (2016, p.4, paragraph 12).  This reassertion of disability rights contested Blair’s 
(1999) agenda of welfare reform and its subsequent enactment.  
The UK government responded by framing the task as the need to balance their 
obligations with the individual responsibility of disabled people.  It stated ongoing 
commitment to:  
disability equality which focuses on inclusion and mainstreaming, with additional 
support provided as necessary, and on involving disabled people in making the 
decisions that affect their lives. (Great Britain. UK Government, 2017, p.3)  
This mirrors the discursive representation of the problem addressed by the White 
Papers (2006; 2010).  Drawing on the biopsychosocial model, the government 
response includes 57 references to the value of work, asserting ‘benefits to an 
individual’s mental and physical health and well-being’ (2017, p.3) while asserting that 
citizens ‘who cannot work because of a disability or health condition’ receive the 
support they need (2017, p.3).  This assertion is complemented by nine references to 
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disabled people as ‘vulnerable’, thereby locating the problem with the individual rather 
than with collective failure to address systemic barriers.  The conditionality of 
entitlement inherent in the government’s response, mirrors distinctions in welfare 
reform and immigration policy.  Furthermore, in a similar manner to discourse 
associated with the VPRS (2014), the government asserts being ‘proud of its record’ 
(2017, p.3).  Disabled people are thereby framed as beneficiaries of generosity, rather 
than holders of rights.  Such lack of congruence with government obligations under the 
UNCRPD may stem from lack of understanding (Degener, 2017) or lack of concern.  
Either way, the government response to the UN inquiry simply reasserts the logics of 
the legislation.  
Government failure to facilitate disabled people’s access to the rights enshrined in the 
UNCRPD may, however, not be the core problem.  Writing before this UN inquiry, Oliver 
and Barnes (2012, p.151) assert that it is unsurprising that the rights-based consensus 
‘has not brought about equality for disabled people or other oppressed groups’.  If the 
problems faced by disabled people or migrants stem from neoliberal reduction of state 
services and capitalist prioritisation of economic productivity, then the legal right to 
support within these structures would be insufficient adjustment.  In a capitalist 
economy, driven by the balance of profit and loss, some investment is needed to 
promote a productive workforce.  However, as Clifford (2020, p.48) argues, expenditure 
on people perceived as unproductive becomes simply a loss to be reduced.  As such, 
logics of rights could contest logics of generosity and the framing of support for asylum 
seekers as a gift, however, systemic contestation based on social logics of equality and 
solidarity are needed to contest assumed distinctions of human worth.   
The dominant discursive struggles shaping welfare are summarised in Table 7.   
Table 7: Dominant discursive representations shaping entitlements in UK 
government welfare reform policy 
Common-sense, or rarely contested, 
social logics 
Non-disabled citizens framed as the norm 
to be prioritised, with the ‘other’ 
categorised according to perceived 
individual merit.  In the context of a 
capitalist economy, people with 
impairments limiting productivity assumed 
to be a burden on profit. 
Potential moment of politics The moment of instability or ‘shock’ (Klein, 
2007) of the financial crash (2008) 
facilitated neoliberal cuts to state services, 
shifting assumed collective responsibility 
to the individual, with disabled people 
disproportionately affected (UN, 2016). 
Agenda for overt debate, or political 
logics 
Welfare reform framed as balancing the 
rights-based logics of the post-war era and 
the welfare state, with modern neoliberal 
logics of individual responsibility. 
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Discursive   representation reinforced 
by fantasmatic logics 
Disabled people are framed as providing 
inspiration, or as a burden on the wider 
population.  Both positions are relative to 
the needs of a dominant population.   
The discursive struggles shaping immigration policy and welfare reform shape the 
restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum seekers and refugees.  I 
now turn to analyse discursive representation of intersectional needs.   
4.4 Intersectional political discourse  
If the problem to be addressed by government legislation is framed as the ‘threat’ of 
immigration or the ‘burden’ of the welfare state, then control or responsibility, rather 
than rights-based solutions, appear appropriate.  The primacy of assumed ‘normality’, 
on which immigration policy and welfare reform is based, marginalises people framed 
as ‘other’.  It might have been anticipated that the discursive struggles of disability policy 
would facilitate contestation of the disabling impact of denial of services at the core of 
immigration policy.  However, neither the discursive struggles of immigration policy, nor 
those of welfare reform, expose the intersectional barriers faced by disabled people in 
the asylum and immigration system.  Contestation is hindered by the dislocation of 
rights-based discourse and its replacement with increasingly hegemonic framing of 
disabled people as a burden, within wider neoliberal discourse of individual 
responsibility.  Meanwhile, immigration policy, and particularly the VPRS (Great Britain. 
The Home Office and The Rt Hon James Brokenshire MP, 2014), adopts a charity 
model approach, framing individuals as beneficiaries of generosity, while disregarding 
collective responsibilities to address socially constructed barriers.  The language of 
vulnerability affirms this approach, locating the problem with the individual, undermining 
the collective focus of the UNCRPD, and facilitating neoliberal focus on individual 
responsibility (Morris, 2015; Yeo, R., 2019; Clifford, 2020).  The solution to the 
restrictions and inequalities faced by disabled asylum seekers or refugees thereby 
becomes framed as an individual quest for recognition of vulnerability and therefore 
entitlement.  Both policy areas frame the problem as the identification of people worthy 
of support, rather than the meeting of human needs.  Disabled migrants become framed 
as insignificant minorities, or as vulnerable recipients of generosity, but not as people 
entitled to meet their human needs. 
There are multiple examples of the convergence of the two areas of policy.  Disabled 
asylum seekers lost entitlement to Disability Living Allowance through the Immigration 
and Asylum Act (1999); citizens began to lose this entitlement through the Welfare 
Reform Act (2012).  Similarly, asylum seekers became subject to forced dispersal to 
areas of low-cost housing more than a decade before the Welfare Reform Act (2012) 
introduced the under-occupancy penalty, commonly known as the ‘bedroom tax’ 
(Clifford, 2020, p.12).  The dominant discursive justification for the dispersal of asylum 
seekers was control over ‘them’, whereas the bedroom tax evokes logics of individual 
responsibility.  However, the impact is similar: benefit-claimants are forced to move to 
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areas of low-cost housing, irrespective of where family, friends and support networks 
might be based.  In addition, the halting of support to asylum seekers whose asylum 
claims are refused is not unlike the use of sanctions on benefit-claimants (Ryan, 2019; 
Clifford, 2020).  The potential for support to be stopped creates an extrajudicial form of 
punishment, increasing precarity and reducing transparency of decision making, 
thereby creating a more compliant population.  The transfer of responsibility to the 
voluntary sector results in increasing dependence on discretionary acts of generosity 
from friends, family, and charitable agencies.  
In a move suggesting more deliberate denial of intersectional rights, when the UK 
ratified the UNCRPD it included a reservation exempting immigration policy from its 
obligations.  As barrister Stephanie Motz explains in a lecture, ‘the right to liberty of 
movement contained in the CRPD does not apply to disabled persons without a right 
to enter and remain in the UK’ (2016).  However, she questions the reservation’s legal 
compatibility with the object and purpose of UNCRPD.  The CRPD committee criticised 
EU member states’ response to the needs of disabled migrants.  It recommended the 
mainstreaming of disability in immigration policies (2 October 2015, cited by Motz, 
2016), thereby confirming the view that government obligations under the Convention 
extend to migrant populations within their country.  However, the UN inquiry included 
only indirect reference to the intersectional needs of disabled migrants or non-citizens.  
The UK government report states that it ‘wants all citizens … to have more control’ 
(paragraph 24).  The implication is that non-citizens are the ‘other’, whose existence 
requires no acknowledgement.  Reiterating Ball’s (2006, p.14) assertion of the 
importance of what ‘they do not think about’, this omission is itself noteworthy.  Failure 
to consider intersectional restrictions suggests hegemonic acceptance of social logics 
of citizen priority, with the lower entitlements of asylum seekers ignored or framed as a 
separate issue.  
Despite increasing commonalities in the impact of immigration policy and welfare 
reform, distinctions in the discursive rationales are maintained.  As explained, the 
notion of ‘control’ has normative but inconsistent, or what Butler, Laclau and Žižek 
(2000, p.305) refer to as ‘floating’, meaning within UK government discourse of 
immigration (Great Britain. The Home Office, 1998) and welfare reform (Great Britain. 
Department of Health and Social Care, 2006) policies.  In the 1998 White Paper, the 
words ‘control’ or ‘controlling’ are used 186 times in the 55-page document, 
emphasising the state’s need to assert control over migrants to avert the apparent 
threat.  This control is coercive or disciplinary.  The same words are used 141 times in 
the 2006 White Paper providing service users with ‘more choice and control’ over their 
care services.  This control is framed as empowering.  The two forms of control are not 
interchangeable.  The notion that asylum seekers might be given ‘choice and control’ 
over services remains counter-hegemonic.  Furthermore, the contingency of discursive 
practice is highlighted by the potentially progressive goal of individual control being co-
opted to mask the reduction of state services.  This facilitated the introduction of 
restrictions in the 2010 Welfare Reform White Paper, including coercive forms of control 
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akin to the 1998 White Paper.  These Papers indicate increasing commonalities 
between the discourse of coercive control within both welfare reform and immigration 
policy.  The contemporary neoliberal discursive hegemony frames disabled people and 
migrants as burdens to be controlled.   
Conclusion 
The discursive policy struggles outlined in this chapter are those of the dominant 
political class.  These struggles shape the intersectional entitlements associated with 
disability and immigration.  In both policy areas, the need for distinctions of entitlement 
is assumed, with access to support conditional not on need, but on individual attributes 
of apparent worth.  Overt contestation, within the policy discourse, is focused on 
adjusting the borders of entitlement, determining who is worthy of generosity, who is 
framed as a burden, and whose life remains unacknowledged.  Public discourse 
becomes limited to balancing political logics of defence, generosity, rights, and 
responsibility.  Such discourse is assisted by fantasmatic logics of threat, goodness, 
and pride.  The resulting appearance of political debate assumes the legitimacy of 
social logics, in which the entitlements of disabled people and migrants are secondary 
to those of non-disabled citizens.  Disabled asylum seekers are thereby automatically 
framed as the ‘other’, potentially worthy of generosity but not of equality.   
 
The convergence of dominant discourses of immigration and welfare reform policies 
does not suggest an end point.  Social orders are always, and inevitably, contingent.  
However, political contestation is defined and limited by awareness of possibility.  When 
the hegemonic discursive agenda is restricted to contesting the borders of entitlement 
and determining the appropriate balance between existing political logics, then core 
inequalities appear inevitable.  This serves to preclude, or to diminish, the validity of 
alternatives such as logics of equal rights and the inherent worth in a person’s 
existence.   
This chapter has focused on the discursive struggles determining government policies 
regarding entitlements associated with disability, forced migration and intersectionality.  
These struggles determine the formal entitlements of disabled asylum seekers and 
refugees.  If the entitlements are to be effectively challenged, then their discursive 
representation must also be contested.  The contingency of these policies motivates 
the investigation. Subsequent chapters explore how hegemonic discursive 
representations, and the associated concealment of possibility, are contested, 
reflected, or reinforced by people with different subject positions.  Chapter 5 explores 
how problems associated with disability and forced migration are explained by those 
responsible for implementing policy.  Chapter 6 turns to the explanations of those on 
whom policy impacts most directly: disabled asylum seekers and refugees themselves.  
The final chapter investigates how these perceptions frame understanding of potential 
solutions and shape attempts to contest the hegemony.    
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Chapter 5.  Discursive representation of disability and 
forced migration adopted by people shaping the 
implementation of policy and practice.   
to what extent do subjects engage authentically with the radical contingency of social 
relations… or to what extent are they complicit in concealing it?  
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.111) 
The previous chapter analysed discursive representations of the problems associated 
with disability and forced migration adopted in UK government policy documents.  
Drawing on the poststructuralist logics of critical explanation introduced in Chapter 2, 
analysis focused on key immigration and welfare reform policies determining current 
entitlements of disabled asylum seekers and refugees.  These policies appear 
underpinned by rarely contested social logics assuming the primacy of non-disabled, 
economically productive citizens of the nation-state.  Overt debate then becomes 
limited to determining the borders of entitlement by balancing political logics of 
generosity, defence, responsibility, and rights.  These political logics are reinforced with 
fantasmatic logics of pride in ‘our’ generosity and the need to defend against the 
perceived threat of the ‘other’.  Any social order foregrounds the visibility, or aesthetics 
(Rancière, 2011), of some perspectives rather than others.  The jurisdiction of a 
national government extends to its borders, it may therefore be expected that its 
discursive representations assume the prime legitimacy of citizens of the nation-state.  
Furthermore, in the context of a capitalist economy, it is also to be expected that profit 
maximisation is prioritised, and that effort is made to reduce perceived burdens on 
economic productivity.   
Attention now turns to analyse how elite policy discourse is reflected, reinforced, or 
contested by people with different subject positions regarding implementation of policy 
and practice in the asylum sector and disabled people’s movement.  This includes 
politicians, civil servants, social care staff, legal representatives, voluntary sector 
employees and activists. Some interviewees have formal responsibilities for 
implementation of government policies; others contribute to shaping informal services, 
including potential peer support. Analysis again explores the logics adopted in 
discursive struggles for hegemony.  If policy discourse is replicated by people with 
different roles and responsibilities, then it becomes hegemonic. The radical 
contingency of any social order may thereby become obscured, hindering effective 
contestation of existing injustices and the development of alternatives.     
This chapter is followed by analysis of the perspectives of disabled asylum seekers and 
refugees with lived experience of the impact of current policies.  The analytical 
distinction between the perspectives of people who implement policy and practice, and 
those with lived experience of the impact, is not to suggest an absolute divide.  
Everybody has multiple identities, roles, and responsibilities. The hegemonic 
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assumptions shaping the social order impact on everybody, albeit with different 
consequences according to a person’s subject position and relative power.  As Gramsci 
argues (see for example Crehan, 2016), hegemonic discourse is implemented or 
contested through everyday cultural interactions and is, therefore, not limited to people 
with formal positions of responsibility.  However, making a distinction between 
perspectives associated with different subject positions enables more explicit analysis 
of the expertise developed through lived experience, for whom current policy and 
practice has the most direct, potentially life or death, impact.   
As explained in Chapter 3, analysis focuses on the nature and impact of different 
perspectives, rather than on any quantitative assessment of injustice.  Purposive 
sampling was used to elicit contributions from people with diverse subject positions.  As 
such, no interviewee is assumed to represent a larger body and no judgement is made 
regarding how pervasive any perspective may be.  Interviewees were encouraged to 
speak about their perceptions of disability and forced migration, rather than to provide 
comparable answers to predetermined questions.  This chapter brings together these 
perspectives, beginning by considering what interviewees understand by disability.  
This contributes to more detailed discursive explanation of the discursive logics 
adopted by interviewees to explain the nature of problems associated with disability 
and forced migration, investigating what the problem is represented to be, where it is 
located, and how this relates to elite policy discourse.  Finally, this chapter explores the 
drivers of current discursive explanations, considering the consequences for disabled 
asylum seekers, refugees, and the wider population.  
The previous chapter showed that government policies regarding both disability and 
migration are designed to create distinctions between people framed as worthy of 
support and those who are not.  It is unsurprising that there are numerous examples of 
the injustices experienced by people framed as unworthy.  Some of these injustices will 
be discussed in the next chapter, but as explained, this study is not designed to 
catalogue or to prove the existence of the resultant injustices.  Instead, the focus is on 
understanding how such injustice is determined, becomes hegemonic and how it could 
be effectively contested.   
With this goal, this chapter turns to the perceptions of people who implement policy and 
practice, before exploring the expertise resulting from lived experience of the impact in 
Chapter 6.  There is a clear need for greater understanding of disability among asylum 
sector staff.  The multifaceted struggles and resulting distress which people experience 
cannot be underestimated. Das5 has a safe place to live and some basic financial 
support.  However, he spoke of relentless struggles to find support for himself and his 
adult disabled daughter.  She cannot currently be left alone and cannot leave their one-
bedroom flat.  Without apparent means of resolving these barriers, he spoke to me of 
feeling like a candle that is burning to give other people light.  The problem, he 
explained, is that they do not realise his heart is being destroyed until there will be 
nothing left.   
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In the context of the scale of current struggles for survival, I do not seek to criticise work 
to improve access to immediate needs. Instead, I analyse whether current 
understanding of the problem, and the resultant actions, serve to contest causal 
inequalities.  
5.1 Understanding of disability  
Discursive representations of disability shape perceptions of the problem in the current 
social order.  Such representations reflect understanding of who has the expertise, 
where allegiances are made, and who is responsible for any injustices.  Like all 
discursive explanations, the framing of disability is always relational and cannot be 
neutral.  Whether intentional or not, the discourse of people with different subject 
positions draws on logics of equivalence or difference with dominant policy discourse, 
thereby reinforcing or contesting the existing social order.   
Lack of routine interaction between the immigration sector and the disabled people’s 
movement results in little attention being given to intersectional experiences.  The 
removal of entitlement to financial support associated with disability, from asylum 
seekers through the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, was a fundamental moment in 
the dislocation of logics of rights, as discussed in Chapter 4.  Yet this remained 
unreferenced in key academic literature in disability studies (Barnes and Mercer, 2003; 
Oliver, 2009; Roulstone, Sheldon and Harris, 2017; Shakespeare, 2017).  There has 
been similar lack of intersectional focus in the immigration sector.  According to Home 
Office and NGO members of the Equalities sub-group of the National Asylum 
Stakeholder Forum (NASF), disability had not featured on their agenda until 2013, 
when I and a voluntary sector employee presented these issues.  For people without 
access to intersectional interaction or to counter-hegemonic discourse, it becomes 
unsurprising if elite discourse sets the parameters for wider debate.  In the context of 
the neoliberal hegemony, with assumed distinctions of individual worth and the 
reduction of state services (Harvey, 2007), it becomes counter-hegemonic to assert 
logics of equal rights or social model principles of collective responsibility to address 
the disabling impact of inadequate, or inaccessible, services.   
Discursive representation of a problem may reinforce the hegemony, or facilitate 
contestation in progressive, or regressive, ways.  As outlined in Chapter 4, the use of 
labels of individual vulnerability (VPRS, 2014; Shaw, 2016; Bolt, 2019) to indicate 
eligibility for support, undermines social model principles of collective responsibility.  In 
an informal discussion with a disabled citizen who had had a leading role in developing 
the UNCRPD, he asked why the asylum sector invents new terms when the word 
‘disabled’ already exists.  Reliance on different terminology frames disabled asylum 
seekers as if distinct from citizens, while also undermining the achievements of the 
disabled people’s movement.  As discussed in Chapter 1, social model (Oliver, 1983) 
rhetoric temporarily gained hegemony relative to individualistic medical or charity 
models of disability (Fleischer and Zames, 2001; Oliver et al., 2012; Clifford, 2020).  
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The shift to the biopsychosocial model (Waddell and Aylward, 2009) and the assertion 
of individual responsibility, facilitated the withdrawal of services and support on which 
Welfare Reforms are based.  It is perhaps inevitable that the discursive representation 
of policy impacts on the understanding of those who implement policy and practice.  
Confusion regarding terminology extends beyond the immigration sector.  The term 
‘people with disabilities’ is accepted language in many countries, including in the 
UNCRPD.  However, in the UK, the social model is based on the premise that societal 
structures disable people, therefore people are disabled, rather than having disabilities.  
A disabled citizen (udc1) referred to ‘disabled people’ and ‘people with disabilities’ 
interchangeably.  When questioned about his rationale for oscillating between different 
terminology, udc1 responded that one never knows who is listening.  Having grown up 
under New Labour, this person explained: ‘we were always taught: Hold the centre.  
Hold the centre’.  He went on to explain that he sought to avoid being perceived as 
having ‘a chip on my shoulder’, wishing not to come across ‘as against capitalism’.  His 
assumption was that avoiding contestation is akin to neutrality, and that this is both 
possible and desirable.  Debates as to preferred terminology and associated 
allegiances may seem trivial in the context of life-threatening denial of support.  
However, as stressed in Chapter 4, discursive representations of the problem, shape 
policies, actions, and perceived solutions.   
Taking a poststructural position, discursive framing is understood as both describing 
and shaping policy and practice.  If state support is removed, then collective 
responsibility is also removed.  Survival then depends on individual initiatives.  People 
who can cope are framed as if not ‘vulnerable’ enough to be entitled to additional 
support.  As a legal professional (lp1) explained:   
I suspect that … the resourcefulness of people to cope, they find ways to cope. It doesn’t 
help them … because quite often the attitude is, “well you have survived so far, so you 
are coping”.  And you have to show that they are not coping.  And so, you have to reach 
this sort of crisis point, which services aren’t supposed to let you reach, in order to show 
that they need to intervene. 
Labels of vulnerability are combined with labels of resilience, a highly valued attribute 
of neoliberal discourse, indicating individual responsibility.  Escaping from difficult 
situations, travelling to the UK, and surviving in the asylum system, relies on high levels 
of resilience.  However, if a person is perceived as ‘able to cope’, then they also become 
undeserving of generosity.  Both resilience and vulnerability locate the problem and the 
solution at the individual level, rather than with socially constructed physical or 
attitudinal barriers (see for example Yeo and Moore, 2003, p.572). If the problem is 
represented as being at the individual level, then the solution becomes distinguishing 
between who is worthy, and who is not, rather than addressing systemic causes. 
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Segregation from the history and achievements of the disabled people’s movement 
enables the immigration sector to function in discursive isolation.  Responsibility for this 
division cannot be attributed entirely to either sector.  An employee of a disabled 
people’s organisation (vsd1) explained that the lack of asylum seekers among their 
membership is because the organisation’s constitution insists members identify as 
disabled people and support the social model of disability.  According to her, ‘prejudice 
within their communities’ makes it harder for asylum seekers or members of minority 
ethnic groups to identify as a disabled person.  The overwhelmingly white membership 
was thereby attributed to problems in ‘their communities’ rather than organisational 
barriers.  It is ironic if expectations of adherence to the social model’s focus on systemic 
disablement, hinder contestation of the disabling barriers of the asylum system.   
Some immigration sector interviewees referred to stigma associated with disability as 
if it were an issue exclusive to countries from which refugees flee.  An asylum sector 
employee (vsi5) with awareness of social model principles stated that: 
in the UK, people would quite proudly say … society has done that to me in a social 
model way.  But, in other places, people don’t have all of that … theory around it, or a 
history of a disability movement ... so people are kind of a little bit like, well …I also have 
a problem with this thing… 
The perception that asylum seekers have different understanding of disability appears 
pervasive.  In a group discussion (vsi1), a voluntary sector employee stated that ‘they 
[refugees] don't see disability the same way we [British citizens] see disability, there is 
a lot of stigma to do with it’. This view was repeated by a local authority employee 
(laer3), who stated that resettled refugees feel stigma regarding disability, because they 
come ‘from a country that doesn’t recognise disability in a positive way’.  This person’s 
colleague (laer1) stated in a separate interview that there is:  
not much of disability awareness where people come from and a lot of people see it as 
a weakness in the family or shame to the family having a disabled person in the family 
or being disabled yourself … here … that shame is gone because over here people are 
treated as they are. 
A disabled refugee (das10) contradicted this perception just moments later and in the 
presence of laer1, describing equally positive support in his country of origin as in the 
UK.  This lived experience did not appear to shift the perceptions of the local authority 
employee.  He continued to locate the problem with disabled refugees:   
some people … they start to define themselves by their disability and they don’t do 
much about getting on in their lives … if you’re in a wheelchair you can still find a job … 
some people … they don’t really make any effort. 
This perspective implicitly asserts the biopsychosocial model (Waddell and Aylward, 
2009), reinforcing the hegemonic discourse of individual responsibility which shapes 
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welfare reform.  This person went on to criticise a disabled refugee for unwillingness to 
use a wheelchair.  In this study, only statutory service providers overtly blamed disabled 
people for the difficulties.  Perhaps implementation of restricted entitlement to services 
and support results in a dispassionate approach towards people denied access.   
The assumption that disability is associated with greater stigma in people’s countries 
of origin is not borne out by this study.  One asylum seeker (das2) very openly uses an 
electric wheelchair as a practical tool to help her get around but gets out of it when she 
can.  I overheard a UK citizen watching her dance at a social event and questioning 
whether she is really disabled if she can get out of her chair.  This questioning suggests 
several problematic assumptions.  It reinforces the notion that an asylum seeker may 
be seeking more than they are entitled to and that a non-disabled citizen can make this 
judgement.  Furthermore, the notion that ‘real’ disabled people cannot get out of a chair 
is built on the assumption that the use of mobility aids is a last resort rather than a 
useful tool.  This reinforces stigma (of which das2 appears unaware) associated with 
the use of such aids in the UK.  More fundamentally, the questioning reinforces 
assumed distinctions between worthy and unworthy asylum seekers.  
The stigma commonly associated with mental distress in the UK requires further 
consideration.  A disabled citizen working with asylum seekers (udc2), explained that 
in her observations, among asylum seekers:  
the largest group I would say, probably have experienced mental health issues.  And 
that's a big taboo in this country amongst the white population. 
As a mental health service user herself, she was under no doubts as to the disabling 
and stigmatising barriers experienced in this country.  The stigma associated with 
mental distress in the UK is contrasted with the perceptions of disabled asylum seekers 
in the next chapter.  
Different understanding of problems associated with disability shape assumed priorities 
for action.  One person (vsi5) who has worked in voluntary organisations in the asylum 
sector for many years, explains that in the asylum sector, high levels of mental distress 
are: 
normalised… we're like, people just don’t sleep … people just are depressed … people 
just do have flashbacks … in someone else who wasn’t an asylum seeker, maybe we 
would think oh, how awful, we should do something about it…[in the asylum sector] 
there's some kind of inertia … because it's nearly across the board. 
Despite assertions that disability is rare in the asylum system, several interviewees 
reiterated the notion that mental distress is ‘across the board’ (vsi5).  A legal 
professional (lp2) explained: ‘everyone has some mental health problem if they’re an 
asylum seeker, because life is so grim’.  Specific research has been carried out 
regarding mental distress in the asylum sector (see for example Patel and Mahtani, 
2007), as discussed in Chapter 1. However, if in the asylum sector, disability is 
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assumed not to include people with those forms of impairment that are ‘nearly across 
the board’, then it is unsurprising if it also appears as if not many disabled asylum 
seekers exist. This then feeds into dominant narratives that the needs of disabled 
asylum seekers are insignificant minority issues.  If there were more interaction with 
the disabled people’s movement it would be known that mental distress is a form of 
impairment which is included even in legal definitions of disability, as listed in Chapter 
1.   
Different ways of understanding disability undoubtedly hinder communication and 
unified action.  The impact of different theoretical understanding of disability is 
compounded by reliance on interpreters, where different ways of translating 
terminology may result in different understanding of the problem and potential 
solutions.  The assumed location of responsibility to address the problems faced by 
disabled people shapes where alliances are made and what the solutions are perceived 
to be.  Immigration sector interviewees, from both statutory and voluntary sectors, failed 
to draw equivalence between discursive battles regarding migration and those of the 
disabled people’s movement.  Instead, disability in the immigration sector becomes 
framed as a distinct, minority issue, located at the level of the individual, rather than an 
issue of collective responsibility caused by disabling barriers. This discursive 
representation of problems associated with disability reinforces hegemonic dislocation 
of rights, and limits perceived solutions to endeavours to reduce individual impact, as 
will be analysed in Chapter 7.   
5.2 Discursive representations adopted by people implementing 
policy and practice 
Perceptions of disability feed into wider explanations of the restrictions and inequalities 
faced by disabled asylum seekers.  Among the diverse contributors to this study, some 
people frame themselves as neutral administrators; others are explicitly opposed to the 
hostility of the current system.  However, no contributor overtly condoned the 
restrictions faced by disabled asylum seekers.  This analysis explores what maintains 
current injustices in the context of such lack of endorsement.    
The perspectives of contributors to this study are summarised in three interconnected 
categories, as outlined in Table 8. 
Table 8: Discursive representations of the problems associated with disability 





Hegemonic representations are reinforced, implicitly affirming 
the primacy of non-disabled UK citizens.   
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Agenda for overt 
debate, or 
political logics 
Fatalistic approach to systemic inequalities, reduces overt 
debate to political logics of pragmatism, creating categories of 
exceptional entitlement, with a sufficientarian approach to 
support, rather than contesting the existence of distinctions of 
human worth.  
Contestation based on logics of solidarity and equality is 






Social and political logics are reinforced by fantasmatic logics of 
pride in the support provided, or in the appearance of 
contestation among people adjusting the borders of entitlement, 
despite lack of challenge to hegemonic distinctions of human 
worth. 
Despite the broad consensus as to the injustices experienced by disabled asylum 
seekers, the perceived intractability is affirmed by the reinforcement of these 
hegemonic discursive logics.  This is not to suggest a total absence of wider 
contestation.  Activist contributors such as udc5, das9 and participants in dmas3 assert 
commitment to the promotion of solidarity and equality of entitlement.   
These broad logics of explanation are examined before considering the consequences 
and repercussions of these discursive representations.   
Social logics asserting the primacy of non-disabled citizens with sufficientarian 
response to the ‘other’ 
Broad consensus among interviewees that disabled asylum seekers face injustice is 
combined with discourse of fatalism.  The suffering experienced by disabled asylum 
seekers is thereby framed as unfortunate, but inevitable.  Uncontested social logics 
assume the greater entitlement of non-disabled citizens to be incontestable.  Equal 
rights are therefore assumed to be unattainable or inappropriate.  This is similar to 
Gramsci’s analysis that hegemonic framing of the social order is as ‘a fixed and 
unchangeable reality that it would be futile to oppose’ (Crehan, 2016, pp.51-52).  The 
‘other’ may be unreferenced, framed as having ‘disposable’ (Giroux, 2008) or ‘wasted 
lives’ (Bauman, 2004), or perceived as further evidence of the brutality of the existing 
system.  But if the system is perceived as intractable then any support becomes framed 
as sufficient.  
Pervasive discourse of fatalism among interviewees with different subject positions is 
not to suggest their lack of commitment towards people experiencing injustice.  At a 
planning meeting for an event (dmas2) focused on the social care needs of asylum 
seekers, an asylum sector employee expressed surprise at the outrage shown by 




everything we do with the Home Office is inhumane, we just get used to it.  We 
constantly have to accept systematic abuse. I can’t campaign because all my time is 
spent trying to get people’s needs met in the system.   
All her time is spent working for people’s immediate survival needs.  Likewise, a 
disabled asylum seeker (das13) who had been made street homeless shrugged with 
resignation as he described his constant struggle to find food, somewhere to sleep and 
to be safe.  For him, these experiences simply add to the litany of injustices he has 
experienced.  Both he and the asylum sector employee had adopted fatalistic 
perceptions, whereas udc5, a disabled citizen, objected to the apparent acceptance of 
lower standards for asylum seekers.  As such, udc5 contests hegemonic social logics, 
instead assuming equality.  Increasing commonalities between the restrictions imposed 
on asylum seekers and welfare reform policies could highlight the need for 
intersectional resistance or could reinforce the sense of impotence.  
Perceptions of the system as unjust but intractable are not confined to the voluntary 
sector.  People involved in implementation of what could be described as political logics 
of defence at the Home Office (cs1,2), or logics of generosity within the VPRS (uis6, 
dcm3), stressed the limitations of their power within the context of wider immigration 
objectives.  With faltering language, as if aware that the perceived choices are 
unappealing, a Home Office employee (cs1) described the inevitable consequences of 
‘immigration control’: 
there will be people who get decisions … that aren’t the decisions that they want … we 
obviously have got … safeguarding and vulnerability responsibilities as people go 
through the system, but … if you haven’t been granted, how do we ensure that there is, 
you know, I guess, that the options around supported return… 
This person locates the problem with asylum decisions, yet he frames these as if 
intractable.  A colleague (cs3) of this person expressed similar fatalistic assumptions, 
focusing on perceived Home Office impotence to address the problems.  Beyond 
asylum decision-making, he described the ‘few powers we have when it comes to 
vulnerabilities.  The power’s really to recognise and refer’.  The fatalism expressed by 
cs2 is associated with this reliance on wider services:   
we’re so dependent on whatever systems deal with those vulnerabilities, whether it’s 
mental health, or physical disabilities … If those systems are stressed … it makes 
liaising with those providers and trying to get a service for a particular person … that 
much harder.   
He continued that, ‘in a way, we’re no different than another member of the public who’s 
trying to get service for their own family member’.  To liken a core government agency 
to a ‘member of the public’ suggests denial of the existence and consequences of 
power inequalities.  Furthermore, it is disingenuous for the Home Office to focus on 
wider services’ responsibility, when the Home Office is responsible for providing 
accommodation and support for asylum seekers, irrespective of whether this 
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responsibility is outsourced to external contractors.  Only if a person is found eligible 
for Community Care (Great Britain. The Home Office, 2018a) does responsibility shift 
to the local authority.  Nonetheless, the impact of service cuts was reiterated by people 
with wider subject positions.  In a group of voluntary sector staff and activists (laer2) 
working with refugees with entitlement to access the welfare state, one person 
described the impact of cuts resulting in people arriving in the UK ‘coming onto a sinking 
raft’.  If the problem is perceived as stemming from wider service cuts, then no single 
organisation can be held responsible.  This compounds the perception that the cause 
of the problem is intractable.  However, service cuts do not negate the contingency of 
current restrictions, they simply indicate the scale of the problem.   
Beyond a shortage of services, the perceived intractability of injustice may be attributed 
to the sense that restrictions stem from deliberate implementation of the hostile 
environment (Liberty, 2018), rather than from oversight.  An advocate working with 
das3 explained that during a care assessment:  
it felt like there was a decision they had made, and I don’t feel the assessment had a 
lot of bearing on the decision … The problem is that some people are ignorant, but do 
they want to know what it’s really like? … that, I don’t know. 
The insinuation that some people do not want to ‘know what it’s really like’, implies that 
the lack of provision is deliberate.  Knowing ‘what it’s really like’ is irrelevant if the goal 
is not to provide for human needs.  If social logics of the primacy of the nation-state 
form the assumed common-sense, then the problem becomes ensuring that the ‘other’ 
does not get more than their entitlement.  This is important in shaping effective 
intervention.  Lobbying policymakers with examples of the degree of suffering will be 
ineffective if policy is not designed to alleviate suffering.   
This is not to deny the increased attention being given to issues of disability in the 
asylum system.  A Home Office employee (cs1) described investigating provision for 
disabled people in the asylum process, as ‘an eye-opener’.  She called for better 
availability of mobility aids and accessible accommodation.  Her explanation of the 
system was as an incontestable entity, with action to address specific problems, then 
framed as sufficient.  Similarly, a local authority director of social care explained that 
he would not be attending a meeting (dmas2) to discuss asylum seekers’ access to 
social care.  Instead, he advised by email (November 2018): 
We do take this issue very seriously of course and would suggest an approach to the 
Adult Safeguarding Board if you feel it appropriate, could be your next step. 
By representing the problem as identifying individuals in need of safeguarding, the 
causal factors are again presented as intractable.  The assumed goal is not equality or 
to reduce barriers to meeting human needs, but to provide sufficient response to reduce 
immediate risk to life.  
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If immigration policy is perceived as an unchangeable entity, then the restrictions and 
inequalities faced by disabled people become exceptions to be addressed individually.  
A group of Home Office employees (cs1) described their safeguarding strategies as an 
explanation of how they meet the needs of disabled asylum seekers.  When asked how 
these strategies address an individual’s despair arising from systematic denial of 
needs, two employees responded by asserting the need for people to ‘voluntarily’ return 
if their asylum claim is refused.  The problem and associated blame is thereby located 
with the ‘other’, and effective policy implementation is prioritised.  
Fatalistic conceptions of the system enable statutory authorities to be framed as 
benevolent protectors.  When examples of lived experience were conveyed to a senior 
member of a local authority, her response was that the solutions are ‘common-sense’ 
(dmas2), and that, as she is a ‘can-do’ person, she would ensure that appropriate action 
is taken.  The implication of her statement is that current restrictions result from 
oversight, and that her benevolent intent would ensure that problems are solved, 
without requiring systemic change.  This perception was reiterated by a civil servant 
working on broader disability issues (cs4), who explained that the problem is ‘not 
knowing what to do’.  The solution is thereby presented as an issue of technical 
expertise and positive intent, rather than political change.  
Lack of acknowledgement of the radical contingency of the existing system is affirmed 
by reluctance to consider the deliberate nature of policy creating current inequalities.  
One contributor to a wider discussion (dmas2) referred to a disabled asylum seeker 
having ‘slipped through the net’.  The suggestion that there is a net which generally 
provides for people’s needs conceals the deliberate nature of policy restrictions.  
Section 115 of the Asylum and Immigration Act (1999) explicitly removes entitlement 
to access the welfare state.  Subsequent legislation, particularly the 2014 and 2016 
Immigration Acts, further limit access to services and support as a matter of deliberate 
policy, epitomised by the ‘hostile environment’ (Goodfellow, 2019).  It is misleading to 
frame the problem as ‘slipping through the net’ when the net has been deliberately 
removed.  If problems are presented as a series of oversights, it obscures the 
systematic nature of inequalities, and facilitates the presentation of any action as 
sufficient. 
Lack of provision for the human needs of disabled asylum seekers can be understood 
as part of the ‘othering’ (Spivak, 1988) associated with immigration and with disability, 
discussed in Chapter 1.  Hegemonic social logics of the primacy of an assumed norm 
result in disregard for the ‘other’.  The impact of such assumptions is illustrated by the 
contribution of an interviewee who is active in the voluntary sector and local politics 
(pol2).  This person recalled that during discussions as to what could be learnt from 
experiences of hate crime, it was suggested that voluntary sector employees share 
information regarding the mental health needs of asylum seekers.  The assumption that 
such action would be beneficial was repeated by a voluntary sector employee during 
an informal conversation.  This response frames the problem as if stemming from the 
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victim’s impairment, rather than from the perpetrator’s hate crime.  Both Kamil Ahmad 
and Bijan Ebrahimi reported their experiences of hate crime many times to multiple 
authorities, without adequate response.  The lack of protection therefore resulted not 
from ignorance, but from disregard for their needs.  As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
process of othering asserts a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Grove and Zwi, 2006; 
Anderson, B.L., 2013).  This distinction is reinforced, rather than contested, by lower 
standards of privacy for ‘them’ rather than ‘us’.  Furthermore, the suggestion that a 
solution would entail voluntary sector employees knowing a person’s mental health 
experiences, reinforces disregard for the expertise of lived experience.  If, instead, the 
problem was framed as the systemic barriers faced meeting human needs, then 
dominant policy narratives would be contested, and logics of rights could be asserted. 
Hegemonic assumptions of fatalism regarding the scale of injustice, combined with the 
assumed primacy of the needs and expertise of non-disabled citizens, implicitly 
dislocates the collective responsibility of the social model.  The result is to limit 
representation of the problem to pragmatic considerations of how to mitigate the worst 
impact of the system for certain people.  Contestation becomes focused on who is 
worthy of support; how much support should be provided; and how distinctions should 
be controlled.   
Political logics of overt debate focused on pragmatic adjustments to the borders 
of distinctions of human worth and associated entitlement. 
If common-sense social logics assume systemic inequalities associated with disability 
and forced migration are inevitable, or if people perceive themselves as unable to effect 
wider change, then political logics of overt debate become focused on pragmatic goals 
of what is considered achievable.  The problem becomes framed as adjusting the 
borders of eligibility, or identifying people perceived as worthy of support, thereby 
seeking to limit, rather than overturn, injustices. 
 
The perceived scope of possibility shapes what is perceived as useful contestation and 
the agenda for overt debate.  Attention is directed at managing the systemic absence 
of rights to support and services.  If there is no additional entitlement, then as lp2 
explains, identifying the need is futile: 
categorising off a group … and saying ‘You meet the threshold for being disabled’ when 
it doesn’t give them any entitlements isn’t particularly interesting ... If you don’t meet 
that threshold, who cares? You don’t get any special treatment. 
The route to survival becomes to assert an individual’s exceptional need.  An employee 
of a voluntary sector organisation (vsi5) explained that an asylum seeker with 
significant health issues eventually got a bus pass, but that he:   
didn’t just get one because the refugee sector people wrote a letter … he needed some 
posh medic person to write for him to get what he needed.  And sometimes the posh 
medic is needed rather than the GP.  
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Similarly, a volunteer advice worker (uis5) working with asylum seekers recalled the 
quest to get a bus pass for disabled asylum seekers.  She explained that she had never 
been successful:   
you don’t get one through being an asylum seeker.  You can request one … but the 
criteria are high. 
According to the advice worker, a bus pass is at the discretion of the local authority.  
There would be no gain for the individual concerned if focus were directed at contesting 
systemic dislocation of rights.  The goal, therefore, becomes framing individuals as 
worthy of discretionary logics of generosity.   
Campaigns focused on individual examples of need may provide the appearance of 
contestation.  However, if the agenda is focused on adjusting the balance of political 
logics, the social logics on which current inequalities are premised, remain 
unchallenged.  This issue is not necessarily addressed by asserting logics of rights.   A 
briefing from the Hear Network (2016) states that under the Transport Act (2000) all 
disabled people are entitled to concessionary travel, irrespective of migration status.  
According to them, it is necessary to assert a right rather than to frame someone as 
worthy of generosity.  However, a voluntary sector employee, with a migration 
background, (vsi1), explained, ‘in law it says that I am able to have this and that, but 
then you also go up against walls all the time’.  The assertion of legal rights may be 
particularly limited when a person faces wider issues of immediate survival.  For this 
reason, Oliver and Barnes (2012, p.175) argue that focusing on rights only benefits 
‘those with plenty of money to spend and those employed in the legal and related 
professions’.  With or without legal rights, if people lack the means to assert those 
rights, the focus turns to highlighting exceptional worth.   
It is important to reiterate that provision of support for disabled asylum seekers is not 
uniform.  A legal professional (lp1) was asked what determines variations in access to 
services and support.  His initial reply was ‘postcode lottery’, thereby suggesting a 
chaotic and unpredictable system.  More specifically, lp1 elaborated that beyond 
chance, inequalities of support may relate to migration status, country of origin, and the 
nature, or cause, of impairment.  This accords with evidence from wider research 
regarding the precarity resulting from the conditionality of support for disabled people 
(Dwyer, McNeill and Scullion, 2014), migrants (Dwyer and Scullion, 2014)  and the shift 
in UK government policy to greater reliance on voluntary sector provision (Evans, K., 
2011).  Without clear entitlements, access to support may depend on influential 
advocacy.  An interpreter involved in a small group discussion (laer2) noted that his 
presence resulted in service providers paying greater respect to the needs of das9.  
Entitlement appears to be affected by social status.  
Disability is not always associated with lower entitlements in the asylum system.  Both 
the legal professionals who contributed to this study spoke of disability as a path to 
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greater entitlement.  As one person (lp2) remarked, ‘if an asylum seeker is not disabled 
when they arrive it would be helpful if they become disabled quick’.  Capacity for legal 
contestation is not necessarily dependent on need.  A different legal professional (lp1) 
explained:   
The immigration system as a whole is just inherently racially discriminatory.  But you 
can’t really do anything about that … there is an Equalities Act exemption for decisions 
made under the Immigration Act in relation to race discrimination … no doubt in 
recognition that immigration laws disproportionately target brown people …  within that 
cohort that is racially discriminated against … we can help people with disabilities … 
because we have additional laws at our disposal … But it feels a bit wrong when at its 
heart you know they are all discriminated against on the basis of their race … that’s just 
not something that equality legislation will recognise.  
This person recognises the injustice of the current system, but his attention must be on 
gaining the best outcome for his client.  Challenging the racism underpinning 
inequalities of immigration policy would not support the immediate needs of a client.  
The focus must therefore remain on goals that are potentially achievable.  The systemic 
roots of the problem thereby remain uncontested.  If all asylum seekers have significant 
unmet needs, then the problem becomes which needs carry additional entitlement.  
This may be an issue of pragmatic decision-making as to which aspects of need or 
identity to foreground.  Individual symptoms of disability may then become one of the 
criteria of worth.  In some circumstances, such as the VPRS (2014), being identified as 
‘vulnerable’ may result in improved access to support.    
The association between labels of ‘vulnerability’ and improved support are not 
necessarily advantageous to the person concerned.  According to lp2, if disability is a 
source of agency in a person’s asylum claim or entitlement to support, then ‘it 
contributes to making people cling to their symptoms and define themselves in that 
way.  It’s very disabling’.  This perception reinforces dominant policy discourse of 
disability as an embodied problem, to be addressed by individual endeavour, rather 
than a social model focus on collective responsibility to facilitate access to services and 
support.  The binary logics of defence and generosity are reinforced by the dislocation 
of the social model.  Similarly, as Ticktin observes (2011, p.4) regarding French 
immigration policy: 
sick bodies are given recognition by the state … but only as long as they remain sick; 
this gives immigrants’ rights, not as equal citizens, but only insofar as they are – and 
remain – disabled.   
Ticktin (2011, p.9) describes undocumented migrants in France relying on ‘stories of 
suffering in order to be heard’.  Entitlement then depends on embodiment of ‘this 
paradoxically privileged position as the most disenfranchised, the most wretched of the 
earth, the most worthy of care’ (2011, p.11).  Similarly, Naomi Millner (2011, p.325) 
describes how in Calais refugee camps, support is framed as ‘benevolent actions of 
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generous citizens’ towards those victims perceived as worthy.  The dislocation of logics 
of rights results in survival depending on portraying oneself as worthy of generosity.  
 
Entitlement becomes dependent on the cause of need, rather than the need itself.  The 
focus of pragmatic contestation therefore turns to defining categories of entitlement and 
identifying people with eligible attributes.  People with different subject positions 
focused their attention on two key overlapping categories of exceptional entitlement: 
labels of vulnerability and evidence of torture.  
Categories of exceptional entitlement 
People with different subject positions in the immigration sector drew on euphemisms 
of vulnerability to refer to disability, thereby reinforcing policy narratives and further 
dislocating collective responsibility and logics of rights.  A legal professional (lp2) 
observed that when disabled people are referred to at all in the asylum system, it is 
always with the label ‘vulnerable’.  Similarly, a Home Office policy officer (cs2) referred 
to ‘people with vulnerabilities’.  This repetition of policy discourse is sometimes made 
without comment, at other times it is described as strategic.  A voluntary sector 
employee (vsd2) working in the immigration sector, defines herself as disabled, is 
involved in disabled people’s organisations, yet referred to disabled asylum seekers as 
‘vulnerable customers’.  Her rationale is that this reflects Home Office language and 
thereby facilitates communication: ‘it’s just gonna take much longer for them to 
understand it if you don’t use their language’.  Describing asylum seekers as 
‘customers’ reflects Home Office reference to their ‘business model’ (UKVI, 2017), 
framing the immigration system as part of the market economy.  The repetition of 
euphemisms of policy discourse may facilitate communication with Home Office staff, 
but reference to ‘vulnerable customers’ reinforces hegemonic individualistic 
conceptions of responsibility.  The result is to dislocate the collective responsibility of 
the social model of disability, the UNCRPD and the welfare state.  Hegemonic 
representation of the problem is thereby reinforced, rather than contested. 
Fatalistic conceptions of the social order frame the quest as being to identify and 
highlight evidence that an individual is exceptionally worthy, and therefore entitled to 
mitigation of wider restrictions.  Evidence of apparent ‘vulnerability’ may achieve this 
goal, as may evidence of torture.  Proof that an individual has survived torture may 
provide the evidence of persecution necessary for legitimacy under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.  Therefore, needs stemming from torture carry greater entitlement than 
similar needs stemming from other causes.  Anthropologist Tobias Kelly (2012, p.754) 
argues, ‘It is not the quality, or nature, of the pain that singles out torture survivors, but 
the specific cause of their distress’.  Distinctions in the entitlements results in people 
with different subject positions encouraging asylum seekers to disclose experiences of 
torture.  Like labels of vulnerability, this approach reinforces hegemonic dislocation of 
individual rights and collective responsibility.  Certain individuals become framed as 
exceptionally worthy and therefore deserving of generosity, without contesting logics of 
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defence against the wider population of asylum seekers.  Medical evidence of torture 
may provide what Didier Fassin and Estelle d’Halluin (2005, p.606) describe as ‘the 
tenuous thread on which hangs the entire existence - both physical and political - of the 
asylum seeker’.  The problem then becomes, not removing systemic barriers to meeting 
human needs, but identifying and proving the source of individual symptoms.  The 
immediate concern is then how to facilitate disclosure of such experiences, balancing 
concern for possible detrimental psychological impact with the potential for greater 
entitlement.  
There are many problems associated with providing evidence of torture.  Fassin and 
d’Halluin (2005, p.598) explain that ‘Scars, both physical and psychological, are the 
tangible sign that torture did indeed take place’.  However, some symptoms are more 
visible and provable than others.  Despite the prevalence of mental distress among 
asylum seekers, several interviewees (lp1, laer3, pol2, vsi3) perceived people with 
mental health support needs to experience additional barriers.  One person working 
with people affected by torture (vsi3), believed that psychological impact is less readily 
addressed than physical symptoms.  As a legal professional (lp1) explained, ‘self-
reporting is received so sceptically’.  It appears easier for people with visible scars 
(das16) to access support, as will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 6, than for 
people with mental distress or invisible impairments, irrespective of current impact.   
The potentially crucial significance of evidence of torture, in relation to entitlement to 
support, does not necessarily facilitate disclosure.  One asylum sector employee (vsi5) 
explained how one person: 
didn’t say and they didn’t say, and they got detained and they didn’t say ...  Unbelievable 
amounts of stress and trauma that they went through in order to not say … the three 
most trusted people in that person's life … met them once a month for a year and went 
through their case to help them understand what was going on and then finally it was 
disclosed bit, by bit, by bit.   
As she elaborated, some people have experienced: 
unspeakable things … they won't say them because it's so difficult to say them.  So 
there's also a totally, and completely, hidden cohort of people … that has gone through 
something like that and never spoken of it.  And only when you spend loads of time with 
people … then finally you can realise.  And by that point the Home Office is like, well, 
you're obviously lying because why didn’t you tell us about your sexual abuse earlier?   
According to a torture specialist (vsi3), sometimes people ‘may not be aware that what's 
happened to them is torture … and it may not be something that people ask them about 
in ways that facilitate disclosure’.  Even when people do speak about such things, 
sometimes UK medics are ill-equipped to address the symptoms.  According to one 
interviewee (laer3), a torture survivor went to the doctor with knee problems resulting 
from having been beaten for 40 days.  The doctor responded with dietary advice and 
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referral to physiotherapy.  If a person discloses their torture to a person who provides 
inappropriate response, then it may discourage further disclosure.  Furthermore, 
capacity to speak about traumatic experiences may depend on the nature of ongoing 
psychological impact (Basoglu et al., 2001).  Scars may be considered an indicator of 
legitimacy; however, they may also be associated with shame, trauma, and continued 
grief.   
The barriers to acquiring evidence of torture are recognised by a Home Office 
employee in a discussion group (cs1):  
someone with PTSD for example, it’s well known that people won’t disclose that until 
they feel safe, so actually it might not even come out at all during the whole asylum 
process … what we have to do is ensure that staff have got the right level of awareness 
and training to spot the signs and then to know what to do about it 
If inequalities associated with evidence of torture are uncontested, then this reinforces 
hegemonic distinctions of apparent human worth. 
Evidence of torture may be significant to an asylum claim, but once a person has 
migration status, the cause of an impairment becomes insignificant.  At this stage, the 
existence of an impairment which results in eligibility for disability benefits could make 
a significant difference to family income.  The Welfare Reform Act (2012) introduced a 
cap on benefit payments unless a family member is disabled.  One local authority 
employee (laer3), working with resettled refugees, referred to someone who ‘doesn’t 
see herself as disabled… she can do everything for herself’ and tries to hide her 
impairment.  Nonetheless, her husband was keen for her to apply for disability benefits 
to increase their income.  The issue according to laer3 is that:  
at a really practical level, for people who are very poor, it’s all about getting disability 
benefits, because they passport you to different things … it releases him from the 
benefit cap. 
Without refugee status, there is no disability benefit, let alone benefit cap.  These 
complicated and fluctuating implications of disability result from the break between 
need and entitlement to support, yet this break remains hegemonically uncontested.   
Without entitlement based on need, as one legal professional (lp2) explained, extra 
scrutiny of categories of entitlement is to be expected.  The Independent Chief 
Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) proved the validity of this expectation by 
warning that if there are possibilities of entitlement associated with labels of 
vulnerability, then people may be encouraged to ‘play the system’ (Bolt, 2019, p.14 and 
23).  The impact of this on individual experience is highlighted by a legal dispute brought 
by the Home Office against an asylum seeker (KV) with scars caused by having been 
burned with metal rods (2014; 2019).  The apparently superior prospects for asylum 
seekers with torture wounds may explain the Home Office prosecution questioning 
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whether acupuncture could be used to enable toleration of the pain if such wounds 
were ‘self-inflicted by proxy’.  As discussed by barrister Colin Yeo (2019a), these 
allegations were judged by the supreme court to be without basis, providing further 
indication of a pervasive culture of disbelief (Anderson, J. et al., 2014) in the 
immigration system.  Nonetheless, when survival depends on evidence of torture, there 
may be times when extreme measures are taken by those seeking sanctuary.  Ticktin 
explains that in France,  where there is provision for ‘exceptional means of entry’ (2011, 
p.9) for migrants with proven humanitarian care needs, the result is that people 
sometimes resort to ‘physical injury or infection to claim basic rights’ (2011, p.190).  In 
the context of denial of support to the wider migrant population, greater entitlement 
associated with care needs exacerbates, rather than addresses, inequalities.  Whether 
or not a person has been tortured, a system that depends on such evidence breaks the 
association between need and entitlement to support.  When the overt agenda is 
focused on managing the impact of existing inequalities, or identifying people worthy of 
generosity, the result is to reinforce systemic inequalities and the dislocation of rights. 
Fatalistic understanding of wider immigration politics shape people’s stated motivation 
to focus on individual acts of generosity and compassion, rather than on assertion of 
rights or systemic change.  Evidence of suffering based on torture or vulnerability 
becomes evidence of being worthy of compassion.  Fassin describes this as 
‘compassionate attachment to individual suffering’ (2005, p.372).  Despite the assertion 
by a local organiser (uis6) that he was motivated by shame at Britain’s initial lack of 
response, his discourse of generosity and pride reinforces hegemonic distinctions.  He 
described his goal as seeking to avoid confronting the ‘loaded’ or ‘complex’ issues of 
the wider immigration system.  His approach reflects Ticktin’s (2011, p.19) view that 
‘those who act in the name of the moral imperative generally claim to be apolitical’.   
However, she goes on to explain that ‘rather than remaining outside the system, in their 
desire to not engage with politics, they work to reinforce the status quo’ (ibid).  Among 
contributors to this study, there was no direct reference to the need for logics of defence 
against disabled asylum seekers.  However, providing discretionary support to selected 
refugees reinforces fantasmatic logics of pride associated with logics of generosity 
towards those framed as worthy.  Such discourse frames the givers as arbiters of 
entitlement and therefore as morally superior to the receivers.  The implication is that 
‘we’ the generous citizens, have something to protect, thereby legitimising wider 
discourse of defence.  The result is to reinforce systemic inequalities, precarity and 
hegemonic discourse.  As Ticktin (2011, p.21) continues, ‘the anti-politics of care is not 
about the politics of care gone awry; anti-politics lies at its very core’.  Acts of apparent 
generosity towards selected people may improve some lives but reinforce hegemonic 
inequalities.   
The transfer of responsibility for immigration from the state to the voluntary sector 
evokes political logics of generosity, reinforced with fantasmatic logics of pride, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  People made destitute by the state may rely on voluntary 
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donations for food and shelter.  This may build relationships of care and solidarity.  
However, the relationship is inherently unequal, based on host kindness and 
beneficiary need, rather than formal rights and obligations.  Relying on the voluntary 
sector to provide for people with mental health support needs is particularly 
problematic.  One volunteer (udc2) described hosting someone with what she 
described as ‘active PTSD’.  She recalled:  
it was really not appropriate for her to be here.  I mean, fortunately, everybody pulled 
out the stops and moved her into supported accommodation, which is where she 
needed to be.  
This person is clear that voluntary sector support may be appropriate for some people 
but not others.  Acts of benevolence or solidarity may mitigate the impact of systemic 
restrictions.  However, such acts may also enable the state to reduce its role, 
transferring responsibility to the voluntary sector and thereby affirming the discursive 
shift of focus from logics of rights to logics of discretionary generosity.  
Whether intentional or because of confusion among service providers, asylum seekers 
face barriers accessing the rights which do exist, including access to healthcare.  A 
legal professional (lp1) explained that GP surgeries have been known to create criteria 
based on migration status for registration with a GP:  
there’s no legal basis for restricting access to GP surgeries… You can’t just create your 
own criteria ‘cause then that’s race discrimination … but …as soon as you raise that, 
they correct themselves and say it was all a terrible misunderstanding. 
Uncontested social logics of asylum seekers as the ‘other’, combined with political 
logics of generosity and the dislocation of rights, may facilitate the framing of access to 
basic needs such as medical care as discretionary.  This framing of the problem allows 
provision of support to be underpinned with fantasmatic logics of pride, rather than with 
obligation.  
Fantasmatic logics of pride, in place of rights, reinforce wider hegemonic 
representations.  
Discursive representations of discretionary generosity are complemented with 
fantasmatic logics of pride.  When das9 was experiencing mental distress exacerbated 
by destitution, considerable lobbying resulted in a local authority care assessment.  He 
was then provided with financial support of approximately £5 per day and hostel 
accommodation.  The outsourcing of statutory obligations from the state to the 
voluntary sector housing provider may account for the framing of such minimal 
provision as an act of generosity.  According to his interpreter and close friend, the 
providers were ‘acting as if it was a favour… privilege’ for which das9 should be grateful.  
With disdain for such framing, the interpreter added: ‘imagine it… it is an insane world’.  
His contestation of such framing and his solidarity with das9 could be understood as 
134 
 
counter-hegemonic.  However, in the absence of organised resistance, this has little 
power to dislocate hegemonic discourse.   
Discourse of generosity complemented with pride was pronounced among people 
providing support for refugees resettled under the VPRS.  The scheme was welcomed 
by people with diverse subject positions, including a national politician (pol1), voluntary 
sector employee (vsd2), and local community organiser (uis6), as if acts of generosity 
were unquestionably positive.  In meetings at both small town and district level (lm3 
and dcm2), people working in paid or unpaid capacity presented themselves as proudly 
providing gifts, rather than as political activists demanding rights, or contesting systemic 
deficiencies.   
Philanthropic support can be framed as an indicator of the moral standing of the 
provider.  The social identity theory developed by social psychologists Henri Tajfel and 
John Turner (2001) provides useful analysis. It attributes the need to locate ‘us’ as 
better than ‘them’ as stemming from people’s need to belong to a social group and to 
believe that their group is better than others.  If social identity is located at the level of 
the nation-state, then refugees may be framed as the outsiders, with Home Office (cs1) 
and local authority (laer1) staff locating blame with disabled asylum seekers and 
refugees.  In contrast, voluntary sector employees contributing to this study routinely 
present themselves as better than the Home Office, even when relying on pragmatic 
repetition of hegemonic discourse.  If support were framed as an issue of equal rights, 
then distinctions of social identity between ‘us’ and ‘them’ would become irrelevant to 
the goal of removing barriers to accessing these rights.   
Collective community pride may be enhanced by welcoming refugees if support is 
framed as an issue of discretionary generosity.  At a small-town meeting (lm3), 
presenters focused on the special reception offered to two Syrian families.  Members 
of the public were reported to have ‘donated loads and loads of stuff’.  It was described 
as ‘inspiring’ and ‘typical’ of the ‘community spirit’, which ‘epitomises’ the town.  Such 
small numbers of refugees relative to the 20,000 people to be resettled in the whole 
country did not deter organisers from repeatedly asserting a belief in their own 
generosity.  Drawing on fantasmatic logics of pride, based on unevidenced 
assumptions that the welcoming of two families contained lessons for the wider UK 
population, there were questions as to how the work could be promoted at a national 
level.  Such assumed superiority contrasts with a study of geographical differences in 
attitude to migration (Crawley, Drinkwater and Kausar, 2019), in which it was found that 
out of 12 regions of Britain, the region under discussion had the third lowest level of 
support for asylum seekers.  Like the initial announcements of the VPRS (Great Britain. 
The Home Office and The Rt Hon James Brokenshire MP, 2014) discussed in Chapter 
4, the number of people welcomed is framed as less significant than the generosity of 
response towards those selected.  Fantasmatic logics of pride are emotional and 
unquantifiable.  Without acknowledgement of possible alienating inferences for non-
Christians, the small-town meeting (lm3) was held in a church, with local organisers 
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speaking from the pulpit, thereby evoking almost religious zealotry to affirm pride in 
‘our’ goodness.  The purpose was not to discuss the inequalities of migration support 
or to contest the asylum system, but to highlight ‘our’ achievements.      
Similar discursive representations of generosity and pride were used at a district-wide 
meeting (dcm2) of elected Councillors, Council employees and volunteers, regarding 
the welcoming of selected Syrian refugees.  Such is the need to assert pride, that my 
attempts to discuss recent immigration legislation and the resultant increased 
restrictions being imposed on the wider population of migrants, were met with derision 
and requests from elected Councillors to avoid ‘politics’.  Five years after Theresa May 
had referred to her intention to create a ‘hostile environment’ (Kirkup, 2012), and with 
ongoing widespread media coverage of that goal, meeting attendees denied it had 
happened.  When evidence was provided, one Councillor asserted that it only applied 
to ‘illegals’, not to the ‘good’ refugees being hosted locally.  Hegemonic distinctions of 
entitlement are thereby affirmed while people simultaneously present themselves as if 
introducing innovative solutions.  This exchange highlights the irrelevance of evidence 
in maintaining fantasmatic logics of pride.  Hegemonic discourse is reinforced by the 
incontestable nature of fantasmatic logics of pride, complemented by political logics of 
‘our’ generosity, and underpinned by uncontested social logics regarding the primacy 
of citizens of the nation-state.   
Local level meetings focused on discussing implementation of the VPRS, framed as 
issues of generosity, rather than the defensive measures targeted at asylum seekers.  
However, according to national politician (pol1), inequalities of entitlements between 
asylum seekers and people selected for the VPRS, is not a reason to criticise the 
scheme.  Instead, he thought the approach should be extended to more people.  Such 
an approach seeks to adjust the borders of entitlement to create more exceptions but 
fails to contest the systematic hostility of government policy.  In contrast, a local 
politician (pol2) described the divisive impact of the VPRS on migrant communities.  
More specifically, an impromptu discussion group of people working with asylum 
seekers and with refugees resettled under this scheme (laer2), described the impact 
that these distinctions appear to have on people’s psychological state.  In their 
experiences, many asylum seekers act as if they are beholden and immensely grateful 
for the smallest support.  In contrast, people selected for the VPRS are described as 
assertive and demanding.  Returning to Fanon’s (1967) argument that racism impacts 
on people’s perceptions of themselves, distinctions in entitlements may impact on 
people’s own behaviour or other people’s perceptions thereof.   
People with direct roles of policy implementation were found to reinforce social and 
political logics with fantasmatic logics such as to frame any services that are provided 
as if worthy of pride.  A senior Home Office policy officer complained in a meeting 
(nm1a) that he was fed up with being lobbied by NGOs, when, as he put it, ‘It’s about 
working together to make the world a better place’.  Similarly, his colleague described 
the motivation to do the ‘right thing’.  Such distinctions between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ serve 
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to assert self-worth.  The tendency to frame oneself as free of blame is perhaps 
necessary for emotional preservation.  Only a disability activist (udc5) overtly 
acknowledged collective blame for deliberate and systemic problems.  Without having 
taken a representative approach to sampling, I do not pass judgement as to how 
unusual this admission may be.  However, if discursive explanations of the experiences 
of disabled asylum seekers are dominated by fatalism, then any mitigation of ongoing 
problems may be presented as evidence that ‘we’ are doing our bit, thereby evoking 
logics of generosity and associated pride.  The problem becomes framed as how to 
mitigate the suffering of certain people, rather than how to contest the wider system 
and assert alternative forms of organising society, distributing resources, or judging 
human worth.  
Logics of generosity enable service providers to be framed as saviours, rather than as 
obligated to ensure rights are met.  This is not unique to the framing of intersectional 
minority needs.  Mondon and Winter (2020, p.215) accuse what they call the ‘self-
righteous liberal centre’ of ‘propping up systemic inequalities and injustice’ by diverting 
attention from systemic racism.  This is, however, not to suggest that contestation is 
easy.  As Zoe Gardner, an immigration sector employee, tweeted on 19th May 2020, 
‘People always tell me to keep hope... As if anyone in this line of work has had hope 
for a decade?  Working without hope because we must & if we didn’t it would be so 
much worse’.  According to Goodfellow (2019), the hostile environment not only affects 
migrants but also organisations that support migrants, such that few people can 
continue this work for long periods.  Focusing on pragmatic targets of reducing 
incidents of injustice may provide people with the sense of achievement necessary to 
continue such work, however, if those targets leave causal factors uncontested, then 
the perceived impossibility of alternatives may be heightened.  
5.3  Drivers and impact of current discursive explanations 
My analysis has shown that hegemonic distinctions of entitlement, underpinning 
government policies, are reinforced by people with diverse subject positions.  As 
Goodfellow (2019, p.37) explains,  ‘even some parts of the immigration sector have 
helped sustain a “hierarchy of migrants”’.  The contrasting entitlements of asylum 
seekers and refugees resettled under the VPRS is a clear example of this hierarchy.   
Even among critics of the hostile environment and logics of defence, the generosity of 
the VPRS is assumed to be a positive alternative (pol1, vsd2).  Normative framing of 
pragmatism results in the apparent generosity of the VPRS being presented as the best 
that can be expected.  However, as I have argued, not only do logics of generosity and 
pride complement logics of defence, but such discourse also obscures the radical 
contingency of the social order, thereby hindering the development of alternatives.  Yet, 
hegemonic discourse changes.  As Mondon and Winter argue:  
ideas that begin as simply unacceptable can become acceptable or even “common-
sense” … a critical mass can alter established beliefs and change the landscape more 
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or less radically, bringing social groups (and demands associated with particular 
groups) into the mainstream and rendering their newly acquired rights to something 
natural or normal. (2020, p.113) 
The contingency of hegemonic assumptions is demonstrated by the change in the 
discursive representation of disability since the advent of the social model (Oliver and 
Barnes, 2012).   
The reinforcement of hegemonic discourse is not necessarily deliberate.  As Gramsci 
explains, cultural hegemony shapes the assumptions and institutions of everyday life.  
Glynos and Howarth (2007, p.104) observe that many everyday activities, ‘from making 
breakfast in the morning to the successful delivery of children to school … contribute 
to the successful reproduction of various systems of social relations’.  These tasks may 
be routinely undertaken without analysing the implications or the alternatives.  As 
Glynos and Howarth (2007, p.120) continue, often invisible everyday inequalities ‘may 
involve and rely upon relations of subordination, but they need not be experienced as 
oppressive, nor regarded as unjust’.  People with diverse subject positions may 
perceive inequalities associated with disability and forced migration as unfortunate but 
inevitable.  Without awareness of intersectional historic struggles to address systemic 
barriers, such as could be provided by the social model of disability (Oliver, 1983) 
combined with critiques of the primacy of the nation-state (Hobsbawm, 1975; Anderson, 
B., 1983), the sense of injustice may be directed into multiple liberal struggles to meet 
an individual’s immediate needs.  The systemic roots and contingency of current 
injustice are not dependent on being acknowledged as such.    
Repetition of dominant narratives reinforces the hegemony and hinders the 
development of alternatives, irrespective of whether that is the intention.  However, 
such repetition may appear strategic to people seeking career advancement or to those 
seeking pragmatic policy adjustments.  As discussed previously, for vsd2, effective 
communication would take so much longer without repeating the language of the 
people you seek to change, in this case, the Home Office.  However, this assumes that 
the objective is pragmatic reform, or policing.  Structural change, or a moment of politics 
in which those without a voice assert their voice, is actively hindered by reinforcement 
of hegemonic discursive representations underpinning the problem.   
The restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum seekers are 
determined by deliberate policies, rather than oversights, as explained in Chapter 4.  
Without active contestation, this analysis indicates that the discursive explanations on 
which current immigration and welfare reform policies are based, are continually 
reinforced by people with diverse roles and responsibilities.  It is, however, reiterated 
that interviewees may not necessarily recount their own views.  This is particularly 
anticipated where people were interviewed in a group or in the context of their 
employment.  Furthermore, civil servants may perceive themselves as neither 
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responsible for the consequences of policy, nor as having options beyond 
implementation.   
In addition to the dislocation of collective responsibility and the reduction of state 
services which are core to neoliberal ideology, the systematic denial of rights to 
disabled asylum seekers stems in part from both racism and ableism.  An asylum sector 
employee (vsi5), who previously worked in Social Services, believed that racism is core 
to the lack of attention paid to disabled asylum seekers.  She explained that in Social 
Services, ‘If they're experiencing autism, people are like oh, it's a cultural difference.  
So ‘their’ autism and ‘our’ autism must be different, and so it must just be a weird, 
foreign thing’.  More explicitly, as explained above, a legal professional (lp1) described 
the immigration system as inherently racist.  Such approaches, combined with the 
deliberate denial of services and support to asylum seekers, creates a system which is 
both racist and disabling.  Yet, even those interviewees (vsi5 and lp1) who 
acknowledged the problem, framed it as an observation rather than as something that 
could be contested.  Similarly, the Home Office employee who, in a meeting (nm1), 
referred to his motivation to do the ‘right’ thing, was not suggesting he would address 
the systemic racism or disabling impact of denying access to services and support.  He 
framed the problem as identifying individual oversights rather than systemic 
contestation.  
Speaking more specifically about the influence of racism and ableism, one disability 
activist (udc5) described barriers within disabled people’s organisations and asylum 
sector organisations.  He explained that organisations reliant on external funding, 
perhaps inevitably prioritise employees able to communicate with funders. This 
includes having the same language, culture, and skillset as funders.  His analysis is 
similar to the findings of Weisinger et al. (2016), who explain the disproportionate 
number of middle-class volunteers in the voluntary sector stems, in part, from 
perceptions that:   
Middle-class young people are more capable in part because of educational 
advantages that they enjoy. But there is also a closer cultural fit between the young 
people and staff members. Thus, staff members feel it is easier to get their work done 
effectively with middle-class young volunteers. (2016, p.19s) 
According to udc5, the problem increased after the introduction of direct payments, 
when disabled people’s organisations changed from being primarily peer support 
groups, to becoming service providers, reliant on local authority funding.  He believed 
that the unspoken ethos from funders was that trustworthy organisations must be led 
by ‘middle-class, white, disabled people that we know’.  Organisations may frame 
themselves as peer support, but if they are dominated by people from a privileged 
background, using ‘expert’ language, then people with other identities and backgrounds 
may be alienated.  Attempts to ‘reach out’ to groups construed as ‘hard-to-reach’ are 
then impeded by the power imbalance.  For disabled asylum seekers, barriers 
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associated with racism, disability, social class, and cultural and linguistic differences 
are combined with the immediacy of struggles for survival.  In the context of such 
barriers and without obvious material benefits, it is unsurprising if disabled asylum 
seekers are not engaged in the disabled people’s movement.   
The contributions from people with different subject positions highlight the lack of 
interaction between the immigration sector and the disabled people’s movement.  The 
resultant lack of understanding of ongoing barriers, as well as previous struggles and 
achievements, hinders the scope for awareness and contestation of the regressive 
impact of current hegemonic discourse.  The social model and the rights enshrined in 
the UNCRPD bring highly relevant insights to the disabling impact of current 
immigration policy.  A disabled citizen and activist (udc5) explained that seeing the 
world ‘through the lens of the social model’ leads him to focus on social constructions 
of problems.  He criticised an asylum sector document in which the problems 
experienced by a disabled asylum seeker were described as stemming from the 
person’s inability to speak English.  If the problem is represented as located with the 
individual’s lack of English, then the person may be blamed for failing and portrayed as 
a burden.  If the problem is framed as lack of interpreter, accessible English classes, 
or the daily struggles which impede capacity to learn a new language, then the focus 
is on society’s responsibilities and the need for systemic change.  As such, a social 
model approach assumes social logics of equality and collective responsibility, from 
which political logics of solidarity rather than generosity are drawn.    
The repercussions of failing to contest causal issues or hegemonic representations of 
the problem are acknowledged by some contributors.  A legal professional (lp1) 
described how if the problem is not addressed at the causal level, there will be wider 
repercussions.  The denial of healthcare stems from what he describes as:  
manufactured outrage about health tourism, migrants needing the NHS and so on… 
And in response … they are setting up the infrastructure for paying … private patients 
across the NHS and before you know, it will all be there, and they started it all on 
migrants ‘cause no one was going to speak up for them, and it’s all in place for them to 
broaden it out to the rest of the population. It will progress from migrants to those who 
brought it on themselves, the obese, smokers, alcoholics.  Yeah it will creep through, 
but you start on unpopular people and before you know it, it’s too late to step back. 
Failure to challenge hegemonic discourse regarding both immigration and disability 
enabled the dislocation of rights to spread from the immigration sector to the wider 
population as discussed in Chapter 4.  Unless effective means of contestation are 
developed, this process looks set to continue.  
Conclusion 
Despite professed concern regarding the experiences of disabled asylum seekers, 
interviewees with diverse subject positions reflected and reinforced the hegemony of 
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the policy discourse analysed in Chapter 4.  With fatalistic assumptions that the system 
is intractable, social logics of the prime legitimacy of non-disabled citizens remain 
uncontested.  As such, any support provided to disabled asylum seekers is presented 
as if sufficient, with debate reduced to pragmatic goals of identifying people worthy of 
support.  This does not challenge systemic restrictions and inevitably leaves some 
people without support.  The existence of distinctions in human worth is hereby 
affirmed, with the regressive assumption that entitlement depends on the cause, rather 
than the existence, of need.  Provision of support for those people framed as worthy 
evokes logics of generosity complemented by fantasmatic logics of pride.  Perhaps 
most significantly, the discursive framing used by people with different subject positions 
obscures the radical contingency of any social order, thereby not only affirming 
hegemonic discourse but hindering development of alternatives.    
Whether the restrictions faced by asylum seekers result from oversight, wider policy 
objectives, or deliberate intent may appear irrelevant to lived experiences of suffering.  
However, understanding discursive representations of a problem is essential to 
understanding how the system could be, or is already being, contested.  If policy is 
designed to create sufficient hostility to prompt people to leave the UK, then highlighting 
the suffering that is caused is unlikely to result in significant change.   
A fundamental gap in the perceptions of people with a wide range of subject positions 
is the knowledge from disabled asylum seekers themselves.  Instead, relevant 
knowledge and information are presented as if located with people in similar positions 
to themselves.  In contrast, and despite the powerful hegemonic role of the institution, 
a World Bank report asserts:  
The real repositories of local knowledge on disability … are the disabled people that live 
there, and the most efficient way to tap into their local knowledge is to provide them 
with mechanisms for making their needs known. (Metts, 2000, p.xv) 
The perspectives, insights or ‘repositories’ of knowledge in people with lived experience 
of disability and forced migration are investigated in the next chapter.  This is critical 
not only to understanding the problem to be addressed, but also in showing that respect 






Chapter 6: Discursive representation of disability and 
forced migration by people with lived experience of 
the impact of current restrictions and inequalities. 
the epistemologies to which western modernity ascribes value; in this case, mostly 
those produced by science and biomedical discourse … ha[ve] had tremendous 
consequences for disabled people everywhere because only knowledge constructed 
within the parameters of normalcy are in fact considered valid. 
(Bê, 2019, p.16) 
To conclude analysis of discursive representations of problems associated with 
disability and forced migration, this chapter turns to the perceptions of people with lived 
experience of the impact of current policy and practice.  This builds on the analysis in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  The analysis in Chapter 4 focused on the discourse shaping current 
entitlements associated with government immigration and welfare reform policies.  This 
showed that despite little direct reference to intersectional issues, there are growing 
commonalities in the representations of these two policy areas.  Chapter 5 explored the 
perspectives of people with diverse subject positions for the implementation of policy 
and practice in the asylum sector and the disabled people’s movement.  There was 
broad consensus that the restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum 
seekers are unjust.  Yet the development of alternatives is hindered by fatalistic 
understanding of the assumed lack of potential for systemic change, reinforcing rather 
than contesting hegemonic distinctions of entitlement, even among people explicitly 
opposed to government policy.   
As previously stressed, this study is not designed to catalogue the nature or scale of 
injustices experienced.  However, in the face of hegemonic marginalisation of 
disabled asylum seekers, it is important to assert the significance of people’s lives, 
expertise and contribution.  This chapter begins by analysing the context for the 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers.  The asylum system includes systematic 
restrictions to the services and support necessary to meet human needs.  These 
restrictions are underpinned by hegemonic social logics assuming the prime 
entitlement of non-disabled citizens.  Analysis then turns to the perceptions of people 
with lived experience of the impact of such policy and practice.  People criticise 
experiences of deliberately punitive policies, stemming from a climate of hostility, 
chaos and the sufficientarian approach discussed in Chapter 1.  Contestation of 
political logics does not, however, automatically result in contesting the legitimacy of 
hegemonic social logics.   
Despite some commonalities with other contributors to this research, the ‘scream’ 
(Holloway, 2002) of injustice expressed by contributors with lived experience is distinct 
from the pragmatic discourse described in earlier chapters.  Nonetheless, survival may 
depend on managing, rather than contesting, hegemonic distinctions of entitlement.  
Apparent consensus as to the injustice of current restrictions does not alter experiences 
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of the impact.  This section therefore concludes by considering the administration of 
current injustice, drawing on Arendt’s (1964) conception of the ‘banality of evil’.  Current 
policy restrictions reinforce hegemonic inequalities irrespective of whether that is the 
intention.  The next chapter explores how discursive representations of the problem 
shape perceived solutions. 
6.1 The context of regressive and disabling restrictions  
The experiences of disabled asylum seekers must be understood in the context of wider 
issues of disability, introduced in Chapter 1.  The UNCRPD (2006) was developed in 
recognition of the need to address barriers meeting human needs.  These needs cannot 
be met in isolation.  In a lecture regarding the nature of vulnerability, Judith Butler 
(2015b) argues that all humans are inevitably dependent on ‘other bodies and networks 
of support’.  Lack of access to such ‘networks of support’, can be disabling.  As 
summarised in Figure 3, disability results from barriers preventing people with 
impairments from meeting human needs.  The deliberate restrictions of access to 
services and support for asylum seekers result in a particularly disabling system, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.  In addition to the physical impact, the stress associated with 
managing these restrictions, together with the trauma stemming from previous 
experiences, often imposes an insupportable burden on mental health.  Asylum 
seekers contributing to this study described high levels of mental distress.  As das8 
explained:  
this mental you know… it has been brought by the problems … I’m taking medication 
for mental but … there is another thing that can control your things.  If the things are 
better, I think all can be well.  
This is in accordance with the findings of wider studies highlighting the impact of asylum 
restrictions on mental health (Turner et al., 2003; Bhugra, Craig and Bhui, 2010; Lawlor, 
Sher and Stateva, 2015).  Lack of ability to meet human needs is disabling and can 
create mental distress (Ferguson, 2017) irrespective of migration status, but the 
restrictions faced by asylum seekers are particularly acute.  The current system creates 
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Figure 4: Disabling impact of UK asylum system 
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Issues of mental health must be seen in a broader political context.  According to 
research carried out by the Mental Health Foundation (2017), the prevalence of 
mental distress in the UK is significantly higher among the lower paid: 73% of people 
earning less than £1200 per month report experiencing mental distress compared 
with 59% of people earning over £3701 per month.  Ferguson (2017, p.12) argues 
that this relates to ‘benefit cuts … and a brutal sanctions regime’, combined with 
pressure to accept exploitative working conditions.  He argues (2017, pp.13-14) that 
the increase in individual psychological struggles is directly related to the reduction 
in collective union power and that ‘stress appears to be standing in for older 
concepts like injustice, inequality and frustration, seen at the level of the individual 
rather than of the wider workforce’.  It is unsurprising if there are high rates of mental 
distress among asylum seekers who experience the stress of migration, struggles 
to meet human needs, and displacement from loved ones.  
Contrary to the assumptions of some non-disabled people (particularly laer1) 
discussed in Chapter 5, no disabled person contributing to this study spoke of their 
impairment as a source of shame.  Using an unstructured approach, I did not ask 
anyone about their impairment or medical histories.  However, several disabled 
asylum seekers spoke particularly readily about their mental health support needs, 
without the apparent stigma commonly associated with mental distress (Gaebel, 
Rössler and Sartorius, 2017).  It may be that this openness was motivated by the 
need to foreground evidence of disadvantage associated with entitlement to 
support.  Apparent lack of stigma may also stem from the attribution of mental 
distress to the punitive and disabling nature of the asylum system, rather than to 
individual weakness.   
Irrespective of the disabling impact of current policy and practice, disabled asylum 
seekers may be unable or unwilling to take a leading role in contestation.  Lived 
experience of disability may provide people with distinct epistemological 
standpoints, or what Johnson and McRuer refer to as  ‘cripistemologies’ (2014), 
which could provide crucial insights with which to contest the hegemony.  However, 
the expertise of people who Gramsci refers to as the ‘subaltern’ is systematically 
undervalued by the dominant social class.  Returning to Rancière’s (1999) 
description of ‘logos’ discussed in Chapter 1, the marginalisation of disabled asylum 
seekers can be understood as stemming from being framed as ‘beings of no 
ac/count’ (1999, p.24). What Rancière (2010) describes as the aesthetics of politics 
render some experiences and associated perceptions visible, while others are 
obscured.  The distinctions between whose perspectives are visible and whose are 
not, are, however, not constant.  Some disabled asylum seekers do, at times, gain 
logos and become visible.  Nujeen Mustafa (2016), a Syrian wheelchair user, has 
written a book about her experiences of migration and has spoken at numerous 
international events.  However, without discounting the value of her contributions, 
the increased visibility of her experience does not appear to have significantly 
altered the invisibility of wider experiences. 
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Lack of capacity to assert needs and understanding may be combined with fear of 
the consequences.  According to das8, the problem is that ‘even though I have 
something that I can talk to people … we are in fear of doing campaigns though we 
have a lot that we can change this country’.  Adoption of hegemonic discourse may 
be a survival strategy or a symptom of perceived impotence.  According to Crehan, 
the maintenance of hegemonic discourse: 
does not require that those who are ruled, the subaltern, see their subjugation as 
justified, only that they see it as a fixed and unchangeable reality it would be futile 
to oppose. (2016, pp.51-52)  
The capacity to consider and assert the insights of previously ‘subjugated 
knowledge’ (Bê, 2019, p.1), relies on belief in the possibility of change and therefore 
the value in developing alternatives. If current circumstances are perceived as 
‘unchangeable’ then there is no purpose in devoting energy to developing 
alternatives.   
Without the means to assert their needs and experiences, the existence of disabled 
asylum seekers can be ignored by policymakers, service providers and the wider 
population.  However, to frame the problem as lack of ‘logos’ risks framing the 
problem as ignorance of people’s needs, thereby obscuring the deliberate policy 
restrictions designed to create a ‘hostile environment’ (Yeo, C., 2017; Liberty, 2018; 
Goodfellow, 2019).  For das8, there is no doubt that the restrictions imposed by 
government are intentional: ‘they know what they are doing’.  She is clear that the 
problem is not addressed by explaining what is happening.  Her assertion is borne 
out by policy analysis.  Disabled asylum seekers are not referred to in the 1998 
White Paper, however, the disabling impact of removing access to the welfare state 
cannot be attributed to oversight.  There were always exceptions to the ‘universal’ 
nature of human rights (United Nations, 1948), as discussed in Chapter 4.  The 
particularly acute restrictions imposed on disabled asylum seekers simply extended 
and made these exceptions more explicit. 
The discursive logics adopted by people with lived experience must be understood 
in this context.   
6.2 Discursive representation of the impact of current policy and 
practice  
As discussed in Chapter 4, policy discourse shaping the entitlements of disabled 
asylum seekers is focused on political logics of defence.  The expressed aim is to 
reduce the apparent burden of migration on citizens of the nation-state.  Such 
discourse is complemented with apparent generosity towards those people framed 
as worthy exceptions.  Implementation of these policy distinctions draws on fatalistic 
assumptions, evoking pragmatic mitigation of hostility towards those assumed to be 
deserving.  Hegemonic assumptions of distinctions of human worth and associated 
entitlement are thereby affirmed.  Disabled asylum seekers contributing to this study 
described the punitive impact of deliberate restrictions to meeting human needs, a 
sufficientarian approach to the support available and perceptions of illogical 
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inequalities of entitlement.  Some contributors also spoke of examples of generosity.  
However, the unpredictability of access to support compounds wider perceptions of 
a chaotic system.  The discursive representations adopted by people with lived 
experience of policy impact are summarised in Table 9. 
Table 9: Discursive representations of the problems asserted by people with 
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These representations will be considered in turn.  
The ‘scream’ of injustice contesting the inequality of social logics  
Hegemonic social logics frame the prioritisation of non-disabled citizens of the 
nation-state as inevitable, thereby legitimising inequalities associated with disability 
and forced migration.  For people experiencing the direct impact of inequalities 
resulting from these assumptions, this is not an abstract issue.  The ‘scream’ of 
injustice (Holloway, 2002, p.73) underpins the accounts of disabled asylum seekers.  
It is a fine balance between political energy stemming from the ‘scream against 
oppression’ (ibid) and exasperation, or resignation, regarding the relentless, 
apparent hopelessness of the situation.  As das9 stated, ‘I am so tormented here by 
this system, that sometimes I feel like killing myself’.  This raw emotional energy of 
desperation is shared by some activists with lived experience of the impact of 
restrictions associated with disability, without intersectional issues of migration.  As 
udc5 explained, ‘it feels awful… the relentless, relentless attacks on disabled 
people, making increasingly coercive welfare reforms … people are fighting for 
existence’.  Similar exasperation was shared by other people contributing to the 
event dmas3, which brought together disability activists.  The emotional ‘scream’ of 
injustice or the resignation of despair contrasts with the discourse of contributors 
with wider subject positions, discussed in Chapter 5.  In the words of a voluntary 
sector employee (Vsd2) ‘it’s that interesting thing of like, they’re taking on board 
what we’re saying but it’s government, so it’s slow’.  This person in no way condones 
the restrictions faced by disabled asylum seekers and is committed to addressing 
the injustice.  However, the measured and apparently pragmatic focus is distinct 
from the ‘scream’ of injustice.   
Exasperation and rejection of present injustice might be expected to result in 
systemic contestation.  However, as Holloway (2002, p.146) writes, ‘we who scream 
are we who acquiesce’.  For disabled asylum seekers, struggles for immediate 
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survival temper the capacity for hegemonic contestation.  As explained in Chapter 
3, das11 was clear that her survival depended on keeping her boat afloat and that 
she was, therefore, unable to devote energy to contesting causal problems or to 
develop alternatives.  In this regard, the claim that people have ‘nothing to lose but 
their chains’ (Marx and Engels, 2009), is misleading.  While people are still alive, 
there remains something to lose, and the more life becomes a struggle for basic 
survival, the less capacity there is for systemic resistance.   
Denial of support for disabled citizens created the motivational anger which led to 
development of the social model of disability.  Lived experience of injustice can 
result in a moment of politics.  However, as Clifford (2020, p.269) argues, it cannot 
be assumed:  
that those at the sharp end of neoliberal ideology would play a leading role in the 
fightback … Space, time and resources have had to be carved out for activism on 
top of attempting to navigate the ever more wearing daily grind. On the other hand, 
the one thing disabled people are familiar with, by the very definition of being 
disabled, is struggle. 
Clifford argues that resistance must be led by people with lived experience.  
However, notwithstanding the systemic injustices and dramatic reduction in support 
available to disabled citizens, these still create fewer barriers to organisation 
compared with those experienced by disabled asylum seekers.  While disabled 
citizens campaign against the reduction and withholding of support associated with 
the introduction of Universal Credit (Ryan, 2019; Clifford, 2020), the support 
available to asylum seekers is equivalent to approximately 40% of this benefit, and, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, without entitlement to financial support for costs 
associated with disability.  Among asylum seekers contributing to this study, the 
struggle for survival risks turning the potential energy of anger into the despondency 
of despair.   
Solidarity is needed to turn the energy of the ‘scream’ into effective intersectional 
resistance.  The prime barrier to effective solidarity does not appear to be the 
specifics of disability or migration status, but hegemonic social logics framing 
disabled asylum seekers as the ‘other’, obscuring commonalities of human need.  
Lack of interaction between sectors obscures the relevance of the achievements of 
one sector to the other.  In the asylum sector, there appears to be little awareness 
of the social model, the UNCRPD or the disabling impact of systemic restrictions.  
Yet, as discussed in Chapter 4, the politics of austerity enshrined in the 2010 White 
Paper of welfare reform, reflect the logics of defence adopted in immigration policy 
to justify removal of support and services for citizens (Ryan, 2019).  In both sectors, 
uncontested social logics prioritising economically productive, non-disabled citizens 
continue to frame impairment or lack of migration status as if explanation or 
justification for reduced access to services and support.   
The impact of distinctions of entitlement is not simply a practical issue, the 
denigration of rights is felt at a personal level.  As das8 explains, ‘when you don’t 
have [migration] status here, it’s like you’re a sinner…you’re not recognised as 
human being…You are nobody’.  Hegemonic denigration of people without 
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migration status affects formal entitlements, but also builds feelings of shame 
among asylum seekers themselves.  As das8 continued, ‘being asylum is something 
that you feel…people feel ashamed to say who you are’.  Similarly, as explained in 
Chapter 3, das5 spoke of his shame at being a refugee being so great that he had 
not told his daughter.  It is perhaps inevitable to absorb some elements of 
hegemonic values.  Lorde (1984, p.123) asserts: 
The true focus of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situations 
which we seek to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep 
within each of us, and which knows only the oppressor’s tactics and the oppressor’s 
relationships. 
Hegemonic contestation relies on having sufficient energy to think beyond individual 
survival and to perceive the possibility of systemic change.   Such energy is hindered 
by the extent of despair.  As das8 explained, ‘You struggle on your own, and when 
the day comes to an end … you say thank God, the day’s gone’.   Expressions of 
despair were common to all the asylum seekers contributing to this study.  The 
despair is compounded by the deliberately punitive nature of the asylum system.   
The punitive impact of political logics of defence, sufficientarian approaches, 
and perceived chaos  
The logics of defence on which the White Paper (1998) was based, are experienced 
as punitive by asylum seekers and refugees contributing to this study.  The most 
overt experiences of punishment are attributed to the detention system.  The 
carceral nature of prisons and immigration removal centres is similar.  However, 
unlike prisons, there is no rehabilitative objective in detention centres.  The purpose 
is not so much to punish detainees for having done something, as for being in the 
UK.  This more existential objective may explain why, according to das17 (a blind 
man, with experience of both), detention is more punitive.  Prisoners generally know 
the length of their sentence and could be released early for ‘good behaviour’.  
Consequently, as das17 explained: 
in prison there's a lot of order … there is a protocol which most people follow … you 
know that you're gonna be released on this day, so you don't wanna mess it up. 
In contrast, people in detention do not know how long they will be there but do know 
that they could be deported.  There is a lot of anger.  As das17 continued: ‘people 
don't want to be deported… it's a very volatile environment’.  In his perception, 
detention staff ‘don't care about what you do, as long as you don't escape’.  In prison, 
access issues were considered by officers, but in detention, he relied on getting help 
from other detainees.  Implementation of logics of defence has punitive impact.  
Furthermore, when the ability to meet human needs becomes dependent on 
discretionary acts of generosity, there is little scope to contest provision.  The 
precarity experienced by disabled asylum seekers is thereby reinforced.     
The punitive impact of detention was perceived by das17 as irrational.  He recalled 
being taken from detention to a medical appointment:  
you'll be in handcuffs while the doctor... they've got a longer chain … one of the 
sides of the chain is on you, one is on the officer, one of the officers.  And for 
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someone like me, really, I was relying on them to get to wherever I was going 
…There was no way that I would escape from them when I'm …relying on them. 
The use of chains is symbolic of the disregard for an individual’s well-being, but the 
impotence experienced by das17 is real and systemic.  Like the physical display of 
power at border crossings (Andersson, 2014), chains highlight the power differential, 
overtly asserting control, as called for in the 1998 White Paper.   
Provision for disabled asylum seekers appears characterised by logics of relentless 
punishment with little semblance of rights-based support.  When he was released 
from detention, das17 was taken by taxi to unsupported accommodation in a city 
where he knew no-one.  He was left on a street corner: 
I had stayed without eating for a long time and I was on medication, I was beginning 
to be sick, I was feeling dizzy.  So, in the end, I had to go in an ambulance to hospital 
on the very day that I arrived. 
Eventually, it was agreed that he could stay with his partner.  He continued to have 
to attend an Immigration Reporting Centre.  However, there was no provision to 
address access barriers: ‘no one was organised for me to be escorted there’.  He 
relied on his partner accompanying him at her own cost of £150 each time.  In 
addition, he had to wear an electronic tag with a curfew between 8 pm and 8 am.  
Yet, as he explained, he was unable to leave the house:   
I've stayed two weeks without going outside… I can't abscond anyway… They used 
to call me …  they said, "Okay, we're just checking because we're worried that 
something has happened to you, because we can see that you haven't gone out". 
This apparent concern for his well-being, masks the punitive purpose of the tag.  It 
is not imposed to ensure his safety but as a visible symbol of control.  According to 
Nesrine Malik (2018), herself a former immigration detainee, the immigration system 
is based on ‘arbitrary cruelty’, with an ‘ever-shifting obstacle course with hidden 
trapdoors’.  Contributors to this study provided relentless examples of such 
‘trapdoors’, or the punitive impact of policy and practice.  
The assertion of power and control over asylum seekers has increased significantly 
in recent years, with particular restrictions on access to healthcare (Bhatia, R. and 
Wallace, 2007; Stevens, 2010).  The punitive impact of these restrictions was 
highlighted by das8 when her medical operation was cancelled.  She recalled being 
in hospital waiting for surgery: 
they gave me gown, they gave me stockings ... when I was almost to go to theatre, 
there was a lady who came and say she want to see my papers … I don’t know 
whether they were working with the Home Office.  
She was informed that her asylum claim had been refused.  As stipulated by the 
Immigration Act (2016) her eligibility for secondary healthcare was therefore 
removed.  According to her, the doctor was unhappy with implementing these 
restrictions, he ‘came out and he said there is something that is going wrong 
somewhere, but he doesn’t care.  He will do the operation if there is time’.  However, 
his attempt to overcome systemic punishment with an individual act of generosity 
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was unsuccessful.  He was obliged to prioritise other patients, ran out of time and 
the operation was cancelled.  
Lack of medical intervention may cause impairments, exacerbate existing 
conditions, and as illustrated in Figure 3, is inherently disabling.  One person with 
haemophilia (das15) was detained on arrival in Britain.  He was denied medication 
until after several days of bleeding.  He was then transferred to hospital in chains.  
Intervention from the Haemophilia Association was needed to persuade immigration 
authorities to remove the chains.  However, his asylum claim was refused, therefore 
even after release from detention, he remained eligible only for emergency 
treatment of uncontrolled bleeding, but not for secondary healthcare such as the 
medication to prevent bleeding occurring.  Medical professionals become the 
implementors of such apparently irrationally punitive logics of defence and the 
dislocation of rights.  Doctors provide das15 with the medication his life may depend 
on, but he is billed for it.  Without income, the bills are unpayable, therefore das15 
spoke of reliance on voluntary sector advocates to contest the mounting debt.  Acts 
of discretionary generosity may enable das15 to access lifesaving medication, 
however, he then becomes beholden to the provider.  This approach reinforces, 
rather than contests, systemic inequalities, and the dislocation of rights.  
The punitive impact of hegemonic logics of defence is further asserted through 
restricted provision of housing.   Homelessness may be framed as the result of policy 
failures in the wider population, however, for people whose asylum claim is refused, 
destitution is a tool of overt policy, designed to punish people for being in the country 
(Crawley, Hemmings and Price, 2011).  In this context, expectations become so low 
that any form of accommodation becomes framed as better than nothing, with 
access considerations becoming beyond reasonable expectations.  Das8 recalled 
her social worker explaining that: 
due to my status of asylum seeker … The only thing they can do, they can help me 
with that walking frame and like that seat … If I get the status, I can go back to them.  
Meanwhile, she is unable to access her shower or bath.  Such inadequate 
accessible accommodation not only affects asylum seekers (Ahmed, 2013).  An 
EHRC (2018) report on housing for disabled people, found people waiting over two 
years for accessible accommodation.  Barriers accessing local authority housing 
and social care are exacerbated by lack of stability in the location of asylum seekers.  
One wheelchair user (das11) described spending months negotiating with one local 
authority.  Then a few days before her care package was due to start, she was told 
she would be dispersed to a different area.  She recalled local authority staff saying: 
‘that’s very unfortunate because … we have to refer your case to somebody else’.  
Being forced to move from one area to another is counter to the ‘choice and control’ 
proposed for citizens in the 2006 White Paper.  Furthermore, provision for asylum 
seekers does not allow for the general principles of the UNCRPD, such as the ‘full 
and effective participation and inclusion in society’ (United Nations, 2006).  Instead, 
punitive policies of destitution, detention and deportation systematically exclude 
asylum seekers.  The punitive impact of such policies is reinforced by support being 
reduced to the sufficientarian minimum required to prevent immediate death.   
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Sufficientarian approach underpinning minimal entitlement to support  
A sufficientarian approach to provision of support reduces people’s lives to a 
struggle for survival.  Financial support provided to asylum seekers with ongoing 
claims is not designed to meet the costs of public health recommendations or to 
achieve any level of parity with the wider community, but to provide for minimal 
survival needs ‘like food, clothing and toiletries’ (Great Britain. UK Visas and 
Immigration (UKVI), 2020).  An unsuccessful legal challenge at the low levels of 
support (EWHC, 2014) was lodged by Refugee Action (2014). The charity argued 
that asylum support was insufficient to meet ‘essential living needs’.  If people’s 
asylum claims are refused, all support may be removed.   
Lack of financial support reduces people’s lives to the relentless quest for survival.  
People contributing to this study described struggles to meet basic human needs, 
with little or no financial support (das3,8,9,11,13,17).  Das11 explained that she 
cannot afford fresh food:  
eating healthy is something for people who are already settled in their lives.  Then 
they can think about something else.  … somebody who is not settled, they need a 
sugar rush … for £2 that I would buy strawberries I know it’s healthy but if I buy 
bread or if I buy biscuits that will make me fuller for longer.   
Her expressed need for a ‘sugar rush’ was not purely a financial issue.  She recalled 
a local organisation seeking to support healthy eating by providing volunteers with 
fresh fruit rather than cheaper biscuits.  However, as das11 explained, her food 
choices stem from immediate needs for energy and satisfaction, rather than future 
well-being.  Similarly, research by Oli Williams (2017) highlights that obesity is not 
exclusively the result of lack of access to healthy food.  In the context of wider public 
health recommendations, these food choices might be criticised.  However, wider 
service provision also appears focused on immediate energy needs.  In an initial 
accommodation centre, according to das8, the ‘food is only one diet.  Chips, chips, 
chips and … it’s only chips and this bread that you eat’.  Such food would be 
unacceptable for school dinners (Warin, 2011).  The influence of celebrity chef 
Jamie Oliver has resulted in hegemonic acceptance in the UK that as Griffiths and 
Hunter (2007, p.124) argue: ‘children do better at school if they eat well; patients do 
better in hospital if they eat well’.  However, service provision for asylum seekers 
appears designed not for people to ‘do better’, but to be sufficient to prevent 
immediate death. 
A sufficientarian approach to the needs of asylum seekers ignores psychological 
needs for intimacy, belonging or fulfilment.  Yet, these needs were emphasised by 
many contributors to this study.  At a meeting designed to build a broader disability 
movement (dmas3), one disabled asylum seeker (das4) spoke of the acute pain 
caused by separation from loved ones, combined with language barriers and lack 
of opportunities to build new social and emotional connections.  The relative 
importance of human needs is more fluid and interconnected than presented by 
Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of motivation. The intensity of emotional pain described 
by das4 is beyond her quest to meet physiological needs.  When she recalled having 
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had only a single potato in the house, her anger at the injustice and the anguish of 
loneliness were combined with, rather than secondary to, the recollection of physical 
hunger.  If she were with her family, they would have greater ability to access food, 
and the loneliness, together with large elements of the anger would be reduced.  
Physiological and psychological needs cannot be separated.   
A sufficientarian approach to support does not encourage social interaction or peer 
support with the wider population.  Asylum seekers taking part in a focus group 
(das18) were regularly attending other meetings in the same venue as a disabled 
people’s organisation but were unaware of its existence.  One participant explained: 
nobody has told us anything about it.  And also, we can be told about it and you go 
there, and you feel you are not fit to be there… you feel you are out of place. 
Meeting with strangers can be particularly daunting if there are language barriers, if 
a welcome is uncertain or if, as for das7 and 14, emotional distress impedes group 
interaction.  
The impact of barriers meeting psychological needs for social connections is 
particularly punitive for people who have been through traumatic experiences and 
are away from family and friends (as described by das1,2,4,5,6,7,8).  The existence 
of psychological needs is sometimes acknowledged, if not addressed, by the Home 
Office.  When her asylum claim was refused, das8 received a letter from the Home 
Office advising her that if this news was upsetting then she should speak to a friend 
or to the Samaritans.  This professed concern for her well-being is similar to that 
offered to das17 when his electronic tag had not registered movement.  As das8 put 
it, the Home Office ‘pretend they are doing good things, but they want to destroy 
your soul and your body’.  The punitive impact of restrictions meeting human needs 
cannot be overcome by talking to someone about the emotional impact.   
When people seeking asylum are granted refugee status, the punitive impact of 
sufficientarianism continues.  People may then bring family members to join them in 
Britain, but this does not entitle them to larger accommodation.  Both das1 and 5 
described having to choose which of their children would join them in their 1-
bedroom apartments.  Both families now experience similar problems sharing their 
bedrooms with their adult disabled son and daughter.  In accordance with 
sufficientarian principles, there is no immediate risk to life, but such lack of privacy 
is not conducive to the principles of the UNCRPD (2016), including Article 23, the 
respect for home and family life.  
Barriers to peer support and effective organisation are not caused solely by 
migration status.  In comparison with asylum seekers, a refugee selected for the 
VPRS (das10) has greater entitlement to financial support, housing, and the ‘right 
to work’.  However, as this person explained: ‘since I arrived in the UK… there was 
no chance for me to meet other people with disability, I didn’t have that chance’.  
The result is lack of awareness of commonalities with other disabled people, 
irrespective of migration status.  For some people, the lack of peer support and 
solidarity compounds the isolation.  Das8 complained: ‘we are here fighting for 
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yourself on your own …  Nobody is concerned with your life.  Nobody’.  Without 
regular contact with other disabled people, it is hard to consider the causes of 
current restrictions or to build alternatives.   
With or without other disabled people, peer support reduces the punitive impact of 
isolation.  A drop-in centre organised by an asylum support organisation provides 
important functions.  As das7 explained:   
when I come here, I don’t feel scared.  I see people laughing, I see people smiling, 
I see people talking to each other.  I see people helping other people, so it’s nice 
and this makes me happy.  I’m not scared here.   
Similarly, das4 described her reliance on these spaces for social contact.  Without 
assistance to get out of her flat, she explained that some weeks, the only human 
contact she had was her carer for seven hours per week.  During a focus group 
(das18), it emerged that she and das8 were unaware that they lived in the same 
building.  Even if they were to meet, social contact would be hindered without 
interpreters.  Yet a sufficientarian approach fails to provide for such human needs.   
The impact of apparently irrational decision-making 
The punitive impact of the asylum system is exacerbated by perceived absence of 
rationale.  The lack of clearly discernible rights hinders the ability to make plans.  
This increases the perceived hopelessness and compounds the punitive impact.  
Among asylum seekers, contributing to this study, there was a ubiquitous sense that 
the system is illogical.  This stems in part from differences in individual experiences: 
one refused asylum seeker experiencing mental distress (das7) received a bus 
pass, while another, with a mobility impairment (das8), did not; one person who uses 
mobility aids (das4) received social care, while another (das2) did not; or that some 
asylum claims are accepted (das1,2,5,6), while others are refused.  The impact of 
such apparent irrationality is itself experienced as punitive.  Das8 spoke of other 
people in her accommodation getting migration status, while she remained waiting: 
they were taken out and I was left and it’s a terrible thing, and some other people 
were being brought.  Then they were also given…they left me… going, coming, 
going, coming … it has been terrible.  
The lack of predictability led das8 to speculate:  
the Home office they … don’t consider you as a human being because you are not 
young.  You do not benefit anything to the country. 
In a focus group discussion (das18), a young man pointed out that his claim had 
also been rejected.  An older woman responded that, for him, the problem is that 
‘they know that you are not well, you'll be a burden to the nation’.  Such speculation 
as to the cause of asylum decisions appears to be an attempt to make sense out of 
apparent chaos.  Without clear entitlements, people do not know what to expect, 
whether there is any hope or even where to get reliable advice.  There may, or may 
not, be rational explanations for different experiences.  However, perceptions of the 
system as chaotic shape understanding of the current situation and limit the scope 
for contestation.   
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A combination of punitive and irrational approaches is perceived to extend to the 
wider asylum and immigration system.  Having informed staff of an important 
medical appointment, das17 recalled a Kafkaesque explanation as to why he could 
not attend:  
the officers told me, "Because we knew about the appointment date … you might 
have some people attack us on the way to hospital".  I said, "Ok, if it was like that, 
then why didn't you change it? … I had to tell you about the appointment so that you 
would know and organise people to take me there.  So, if I didn't tell you, you were 
going to say, you're not going because you didn't tell us”. 
The perceived irrationality of their response compounded his sense of injustice.  As 
he put it, ‘what reason, they don’t even know’.  The immigration system appears 
based on irrational punishment, with disdain for the individual impact.  Similarly, 
das8, believed there is no rationale as to when or whether someone is detained:   
they took me to the detention six weeks, and after that, I’m out.  Why was I in 
detention? … Now since 2013, I’m here.  They never talk about again … we don’t 
know how the Home Office work.  We don’t know…  
Similarly, an older woman (das4), without family or friends in the UK, was moved 
three times between cities.  Her carer explained:  
Three times …they bring her here and they send her back, bring her here… She 
doesn’t know why.  She went and they send her back … she was crying … cry a lot. 
Das4 recounted feeling lost, without friends, contacts, or even a language in which 
to find out what was happening.  She recalled arriving in a new city, without money, 
people to help her, or mobility aids to enable her to go out.  The absence of support 
prevented her from meeting basic physical needs, compounding her sense of 
desperation and mental distress.  Such denial of support does not promote logics of 
defence, generosity, or even sufficientarianism.  Instead, it appears motivated by 
irrationally punitive lack of consideration for the well-being of people classed as the 
‘other’.  
Sometimes, the perceptions of an irrational, chaotic system may be due to lack of 
information as to what is happening and what to expect.  One woman (das8) 
explained that she had left her country of origin in a rush.  She had not known where 
she was going, only that she had to escape.  As she put it, she ‘didn’t know the 
asylum I was seeking, what was it’.  She recalled her confusion after arriving in the 
UK and being told to go to East Croydon: 
Nobody’s taking you … after you reach London you find your way.  It was not 
easy but… I went to Croydon and I seek asylum there.  Yeah. …. After you 
seek asylum there, they take your fingerprints and everything, and they 
interview you … I finish with them around nine at night, and …  people were 
being sent somewhere, somewhere… after a week we were given a letter 
that we are going to Wales. 
After a month in Cardiff, she was taken to Bristol.  She was given little notice and no 
choice regarding where to go or when.  Again, this absence of clear policy rationale 
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and the apparent disregard for people’s well-being compounds the sense of 
desperation and mental distress.  
The apparently chaotic manner of decision-making and support provision extends 
beyond the Home Office.  Das4 met a carer who was visiting her neighbour.  This 
carer referred her to Social Services, who eventually found her eligible for social 
care.  The barriers that she had faced accessing social care may in part be attributed 
to lack of English and poor understanding of the system.  However, an assertive, 
English-speaking, wheelchair user (das11), with clearly visible access needs, 
described the chaos she had to navigate to get her needs met:  
they were fighting amongst themselves, these Social Services Departments … I was 
shouting and screaming … I need help.  Who is the right person that I should go to?  
…They were like, “I’m not the one.  I don’t know who that one is”.  
Nonsensical barriers to accessing support can themselves be disabling.   
Threatened eviction from social services supported accommodation caused das3 
immense anxiety.  As outlined in the introduction, he lamented:   
it makes no sense.  They are not listening… without a roof I’m going to be crazy, 
they push you to be crazy man… They want me to become dirty, nasty, and crazy 
and taking drugs … and only then they help me? 
Inadequate advice services and unclear entitlements impede people’s ability to 
contest decisions.   
The perceived illogical basis of policy may, however, result from misunderstanding.  
If the purpose of immigration policy is not to provide for people’s needs but to create 
such hostility as to encourage people to leave, then a sufficientarian, or apparently 
chaotic and punitive denial of basic needs, may be inhumane but entirely rational.    
Reliance on apparently discretionary acts of generosity towards people who 
are framed as exceptions.  
Perceptions of hostility, sufficientarianism and chaos reinforce perceptions of the 
system as punitive.  Hegemonic dislocation of rights results in support being framed 
as discretionary acts of apparent generosity.  One person (das12) who was 
trafficked into slavery in the UK described how, after escaping, her claim for asylum 
was refused and formal support was denied.  Rather than foregrounding her 
suffering, or the denial of rights, she expressed gratitude for the support received 
from the church and voluntary sector.  In her view, in ‘this country they look after 
people’.  Her apparent lack of expectation of rights, reflects hegemonic discourse of 
generosity to those perceived as worthy, as discussed in Chapter 4.    
Sources of support are different for different people.  When her asylum support was 
stopped, das8 referred to relying on ‘our people’.  She seemed surprised that I was 
unsure who this meant, ‘you know, our community people’.  I asked if she meant 
people from a voluntary sector organisation.  The response was, ‘No, no, no.  Our 
community’.  To her it was obvious that her community is composed of fellow 
nationals.  The people to whom someone turns in crisis can reveal where the trust 
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and identification lies, rather than who has the material resources (Niven, 2013).  I 
had under-estimated the significance of solidarity from fellow nationals and 
assumed exaggerated significance in the role of the voluntary sector.  This highlights 
the pervasive and unconscious nature of cultural hegemony.  The voluntary sector 
has the resources and motivation to publicise their role, whereas the solidarity of 
friends is unmeasured.  Das8 recalled sharing a bedroom with the children of a 
fellow national for more than a year when she would otherwise have been homeless.  
Only when her symptoms of mental distress increased, did her friends push for 
statutory support.  The role of unpaid solidarity is clearly crucial to survival and 
potential resistance. 
A discretionary approach to service provision is not exclusively applied to disabled 
asylum seekers.  Building on the discussion in Chapter 1, the hierarchy in provision 
of services, described by Mhairi Mackenzie et al. (2015), affects a wider population.  
Without enforceable rights, people rely more exclusively on informal support from 
friends, religious groups, fellow nationals, or voluntary organisations.  In this context, 
chance encounters may have life-changing impact.  Das1 recalled asking a stranger 
for directions.  That person then helped him find a doctor and support for his disabled 
wife.  A chance encounter with a pastor introduced das2 to a church community 
which became her prime support network.  She described them as ‘like to see my 
family.  When I see them, I forget everything.  Their kindness is from their hearts’.  
However, support which relies on voluntary acts of generosity is inherently unequal 
and precarious.  One person (das8) spoke of her frustration that sometimes her 
travel costs are refunded by an asylum support organisation, but sometimes they 
are not.  She explained, ‘You have to ask for it … and you get upset’.  This 
uncertainty and need to ask creates perceptions of generosity, with the recipient 
beholden to the donor.  If people have friends or family in better circumstances, they 
may borrow money, but as das8 and das11 explained, this creates an imbalance in 
friendships.  This inequality is amplified by differences in individual dispositions.  
People who are extrovert or have cheerful dispositions may have greater social 
contacts and consequently have their needs met more readily.  In contrast, people 
who are depressed or angry may have the most urgent needs but, as argued by 
Mackenzie et al. (2015), they may find it harder to access discretionary support. 
If support is determined, or perceived to be determined, by discretionary decisions, 
rather than rights, then performed appreciation becomes necessary.  This ‘gratitude 
imperative’ (Schwartz, 1967, p.1) may explain why das2 constantly expressed 
thanks:  
Good GP, good … good and church.  xx people very good, very help and thank you 
very much, people.  And you and xx, thank you very much. 
On overhearing this, das8 commented to me, ‘you have to understand she is not 
ok’.  Whether or not das2 is less ‘ok’ than anyone else, successfully navigating the 
asylum system may depend on endorsing logics of generosity.  This is not unique 
to Britain.  In the Finnish film ‘The other side of hope’, a newly arrived asylum seeker 
asks for advice from someone who has been there longer, ‘should I pretend and 
smile too?’.  He is advised, ‘Yes, it will help.  Just don’t smile in the street, they’ll 
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think you’re crazy’ (Kaurismäki, 2017). If support is perceived as discretionary, then 
beneficiaries must respond as they would to a bearer of gifts.  Expressions of 
gratitude and appreciation may be endearing, while anger and frustration may 
alienate potential support.   
Perceptions of generosity may also shape the actions of asylum seekers towards 
voluntary sector organisations.  Some people spoke of resentment when their 
perceived generosity towards these organisations is not reciprocated.  According to 
das8:  
We keep on telling our stories …sometimes we don’t benefit, it’s the charity that 
benefits … I tell people about our problem, you write a cheque and send to the 
charity …sometimes you are tired of doing things because if you keep on doing 
things and nothing is changing in your life, why should you continue? 
If people perceive themselves as giving their time and energy to an organisation, 
then appreciation is to be expected.  Gifts, of whatever form, are discretionary and 
require gratitude.  
When the focus is on survival, supporting a charitable organisation is an indicator of 
a person’s worth.  However, such support is futile if unacknowledged.  Similarly, 
campaigning for rights is only worthwhile if the right people are listening.  At an event 
bringing together disabled people (dmas3) irrespective of migration status, to share 
experiences and build a stronger movement, asylum seekers spoke of it being 
pointless without the presence of powerful decision-makers.  Das4 asked, how a 
stronger movement could help her find out if her son is dead or alive? or how a 
stronger movement could get her identity documents back from the Home Office.  
Similarly, das5 asked whether a stronger movement would stop him and his wife 
having to share a bedroom with their adult daughter.  Irrespective of whether a 
stronger movement could potentially facilitate such changes, the perceived solution 
to problems was firmly focused on individual pleading with decision-makers, or with 
the ‘giants’ (das8), rather than building a movement for systemic change.   
Notwithstanding the misgivings of disabled asylum seekers, critical moments of 
change have occurred through collective determination based on the solidarity of 
organised action.  As outlined in Chapter 4, the social model of disability can be 
considered a moment of politics.  As Rancière explains:  
politics exists wherever the count of parts and parties of society is disturbed by the 
inscription of the part of those who have no part.  It begins when the equality of 
anyone and everyone is inscribed in the liberty of the people. (1999, p.123) 
In the context of current experiences of disability and forced migration, collective 
organisation and political change may be hampered by the urgency of survival 
needs.  To reiterate the perspective of das11, longer-term battles for systemic 
change cannot be the focus when immediate survival is at stake.  Nonetheless, as 
argued in Chapters 4 and 5, logics of generosity reinforce, rather than challenge, 
wider logics of defence or punishment.  
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6.3 Inequalities of access resulting from distinctions of 
entitlement 
The combined impact of systematic restrictions and discretionary framing of support 
gives rise to relentless struggles for survival.  It would, however, be wrong to suggest 
that all disabled people seeking asylum encounter similar barriers.  Some people’s 
needs are met more adequately than others.  These inequalities are not always 
described by asylum seekers in a negative manner.  As explained above, das12 
perceived any support as acts of generosity, ascribing this to her being ‘respectful, 
works hard, brave’.  According to her, asylum seekers ‘find it hard to get needs met 
if lazy’ and that ‘through attitude, people come and help’.  This echoes hegemonic 
neoliberal logics of individual responsibility and the biopsychosocial model (Waddell 
and Aylward, 2009) referenced in Chapter 4.  This discursive framing is unusual 
among contributors with lived experience in this study.  However, the lack of clear, 
rights-based entitlement encourages speculation as to the basis of inequalities.  
Research by Gill et al. (2015, p.52) found that ‘factors such as the gender of the 
judge and of the appellant, and where the appellant lives, are influencing asylum 
appeal adjudication’.  This raises criticisms of a ‘postcode lottery’ as stated by lp1 
and discussed in Chapter 5.  The organisation of resistance is hindered if individual 
survival relies on apparently arbitrary and discretionary decision making.   
Policy discourse frames asylum support as dependent on whether an individual is 
considered deserving, rather than on whether the person needs support.   
Categories of apparent worth are not exclusive to disabled migrants.  Nandita 
Sharma (2005, p.93) criticises the approach of campaigners who present some 
women as victims of trafficking, in the quest to ‘transform them into extraordinary 
innocent beings’ in contrast to unvictimized, and therefore unworthy, ‘illegal 
migrants’.  Such campaigns reinforce notions that some humans are deserving, and 
others are not, while leaving the causes of injustice uncontested. 
Lack of clarity in categorisations of entitlement and Home Office decision-making, 
leads to wariness among disabled asylum seekers.  After taking high profile roles in 
public campaigns, Das8 recalled receiving negative decisions from the Home Office.  
In her perception, resistance is dangerous.  In contrast, das11 believed that her role 
in public campaigns protected her.  Lack of transparency makes it difficult to know 
who is correct.   Das11 recalled that on the day when she was due to be evicted, a 
protest was arranged with disabled citizens, asylum seekers and local media.  She 
recalled: 
there were people outside with placards.  It was a big thing on the news … That’s 
when I got a call from the Home Office that I should go to xx and fill out the section 
4 form … I said, “But I went yesterday, they refused me”.  
The Home Office contacted the charity that had refused to help das11 and called 
for her to be supported.  As she put it, ‘imagine that!’.  She was clear that the media 
publicity was influential in her support being reinstated.  According to her, service 
providers feared that she could instigate another public campaign and, therefore, 
became more attentive to her needs: ‘I’m in an organisation and I have support and 
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it can go on the media’.  She recounted several further occasions when she believed 
that her agency resulted in preferential treatment.  For example, unlike other asylum 
seekers, she was shown possible accommodation and asked if it was appropriate.  
As a wheelchair user, her agency in this context stemmed from the vulnerability 
associated with the threat of being made street homeless.  As Butler (2015a) argues 
in a lecture, vulnerability may be a mobilising force for resistance, ‘The very meaning 
of vulnerability changes when it becomes understood as part of the practice of 
political resistance’.  In the absence of clear criteria for decision-making, we can 
only speculate.  It may be that both das8 and das11 are correct in their analyses.  
Butler (2015a) describes the ‘mobilisation of vulnerability’ as being ‘exposed and 
agentic at the same time’.  What das11 perceived as relative advantage may also 
stem from her social capital.  As a university-educated English speaker, she had 
good understanding of how the system works.  Unlike das4, she had no false 
expectation that asylum decisions take place in public meetings and therefore 
understood how to assert influence.  
Evidence from this study highlights inherent inequalities in people’s capacity to use 
publicity to address the problems experienced.  It may be easier for a person with a 
mobility impairment (das11) than for a person experiencing mental distress such as 
das7.  The experiences described by das11 contrast with those outlined by Imogen 
Tyler (2013, p.68) in which Tyler cites a person wanting ‘to become invisible’ to avoid 
deportation: ‘the longer nobody comes, I keep thinking, it is possible they have 
forgotten about me and I can stay and have a normal life’.  The quest for invisibility 
as a route to safety contrasts with Rancière’s (1999) account of logos as a means 
of agency.  There may be times when visibility is important and other times when it 
is beneficial to remain hidden.  Attempts to gain publicity to halt the deportation of 
das17 were unsuccessful.  Two generally sympathetic journalists were reluctant to 
get involved after learning of his conviction for rape.  Drawing on distinctions made 
by Anderson (2013, p.7), he can neither be considered a ‘Good Citizen’ nor a ‘Failed 
Citizen’ but a failed non-citizen, the epitome of worthlessness.  As Anderson 
explains: 
The claim that immigrants are not illegal on the grounds that they are not criminals 
… implicitly claims that the migrant belongs in the community of value, in contrast 
to the criminal who does not. (2013, p.118)  
When distinctions of assumed human worth are hegemonically assumed to depend 
not on rights, but on defence counterposed with generosity, then indefensible 
wrong-doing such as rape must be hidden if wider needs are to be met.  To assert 
the rights of a criminal becomes counter-hegemonic, irrespective of the injustices 
imposed.  Access to support becomes dependent on judgements of human worth 
rather than rights or need.  
Distinctions in lived experiences might be assumed to depend on the form of a 
person’s impairment.  However, response to migration status may be a bigger 
contributor to inequalities of entitlement.  Two men with visual impairments, but 
differences in migration status, recounted distinct experiences.  A blind person 
(das10) with refugee status, selected for the VPRS, described problems finding his 
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way.  He explained that language barriers hindered his ability to ask for help, but 
attributed lack of support to oversights, explaining that in Britain, as in his country of 
origin, people ‘try to help anyone with visual impairment’.  As illustrated in Figure 3, 
lack of services and support is disabling, irrespective of whether restrictions stem 
from oversight or deliberate policy.  However, restrictions stemming from oversight 
are more easily addressed than those that are deliberate.  The experiences of 
everyone trying to help (das10) could not be more different from those of das17, 
also with visual impairment, but with a criminal record and without refugee status.  
He described the lack of adjustments made to meet his access needs in detention.  
Worse still, he recounted that Home Office staff denied that he could be blind.  One 
official asked him, ‘How come you’re looking at me?  How come you’re blinking?’.  
The deliberate hostility directed at a person with a criminal record in the immigration 
system is not reserved for disabled people.   Discursive analysis by Bowling and 
Westenra (2018) concludes that migrants with criminal records are hegemonically 
represented as ‘folk devils’.  Das17 attempted to contest the denial of his human 
needs, by asserting the vulnerability associated with blindness.  It was essential to 
use all means possible to resist the injustice of the life-threatening deportation which 
he faced.  However, if wider contestation of injustice is based on asserting individual 
examples of worth based on exceptional status, rather than on equal rights or 
common humanity, then hegemonic distinctions of entitlement are reinforced.  
During my doctoral research, I spent six months working with disabled asylum 
seekers in Berlin (2017b).  According to Eurostat (2018) figures, in 2016, at the peak 
of recent migration to Germany, there were 722,265 new applications compared 
with 39,240 to the UK.  Despite the hugely greater numbers of asylum seekers in 
Germany, the inequalities of support appear broadly similar to those in the UK.  For 
example, a Syrian family with a small child with physical impairments described 
large levels of informal support.  Most of the family’s support is provided through the 
kindness, or discretionary generosity, of neighbours rather than through statutory 
rights.  Such reliance on discretionary support regarding needs associated with 
disability and migration result in contrasting experiences of a middle-aged blind 
man, also from Syria.  He was living in a small flat with little support.  His sister 
recalled how in Syria he had been able to go out and visit people, whereas in 
Germany he had little social contact and consequently was experiencing great 
mental distress.  This is not dissimilar to the experiences of das10 selected for the 
VPRS in the UK, who spoke of having his formal needs met, but having inadequate 
support to go out, and therefore struggling psychologically.  
The lived experiences of people contributing to this study highlight that being 
disabled is not exclusively associated with reduced entitlement in the UK asylum 
system.  When a person’s asylum claim is refused, housing and financial support 
are also removed, unless a person can prove that they are unable to return to the 
country of origin.  People receiving housing and financial assistance from Social 
Services may have greater leverage in maintaining some support if they get a 
Human Rights assessment.  Several people involved in this study (das 3,8,9,11,13) 
continued receiving support from Social Services after their asylum claims were 
refused.  However, all these people faced the precarity of not knowing whether 
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support would be removed.  Furthermore, the standard of provision is based on 
preventing infringement of human rights rather than on logics of equality.   
The capacity to mobilise resistance may depend, in part, on the form of a person’s 
impairment.  It may be particularly difficult to get the energy, confidence and social 
capital necessary to gather support if a person is also experiencing mental distress 
or chronic illness.  The struggles faced by das13 and das3 (both experiencing 
mental distress) while resisting eviction are not inherently different from those faced 
by das11 (a wheelchair user).   To organise effective resistance, as das11 explained 
in a public meeting (dmas1), you have to overcome the feeling that: 
you are fighting for something you don’t deserve.  You have to feel it should not be 
like that.  Then you can make a difference. 
The barriers faced by wheelchair users may be more visible, overt, and perhaps 
more easily challenged than those faced by someone experiencing mental distress.   
Further inequalities of support may stem from the response to the cause, rather than 
the nature of an impairment, as discussed in Chapter 5.  One asylum seeker (das16) 
showed me photographs of his torture scars which he had ready for his solicitor.  I 
observed in my journal at the time that ‘his scars seem to be core to the asylum 
claim because they prove his suffering’.  Yet the scars do not prove his need, only 
the origin of the need.  Furthermore, as Udit Bhatia (2019) argues, there is a 
responsibility not to obscure people’s needs, even if those needs do not meet the 
criteria of the 1951 Convention.   
In combination with distinctions of entitlement, there are distinctions in the value 
ascribed to human life.  Writing with regard to the wider population, Butler (2015a) 
refers to distinctions as to whose lives are ‘grievable’.  The injustices experienced 
by people without logos need to become exceptional to impact on public discourse.  
The struggles faced by Kamil Ahmad were not acknowledged in media discourse 
when his asylum claim was refused, when he had no formal support and when he 
was experiencing severe mental distress.  At that time, like many of those 
contributing to this study, his life was a struggle for survival.  Such suffering is 
attributed to systematic policy restrictions, which are largely unacknowledged or are 
framed as if inevitable in public discourse.  If he had died unsupported on the street, 
like the estimated 726 homeless people who died in 2018 (Office for National 
Statistics (ONS), 2019), his life would not have been publicly grievable. There has 
not been media coverage and public outrage at each of these deaths.  It was only 
when the overt and obscene violence of his murder became the focus of public 
attention that his life became framed as ‘grievable’ in public discourse.  The blame 
could then be attributed to an act of villainy rather than to systematic state-
sanctioned denial of support.   
The potential political impact of denial of rights is contentious.  Arendt (1951) argues 
that refugees like herself have lost everything (1943), including the ‘right to have 
rights’, which according to her is synonymous with losing political agency.  However, 
according to Rancière (1999), it is when those without a part assert their part that a 
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transformative moment of politics can occur.  As he explains, the premise that ‘some 
people command and others obey’ underpins ‘the sheer contingency of any social 
order’ (1999, p.16).  Maintenance of the social order relies on people understanding 
and accepting their roles: to command or to obey.  Disabled people in the asylum 
system are clearly in the category of those who must obey, and who are rarely 
considered in political discourse.  However, the problem is not that people fail to 
speak.  The problem is that the existing social order relies on one speech being 
‘understood as discourse and another as noise’ (Rancière, 1999, p.29).  This 
capacity for those without rights to assert political change relies on breaking ‘the 
tangible configuration’ (ibid).  Such a moment of politics may necessitate asserting 
the logos of disabled asylum seekers, but it also involves contesting the systemic 
causes in alliance with other oppressed people.  If the current system is contingent, 
then alternatives must be possible.  
6.4 Responsibility for disabling impact  
The impact of current restrictions on disabled asylum seekers and refugees 
highlights the disabling impact of the asylum system.  The deliberately punitive 
nature of restrictions designed to create a ‘hostile environment’ (Yeo, C., 2017; 
Liberty, 2018; Goodfellow, 2019) may go beyond the exclusion described by 
scholars of disability studies (Oliver, 1983; Morris, 1991; Barnes and Mercer, 2003; 
Swain et al., 2013; Shakespeare, 2017).  No contributor to this study condoned the 
restrictions and inequalities associated with disability and forced migration, yet not 
only do such policies continue, but they have been extended to a wider population, 
in the form of benefit sanctions, public service cuts and wider welfare reform (Adler, 
2018; Ryan, 2019; Clifford, 2020).  However, ongoing restrictions and inequalities 
are socially and politically constructed, rather than inevitable.  It is, therefore, 
necessary to analyse the administration of such injustices.     
The administration of injustice 
The restrictions and inequalities of the asylum system result from deliberate policy, 
but this does not mean that those implementing policy are necessarily motivated by 
malicious intent.  People responsible for policy implementation may perceive 
themselves as impotent, neutral, or even as pragmatically doing their bit to mitigate 
the impact of an inherently unjust system.  However, their motivation is irrelevant to 
the impact.  Without effective contestation, hegemonic distinctions of entitlement 
continue.  As discussed in Chapter 1, when observing the lack of remorse shown by 
Eichmann for his role in Nazi atrocities, Arendt (1964) referred to the ‘banality of 
evil’, concluding that he perceived his role as administrative rather than malicious.  
Responding to Arendt’s analysis, Richard Bernstein (2000, p.220) argues that 
Eichmann, ‘was motivated by the most mundane and petty considerations of 
advancing his career, pleasing his superiors, demonstrating that he could do his job 
well’.  At the Eichmann trial, Arendt made a distinction between the doer and the 
deed: ‘the deeds were monstrous, but the doer - at least the very effective one now 
on trial – was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous’ 
(Arendt and Kroh, 1964, p.4).  Phil Cole elaborates on Arendt’s argument: 
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what is most terrifying and indescribable about these people is not that they are 
monsters, but that they are human… one aspect of the banality of evil is that those 
who perform it are staggeringly, disturbingly normal.  (2006, p.199) 
He goes on to relate Arendt’s work to the UK asylum system, warning that to make 
the humanity of certain people superfluous and ‘to demonise others is to fail to learn 
the lessons of history’ (2006, pp.208-209).  Without exaggerating the parallels 
between Nazi atrocities and the implementation of current immigration or welfare 
reform policy, Arendt’s observations bring useful insights.  The Shaw Report (2016) 
highlights the harmful effects of the UK detention system, yet it calls, not for the 
ending of detention, but for ‘vulnerable persons’ to be spared the worst effects.  This 
is, of course, a different magnitude, however, in principle, it is not unlike Eichmann’s 
efforts to reduce numbers of people in railway carriages.  The focus is on being 
somewhat less bad, rather than contesting systemic injustice.   
The asylum system is composed of many ostensibly banal acts, in addition to the 
more overtly violent acts associated with detention or deportation, for example.  It 
was a hospital administrator who checked the migration status of das8, resulting in 
her operation being denied, exacerbating her physical and psychological pain, and 
preventing her from getting to a food bank or asylum support organisation.  The 
administrator was carrying out a banal task without overt violence and quite probably 
without malicious intent.  The impact of the restrictions faced by asylum seekers 
(particularly those whose asylum claims have been refused) is not altered by the 
routine nature of their implementation.  However, the banality of these tasks shapes 
hegemonic perceptions of common-sense, or the uncontested social logics 
underpinning systemic inequalities.   
Together, these acts create a system in which hostility and deprivation of basic 
needs are routine.  If the restrictions were the result of oversights, they could have 
been rectified when brought to wider attention (Harris and Roberts, 2001).  Instead, 
my research has found that the restrictions and inequalities associated with disability 
and forced migration result from uncontested and hegemonic discursive 
representations of a problem, in which non-disabled, economically productive, 
citizens are framed as the norm to be prioritised, while ‘others’ are framed as 
problematic.  Political contestation thereby becomes limited to adjusting the 
entitlements of the ‘other’ and highlighting varying degrees of ‘their’ apparent threat 
or ‘our’ generosity.  People with diverse subject positions contributing to this study 
failed to contest this discursive framing, instead seeking pragmatic mitigation of the 
consequences.  The restrictions experienced by disabled asylum seekers are not 
an oversight, but the inevitable consequence of such discursive framing.  The 
appearance of banal bureaucratic decision-making, according to Cole (2006, 
p.200), ‘enabled Eichmann to make decisions about the fate of millions, and yet be 
at a distance from their fate’.  If the suffering experienced by disabled asylum 
seekers is caused by human actions, then, however mundane, and apparently 
innocent each person may perceive their role, the result is to administer injustice.   
Despite the deliberate nature of immigration policy and service provision, no 
contributor to this research portrayed themselves as to blame for the injustices 
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experienced by disabled asylum seekers, other than as the result of possible 
oversight.  Interviewees in each sector did, however, blame those in other sectors, 
with the implication that if ‘they’ are the problem, then ‘we’ are not.  Variations of 
such representation of the problem are perhaps universal, and a means of 
facilitating Lacanian enjoyment: ‘we’ could be complete if only ‘they’ were different.  
As Cole (2006, p.6) writes, an ‘attraction of the idea of evil is that it can fill that hole’.  
In a similar manner to Schinkel’s (2013) rejection of integration as a solution, labels 
of evil locate the problem elsewhere, leaving systemic injustice uncontested and 
allowing ‘us’ to be relieved of guilt.  The notion of evil, whether banal or otherwise, 
therefore facilitates avoidance of systemic analysis.  As has been explained, no 
contributor to this study condoned current inequalities, therefore the problem cannot 
be attributed to individual malicious intent.  
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed how hegemonic representations of the needs and 
entitlements associated with disability and forced migration are reflected, reinforced, 
or contested by people with lived experience of the impact of existing policy and 
practice.  Disabled asylum seekers described the impact of what are perceived as 
irrationally punitive policies restricting access to services to a level sufficient only to 
impede immediate death.  Such restrictions meeting basic human needs result in 
struggles for survival mitigated only by instances of apparent generosity towards 
individuals framed as exceptions.  If survival depends on being framed as an 
exception, then attention must be directed at this goal.  Therefore, even those 
experiencing the most direct impact of current policies, reinforce hegemonic 
distinctions of entitlement, with contestation focused on the quest to highlight 
individual worth or adjusting definitions of exception, rather than seeking systemic 
alternatives. 
This analysis has found remarkable commonalities in the discursive representations 
of problems associated with disability and forced migration, used in policy discourse 
and those used by people with different subject positions, including people with lived 
experience of the impact.  Despite broad consensus among people with diverse 
subject positions that the existing situation is unjust, discursive representation of the 
problem fails to contest hegemonic distinctions of entitlement.  Policy discourse 
(Chapter 4) asserts common-sense social logics assume the legitimacy of 
distinctions of individual entitlement, based on the primacy of national borders and 
capitalist prioritisation of profit.  Meanwhile, people responsible for implementation 
of policy and practice (Chapter 5) may frame the experiences of disabled asylum 
seekers as unjust but as inevitable within the confines of hegemonic common-
sense.  Meanwhile, with the ‘scream’ of injustice, disabled asylum seekers (Chapter 
6) may assert their common humanity and plead for change.  However, in the 
absence of solidarity or effective means of developing and asserting alternatives, 
the energy of this ‘scream’ easily dissipates into despair with attention focused on 
survival within the existing hegemony. 
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Beyond assumed common-sense representations of the problems, overt debate 
focuses on political logics.  As discussed in Chapter 4, policy discourse of migration 
draws on political logics of defence, complemented with generosity to those 
individuals framed as worthy exceptions.  Meanwhile, welfare reform, which is a 
central element of policy associated with disability, portrays entitlement to support 
as dependent on political logics of individual responsibility.  Both policy areas 
implicitly dislocate the logics of rights which had underpinned the post-war 
consensus and later the social model of disability.  The disabling impact of 
inaccessible services thereby remains obscured.  Instead, with fatalistic framing of 
the current social order, the problem becomes presented as the pragmatic need to 
mitigate the impact of asylum policy on those considered worthy of support.  Without 
discourse of rights or equality, logics of generosity can be complemented by 
fantasmatic logics of pride. Distinctions of entitlement are thereby discursively 
legitimised. 
Lack of hegemonic contestation obscures the radical contingency of the social order 
and hinders the development of alternatives.  This phenomenon is not unique to the 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers.  According to Simon, many people:  
accept inequality and oppression as natural and unchangeable.  Gramsci used the 
term common-sense to denote this uncritical and partly unconscious way in which 
people perceive the world. (1982, p.26) 
This concludes analysis of discursive representation of the problems associated 
with disability and forced migration.  Such representations shape perceptions of 
possibility and resultant actions.  If the problem is that government policies are 
actively disabling, then the solution cannot be to identify certain individuals framed 
as exceptions and therefore worthy of apparent generosity.  Solutions focused on 
identifying people or adjusting the criteria of entitlement, can be understood as 
policing, rather than contesting systemic injustice or promoting a moment of politics 
‘when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of the part of 
those who have no part’ (Rancière, 1999, p.11).  The next chapter explores current 
initiatives regarding the needs of disabled asylum seekers, analysing whether these 




Chapter 7.  Perceived solutions to intersectional 
problems associated with disability and forced 
migration. 
Sometimes the governing paradigms which have structured all our lives are so 
powerful that we can think we are doing progressive work when in fact we are 
reinforcing the paradigms.  
(Grillo, 1995, p.16) 
The way a problem is represented shapes the solutions that appear appropriate 
(Bacchi, 2009).  This chapter, therefore, turns to explore apparent solutions resulting 
from different perspectives of the problems associated with disability and forced 
migration.  Attention focuses on existing and proposed initiatives including those 
emanating from formal UK policy, voluntary sector work, and response to initiatives 
I organised during this study.  Analysis continues to draw on poststructuralist 
discourse theory (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), investigating how the discursive 
logics (introduced in Chapter 2) of perceived solutions reinforce, adjust or contest 
hegemonic representations of the problem and how a moment of more fundamental 
political contestation might be achieved.  This analysis is complemented with 
Rancière’s (1999) distinction, considering whether new initiatives result in policing 
the system, or facilitate a moment of politics where those with no part assert their 
part.  The barriers to effective hegemonic contestation of systemic inequalities are 
assessed, exploring how alternatives might be developed.   
Analysis of existing and proposed solutions is divided into three broad categories: 
Hegemonic reinforcement  
Several Home Office initiatives seek to identify disabled migrants, among those 
labelled as ‘vulnerable’, presented as worthy of less restrictive conditions than the 
broader migrant population.  These initiatives are widely supported by voluntary 
sector contributors to my study, framed as promoting positive, if insufficient, change.  
However, these initiatives do not seek to adjust or contest the hegemony; instead, 
addressing the needs of ‘vulnerable’ migrants is portrayed as a way to restore faith 
in the existing system.  As such, hegemonic distinctions of human worth are 
reinforced, drawing on discursive logics of generosity towards people identified as 
worthy exceptions.  This implicitly validates lesser support, drawing on logics of 
defence towards the wider migrant population.  
Hegemonic adjustment 
Analysis of voluntary sector approaches focuses on two particular areas: a) 
initiatives supporting the immediate survival needs of individual disabled asylum 
seekers, and b) the campaign for the broader population of asylum seekers to have 
the ‘right to work’.  These areas of voluntary sector work draw on logics of 
pragmatism, seeking to mitigate the impact of current restrictions and inequalities, 
with some attempt to adjust the borders of entitlement, determining who is included 
in the parameters of worth.  However, without negating the critical importance of 
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meeting peoples immediate needs, I argue that unless systemic causes are 
contested, individualised approaches risk reinforcing logics of discretionary 
generosity.  Campaigns for the ‘right to work’ are underpinned by the assumed 
normative value of discursive logics of individual responsibility.  Although these 
voluntary sector approaches are framed as if in opposition to Home Office 
narratives, they fail to contest distinctions of entitlement or to promote an equal part 
for those with no part (Rancière 1999).  I therefore attribute these approaches to 
policing the existing social order rather than promoting a moment of politics.  
Hegemonic contestation 
Attempts to contest hegemonic distinctions of entitlement are then considered, 
focusing on attempts to promote logics of equal rights, rather than discretionary 
logics of generosity towards individuals framed as worthy of support.  I analyse the 
response to initiatives organised as part of this study, designed to contribute to 
building a broader, intersectional, movement of resistance, bringing together the 
disabled people’s movement and the asylum sector.  This is perceived as potentially 
contributing to the development of a moment of politics, in which disabled asylum 
seekers with no part, assert their part (Rancière 1999) and thereby facilitate 
hegemonic contestation of the distinctions of entitlement on which the prevailing 
social order is based.  My analysis focuses on statutory and voluntary sector 
response to attempts to improve asylum seekers’ access to social care.  
Drawing on the logics of critical explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), I analyse 
the assumed, but rarely contested, social logics underpinning the social order, as 
well as the political logics shaping the agenda for overt public debate, 
complemented by fantasmatic logics.  If the problems faced by disabled asylum 
seekers result from systemic distinctions of entitlement, then effective contestation 
requires hegemonic dissensus rather than adjustment of the balance of political 
logics.  Contestation of the social logics underpinning the contemporary social order, 
requires new perspectives, including the insights of people with lived experience of 
the impact of current policy and practice.  The final chapter will consider what is 
missing from hegemonic representations of the problem and associated solutions, 
together with how more effective contestation might be achieved.  
7.1 Hegemonic reinforcement: Home Office initiatives evoking 
discourse of generosity  
Discursive representation of the needs of disabled migrants has not remained 
constant during the period of investigation.  In comparison with previous invisibility 
(Straimer, 2011) there is undoubtedly greater recognition of the existence of 
disabled asylum seekers in the immigration sector. I therefore turn to investigate 
expressions of commitment and practical initiatives introduced by the Home Office.  
As noted in Chapter 5, Home Office interviewees and focus group members (cs1, 
2) contributing to this research expressed willingness to address the needs of 
disabled people, with one employee systematically exploring provision at different 
stages of the asylum process.  Disability has also become a regular agenda item for 
Home Office and voluntary sector representatives in the equalities sub-group of the 
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National Asylum Stakeholder Forum (NASF).  This heightened interest may stem in 
part from concern regarding the legal obligations, such as the public sector equality 
duty set out in the Equality Act (2010).  However, the result of current initiatives is 
to focus on identifying people who are worthy of some mitigation of wider 
immigration policy, rather than requiring wider systemic change.  The hegemony of 
discursive representations used in UK government policy, discussed in Chapter 4, 
is reinforced rather than contested by these initiatives.  Hegemonic political logics 
of generosity and sufficientarianism, together with fantasmatic logics of pride are 
affirmed, without disrupting political logics of defence or social logics of the prime 
legitimacy of normality associated with non-disabled citizens of the nation-state.  
Initiatives to identify ‘vulnerable’ individuals  
The UK Home Office has introduced several initiatives which frame ‘vulnerable’ 
people as worthy exceptions, in comparison with the wider migrant population.   As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the VPRS (2014) offered resettlement to selected refugees 
affected by the conflict in Syria and framed as ‘vulnerable’.  This was followed by 
the Shaw (2016) report into the ‘Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons’.  The 
aim was to mitigate the negative impact of detention on people labelled as 
‘vulnerable’.  In addition, the Home Office has developed a safeguarding strategy  
(Great Britain. UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI), 2017), using a matrix of indicators 
of vulnerability, to identify people for referral to wider services.  The strategy is 
applied only to people in the process of a first asylum claim, thereby further 
restricting categories of entitlement.  The Home Office approach to the ‘identification 
and safeguarding of vulnerable adults’ was subject to inspection by the Independent 
Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (Bolt, 2019), however, the value of 
identifying people was uncontested.  Most recently, the Home Secretary Sajid Javid 
announced plans for a new scheme to resettle some of the ‘world’s most vulnerable 
refugees’ (Great Britain. The Home Office and The Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, 2019).  
The label of vulnerability is ill-defined but is core to all these initiatives.  The goal is 
not to remove disabling restrictions, but to improve identification of who is worthy 
and who is not.  This goal is applied to those framed as ‘vulnerable’, however, it is 
also the basis of the asylum process, whereby support depends on meeting the 
criteria of a worthy exception among a wider population of migrants. The divisive 
impact of exceptionalism can become obscured by its hegemonic ubiquity. During 
this study, I was reminded by one interviewee that when I first attended the 
Equalities sub-group of the National Asylum Stakeholder Forum, I remarked on the 
absurdity of a group seeking ‘equality’ within an asylum system explicitly designed 
to assert inequality based on migration status.  Yet, after a few years of involvement 
I had forgotten about my original cynicism and was also seeking some level of 
change within the system.  However, this investigation seeks to understand how 
causal problems could be addressed. 
It is not new to seek to identify people worthy of concessionary treatment.  Writing 
at a time of increased collaboration between the New Labour government and the 
disability movement, Finkelstein (2007, p.5) warned against focus on ‘identifying 
characteristics of the individual, rather than the nature of society, and then making 
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selected “concessions” to those so defined’.  Such focus may relieve some 
symptoms but fails to contest causal problems.  The precarity of people’s existence 
is exacerbated when provision of support depends not on need but on being 
perceived as worthy of discretionary acts of concession.  When the Immigration and 
Asylum Act (1999) removed eligibility to access the welfare state, acknowledgement 
of the financial costs associated with disability became limited to occasions when 
‘the Secretary of State considers that the circumstances of a particular case are 
exceptional’ (Section 96, paragraph 2).  A specific briefing document (2017) was 
later produced to clarify the eligibility criteria for this apparently exceptional status.  
The additional support depends on a person’s needs being beyond the responsibility 
of wider service providers, including local authority social care.  However, a 
Freedom of Information request to the Home Office (reference 52045, 2019) 
revealed that out of 345 applications submitted in 2018 (after the updated guidance) 
support was provided to just 10 people.  With such low rates of acceptance, the 
function of this provision for exceptional needs must be questioned.  If provision is 
based on discretionary and rarely-used criteria, it evokes fantasmatic logics, 
potentially enabling enjoyment of ‘our’ kindness towards those deemed 
exceptionally worthy of support, thereby affirming ‘our’ (moral) superiority, without 
contesting the wider logics of defence.  Alongside the low probability of successful 
application, the apparently discretionary nature of wider asylum decision-making 
may deter people from seeking additional support if disability is perceived as 
potentially detrimental to their wider claim. There are no clear rights-based criteria 
for provision for ‘exceptional’ needs.  Instead, it appears to be at the discretion of 
decision-makers. 
The Home Office exists to implement government policy, including the restrictions, 
characterised as ‘the hostile environment’ (Kirkup, 2012) designed to deter migrants 
from entering or remaining in the UK.  By promoting apparent generosity towards 
individuals framed as worthy, the perceived legitimacy of restrictions towards a 
wider population framed as unworthy may be reinforced, thereby upholding 
government policy.  Analytical conclusions that these initiatives fail to contest 
hegemonic discursive distinctions are not, therefore, to suggest that they are 
ineffective, but that contestation is not the purpose.  Moreover, my criticism of these 
initiatives is not to question the sincerity of Home Office employees (cs 1,2,3,4) who 
spoke of their wish to collaborate in ensuring that the needs of disabled asylum 
seekers are met.  If the problem is perceived to be located at the level of individuals, 
then it does not conflict with wider goals to deter migration.  My criticism is, therefore, 
directed at the representation of the problem on which these initiatives are based, 
rather than the effectiveness of the initiatives.   
I consider the specific elements of these policy initiatives before turning to voluntary 
sector approaches.   
Use of euphemistic labels  
Current Home Office initiatives adopt euphemistic labels which avoid 
acknowledgement of commonalities with the circumstances of the wider population 
of disabled people.   Labels of vulnerability are complemented with references to 
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people having ‘exceptional needs’ (Shaw, 2016) being ‘at risk’ (Immigration Act, 
2016; Great Britain. The Home Office, 2018b) or having ‘care needs’ (Great Britain. 
The Home Office, 2018a).  The use of euphemisms for disability is not simply an 
issue of preferred language.  Labels of commonality are potentially revolutionary.  
As Arendt wrote in relation to the French peasantry: 
what urged them on was the quest for bread and the cry for bread will always be 
uttered with one voice.  Insofar as we all need bread, we are indeed all the same 
and may as well unite into one body (1963, p.94). 
If the needs of disabled asylum seekers in the UK were framed as the ‘quest for 
bread’, it would become apparent that the problem is one of access to human needs.  
If the existence and ‘logos’ of disabled asylum seekers were articulated together 
with the rights and achievements of the international movement of disabled people, 
this could facilitate awareness of commonalities, unified struggle and potential for 
what Rancière (1999) refers to as a moment of politics.  Ferguson (2017, p.115) 
argues that ‘an approach which stresses the commonality of mental distress is likely 
to have a greater political impact than one which prioritises a difference’.  Instead, 
the use of euphemisms of vulnerability or exceptional needs frames disabled asylum 
seekers as a distinct and insignificant minority.  Moreover, such discourse further 
dislocates the logics of rights and obligations enshrined in the UNCRPD (2006), 
developed through decades of struggle by the disabled people’s movement.  These 
Home Office initiatives to identify ‘vulnerable’ people are presented as if innovative, 
however, no discursive intervention occurs in a vacuum.  The use of distinct 
terminology avoids articulation with the disabled people’s movement and the 
UNCRPD.  This obscures the dislocation of rights, reinforcing hegemonic 
distinctions of entitlement which are core to immigration policy (particularly the 1998 
White Paper) and welfare reform (2010) as analysed in Chapter 4.  
Individual labels of vulnerability obscure systemic causes of disablement.  Despite 
reliance on labelling individuals as ‘vulnerable’, both the Shaw report (2016) and the 
ICIBI inspection (2019) acknowledge that the system creates or increases 
‘vulnerability’.  As Judith Butler (2015b) explains, with reference to wider labels of 
vulnerability, it is ‘not as if we were not vulnerable before, but when infrastructure 
fails, that vulnerability comes to the fore’.  In a suggestion of awareness of 
distinctions between the social and medical models of disability, the ICIBI (2019, 
p.18) report notes that ‘immigration control measures which deny access to 
services, can increase vulnerability’ with an ‘emerging picture of negative outcomes 
linked to our system’.  The Shaw Report (2016, p.10) also notes that ‘vulnerability 
is intrinsic to the very fact of detention’.  This recognition of the impact of systemic 
access barriers suggests understanding of the social model (Oliver, 1983).  
Similarly, Smith and Waite (2019) observe that ‘the governing of migration can … 
generate and produce vulnerabilities’.  Nonetheless, having acknowledged the 
impact of systemic barriers, both Shaw (2016) and ICIBI (2019)  focus on the need 
to identify and mitigate the impact on people labelled as ‘vulnerable’ rather than to 
remove the barriers.  The solution is thereby framed as a never-ending quest to 
identify people affected, while systemic causes remain uncontested.   
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In the context of the injustices faced by disabled asylum seekers, initiatives based 
on identifying ‘vulnerable’ people, might be considered a welcome, albeit insufficient 
response.  A voluntary sector employee (vsd2) and a Member of Parliament (pol2) 
referred to the identification of individuals as an obvious prerequisite for action.  
However, the ICIBI is explicit about the Home Office objective: identifying ‘the needs 
of vulnerable individuals is a test not just of its competence but also of its capacity 
for compassion’ (Bolt, 2019, p.8).  The motivation is thereby to enhance, not to 
challenge, systemic credibility.  Sajid Javid (Great Britain. The Home Office and The 
Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, 2019) explains that the extended scheme to support 
refugees ‘restores dignity and offers refugees a viable future’.  He thereby links the 
scheme with the much-used fantasmatic logic of pride in Britain’s ‘long history of 
supporting refugees’, discussed in Chapter 4.  However, such notions of ‘dignity’ are 
reserved for selected individuals.  Support provided by an ‘imagined community’ 
(Anderson, B., 1983) of citizens are framed as acts of generosity.  The 
interconnections between logics of explanation are essential to this analysis.  
Fantasmatic logics of pride associated with apparent generosity assert Britain’s 
superiority and therefore entitlement to defend its borders.  The quest to identify 
exceptions reinforces the articulation of hegemonic political logics of generosity with 
logics of defence to a wider population.  Furthermore, the implication of identifying 
‘vulnerable’ individuals is that the wider migrant population is not ‘vulnerable’.  
Distinctions of entitlement therefore rely on hegemonic logics of individual 
responsibility, with those labelled as ‘vulnerable’ framed as an exception.   
Attempts to identify individuals who are worthy of support, frame the solution as a 
technical task, devoid of political contestation or dissensus (Rancière, 1999).  
Policies based on logics of generosity promote a humanitarian response.   With 
reference to similar discursive response in the French context, Ticktin (2011, p.191), 
describes the result as to create ‘subjects not of equal rights, but of pity’. Such 
discourse is not unique to issues of migration.  As Hughes (2019, p.835) argues, 
‘Pity creates charitable ‘targets’… ‘charity sustains the distinction between ‘the 
vulnerable’ and ‘the invulnerable’, conferring moral agency on the former while 
snatching it from the latter’.  Yet, despite previously increased recognition of the 
social model of disability, as Clifford (2020, p.195) observes, ‘disability is still 
predominantly viewed through a pity prism rather than understood to be an 
equalities issue’.  Identifying individuals considered worthy of support, reinforces 
this ‘pity prism’, thereby also reinforcing the dislocation of the normative value of 
equality.   
Wider discursive response to Home Office initiatives 
Hegemonic distinctions of entitlement remain uncontested by Home Office 
initiatives.  It is perhaps more noteworthy when people, presenting themselves as 
critical of government policies, still reinforce dominant narratives.  In a voluntary 
sector preparatory meeting of the National Asylum Stakeholder Forum, I was 
advised not to refer to the system as disabling because it would alienate Home 
Office staff.  Instead, I was told we should focus on the pragmatic goal of supporting 
the identification of ‘vulnerable’ people.  The purpose is thereby reduced to 
mitigating the impact of restrictions on selected individuals.  Similarly, at a local 
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level, a volunteer involved with a small town’s preparation for the arrival of two 
resettled Syrian families (uis5) spoke of his motivation to avoid what he perceives 
as political engagement.  As he put it: 
as far as I have any political consciousness, and I’m not sure I do … I choose to get 
involved with something that I think is achievable. 
His focus on what he perceives as ‘achievable’ may provide tangible results, thereby 
enabling fantasmatic logics of pride, but does not contest systemic causes.  
According to Ticktin (2011, p.5), the result of focusing on achievable exceptions, 
worthy of generosity, is that:  
Rather than furthering solidarity or equality in the face of discriminatory policies and 
laws … regimes of care end up reproducing inequalities and racial, gendered, and 
geopolitical hierarchies: I suggest that this politics of care is a form of antipolitics. 
Contrary to the presentation by its advocates, the antipolitics underpinning initiatives 
based on apparent generosity towards selected individuals is a political position 
affirming hegemonic dislocation of rights, underpinned with the assumption that 
systemic change is impossible.  Mondon and Winter (2020, p.3) argue that ‘apathy 
is a political position and a reactionary one.  Things do not have to be this way’.  If 
the problem is not framed as systemic injustice, then the solution does not require 
systemic change.  The dislocation of rights is reinforced, with some mitigation of 
suffering towards selected individuals then presented as sufficient.  This example is 
not unique to intersectional issues of disability and migration in the UK.  With 
reference to activism against immigration detention and deportation in the USA, 
Nancy Hiemstra warns that: 
it is critical that we remember the goal is not to bring order to the chaos to just build 
a better ‘D and D system’ [detention and deportation] … Instead, those working for 
change must target the driving forces behind the existence of the system.  We must 
therefore work for broader structural changes regarding the economic dependencies 
that have been created, the intimate ties between corporations and policymakers, 
and the popularity of anti-immigrant discourse.  (2016, p.72)  
The identification of people framed as worthy exceptions to systemic restrictions 
may result in legitimising hegemonic distinctions of human worth and building a 
‘better’ system.  Initiatives based on such distinctions, further dislocate a link 
between need and entitlement to support.   The result is that inherently discretionary 
political logics of generosity are reinforced, inevitably leaving some people without 
support.  Furthermore, without rights to support, people lose the ability to contest 
decisions, and precarity is increased.  Initiatives based on identifying people worthy 
of support therefore reinforce, rather than contest, hegemonic inequalities.   
Academic literature regarding disability and migration risks further reinforcing 
hegemonic discursive assumptions.  A core part of the problem is presented as lack 
of data regarding numbers of disabled asylum seekers in the UK (Harris and 
Roberts, 2001; Ward, Amas and Lagnado, 2008).  Taking a more international 
perspective, but arriving at similar conclusions, Crock, Ernst and McCallum Ao 
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(2012, p.736) argue that the ‘fact that there are as yet no reliable statistics on the 
incidence of disabilities amongst refugees and asylum seekers is a measure of the 
neglect’.  Yet, if the system itself is disabling then counting the number of people it 
disables is no solution.  An individualistic approach to the exclusion of disabled 
people was discredited with the development of the social model.  As Oliver and 
Barnes explain:  
Head counting … has long been regarded as an essential element of social policy 
because, so it is argued, governments are unlikely to commit resources to particular 
policy initiatives unless they can be reasonably sure of the numbers of people who 
may benefit and have some idea of the costs involved (1998, p.13) 
 
Counting people and identifying individuals may be hegemonically construed as a 
manageable policy goal, whereas system change is not.  However, attempts to 
identify and count disabled people assume clear and stable distinctions between 
disabled and non-disabled people.  Furthermore, as Oliver and Barnes (ibid) argue, 
policy solutions based on ‘head counting’ implicitly obscure the impact of systemic, 
disabling restrictions, thereby impeding political change.  This relates to earlier 
criticism of the seminal study (Harris and Roberts, 2001) in which the apparent 
diversity of asylum seekers is affirmed by a list of impairments.  If the problem is 
framed as the diversity of medical conditions, then the solution appears to be a 
technical issue of identifying and providing ‘special’ support, rather than a political 
issue of contesting inequality and denial of rights.  The social model was developed 
in contestation of individualistic, charitable initiatives.  The solution to the restrictions 
faced by disabled asylum seekers cannot be the imposition of individualistic 
charitable initiatives.  
7.2 Hegemonic adjustment: Voluntary sector focus on logics of 
pragmatism and individual responsibility 
Analysis now turns to voluntary sector responses to the restrictions and inequalities 
experienced by disabled asylum seekers.  Two key areas of voluntary sector work 
are considered: response to the immediate survival needs of individual asylum 
seekers and wider campaigns for asylum seekers to have the ‘right to work’.  These 
responses are framed as in opposition to Home Office restrictions, but the focus is 
on pragmatic mitigation of suffering rather than systemic contestation.  The result 
risks reinforcing hegemonic distinctions of entitlement and the assumed 
impossibility of systemic change.  
Pragmatic focus on addressing immediate survival needs  
The voluntary sector frequently provides lifesaving support to disabled and non-
disabled asylum seekers impacted by systematic restrictions.  In the context of the 
immediacy of struggles for survival, the value of such support cannot be 
underestimated.  People may be supported to meet their physical and emotional 
needs, including food, shelter, advice, and social contact.  The focus is on what is 
perceived as pragmatically achievable within existing policy and practice.  The result 
may be to include different people and perhaps greater numbers of people in the 
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hegemonic framing of ‘worth’, or to adjust the discursive borders of entitlement, but 
not to contest the existence of systemic inequalities.   
The quest to meet an individual’s immediate needs is not necessarily distinct from 
contesting hegemonic acceptance of distinctions of human worth.  The experiences 
of das3 highlight the potentially interrelated nature of individual and systemic 
targets.  He was housed in local authority accommodation in response to his mental 
health support needs.  He recalled that one day when he went to fetch his financial 
support, he was informed that his entitlement to housing and support would stop in 
five weeks.  Voluntary sector housing providers then told him that his PTSD and 
addictions meant it would not be possible for him to be hosted by volunteers.  He 
was advised that after being evicted he would need to sleep in a night shelter and 
use local drop-in centres for food.   Luckily, he had sufficient skills and knowledge 
to contact a voluntary sector advocate, who found that counter to legal 
requirements, there had been no formal reassessment prior to the local authority 
decision to evict him.  Das3 then waited for a year without news of either a 
reassessment or of the threatened eviction.  His fear of prompting the removal of 
support meant that he was reluctant to ask for an update.  The reassessment 
eventually took place, more than a year after Social Services had said it had been 
done.  According to the advocate who attended the reassessment with das3, it 
‘seemed decision had already been made… this was about funding, not about his 
needs’.  Das3 then waited another 6 months before being informed that he had ‘no 
eligible needs’.   According to his advocate, he had been assessed as able to cook 
for himself, because in his current home there was regular food provided by 
Fairshare, which he could take from the fridge. He was also assessed as capable 
of making relationships.  The evidence for this was that when his PTSD causes him 
to scream in the night, other people in the house come to support him.  The result 
of this assessment was that he would be transferred to NASS accommodation and 
potentially dispersed to another area of the country.  This would remove him from 
his current sources of food and emotional support.  Das3 expressed exasperation 
at the nonsensical removal of support such that his health would deteriorate, and he 
would again become eligible for urgent support.  Contestation of the lack of 
assessment and the subsequent threatened eviction was in response to the 
immediate crisis.  However, contestation of Social Services processes may have 
impacted on the assumed insignificance of his needs.   
If survival depends on being framed as an exception to wider restrictions, then this 
must be the immediate focus.  A voluntary sector employee (vsi5) describes 
response to the needs of an asylum seeker with a chronic health problem:  
getting him the travel card was probably the number one thing we did.  Having him 
live somewhere that wasn’t so far away from the hospital was the other thing, and 
then masses and masses and masses of support with NHS charging letters.  
Because he's destitute, he doesn’t have any entitlement to treatment. 
Without questioning the value of such work, the danger is that attention becomes 
directed at framing particular individuals as deserving, reinforcing fatalistic 
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understanding of systemic causes.  The hegemony is reinforced, irrespective of 
whether the motivation is pragmatic.   
The focus on what is perceived as achievable can be partly explained by structural 
factors.  Voluntary sector organisations rely on funding, which is facilitated by 
evidence of impact.  If systemic change is perceived as unachievable or 
undesirable, then it may be less readily supported by funders, than provision for the 
immediate needs of people framed as worthy.  Voluntary sector funding may depend 
on pragmatic focus on targets which are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic 
and Timebound (SMART).  However, as Prather (2015, p.14) argues, such ‘criteria 
fit extremely well’ when focused on returning a particular issue ‘to normal’, but do 
not promote more fundamental organisational change.  Similarly, the neoliberal 
hegemony and systemic root causes of current inequalities cannot be easily framed 
in the confines of SMART targets.  The assumed intractability of systemic change is 
perpetuated by pragmatic focus on symptoms rather than causes.  
Informal support provided by friends and fellow nationals may be more significant to 
the immediate survival of asylum seekers than the work of formal voluntary sector 
organisations.  As legal professional (lp2) notes:  
I suspect that there are people who do a huge amount who are not getting any 
support and probably do spend some of their own meagre pittance on doing that. 
This support may be a lifeline to people in crisis, such as experienced by das8 and 
17, outlined in Chapter 6.  However, the contributions of friends, family or informal 
supporters are unquantifiable.  In a discussion group (laer2), an interpreter for 
several disabled asylum seekers explained that ‘people like me are doing this 
unpaid all the time.  I fill in forms … try and find solutions for people.  This work is 
invisible to organisations’.  This invisibility is exemplified by my assumptions that the 
support received by das8 was provided by the voluntary sector rather than fellow 
nationals, as discussed in Chapter 6.  There are commonalities with the unpaid care 
on which many disabled citizens rely (Slasberg and Beresford, 2014), although 
citizens have greater formal entitlements, including from the welfare state.  Provision 
of informal support to citizens or migrants may be motivated by logics of solidarity 
and equality, but there is inherent precarity and inequality if one person’s survival 
depends on gifts from another.  Informal support may go on for years, however, as 
legal professional (lp1) explains, ‘finally … generosity runs out and a friend that they 
have been staying with … can’t deal with it anymore’.  At this point, a person reverts 
to reliance on statutory services, or the lack thereof.  Acts of solidarity based on 
logics of equality may be counter-hegemonic, however, if focused on an individual 
level, the impact is limited.  Voluntary sector organisations have greater capacity 
and motivation to promote their work in public discourse, thereby heightening their 
hegemonic influence.  
Beyond the inherent inequalities, informal support may even facilitate wider removal 




I am not at all saying they should be done away with, but you know … a wonderful 
network of people helping people and that makes it harder to prove your case … in 
some cases I have had to say, well, you are just going to have to withdraw the 
support you are providing to show that they can’t cope.  
Pragmatic acts of discretionary generosity may be essential to people’s immediate 
survival, however, such actions can be no solution to systemic inequalities.   
Discretionary support as a means of survival is more accessible to some than to 
others.  As discussed in Chapter 6, attempts to gain publicity, and prevent the 
deportation of a blind man convicted of rape (das17) were unsuccessful.  In contrast, 
a tweet from barrister Colin Yeo (April 4th 2019b) regarding the threatened forced 
removal of a 78-year-old with Alzheimer’s disease, received more than 600 
comments and 11,000 ‘likes’. He commented that he was ‘astounded’ by the level 
of response to one example of the injustice faced by an immigration lawyer ‘day in 
day out’.  Distinctions in levels of public support may stem from the dissonance with 
social logics of normalcy.  Deportation may appear as a solution to the criminal 
‘other’, affirming ‘our’ moral superiority and facilitating the psychoanalytic quest for 
‘enjoyment’ (Stavrakakis 2005) of a unified society unsullied by the ‘unintegrated’ 
other (Schinkel, 2013, 2017).  The capacity for ‘enjoyment’ is limited if the victim 
evokes pity.  An older person with Alzheimer’s cannot so easily be discarded as the 
migrant ‘other’ or the ‘failed citizen’ (Anderson, B.L., 2013).  If a person’s immediate 
survival is at risk, then all methods of resistance may be considered legitimate, 
including representing a person as a worthy exception to systemic restrictions.  
However, unless the distinction is made clear, attempts to frame an individual as a 
worthy exception may be confused with attempts to address causal problems. 
   
Ostensibly pragmatic and individualised approaches cannot address hegemonic 
causal distinctions.  Writing with regard to charitable work with disabled citizens, 
Clifford (2020, p.257) describes how the pragmatic focus of lobbying may have 
resulted in benefit-claimants having less long to wait without financial support.  
However, as she puts it, ‘the overall direction of policy remains unchanged and 
grave injustices continue’.  Furthermore, the risk of focusing on policy mitigation is 
that this becomes the target with an increasingly fatalistic approach to systemic 
causes.  Such work may be considered akin to pulling drowning babies out of a river 
without stopping the person throwing them in.  In relation to disabled asylum 
seekers, such practices reinforce the notion that any acknowledgement of people’s 
existence is better than none. 
Campaigns for the ‘right to work’ evoke logics of responsibility, modifying 
borders of entitlement while affirming intersectional divisions 
Attention now turns to discursive representations underpinning ongoing voluntary 
sector campaigns for asylum seekers to have the ‘right to work’.  This right was 
removed by the New Labour government in 2002 in response to the goal to clarify 
whether an asylum seeker is genuinely migrating to flee persecution or is seeking 
economic betterment (Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords, 2002).  A coalition 
of immigration voluntary sector organisations label restoration of the ‘right to work’ 
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as ‘common sense’  (Lift the Ban, 2020).  It may appear laudable to focus on rights, 
rather than logics of generosity or defence.  The potential for individual contribution 
is foregrounded, thereby countering discourse of asylum seekers as being lazy and 
unskilled.  However, this campaign cannot be understood in isolation from the 
neoliberal hegemony.  
The campaign foregrounds the convergence of disparate political perspectives as if 
inherently beneficial.  This is akin to the unifying of ‘Volvos and vegans’ against 
airport expansion (Griggs and Howarth, 2016), discussed in Chapter 2.   On 5th May 
2019, the campaign group Asylum Matters tweeted that the ‘right to work’ is 
‘common-sense’.  The suggestion that if something is ‘common-sense’ then it is 
beneficial, suggests that the restrictions and inequalities imposed on asylum 
seekers result from an aberration rather than from deliberate policy and practice.  
The same month, Marvin Rees, Labour Mayor of Bristol publicly supported this 
campaign (Rees, 2019), writing that it would be ‘good for the Treasury, saving 
money on welfare payments’.  However, the assumed normative value of consensus 
reflects failure to contest hegemonic discourse.  Articulation with Treasury goals, 
‘saving money on welfare payments’ and reducing the ‘burden’ on the taxpayer (Lift 
the Ban, 2020) may be the ‘common-sense’ of the social order but are also core to 
hegemonic discursive inequalities.  Such arguments evoke political logics of 
individual responsibility akin to those set out in the biopsychosocial model (Waddell 
and Aylward, 2009) of disability, reinforce core social logics of the primacy of 
economic contribution, and implicitly frame those people that do not work as 
burdensome.  Reinforcing the ‘common-sense’ on which the social order is based 
cannot address hegemonic inequalities.   
In seeking consensual change, the campaign seeks to mitigate the suffering of some 
people.  If asylum seekers had the ‘right to work’, then some would be proven to be 
‘responsible’ contributors to the economy.  Goodfellow (2019, p.145) refers to 
studies that show that migration is good for the economy as, ‘one weapon in 
campaigners’ arsenal’, challenging hegemonic narratives of immigrants as 
‘“scroungers”, after benefits’, and as ‘taking British people’s jobs’.  However, the 
commonalities of these references with hegemonic discourse of welfare reform, 
which disproportionately targets disabled people (Ryan, 2019), cannot be ignored.  
The campaign for the ‘right to work’ has developed at the same time as government 
targets to get an extra million disabled people into work (Great Britain. Department 
for Work and Pensions and Department of Health, 2017, p.8), through a programme 
of sanctions and benefit cuts (Clifford, 2020, p.74).  This policy has been attributed 
to the deaths of many disabled people (Ryan, 2019; Clifford, 2020), among the 
120,000 people estimated to have died as a result of austerity policies (Stewart, 
2019).  For disabled citizens, the problem is not the ‘right’ to work but the barriers to 
finding appropriate work and the regime of sanctions if work is not found.  Framing 
the ‘right to work’ as if a non-contentious goal actively reinforces hegemonic 
assumptions of the value of individual responsibility, thereby reinforcing the basis of 
wider distinctions of assumed worth and undermining the discursive focus of the 
disabled people’s movement.  While the disabled people’s movement contests the 
prioritising of individual responsibility (Ryan, 2019; Clifford, 2020), the asylum sector 
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advocates this goal.  Like the re-emergence of the term ‘vulnerable’ to refer to 
disabled people discussed in Chapter 1, normative discourse of the ‘right to work’ 
highlights the discursive dissonance between the asylum sector and the disabled 
people’s movement.    
Disabled asylum seekers face barriers to employment on account of response to 
both disability and migration status.  Russell and Malhotra (2002) argue that in a 
capitalist economy, the employment of disabled people is resisted as disabled 
people may be less productive and need more support,  therefore increasing 
production costs.  Writing with reference to the USA, they cite that in 2000, ten years 
after the Americans with Disabilities Act, ‘despite a... national official unemployment 
rate of 4.2%, the unemployment rate for working-age disabled population has barely 
budged from its chronic level of 65-71%’ (ibid).  In addition to the barriers faced by 
disabled citizens, according to laer1, refugees complain of additional stress caused 
by having to seek employment, in addition to other struggles, and when there are 
such barriers to finding, and being offered, suitable work.  A study by Isabel Ruiz 
and Carlos Vargas-Silva (2018, p.863) found that in comparison with people born in 
the UK, refugees remain 22% less likely to be employed and have weekly earnings 
£196 lower than people born in the UK.  Furthermore, it was found that 68% of 
refugees have a health condition which limits the amount they can work, compared 
with 45% of the UK-born population.  The authors suggest that even if asylum 
seekers were to gain the ‘right to work’, employers may be reticent to employ 
someone without certainty as to how long they can stay in the UK (2018, p.860).  
Focusing on the legal ‘right’ distracts from the multiple inequalities causing current 
problems, instead, reinforcing the normative value of economic contribution.   
The rights-based discourse of the campaign may appear counter to hegemonic 
discourse of generosity and defence but affirms neoliberal logics of individual 
responsibility as a solution.  When das13 spoke of the ‘right to work’, he referred to 
his willingness to ‘work hard’, presenting this as an indicator of his value.  He 
appeared to envisage that this trait would result in well-paid, secure employment 
becoming available, with an associated middle-class lifestyle akin to that of the 
asylum voluntary sector staff with whom he had contact.   Referring to the US 
context, Beltràn (2009, p.611) describes how migrants describe themselves as 
‘hard-working’ to gain legitimacy, which, as he asserts, is ‘simply put, a bad idea’.  
He argues that ‘the capacity to work hard and earn, confers little or no civic standing 
on raced subjects’.  He criticises pro-immigrant forces that use ‘incoherent 
arguments regarding justice and the value of the undocumented while failing to 
address central questions of equality and power’.  The assumed consequences of 
the ‘right to work’, indicated by das13 are mirrored by a submission to the London 
sitting of the Permanent People’s Tribunal on migration in 2018.  This referred to the 
‘right to work’ as providing the 'possibility of a decent livelihood and other rights 
taken for granted by others’.  There was no explanation as to who these ‘others’ 
include.  It is doubtful that anyone would campaign to be subject to what Fletcher 
and Wright (2018) refer to as the ‘authoritarian approach to unemployment’ in which 
missing an appointment due to ill-health for example, results in sanctions such that 
all financial support is removed.    
180 
 
Systemic inequalities are glossed over by such campaigns, obscuring the fact that 
asylum seekers and disabled people are already working.  Nobody contributing to 
this study could be described as leading a life of leisure.  Instead, people’s lives are 
structured by the unpaid work of survival (Yeo, 2018).   Many asylum seekers may 
currently rely on illegal work.  However, if people gained the ‘right to work’, we 
cannot assume that improved conditions for the same work would be available.  
Moreover, in the light of the experiences of UK citizens, it can be assumed that 
further conditions would be applied to already low levels of state support.  
Furthermore, such support could be removed as the logical conclusion to promotion 
of logics of individual responsibility.  The ‘right to work’ might therefore exacerbate 
the precarity of people’s existence.  
Normative associations between paid work and human value are not new.  In 1961, 
Foucault argued that hostile attitudes towards madness relate to economic 
productivity.  People unable to work in a capitalist economy are presented as 
undeserving, threatening prevailing assumptions of the prime value of economic 
contribution.  Grover and Piggott (2013, p.36) argue that promotion of the ‘right to 
work’:  
Emphasise[s] paid work as being the means by which individuals can express their 
responsibilities as active citizens ... people who, for whatever reason, cannot work 
are othered as being particularly problematic and burdensome.  
Without employment, asylum seekers are automatically framed among those who 
are burdensome.  Campaigns for the ‘right to work’ do not contest such framing, but 
simply seek to adjust who the label is applied to.  Disabled asylum seekers can be 
assumed to be disproportionately among those for whom the label of burden is 
reinforced.   
To address the restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum seekers 
requires contestation not reinforcement of the common-sense on which the social 
order is based.  The value of work in a capitalist economy needs to be questioned 
rather than reinforced.  As Russell and Malhotra (2002, p.223) argue:  
If the goal of social justice is to ensure the dignity of each and every person, then 
buying into the largely capitalist-induced belief that work equates with self-esteem 
or is a condition for membership of the human race … only serves to oppress us all. 
If the restrictions and inequalities faced by disabled asylum seekers are 
underpinned by social logics of the primacy of economic contribution, then these 
logics should be contested.   If, as Anderson (2013, p.180) argues, the problem were 
to be framed not as the need for ‘a job but with the need for subsistence, not with a 
spouse but with the need for mutual care and support’, then this would have ‘the 
potential to open up politics and analysis’.  It would invite ‘an open, complex, and 
multifaceted contemporary “us” that has the potential of being shaped by shared 
imagined futures as well as shared imagined pasts’.  The development of a 
multifaceted ‘us’ would rely on addressing intersectional divisions such as not only 
to adjust the borders but also to contest the existence of distinctions of entitlement.  
181 
 
Despite criticism of the restrictions and inequalities of the asylum sector, neither of 
the broad categories of voluntary sector approaches considered in this chapter 
contest hegemonic discursive representations of disability and migration.  I am not 
suggesting that asylum seekers should be banned from paid work, or that it is 
detrimental to identify people with specific medical needs, or to offer acts of 
generosity.  However, I argue that none of these approaches is a useful campaign 
focus.  The assumed value of pragmatic goals of consensus limits the development 
of alternatives and hinders scope for political contestation to adjusting who is framed 
as within the criteria of worth and who is not.  In so doing, hegemonic distinctions of 
worth are reinforced rather than contested.  Systemic change may be difficult but, 
in framing it as too difficult, it becomes impossible.    
7.3 Hegemonic contestation: attempted assertion of social model 
discourse and logics of equal rights  
As part of the action research component of this study, I sought to contribute to 
developing alternatives to current injustice by contributing to building a broader 
movement of resistance based on rights and equality.  Before considering what 
hindered effective contestation, it is necessary to review what took place.  I worked 
with a group of activists to organise events bringing together the asylum sector, the 
disabled people’s movement, and allies.  Learning from the expertise of 
intersectional lived experience and the achievements of both sectors, the goal was 
to promote a social model approach to addressing the barriers faced by disabled 
asylum seekers.  Examples from these efforts have been cited throughout the study.  
Attention now focuses on the response to attempts to assert the rights of asylum 
seekers to access social care, exploring where people with different subject 
positions perceive expertise to be located, and with whom allegiances should be 
drawn.  This example highlights how hegemonic narratives are affirmed and 
alternatives precluded, despite people expressing commitment to addressing 
intersectional injustice.    
It must be stressed at the outset that social care is not a need in itself, but a means 
of overcoming barriers to meeting human needs.  This discursive distinction may 
appear inconsequential when people are struggling for survival.  However, if the 
problem is framed as collective needs to address socially constructed barriers 
meeting human needs, then the solutions appear distinct from if the problem is 
located at the level of individuals with ‘special’ or abnormal needs.  It is also 
important to acknowledge that, irrespective of migration status, not all disabled 
people require, or are eligible for, social care.   Among asylum seekers contributing 
to this study, half referred to social care needs.  However, as the sampling is not 
representative, this proportion is not suggested to be indicative of the wider 
population. 
The legal and policy context of intersectional rights to social care 
Before turning to the specific events of this study, it is necessary to outline the legal 
and policy context.  Any resident in the UK is entitled to a community care 
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assessment, irrespective of migration status.  These rights stem from the National 
Assistance Act (1948), updated by the Care Act (2014).  Responsibility to meet 
eligible needs for care and support lies with the local authority if ‘the adult is or-
dinarily resident in the authority’s area’ (The Care Act, 2014, section 18.1).  Beyond 
this, UK policy and practice must be in accordance with the UNCRPD (2006), 
particularly Article 19, obliging state authorities to provide ‘in-home, residential and 
other community support services … necessary to support living and inclusion in the 
community … with choices equal to others’.  However, as highlighted by the Social 
Care Institute for Excellence (2013), local authority funding cuts have resulted in 
increased thresholds for eligibility for care and compounded a crisis of social care 
provision (Slasberg and Beresford, 2014, 2016).  Cuts to the funding of social care 
are underpinned by social logics framing disabled people as an economic burden, 
which at times of scarcity needs to be reduced.   
Responsibility for provision of social care for asylum seekers has been subject to 
legal wrangling between local authorities and the state (Westminster City Council 
vs National Asylum Support Service 2002; Slough judgement 2006).  Apparent 
confusion regarding the entitlements of asylum seekers with care needs in the 
context of the Care Act (2014) resulted in the Home Office issuing new guidance 
(2018a) affirming local authority responsibilities.  There are some restrictions in the 
eligibility of asylum seekers: people are ineligible, if their ‘needs for care and support 
have arisen solely (a) because the adult is destitute, or (b) because of the physical 
effects, or anticipated physical effects, of being destitute’ (The Care Act, 2014, 
paragraph 2).  Furthermore, people whose asylum claims have been refused are 
ineligible for care, unless an assessment indicates that this would breach Human 
Rights (Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, schedule 3).  Confusion 
regarding these restrictions, together with social logics whereby disabled asylum 
seekers are assumed to have lesser priority, may be the cause of barriers accessing 
social care faced by contributors to this study (das3,4,8,9,11,13).  Many of the 
barriers people recounted appear to contravene legal entitlement, however, without 
access to legal support, these breaches remain uncontested.  According to a legal 
practitioner (lp1) specialising in social care issues, ‘immigration status is a massive 
difference’ in the ease of access to social care.  This practitioner regularly supports 
asylum seekers accessing social care but had not been approached regarding any 
barriers faced by people selected for the VPRS, despite the apparent focus on 
‘vulnerable’ people.  As the scheme is administered by the local authority and 
selected people have similar entitlement to citizens, there appear to be fewer 
barriers accessing services.  
The events organised as part of this study took place within one local authority.  
There is no reason to suggest that social care provision is markedly different in other 




Specific policy context from one local authority 
At the time of organising these events, Bristol City Council faced a £108 
million funding shortfall (2018, p.10).  Although this was not referenced by 
any of the contributors to this study, the impact on ability to meet statutory 
social care obligations must be considered.  In the context of this funding 
shortfall, a transformation of social care provision had been introduced, 
euphemistically called the ‘Better lives programme’ ensuring the ‘right level 
and type of support’ (Bristol City Council, 2018, p.25), combined with ‘value 
for money’ (Bristol City Council, 2018, p.27).  The dislocation of logics of 
rights from Council practice is reinforced by a market-driven approach to 
provision of care services.  In its presentation of social care reform, the 
Council promotes the need for a ‘stronger and more resilient care market’, 
ensuring ‘good investment’ (Bristol City Council, 2017).  As Giroux (2008, 
p.594) warns, when ‘the social state is displaced by the market, a new kind 
of politics is emerging, in which some lives, if not whole groups, are seen as 
disposable and redundant’.  This ‘new kind of politics’ is underpinned by an 
implicitly biopsychosocial (Waddell and Aylward, 2009) approach, with social 
care reforms, foregrounding the need to ‘maximise people’s independence’ 
(Bristol City Council, 2018, p.25). This tacitly contests a social model 
approach to collective responsibility to address barriers.   
The Council’s presentation of social care reform makes no explicit reference 
to barriers associated with forced migration.  There are 13 references to 
‘citizen’ (Bristol City Council, 2018).  In a similar manner to the 1998 White 
Paper, analysed in Chapter 4, it is unclear whether ‘citizen’ is used to refer to 
‘people’ or to distinguish from migrants.  Lack of direct reference to the needs 
of non-citizens results in these issues remaining confined to the unreferenced 
‘other’.   
The redefining of independent living 
Rights to independent living are central to the legal and policy context of social care.  
These rights were achieved through decades of struggle by disabled activists 
culminating in the UNCRPD.  Highlighting poststructuralist assumptions discussed 
in Chapter 2 (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Howarth, D.R., Norval and Stavrakakis, 
2000; Glynos and Howarth, 2007) regarding the inherent connection between our 
understanding of the world and its existence, service reductions are rooted in 
discursive representations of social care; hegemonic notions of independent living 
are being systematically undermined by redefining its meaning.  Rather than being 
a right to equality as defined by the UNCRPD, use of social care is becoming framed 
as a negative indicator of being ‘dependent’ (Bristol City Council, 2018, p.11). The 
notion of ‘independent living’ is effectively redefined to mean absence of social care.  
Asylum seekers and citizens (das3,13, and udc3) contributing to this study recalled 
being told that service reduction would enable them to ‘live more independently’.  
Such reductions were contested by a disabled citizen (udc3) who asserted, ‘I am 
more independent if I have the support I need’.  His conception, shared by the wider 
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disabled people’s movement, is the basis of the UNCRPD.  As  Clifford asserts, 
independent living ‘does not mean doing everything for yourself’ (2020, p.53).  
According to udc5, the meaning of ‘independent-living’ developed and enshrined in 
the UNCRPD (2006) has become co-opted, distorted and weaponised against the 
people whose needs it was designed to support.  This approach is not unique to a 
particular local authority.  As Ferguson (2017, p.24) explains, discursive justification 
of austerity is provided by rebranding cuts in services ‘in the name of promoting 
“independence”’.  Such discourse reinforces hegemonic dislocation of rights to 
support and the collective responsibility to remove barriers enshrined in the 
UNCRPD (2006, article 19).  The assumed normative value of facing no barriers 
accessing mainstream services is underpinned by social logics framing disabled 
people as an economic burden.      
The findings of this study must be understood in the context of this wider crisis in 
social care.  However, the focus here, is not on the crisis itself, but the resistance to 
hegemonic contestation.  
7.4 Collaborative efforts to address intersectional restrictions.  
Attempts to bring together the asylum sector and the disabled people’s movement 
highlight the barriers contesting hegemonic discursive divisions.  The biggest of the 
events organised as part of this study, included a public tribute (dmas1) to disabled 
asylum seekers and refugees who have been failed.  At this event, Bristol Mayor 
Marvin Rees apologised for Council failings that had contributed to the murders of 
Kamil Ahmad and Bijan Ebrahimi.  He committed ‘to making sure we look at 
everything that happened and everything that didn’t happen’.  
  
Figure 5: Mayor of Bristol, Marvin Rees, apologised for the Council's failings 
in preventing the deaths of Kamil Ahmad and Bijan Ebrahimi 
At the same event, a voluntary sector employee spoke of asylum seekers with care 
needs facing eviction from local authority supported accommodation and made 
street homeless.  This person warned that without action, further lives will be lost.  
Another meeting (dmas2) was therefore scheduled with MPs, City Council officials 
and social care staff specifically to discuss the problem and appropriate response.  
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It was hoped that the Mayor’s statement combined with heightened awareness of 
the consequences of failure to address the intersectional barriers faced by disabled 
asylum seekers increased the potential to secure progress.  However, despite the 
symbolic significance of the Mayor’s statement, the local authority and voluntary 
sector response to this second meeting (dmas2) highlights the barriers to 
hegemonic contestation and the development of alternatives.   
Response to the issues asserted in this meeting illustrate three main barriers to 
hegemonic contestation.  Firstly, voluntary sector restrictions, or perceived 
restrictions, as to what is strategically permissible to contest.  Secondly, disregard 
for intersectional lived experience and the insights of the disabled people’s 
movement.  Thirdly, liberal assumptions of the normative value of pragmatism and 
consensus. These factors combine to exclude voices of dissent and limit 
contestation to policing the social order.  
Apparent restrictions faced by the asylum voluntary sector 
In preparation for the meeting (dmas2), a short film was made (Yeo and Spencer, 
2018), highlighting the key messages of migrants seeking social care.  Speaking on 
camera, das3 spoke of being threatened with eviction from Social Services 
supported accommodation without having had his needs reassessed.   His voluntary 
sector advocate explained how das3 was being denied his rights under the Care Act 
(2014).  This advocate was the only person contributing to the film in a paid capacity.  
This is significant because employees may be more constrained regarding what it 
is permissible to say.  One week before the meeting at which the film would be 
shown, the advocate’s employer expressed concern about the film’s implied 
criticism of Council practices, explaining, we ‘work in partnership with the Council, 
so we need to be mindful of that’.   The NGO advocate then explained that, having 
discussed it with colleagues, he was withdrawing his criticisms.  This was followed 
by the Chief Executive withdrawing consent for the whole organisation’s 
involvement (referenced in Chapter 3).  No apology, reference to factual inaccuracy, 
or grounds for the last-minute decision were provided, beyond the earlier concerns 
about partnership with the Council.  With reference to collaboration between 
disability charities and the government, Clifford (2020, p.263) calls for 
acknowledgement that ‘the bottom line for these charities is not to do with the 
treatment of disabled people but their own organisational interests’.  The reluctance 
of charities and other voluntary organisations to criticise powerful interests has 
impact beyond the charity itself.  As Beresford (2012) explains, charities present 
themselves as ‘the nation’s conscience’.  If these organisations collaborate with 
government, whether at local or national level, then as Clifford (2020, p.263) argues, 
it encourages public perceptions that ‘everything is essentially OK’.  Media reliance 
on spokespeople from these accredited organisations means that voluntary sector 
acquiescence with dominant narratives, removes criticism from public discourse.   
For the purposes of the local authority meeting, the film was reedited, with the same 
messages, coming from an unpaid activist rather than a voluntary sector employee.  
It was then presented to local and national politicians, social care, and voluntary 
186 
 
sector staff at a roundtable meeting (dmas2).  Social care staff responded to the film 
by committing to address what they framed as multiple oversights, while vociferously 
rejecting systemic barriers.  This response exemplifies disregard for the expertise 
of experience, as will now be discussed.  
The exclusion of voices of lived experience resulting from assumed 
correlations between power and expertise  
The responses from attendees of the meeting (dmas2) suggest that attempts by 
statutory services and the asylum voluntary sector to respond to the care needs of 
asylum seekers are impeded by disregard or ignorance of the experiences and 
achievements of the disabled people’s movement.  Rather than respecting the 
expertise of experience in collaborative quests to contest hegemonic causes of 
intersectional injustice, the focus is on maintaining dominant power relations.  Logics 
of generosity are evoked to mitigate the impact of existing restrictions while resisting 
discursive contestation.   
The apparent impossibility of the Council’s task to balance the budget without 
impacting on statutory duties cannot be denied.  However, voluntary sector, social 
care and Council staff resisted attempts to acknowledge the systemic scale of the 
problem or contest the dislocation of rights.  Instead, a Council leader called for a 
taskforce to ‘tweak the pathways’ necessary to access social care.  The taskforce 
members were selected to exclude disabled service users or activists who could 
speak independently of Council funding.  This would avoid focus on systemic causes 
of service restrictions, including the dislocation of logics of rights, and the failure to 
meet obligations associated with independent living in the UNCRPD.  The exclusion 
of people with specific knowledge and experience of disability rights obscures the 
gaps in the knowledge of those who are involved.  The stated rationale was that 
urgent action was needed and that including disabled people would take longer.  
Ongoing restrictions are thereby justified by the impact of previous restrictions.  
Such attempted justification of the exclusion of disabled people is common.  Clifford 
(2020, p.33) criticises the mainstream media tendency to ‘seek opinion on disability 
issues from non-disabled people’.  When asked whether it would be acceptable to 
have a taskforce examining racism, composed entirely of white people, a senior 
Council executive responded that ‘we work with disabled people all the time, are 
you suggesting we do not know what we are doing?’.  The implication of this 
question is that Council expertise cannot be questioned by those with lived 
experience of the impact.  This official continued that ‘people with lived experience 
might understand their own lives, but don’t understand how the system works’.  
Despite this person’s expressed recognition that disabled asylum seekers 
experience injustice, the implicit assertion that ‘the system works’, limits debate to 
adjustments rather than contestation.  The explicit exclusion of people who would 
contest the assumption that the ‘system works’ enables hegemonic discourse to 
remain unchallenged.  As Mondon and Winter (2020, p.209) ‘emancipatory politics 
will never come from the top as the powerful will always resist the loss of their 
status’.  Building on Fricker’s (2007) conception of epistemic injustice referenced in 
Chapter 6, the assumed superior value of the knowledge of the powerful, results in 
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systematically undervaluing the insights of marginalised people, simultaneously 
denying people the opportunities to gain the experiences valued by the existing 
social order.  
‘Strength-based approach’ to provision of services  
Rejection of the expertise of people with lived experience may be discursively 
framed without contesting apparent commitment to asserting the rights of these 
same people.  The commitment of social care staff to a ‘strength-based approach’ 
to care assessments is an example of this discursive incongruence.  This approach 
is not new or unique to asylum seekers.  It was introduced as a means to ‘transform 
the dominant paradigm’ (Graybeal, 2001) from one in which all disabled people are 
provided with similar service, to one focused on personalised care, built on the 
‘choice and control’ of service users. This approach, therefore, draws on similar 
discourse to that used in the 2006 UK White Paper analysed in Chapter 4.  This 
approach is designed to assess the various assets already available to a person, 
without assuming that formal service provision is the appropriate solution.  However, 
Slasberg and Beresford criticise the approach as defining people’s needs according 
to the resources available and amplifying a  ‘taboo about unmet need’ (2017, p.272).  
The impact of such assessment methods was highlighted in the 2018 report from 
Deaf and Disabled People’s Organisations to the United Nations disability 
committee.  It was reported that ‘strength-based’ assessments are designed to 
reduce state-funded support, thereby denying ‘people the same opportunities to be 
included in the community with choice and control over our own lives’ (Inclusion 
London, 2018, p.31).  Their criticisms are borne out by the experiences of das13, 
who explained he had felt misled into focusing on what he does for himself and had 
not been asked about the barriers he faces or how these can be addressed.  He 
had then had support removed and became street homeless.  Despite this existing 
critique and the immediacy of the testimony of das13, social care staff at the meeting 
(dmas2) vociferously rejected the film’s criticism of a strength-based approach.  One 
staff member described it as ‘empowering’ to focus on people’s strengths rather 
than their weaknesses.  If it is assumed that meeting needs without social care is a 
‘strength’, then this also implies that requiring support and services is a weakness.  
Rather than taking a social model approach and focusing on overcoming 
mainstream barriers, the focus is on individual capacity.  The ableist and citizen- 
focused construction of hegemonic provision is thereby obscured.  This further 
undermines the progress of the disabled people’s movement and the obligations of 
the UNCRPD.  
The affective appeal of pragmatism and consensus 
The affective appeal of avoidance of disagreement and political contestation may 
be the motivation for the selection of people to be involved in the taskgroup but is a 
key impediment to change.  None of the voluntary sector representatives in the 
meeting supported disabled activists questioning the Council’s approach.  Similarly, 
the assumed normative value of solutions based on consensus was asserted by 
people with different levels of involvement in this study (vsd2, uis6, pol1).  As 
Rancière (1999, p.124) explains, ‘the consensus system represents itself to itself as 
the world of law as opposed to the world of non-law’.  Wider change, according to 
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uis6, is too political and therefore, drawing on logics of fatalism, assumed to be 
unachievable.  The exclusion of the experiences, knowledge, and commitment of 
voices of dissent and the expertise of lived experience from the Council’s task force 
had multiple ramifications.  Working with people with similar perspectives to one’s 
own can facilitate communication and affirm the apparent validity of a person’s own 
understanding.  The exclusion of disagreement hinders recognition of gaps in 
knowledge, thereby enabling an illusion of consensus and affirming the 
righteousness of those involved.  As Mouffe (2005a, p.10) explains, ‘every 
consensus is based on acts of exclusion’.  Whatever the motivation, if sources of 
disagreement are excluded, and consensus relies on existing hegemonic discursive 
representation of the problem then systemic change or a potential moment of politics 
(Rancière, 1999) is precluded.  Instead, apparent change is limited to ‘policing’ 
(ibid), or what the Council official referred to as ‘tweaking the pathways’.  Such minor 
adjustments of the social order enable those involved to gain Lacanian ‘enjoyment’ 
from their tangible contribution and avoids the discomfort associated with 
acknowledging the scale of systemic disadvantage, the disabling impact of ongoing 
restrictions, or the requirement to develop alternatives.  The pragmatic, consensual 
approach limits apparent solutions to the perceptions of those who currently frame 
the problem.  It also undermines the achievements of the disabled people’s 
movement, including the obligations of the UNCRPD, particularly General Comment 
7 for the involvement of disabled people.   
The Council’s explicit efforts to exclude voices of dissent or lived experience is 
particularly significant in the context of the Mayoral commitment to ‘look at 
everything’, in the quest to understand why two people’s pleas for help had been 
ignored with fateful consequences.  This exclusion appears to also have removed 
the core commitment to action as the taskforce never actually met.   
7.5 The impact of resistance to hegemonic contestation 
The resistance to hegemonic contestation is not always deliberate.  People may be 
unaware of their role reinforcing the hegemony and resisting contestation.  Cultural 
hegemony is such as to present the potential for influence as requiring collaboration 
with statutory authorities rather than a horizontal movement of resistance.  After the 
Council meeting (dmas2), a voluntary sector employee reported that: 
It was great to hear chief Council officers... being so receptive to inclusion and 
equality - lovely work.  
In the context of a meeting in which Council officers had expressly rejected the 
involvement of people with lived experience, her reference to ‘inclusion’ and 
‘equality’ suggests no expectation of ‘a part of those who have no part’ (Rancière, 
1999, p.11).  In contrast, disabled activists and service users explained:   
I feel very disappointed about what happened…dismissive and invalidating 
response from senior staff.  
The more I think about that meeting, the worse it all feels.  
What happened to, “nothing about us, without us”? 
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Assuming that all perspectives are shaped by a person’s subject position, it is 
perhaps unsurprising if the subject position of a non-disabled voluntary sector 
employee lacks awareness of the history and achievements of the disabled people’s 
movement.  The problem is not the ignorance (Rancière, 1991) but the exclusion of 
different perceptions, such that dominant narratives and inequalities inherent to 
common-sense social logics are reinforced. Cross-party political resistance to 
contestation of discursive inequalities highlights the hegemonic nature of social 
logics.  Attendees in this meeting were employees of the voluntary sector and a 
Labour-controlled local authority, ostensibly in opposition to Conservative 
government policy.  Yet, despite expressing active commitment to addressing the 
problems faced by disabled asylum seekers, these employees ensured that any 
change was limited to policing a system explicitly designed to restrict access to 
services and thereby to create a ‘hostile environment’.    
The vastly different responses to the same meeting may be indicative of the 
organisational distinctions between the asylum voluntary sector and the disabled 
people’s movement.  These are not parallel entities.  The disabled people’s 
movement makes a distinction between peer support organisations of, and 
charitable organisations for, disabled people.  The lack of a similar movement of 
people seeking asylum may be caused by a number of factors, including language 
barriers, lack of financial means to travel and meet each other, the all-consuming 
impact of immediate struggles for survival, and migration status being seen as a 
temporary state rather than a lived identity.  This study did not include 
representatives of organisations for disabled people, which might be considered 
more akin to the asylum voluntary sector.  The distinction is important regarding 
discursive representation of the problem and associated responses.  Logics of 
generosity towards victims of injustice may be the assumed approach of charitable 
organisations, whereas equality and a ‘part for those who have no part’ (Rancière 
1999) is core to the social model on which the disabled people’s movement is based.   
There are always multiple possible allegiances which could be sought.  Assuming 
that everybody’s perspective is shaped by their subject position, people responsible 
for designing or implementing current policy and practice can be expected to have 
limited capacity to envisage counter-hegemonic alternatives.  If the purpose is 
hegemonic contestation, it is nonsensical to prioritise allegiances with the Home 
Office or statutory authorities.  In this example, possible partnership with the 
disabled people’s movement was rejected in favour of the hegemonic stability 
associated with affirming dominant power relations.  It is not new, or exclusive to the 
asylum sector, for funded organisations to side with those perceived to have the 
power.  Clifford (2020, p.253) writes a stinging critique of disability charities that 
avoid ‘outspoken criticism of the government … in favour of opportunities to work in 
partnership’.  Charities may frame their approach as pragmatic.   Effective lobbying 
may be facilitated by identifying shared values with those we seek to influence.  
However, the focus on common ground can hinder the development of systemic 
alternatives.  With high pertinence to this example, Clifford (2020, p.257),  asks 
whether collaboration can be justified if it reinforces regressive policy or is that ‘a 
betrayal of all those suffering as victims of that agenda?’.  In the example of this 
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meeting (dmas2), the allegiances of voluntary sector employees felt like an example 
of such a ‘betrayal’ in the quest to ensure that contestation remains at the level of 
policing.     
The resistance to hegemonic contestation from people with statutory or voluntary 
sector positions, highlights the need for a movement of resistance led by people 
with lived experiences of restriction based on disability, migration status, or wider 
oppression.  I do not argue that anything less than hegemonic contestation and a 
moment of politics should be automatically rejected.  It is undoubtedly necessary to 
seek any means possible to address the immediacy of people’s struggles for 
survival, irrespective of the lack of hegemonic contestation.  However, it is 
necessary to distinguish between action to mitigate immediate symptoms of injustice 
and attempts to address causal problems.  Pragmatic attempts to present 
individuals as exceptions, reinforce discursive inequalities and cannot address 
causal problems.  Where hegemonic contestation of systemic inequalities is sought, 
then the solutions cannot stem from those whose perspective is shaped by the 
hegemony.  It is necessary to bring together the insights of people who currently 
have little hegemonic impact, building a broader movement of resistance based on 
respect for the expertise of lived experience of the impact of current policy and 
practice.  Suggested means of contributing to the required hegemonic change will 
be considered in the next chapter, concluding this study.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed perceived solutions to the injustices associated with 
disability and forced migration.  There are several initiatives ostensibly designed in 
response to injustices associated with issues of disability in the UK immigration 
system.  The existence of these initiatives may be considered progress.  There is 
undoubtedly increased awareness of the existence of disabled asylum seekers in 
comparison with the year 2012, when I was told by the receptionist of a major 
national refugee charity that they do not exist.  However, this analysis reveals that 
these initiatives reflect, reinforce, and even resist contestation of hegemonic 
discursive restrictions and inequalities.   
Perceived solutions must be understood in relation to the perceived problems they 
seek to address.  Home Office initiatives reinforce hegemonic logics of generosity 
and sufficientarianism.  The work is designed to identify those individuals framed as 
worthy of support and thus enhance, rather than contest, the assumed legitimacy of 
the wider system.  The voluntary sector may assume criticism of the restrictions and 
inequalities resulting from government policy, but the responses are dominated by 
logics of pragmatism.  Efforts to address people’s urgent survival needs may be 
lifesaving and cannot be criticised as a form of immediate response.  Furthermore, 
those people able to evidence logics of individual responsibility could also benefit 
from the ‘right to work’.  The focus of these initiatives is not on contesting the 
dislocation of rights or on asserting equality, but on mitigating the impact, adjusting 
the borders of entitlement, and asserting exceptions to the prevailing hegemony.  In 
the context of the long-term and relentless injustices of the asylum and immigration 
191 
 
system, combined with the funding concerns of the voluntary sector, it may be 
understandable that the focus is on pragmatic change rather than hegemonic 
contestation.  Most significantly perhaps, this analysis finds resistance to wider 
hegemonic contestation.  Despite espoused commitment to change, employees 
from the asylum voluntary sector and local authority protect hegemonic power 
relations and the assumed location of expertise, while undermining the 
achievements of the disabled people’s movement including the UNCRPD.  
Any action is necessarily contingent on the perceived scope for political change.   
Writing about the injustices experienced by the wider population of disabled people, 
Hughes (2019, p.843) asserts that current injustice ‘did not fall from heaven and 
cannot be read off from nature.  It arises in the welter of social relations from the 
play of power that gives it shape’.  The shift in hegemonic understanding of disability 
following the development of the social model in the 1970s, discussed in Chapter 1, 
highlights the inherent contingency of any social order.  As a result of campaigning 
based on the social model, hegemonic presentation of disability changed from an 
issue of individual tragedy to increasingly become recognised as an issue of 
collective responsibility (Oliver and Barnes, 2012).  Despite clear relevance to the 
disabling barriers experienced by asylum seekers, this study’s analysis indicates 
that the asylum sector is undermining rather than asserting social model 
approaches.  With the assumed normative value of pragmatism, current initiatives 
reflect and reinforce hegemonic discourse of vulnerability and individual distinctions 
of worth, rather than logics of rights and equality.  As such, these initiatives maintain 
the break with Bevan’s (1952) rights-based conception of healthcare, reinforcing the 
discursive distinction between need and entitlement to support, asserted by the 
1998 White Paper, which is core to current denial of services.   
The assumed value of pragmatic consensus results in attention being focused on 
technical issues of identification or adjustment within the prevailing hegemony.  As 
such, these initiatives are confined to policing the existing social order.  However, in 
the context of deliberate restrictions and inequalities of entitlement to support, 
effective change cannot be achieved without disrupting dominant power relations.  
If the basis for change stems not from the assumed expertise of dominant power 
relations but from the ‘scream’ of injustice asserted by people with lived experience, 
then the necessity for dissensus must be recognised.  A new approach is required 
to disrupt the prevailing orthodoxy.   
Effective contestation of the assumed common-sense social logics underpinning 
hegemonic distinctions of entitlement, relies on learning from the expertise of 
intersectional lived experience, building on previous achievements and creating a 
broad-based movement of resistance, solidarity, and equal rights.  This would 
facilitate a Rancièrian moment of politics and the dislocation of hegemonic 
distinctions of entitlement.  Without this level of change, the injustices experienced 
by some individuals may be adjusted, but the causal inequalities remain 




8.  Concluding comments and recommendations 
we must raise awareness that an alternative is possible – one with different forms 
of human relationships, personal development, and interdependency that we cannot 
even imagine from the constraints of our current position. 
(Clifford, 2020, p.303) 
This study began with the exasperated assertion from a disabled man facing eviction 
and homelessness, that such removal of support ‘makes no sense’.  The 
contributions of people with lived experience of disability and forced migration in 
Chapter 6 have shown that he is not alone in experiencing systematic restrictions in 
meeting basic human needs that appear to ‘make no sense’ other than to reduce 
life to a struggle for survival.  Building on previous academic studies which 
documented the lack of provision for disabled asylum seekers in the UK (Roberts 
and Harris, 2002; Ward, Amas and Lagnado, 2008; Yeo and Bolton, 2013), I did not 
seek to prove the existence of disabled asylum seekers or to document the extent 
of suffering.  Instead, assuming the injustice of these intersectional inequalities, I 
investigated how hegemonic representations of the needs and entitlements 
associated with disability and forced migration in the UK are determined, reinforced, 
or contested.  
 
This final chapter brings together the study’s findings and concludes with 
recommendations targeted at contestation of causal problems as well as 
symptomatic relief of immediate struggles.  As discussed in Chapter 5, I found broad 
agreement that there is need to address intersectional injustice.  The normative 
value of consensus may be appropriate if problems result from oversight, however, 
as highlighted in Chapter 4, current inequalities result from deliberate policy and 
practice.  Therefore, my recommendations include contestation in the following 
areas:  
 
• If the current hegemony reinforces intersectional inequalities, then dissent is 
needed to achieve the necessary paradigmatic shift.   
• Hegemonic assumptions as to the location of knowledge require contestation.  The 
lived experiences of disabled asylum seekers must be central to efforts to 
understand and address current struggles.  
• People facing the direct impact of current inequalities cannot develop alternatives 
while immediate survival is threatened.  There is need for an intersectional 
movement of collaborative solidarity between disabled citizens, asylum seekers 
and allies.  
• A ‘social model of asylum’ would build on the ‘social model of disability’, facilitate 
understanding and targeting of resistance on the disabling impact of restrictions 
within the asylum system rather than exclusively on symptoms of injustice. 
• Publicly engaged academic research could facilitate understanding and 
development of the paradigmatic shift required. 
Finally, I consider the limitations of this study and suggest the next steps to address 
the issues raised.  
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8.1 Summarising the research process and findings 
As far as I am aware, this study is unique in the methodological approach taken to 
studying issues of disability and forced migration.  A poststructuralist perspective 
facilitated focus on the contingency of current social relations, what underpins 
existing inequalities, and how effective resistance should be targeted to contest the 
systemic restrictions meeting human needs.  This was combined with elements of 
action research, in the quest to ensure that the research methods themselves 
contribute to building a broader movement of resistance.  Centring the lived 
experiences of disabled asylum seekers, I brought people involved with the disabled 
peoples movement and the asylum sector into conversation with each other, to learn 
from each other and to develop more effective alternatives to contemporary 
intersectional inequalities.  Taking a retroductive approach, I sought to develop my 
hypothesis and interrogate my own assumptions as the study progressed.  This 
enables reflections as to the contributions made by this study towards policy, 
practice, and theoretical knowledge.   
In this study, I drew on academic literature from the broad disciplines of disability 
studies, migration studies and intersectionality.  Taking a poststructuralist approach, 
and elements of the Essex school of discourse theory, I analysed the social, political 
and fantasmatic logics (Glynos and Howarth, 2007) underpinning representations 
of disability and forced migration.  This approach to discourse analysis highlights 
the contingency of any social order.  If existing inequalities appear inevitable, this 
reveals how hegemonic assumptions and structures have obscured alternatives, not 
that alternatives do not exist.  As part of this study, I worked with disabled asylum 
seekers to take their perspectives and insights to a wider audience, including 
representatives of disabled people’s organisations, the asylum sector, trade unions, 
local and national government.  I do not claim that my approach has changed the 
scale of injustice, however, I have contributed to raising the profile of current 
intersectional experiences and to bringing the disabled peoples movement and the 
asylum sector into conversation with each other. I contend that this conversation 
needs to continue, in order to learn from historical developments in both sectors and 
to develop more effective alternatives to intersectional inequalities. I will summarise 
the contribution to knowledge resulting from the different components of the study 
before turning more specifically to my recommendations for change.  
Chapter 4 
This first analytical chapter focused on investigating the dominant discursive 
struggles determining government policies regarding the restrictions and 
inequalities of entitlement imposed on people with intersectional experiences of 
disability and forced migration.  I began by briefly considering the historical context.  
The rights-based logics of the post-World War Two era have been dislocated from 
contemporary immigration discourse.  Instead, an appearance of contestation is 
focused on adjusting the balance between political logics of discretionary generosity 
towards migrants framed as worthy, and logics of control of the wider migrant 
population from whom citizens should be defended.  Discourse of generosity is 
complemented by fantasmatic logics of pride, whereby support to refugees is framed 
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as if a sign of UK largesse rather than an international obligation to fellow human 
beings.  Meanwhile, logics of defence are complemented by fantasmatic logics of 
the threat posed by refugees, drawing on pejorative reference to ‘swarms’ or ‘floods’.  
This discourse is underpinned by uncontested social logics assuming the prime 
legitimacy of the nation-state and economic gain.  Analysis focused primarily on the 
White Paper, ‘Fairer, faster and firmer’ (1998), which removed entitlement for 
asylum seekers to access the welfare state, and the VPRS (2014) which provided 
support to people selected as worthy of resettlement.  The former was introduced 
by New Labour and the latter by the coalition government of Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat parties.  This cross-party discourse highlights the political 
consensus shaping immigration policy.   
The removal of services and support necessary to meet human needs creates an 
asylum system which is acutely and deliberately disabling.  The social model of 
disability would provide useful analysis of this impact, yet it is rarely applied to 
discourse of immigration.  Instead, my analysis highlights how hegemonic 
developments of immigration policy gradually extended to impact on disabled 
citizens.  I argue that the increasingly hegemonic status of the social model of 
disability at the start of the New Labour government (Oliver and Barnes, 2012) 
prevented the restrictions imposed on asylum seekers being extended to disabled 
citizens at this time.   
The historical development of discourse regarding disability progressed differently 
from that of immigration, however, contemporary discourse is not dissimilar, with 
distinctions of entitlement and explicit restrictions for those framed as unworthy.  The 
discursive shifts facilitating removal of entitlement from disabled citizens developed 
more gradually than regarding immigration policy.  Analysis of disability discourse 
began with then Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Beveridge lecture (1999), in which he 
called for claimants to take individual responsibility, thereby contesting political 
logics of rights which had been central to overt discourse of the welfare state.  His 
vision is reflected in later welfare reform.  Adopting the language of the disabled 
people’s movement, the 2006 White Paper promoted the need for individual service 
users to have ‘choice and control’.  This ostensibly progressive discourse facilitated 
a shift in responsibility from the state to a greater plethora of service providers, with 
normative focus on individual responsibility.  This discursive shift was a precursor 
for the welfare reforms (2010) introduced following the financial crash of 2008.  With 
increasing commonalities to discourse of immigration more than a decade earlier, 
these reforms framed the problem as the burden on public finances posed by 
irresponsible ‘scroungers’ (Garthwaite, 2011) reliant on state services, with the 
solution presented as cuts to state support.  The contemporary experiences of 
disabled asylum seekers must be understood in the context of the increasing 
convergence of policy discourse regarding immigration and disability.  
Chapters 5 and 6 
Attention then turned to examine how hegemonic representations of the needs and 
entitlements of disabled asylum seekers and refugees are reflected, reinforced, or 
contested?  Chapter 5 focused on the perspectives of people with diverse roles 
195 
 
regarding implementation of formal and informal entitlements.  Chapter 6 then 
turned to the perspectives of people with lived experience of the impact of existing 
restrictions and inequalities.  
My analysis found remarkable consistency in perspectives.  Hegemonic common-
sense social logics frame non-disabled citizens as the ‘normal’ (Link, 2006) with 
prime legitimacy, thereby assuming disabled asylum seekers among the ‘other’. 
Overt debate thereby becomes pre-limited to adjusting the criteria of entitlement to 
political logics of discretionary generosity or individual responsibility, with the 
dislocation of rights and collective responsibility left largely uncontested.  This study 
was designed to privilege the perspectives of people with lived experience of 
disability and forced migration.  However, it was found that when access to support 
for basic human needs relies on being framed as exceptionally worthy, then disabled 
asylum seekers may be unable to contest the hegemony.  For these reasons, the 
struggle for justice may rely on the solidarity of allies living in less immediately 
precarious circumstances.    
Chapter 7 
This final chapter investigated how representations of the problem, analysed in 
Chapters 4-6, frame current responses (Bacchi, 2009), and how more fundamental 
political contestation might be achieved.  Analysis focused on current and proposed 
initiatives, as well as response to events organised as part of this study.  I grouped 
responses to the perceived problems according to those seeking to reinforce, adjust 
or contest the hegemony.  Home Office initiatives are designed to more efficiently 
police hegemonic distinctions of entitlement, distinguishing between those who are 
worthy of generosity and those from whom defence is required.  Such efforts are not 
designed to address disabling restrictions and inequalities but, as the ICIBI report 
(Bolt, 2019) asserts, to reinforce the credibility of the UK immigration system.   
Voluntary sector contributors may assume criticism of the Home Office, however, 
fatalistic perceptions of the impossibility of change result in normative conceptions 
of pragmatism.  The focus becomes on adjusting, rather than contesting, hegemonic 
borders of entitlement or asserting logics of rights.  If wider policy is assumed to be 
intractable, then any action can be framed as sufficient.  Mitigating the impact of 
current policies and identifying individuals framed as exceptionally worthy may be 
essential to people’s immediate survival, however, such an approach evokes logics 
of generosity within the broader context of logics of defence.  The hegemony of 
dominant policy discourse is thereby reinforced rather than contested.   
The disabled people’s movement has many experiences and achievements 
regarding the social construction of inequalities which are relevant to the asylum 
sector.  However, the discursive disjuncture between the two sectors is reinforced 
by initiatives such as the asylum sector campaign for the ‘right to work’ (Lift the Ban, 
2020) at a time when the disabled people’s movement is campaigning against the 
conditionality of benefits and being forced to seek paid work (see for example: Peev, 
2010; Grover and Piggott, 2013).  The ‘Lift the Ban’ campaign asserts the potential 
advantages to the taxpayer, thereby reinforcing the notion that those without paid 
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work are a burden.  This approach may be framed as pragmatic, but it obscures the 
radical contingency of the social order and hinders the development of a broader 
movement of resistance.  Contestation becomes limited to what Rancière (1999) 
describes as policing, rather than systemic change and a moment of politics. 
Fatalistic understanding of the social order thereby becomes self-fulfilling.   
My analysis then turned to consider response to attempted contestation of 
hegemonic distinctions of entitlement, bringing together the disabled people’s 
movement and the asylum sector.  Despite the stated commitment from voluntary 
sector and local authority representatives to address the restrictions faced by 
disabled asylum seekers, there was active resistance to hegemonic contestation.  
Instead, service providers asserted the need for adjustments, such as to identify 
individuals considered worthy exceptions to current restrictions.  Voluntary sector 
contributors assumed the need for prime collaboration with statutory providers, 
foregrounding the assumed normative value of pragmatism and consensus.  As 
such, hegemonic discursive inequalities are maintained, the disabling impact of 
current restrictions is obscured, and possible systemic contestation, or a moment of 
politics, is averted.   
This study has highlighted the precarity experienced by disabled asylum seekers 
struggling to meet basic human needs in the UK.  Despite broad consensus among 
contributors to this research that these struggles are unjust and therefore that 
change in policy and practice is required, current initiatives reinforce or adjust, but 
fail to contest, systemic inequalities.  Initiatives focused on consensual adjustment 
rather than contestation might be productive if current restrictions and inequalities 
were based on oversight.  However, intersectional disadvantage stems, at least in 
part, from deliberate restrictions, underpinned by social logics prioritising 
economically productive, non-disabled citizens.  These logics and the resultant 
hegemonic distinctions of entitlement must therefore be contested if inequalities are 
to be addressed.  Notwithstanding the scale of change that is needed, awareness 
of the contingency of the current social order is an essential precursor to the 
development of alternatives.  
Before reflecting on what I perceive as missing from the perspectives of those 
contributing to this study and on what is required to address intersectional injustice, 
it is necessary to reflect on my own assumptions.  Taking a retroductive approach, 
I do not apologise for developing and adapting my hypotheses as the research 
progressed.  With the recognition that everybody’s perspective is inevitably limited 
by cultural hegemony and the limitations of a subject position, I seek to overtly 
interrogate my changing assumptions.    
8.2 Retroductive reflections  
My initial hypothesis had been that assumptions and structures which prioritise 
majority interests result in no sector addressing the needs of people perceived as 
minorities.  However, during this study, it became apparent to me that on some 
occasions, minorities are prioritised as exceptionally worthy.  People labelled as 
‘vulnerable’ or as victims of torture may be framed as having greater legitimacy to 
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support than the wider population of disabled people seeking sanctuary.  Therefore, 
although minority status may impact on the priority given to addressing the barriers 
faced by disabled people, I reject this as a principal explanation of the injustices 
experienced.   
The assumed value of rights-based solutions  
My assumption that the problems faced by disabled asylum seekers stem from lack 
of rights afforded to people perceived as having minority status, resulted in framing 
the solution as the assertion of these rights.  However, the reader may have become 
aware of some confusion regarding my analysis of the discursive role of rights-
based logics.  This reflects my own unresolved perspective as to preferred solutions, 
combined with what I perceive as shifting hegemonic discourse.   
The pursuit of hegemony is never static or complete.  The analysis in Chapter 4 
shows that following World War Two, logics of rights took on a normative and 
foundational role, which I attribute with the status of social logics.  However, the 
example of welfare reform policies (2010) highlights how in the context of an 
increasingly hegemonic neoliberal agenda (Harvey, 2007), discourse of rights 
shifted to become a political logic of overt debate.  Rights became positioned as if 
balanced against responsibilities, with growing credence given to the idea that the 
assertion of rights hinders the central quest for profit maximisation.  In this context, 
pursuit of rights appears counter-hegemonic.  However, just as I am now 
unconvinced that the denial of minority rights is the core problem, I now also 
question whether the assertion of rights could solve the injustices associated with 
disability and forced migration.  Instead, having analysed the discursive 
underpinnings of current injustices, I now suggest that normative pursuit of rights 
may simply adjust the balance within hegemonic discursive political logics of rights 
and responsibilities.  Further, the quest for rights risks exaggerating the significance 
of legality in addressing the structural inequalities of capitalism.  As discussed in 
Chapter 7 the campaign for the ‘right to work’ reinforces hegemonic discursive 
distinctions and the capitalist association between paid work and human worth.  As 
such, discursive representation of rights can become a fantasmatic logic, which 
makes political logics ‘compelling’ (Glynos, Klimecki and Willmott, 2012, p.299), 
rather than contesting hegemonic relations of inequality.  Drawing on Rancière 
(1999), it may be that logics of rights divert contestation to policing the social order, 
thereby hindering a moment of politics.  Without contestation of systemic 
inequalities, the quest to achieve the right to some support may provide the illusion 
of progress without enabling an equal part for those with no part (ibid). 
My perceptions and political understanding are inevitably shaped by my positionality 
and my absorption of hegemonic discourse.  It is, therefore, important to subject my 
conclusions to reflexive scrutiny.  The normative value of ‘rights-based solutions’, 
was an unchallenged focus of my role in the voluntary sector during the New Labour 
government.  I now perceive that focus as limited by my subject position and 
hegemonic perspectives of possibility.  According to Oliver (2002, p.14), this 
realisation is the purpose of research: 
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the research act is not an attempt to change the world through investigation but 
rather an attempt to change the world by producing ourselves and others in differing 
ways from those we have produced before, intentionally, or not. 
Leading activists (Finkelstein, 2007; Oliver, M. and Barnes, 2012; UPIAS, 2018; 
Clifford, 2020) in the disabled people’s movement always focused on contesting the 
causes of disablement inherent in capitalist socio-economic relations, rather than 
on asserting rights within the dominant social order.  As Oliver and Barnes (2012, 
p.5) write, ‘ultimately only the transformation of capitalist society will ensure the full 
inclusion of disabled people and indeed all socially oppressed groups’.  They 
attribute the demise of the impact of the disabled people’s movement as being due, 
in part, to having acquiesced to a ‘rights route to emancipation and equality’ as a 
condition of ‘incorporation into mainstream politics’ (Oliver and Barnes, 2012, p.5) 
of the New Labour government.  I had not previously absorbed the criticisms of 
rights-based solutions, perhaps because this created uncomfortable dissonance 
with my work in the voluntary sector promoting the rights of disabled people.  
The limitations of what Oliver and Barnes (ibid) refer to as a ‘rights route’ regarding 
disability are equally applicable to the barriers faced by people on account of 
migration status.  Refugees have rights under national and international law.  
However, the discursive development of rights has been somewhat distinct in the 
immigration sector.  Perhaps the rights of refugees always had lower precedence.  
The 1951 Convention focuses on the ‘status of refugees’, whereas the 2006 
Convention focuses on the ‘rights of persons with disabilities’.  Logics of rights are 
not apparent among hegemonic political logics determining contemporary 
entitlements of immigrants in the UK.  Instead, contemporary political logics on this 
issue, focus public discourse to balancing generosity and defence.  In this context, 
the assertion of rights may appear radical, and would certainly reduce the precarity 
associated with the quest to be perceived worthy of generosity, but it is not a 
foundational logic.  If entitlement to support were based on logics of rights, it would 
not automatically contest the social logics, whereby lack of economic productivity is 
perceived as a burden.  Provision based on rights might lessen precarity but does 
not constitute the assertion of an equal part for those with no part.  
The central role of lived experience 
Adopting the precept of the disabled people’s movement, my original perception 
was that any solution should be led by people with lived experience: ‘Nothing about 
us, without us’.  I had assumed that disabled asylum seekers should have a leading 
role in the development of alternatives.  However, as das11 asserted, people 
struggling with immediate survival need to manage the system and are therefore not 
well placed to lead contestation.  Nonetheless, my analysis found that a key 
distinction between the contributions of people with lived experience and that of 
wider contributors is the ‘scream’ (Holloway, 2002) of injustice, whereby disabled 
asylum seekers assert the need for change, beyond the pragmatic focus of other 
contributors.  Das8 called for the wider population to recognise that: 
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we are human beings, and they should treat us how they would like to be treated… 
they should know that the pain that they can feel is the same, same pain that we are 
feeling.   
Her ostensibly obvious assertion is also a radical contestation of the social logics on 
which distinctions of entitlement are based.  She did not call for gifts or minority 
rights, nor did she frame herself as an exception, instead she called for 
acknowledgement of shared humanity.  Her assertions were core to my realisation 
that a rights-based approach fails to address systemic inequality. As referenced in 
Chapter 3, her initial condition for involvement in this study was that she would do 
so as my teacher, not my participant.  From my perspective, that is the role she 
played, and should play, in the development of alternatives.   
8.3 Recommended action to contest current intersectional 
injustice  
Having analysed diverse perspectives of the problems and solutions to the 
intersectional injustices associated with disability and forced migration, I conclude 
with a series of recommendations for action, based on what I consider missing from 
current initiatives.  The ‘silences’ (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016, p.20), or what is left 
unproblematised, limit hegemonic perceptions of appropriate solutions and are 
therefore as significant as what forms the agenda for discussion.  As Albert Einstein 
famously warned: ‘we cannot solve our problems with the same level of thinking that 
created them’.  Effective solutions to the restrictions and inequalities associated with 
disability and asylum cannot be developed with the same discursive logics as 
created the problems.   The paradigmatic shift required to build intersectional justice 
requires collaborative learning and actions of solidarity between disabled citizens, 
asylum seekers and allies.   
There is a need to balance achievable short-term change to provide immediate 
improvement to people’s lives, with the need to contest the causal problems.  I do 
not doubt the importance of immediate relief, however it cannot be confused with 
causal solutions.  Furthermore, there is an ethical responsibility to be clear as to 
what is realisable in what time period.  Das8 described her anger and 
disappointment that a campaign to ‘close down Yarl’s Wood’ immigration removal 
centre, was framed as successful by organisers and yet failed in its overt, and for 
her the only meaningful aim. The result was to add an additional burden of 
disappointment to her mental health, creating resistance to further action.  
There is a difficulty in creating campaign objectives that meet everyone’s priorities. 
The buzz of organising a large protest at Yarl’s Wood may appear successful to 
some people, and irrelevant to others.  Similarly, when organising events to bring 
people together, one asylum seeker pushed for the goal to be police reform.  I am 
unconvinced by this goal but in my research diary on 19th January 2018, I ask ‘Who 
am I to say?’.  I have no greater right to determine the objective than anyone else, 
but I am unwilling to put time and energy into a goal that I am unconvinced by.  The 
quest to agree effective and realisable objectives is not simple.  A voluntary sector 
contributor helping to organise, stated that it would be a success if ‘one person 
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changed their views’.  In my research diary of 13th January 2018, I question this, 
writing ‘What would that achieve?’.  Unless this ‘one person’ was in a position of 
great power, their views would not alter distinctions of entitlement.  It is impossible 
to be certain as to what will result from different forms of action.  To address the 
intersectional injustice discussed in this thesis, action to address the immediate 
symptoms of intersectional struggles for survival must be combined with 
contestation of causal inequalities.   
My recommendations include action to address the causes and the symptoms of 
current injustice.  Firstly, I contend that dissent is needed to build the necessary 
systemic change.  Secondly, effective action to address the immediacy of people’s 
needs must respect and learn from the expertise of intersectional lived experience.  
This requires challenging dominant assumptions regarding the location of 
knowledge.  However, people struggling for survival cannot be expected to lead the 
development of intersectional alternatives.  If contestation is to be effective, 
solidarity is needed to overcome the precarity associated with disability and forced 
migration.  My third recommendation is therefore for collaborative learning and 
solidarity between disabled citizens, asylum seekers and allies to create a broad-
based movement of resistance and solidarity.  This would enable responses to bring 
together and build on wider achievements, thereby avoiding the current tendency to 
frame intersectional action as if taking place in an ahistorical vacuum and 
automatically innovative.  These recommendations are integral elements of the 
fourth, to develop a social model of asylum which draws on the social model of 
disability to focus contestation on the disabling impact of current restrictions.  This 
would also help to bring the sectors together and promote solidarity.  Finally, these 
action-based recommendations are combined with an important role for publicly 
engaged academic research to develop the paradigmatic shift required. 
i. Dissensus needed to contest hegemonic, common-sense, social 
logics underpinning distinctions of entitlement. 
The current normative approach to consensus cannot contest hegemonic 
restrictions and inequalities enshrined in government policy.  Contestation cannot 
be limited to adjusting the balance of political logics to mitigate the suffering of 
certain people but must consider the social logics underpinning the existence of 
distinctions of entitlement.  The normative value of consensus assumes a broad 
common purpose.  However, as my analysis has highlighted, government policy is 
explicitly designed to restrict migrant access to services and support.  The purpose 
of distinctions of entitlement is to deter people from coming to, or remaining in, the 
UK (see for example, Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999; Immigration Act, 2014, 
2016). These goals are underpinned by social logics assuming the prime legitimacy 
of non-disabled citizens, and the paramount need to reduce the burden posed by 
the ‘other’ on the over-riding objective of profit maximisation.  Lived experiences of 
the disabling impact of the resultant barriers to meeting human needs were outlined 
in Chapter 6.  The causes of current injustice cannot be addressed without 
contesting the assumed purpose and priorities of immigration policy.  This is 
incompatible with normative assumptions of consensus.   
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Some mitigation of the symptoms of injustice experienced by certain people may be 
achieved by consensus.  However, as I have argued, initiatives based on selecting 
people framed as worthy of support, reinforce hegemonic distinctions of entitlement.  
To address the systemic causes requires dissent.  As Rancière (2010, p.46) 
explains, dissensus is the ‘essence of politics’.  It functions to put ‘one world in 
another’ and thereby to demonstrate ‘a gap in the sensible’ (ibid).  Yet, hegemonic 
assumptions of the normative value of consensus were clearly apparent in the 
solutions proposed by contributors to this study and the responses to attempted 
contestation (dmas1,2).  When organising the public event, dmas1, I was advised 
by an employee of an asylum voluntary sector organisation, not to involve one 
disabled asylum seeker because she gets angry.  Bell hooks (1996, p.12) argues 
that white people being ‘unable to hear black rage’ results in the rage remaining 
‘trapped in the realm of the unspeakable’.  She refers to the silencing of rage as the 
‘sacrificial offering’ made to ‘gain the ear of white listeners’ (1996, p.13). Without the 
anger of dissenting voices, the liberal democratic façade of consensus may be 
maintained, and systemic causes of injustice obscured.  Avoidance of political 
‘intervention in the visible and the sayable’ (Rancière, 2010, p.45) limits debate to 
policing, or the ‘partition of the sensible’ (ibid), thereby reinforcing the ‘common-
sense’ hegemonic consensus.  The normative appeal of pragmatic consensus and 
stability thereby becomes an impediment to addressing injustice.   
An individual’s statement of benign intent is insufficient to contest systemic 
inequalities.  Distinctions of entitlement are core to the socio-economic relations of 
capitalism, creating what Bauman (2004) refers to as ‘wasted lives’ alongside 
‘wasted products’.  Returning to the opening citation: 
There are always too many of them.  ‘Them’ are the fellows of whom there should 
be fewer – or better still none at all.  And there are never enough of ‘Us’.  ‘Us’ are 
the folks of whom there should be more.  (Bauman, 2004, p.34) 
Neoliberal reduction of state services and increased focus on individual 
responsibility (Harvey, 2007), exacerbate the impact of the prioritisation of profit.  If 
the problem is systemic, the solution cannot be to identify a select number of ‘them’ 
considered worthy of support, to adjust the borders between ‘them’ and ‘us’, or to 
pragmatically seek consensus.  Such efforts do not contest the break between need 
and entitlement to support, or the existence of divisions of assumed human worth.      
Current initiatives focus on adjusting the balance of political logics within an 
apparently intractable system.  Social logics assuming the primacy of economically 
productive, non-disabled, citizens underpin hegemonic distinctions of entitlement, 
yet these logics remain uncontested.  Contestation of systemic causes requires 
shifting the focus from identifying ‘vulnerable’ asylum seekers, framed as having 
‘exceptional needs’, to focus instead on asserting core assumptions of equality and 
solidarity (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018).  Attention directed at overcoming disabling 
barriers meeting human needs would highlight what Arendt (1963, p.94) refers to as 
the common ‘quest for bread’ and thereby facilitate awareness of commonalities 
with the wider population.  Contestation of social logics that associate human worth 
with economic contribution requires dissensus from the hegemony.   
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Systemic contestation relies on perceiving the possibility of change, imagining 
alternatives beyond hegemonic common-sense and having the capacity to contest 
the dominant orthodoxy.  If the scope for change is limited to pragmatic consensus 
with the dominant hierarchy, then the development of alternatives to the hegemony 
is precluded.  The capacity to envisage alternatives may be limited by cultural 
hegemony.  However, beyond this, the capacity for contestation is limited by a 
person’s roles and responsibilities.  Home Office civil servants are employed to 
administer, not contest, government policy.  Similarly, voluntary sector employees 
may be constrained by organisational needs for funding or collaboration with 
statutory service providers or policymakers.  As such, these organisations depend 
on the social order and without proactive attempts to overcome such limitations, 
may be a hindrance to a moment of politics in which people with no part assert their 
part (Rancière, 1999).  Instead, collaborative alliances of solidarity are required, to 
build a broader movement of dissensus.     
ii. Centring the expertise stemming from intersectional lived 
experience  
Understanding the immediacy of intersectional struggles for survival requires 
centring the lived experiences of disabled asylum seekers.  It may be commonly 
assumed that women’s understanding and experiences must be central to 
responses to sexism, and people with lived experience of racism must be central to 
anti-racist solutions.  Similarly, the expertise of experience has been central to the 
disabled people’s movement as advocated by numerous disability studies 
academics and activists (including Oliver 1983, Oliver and Barnes 2012, Clifford 
2020).  The events organised as part of this study were a means to enable people 
with wider roles to learn from the expertise of disabled asylum seekers.  Addressing 
intersectional injustice is inseparable from respecting the expertise derived from 
lived experience of current policy and practice.   
 
In academic research, changes in epistemological assumptions as to what 
constitutes knowledge results in different methodological approaches and 
consequently also different research findings.  In terms of public discourse, when 
access barriers are addressed and the expertise of lived experience is respected, 
the nature of debate is transformed.  It appears as if systemic change is impossible 
when the dominant perspectives, methods and assumptions remain constant.  
When different voices and perspectives are heard and respected, then alternative 
methods of organising and distributing resources not only appear possible but are 
actively created.   
 
The expertise of disabled asylum seekers is essential to successful dissensus.  
Building on the analysis in Chapter 6, to realise the contribution of people with these 
lived experiences, it is necessary to overcome the precarity of people’s struggles for 
survival.  Furthermore, a shift in the assumed location of knowledge is needed, to 
contest what Fricker (2007) refers to as ‘epistemic injustice’ or what Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos (2014) refers to as ‘epistemicide’.  If expertise is assumed to be 
associated with power, then the insights of marginalised people are systematically 
subdued.  The detrimental impact of excluding the expertise stemming from lived 
experience of disability, or what (Johnson and McRuer, 2014) refer to as ‘crip-
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specific knowledge’,  is not confined exclusively to those who are subjugated.  The 
knowledge developed out of lived experience of disabling systems, as Ana Bê 
(2019, p.16) argues, could ‘be beneficial to others’.  Without this input, as Oliver 
(2018) warns, in what was to be his final extended interview, non-disabled people 
routinely ‘get it wrong’.  References to the need for statistics to address the lack of 
existing knowledge regarding disability and migration (Crock, Ernst and Ao, 2012; 
Burns, 2017) provides clear example of the impact of subjugating ‘crip-specific 
knowledge’ (Johnson and McRuer, 2014).   This study adopted methodology with 
strong focus on relational work, particularly with people with lived experience of 
disability and forced migration.  This approach is counter to dominant assumptions 
of the location of expertise.  None of the asylum seekers contributing to this research 
called for better statistics, nor did they lament the lack of knowledge.  This is not to 
argue that people with lived experience automatically have the solutions or the 
opportunity to develop alternatives.  As I have argued, cultural hegemony is such 
that people may adopt hegemonic perspectives, irrespective of their subject 
position.  For example, I suggest that das8 adopts hegemonic assumptions 
regarding the location of power, when she calls for prioritising the influencing of the 
‘big giants’ (Yeo and Spencer, 2018).  She believed that events designed to build 
organisations of peer-support were pointless without the attendance of people with 
decision-making power.  The expertise of people with lived experience is essential 
to long-term change, but people struggling for survival must prioritise immediate 
survival needs.  For these reasons, bonds of solidarity which may be built through 
relational work are essential to contesting the current system.  
 
Practical access barriers 
Beyond epistemic barriers, practical access barriers must be addressed to enable 
meaningful contributions from disabled asylum seekers.  These barriers compound 
the struggles for survival and prevent people devoting energy to the development of 
systemic alternatives (das11).  The challenge is to create conditions whereby people 
living in precarious circumstances can contribute their expertise, without 
jeopardising their struggles for survival.  As explained in Chapter 6, some people 
are more enthusiastic than others about becoming involved in peer support 
organisations.  I noted in my journal that das16 showed: 
much more clear-cut interest than other people so far, which is interesting in that he 
is far less obviously disabled than others and could avoid the label 'disabled' if he 
wanted to. 
He showed me evidence of his torture scars as if asserting his legitimacy to be 
involved as a disabled person.   He clearly has strong interest in peer support.  
However, the scope for interaction in wider social settings is limited by language 
barriers.  Interpreters are therefore essential to building solidarity and enabling the 
expertise of lived experience to be shared.   
Without addressing physical, emotional and communication barriers, it will be 
difficult for others to learn from the experiences of disabled asylum seekers.  The 
budgetary implications of overcoming access barriers are unlikely to be prioritised 
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by wider organisations unless the involvement of disabled asylum seekers is valued.  
The disabled people’s movement uses online tools to overcome physical access 
barriers, particularly in the context of the Covid pandemic.  Online meetings may 
overcome mobility access barriers for some, but the internet is particularly 
inaccessible to people living in destitution, including many asylum seekers.  
Nonetheless, as Clifford (2020, p.307) writes:  
Having members with diverse skills and abilities who face diverse barriers requires 
a collective effort that is refreshingly interdependent within an increasingly 
individualistic society. 
As such, finding means to address the diversity of existing barriers can serve to 
contest the logics of individual responsibility which contribute to the discursive 
rationale for current restrictions.  If practical access barriers associated with 
disability and asylum were addressed, the sense of feeling unwelcome or of being 
disregarded, discussed in Chapter 6, could be reduced.   
Lack of organisations with specific responsibility for addressing intersectional 
barriers may hinder wider awareness of people’s needs.  As discussed in Chapter 
6, das11 recalls her intersectional needs being framed as a reason for nobody to 
acknowledge responsibility for service provision.  The problem stems in part from 
the complexity of immigration policy and welfare reform.  This would be vastly 
simplified if entitlement were dependent on human need.  The need to identify 
people considered worthy of support and the need to develop categories of 
entitlement would become redundant.  Such change would dislocate common-
sense social logics of the primacy of the nation-state and economic contribution.  In 
the current hegemony, such change may appear naïvely unrealistic, but the 
collective responsibility on which the NHS (Bevan, 1952) was founded, exemplifies 
the contingency of the social order.  Effective contestation of hegemonic social 
logics cannot however be achieved by policymakers and service providers 
dependent on the power relations of the existing social order.  Instead, a moment of 
politics (Rancière, 1999) and a part for those with no part would be required.  
iii. An intersectional movement of resistance and solidarity  
Collaborative learning and solidarity are needed to develop alternatives to the 
hegemony. This is particularly urgent in the context of the extension of restrictions 
from the asylum sector to a wider ‘war on disabled people’ (Clifford, 2020).  Building 
such a movement would bring together disabled citizens, asylum seekers and allies 
to challenge these intersectional inequalities.  It would involve: acknowledging and 
challenging the disabling nature of societal restrictions (Union of the Physically 
Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), 1976); challenging the ‘citizenship 
assumption’ (Pisani, 2012), which obscured the need for resistance when the rights 
of disabled asylum seekers were removed in 1999; and acknowledging 
commonalities with a wider population experiencing systematic precarity (Standing, 
2014).  Writer and trainer, Vikki Reynolds (2014, p.145) aligns her work with activists 
striving for a movement of resistance, based on ‘horizontally linked, non-hierarchical 
forms of social organization, thought, and communication’.  Her conception borrows 
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from the philosophical notion of the underground power through which rhizomatic 
plants gain their strength.  The power of rhizomes is described by Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari (1987, p.7) as 'ceaselessly established connections between 
semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances’.   Such conceptions of 
power could unite people beyond divisions of identity.  
The experiences of disabled asylum seekers could bring intersectional insights to 
support contestation of ongoing hegemonic and systemic injustices.  However, in 
the absence of regular interaction between disability and immigration sectors, 
acknowledgement of intersectionality becomes framed as if a new discovery, 
disconnected from the broader asylum system, or the history and achievements of 
the disabled people’s movement.  The voluntary sector may be impeded from 
contesting the hegemony or prioritising alliances with the disabled people’s 
movement.  However, there have been successful moments of contestation without 
voluntary sector support.  As discussed in Chapter 6, despite active discouragement 
from a voluntary sector organisation whose funding relied on promoting ‘voluntary 
return’, das11 resisted eviction and the removal of support, eventually gaining 
refugee status.  She did this by bringing together activists from the disabled people’s 
movement and the asylum sector.  In so doing, she highlighted the capacity for 
successful resistance and contestation of hegemonic discursive distinctions of 
entitlement, through combining the learning and achievements of the two sectors.  
The barriers impeding the building of an intersectional movement are not unique to 
these issues.  Oliver and Barnes (2012, p.175) argue that alliances are necessary 
to address the causes of oppression while maintaining the value of the knowledge, 
expertise, and peer support of the disabled people’s movement.  Focusing on the 
experiences of trafficked women, Sharma also asserts the need for feminists ‘to 
contest global practices of exploitation and abuse’ through intersectional resistance 
and solidarity:   
Feminists intent on securing social justice therefore need to make central to their 
praxis, the elimination of all immigration controls and the eradication of those sets 
of social relations organised through global capitalism. (2005, p.106) 
While agreeing with her premise of the need for such solidarity and shared learning, 
there are multiple barriers faced by oppressed people seeking to create alliances.  
As Mouffe (1988, p.42) explains, ‘there is no automatic allegiance between different 
struggles against oppressive discourses’.  Nonetheless, as she also asserts, radical 
democracy requires the linking of expertise and experience from diverse forms of 
struggle.  This would create ‘new subject-positions that would allow the common 
articulation, for example, of anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-capitalism’ (ibid).  She 
does not refer explicitly to disability and migration; however, her analysis is very 
pertinent.  Without access to alternative discursive representations, it is unsurprising 
if people in the asylum sector assume hegemonic discursive representation of 
disability, locating the problem at the level of the individual disabled person.  
Similarly, the disabled people’s movement relies on wider input to contest 
hegemonic prioritisation of citizens.  Without this intersectional exchange, initiatives 
are unlikely to avoid reinforcing the hegemony.  
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iv. A social model of asylum 
The most fundamental and urgent recommendation from this study is my call for a 
social model of asylum.  Such a model would shift current focus from apparently 
pragmatic adjustment of the criteria for distinctions of entitlement. Instead, it would 
facilitate understanding and contestation of the disabling impact of the asylum 
system on those subject to restrictions on the ability to meet human needs.  The 
experiences and achievements of the disabled people’s movement could facilitate 
the building of peer support, overcome barriers based on migration status, and 
provide highly relevant contestation to the disabling impact of the immigration 
system.  It is necessary to build a movement of solidarity, which recognises the 
commonalities of oppression resulting from a social order constructed to maximise 
capitalist goals of profit.  As Russell and Malhotra (2002, p.216) assert, ‘those 
seeking to challenge capitalism in other struggles’, including ‘socialists, union 
activists or academics’, could learn useful lessons from the disabled people’s 
movement.  Home Office and asylum voluntary sector attempts to identify 
‘vulnerable’ asylum seekers, or to mitigate the suffering of certain individuals, are 
clearly not seeking to ‘challenge capitalism’.  Instead, they are perceiving the 
injustices experienced by disabled asylum seekers as specific incidents resulting 
from oversights.   
Effective resistance cannot be achieved by separate battles against each 
manifestation of capitalist and neoliberal restrictions and inequalities.  Barnes 
argues that the politics of disablement:  
like racism, sexism, hetero-sexism, and all other forms of social oppression, it is a 
human creation.  It is impossible therefore to confront one type of oppression without 
confronting them all and of course the cultural values that created and sustained 
them.  (1996, p.ix) 
The barriers to an effective broad-based movement of resistance are not only from 
liberals and those on the right of politics.  As Clifford (2020, p.298) argues, ‘probably 
the majority of people on the left (and the right) hold ideas about disability that align 
with an ideology of individualism as opposed to a social model approach to 
disability’.  Hegemonic discourse frames disabled people as incapable or as a 
burden.  Attempts to provide for people’s needs are thereby framed as if a mark of 
progressive politics.  In common with Clifford and Barnes, I argue that addressing 
barriers to the inclusion of disabled people is not simply an issue of justice, but a 
means of learning from relevant achievements and experiences required for 
effective contestation of the hegemony. 
While promoting the expertise of the disabled people’s movement, the shortcomings 
cannot be ignored.  There was a lack of organised resistance from disabled people, 
when asylum seekers lost the right to access the welfare state in 1999, and when a 
reservation excluding immigration policy was added to the UNCRPD by the UK 
government.  The failure of the disabled people’s movement to contest such 
developments may have stemmed from lack of awareness of issues beyond lived 
experience.  In the absence of direct contact across sectors, access to information 
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is limited to media coverage, compounded by what udc2 described as people’s 
ongoing, individual struggles.  Furthermore, the disabled people’s movement is not 
immune to the impact of cultural hegemony and social logics assuming the prime 
legitimacy of citizens.  Irrespective of the cause, this failure to contest injustice, 
enabled distinctions of assumed human worth and a discursive break between 
needs and entitlements, which were eventually extended to disabled citizens. 
Systemic change may appear unattainable, however, bringing together the 
experiences and achievements of the disabled people’s movement with those of the 
asylum sector, could create a movement of resistance capable of far-reaching 
political change.  It is not only disabled asylum seekers who could benefit from such 
collaboration.  Clifford (2020, p.299) calls for ‘engaging in active struggle alongside 
non-disabled people’, in order to: 
make new alliances and to push a social model understanding of disability onto the 
mainstream agenda… it is also about being involved in building a wider movement 
that is strong in order to win a society that is free from all oppressions. 
Rather than the asylum sector learning from the successful resistance and 
hegemonic contestation which resulted in the hegemonic acceptance of the social 
model, the asylum sector is currently at the forefront of the dislocation of the logics 
of rights.  Instead, intersectional injustices could provide the momentum for a 
moment of politics which could facilitate contestation of the impact of wider 
oppression.   
v. Publicly engaged academic research focussed on developing the 
paradigmatic shift required. 
Recommendations for action to address intersectional injustice could be facilitated 
by publicly engaged academic research.  The innovative methodological approach 
of this study combined rigorous academic study with publicly engaged activism, and 
a strong focus on building relations of solidarity through the research process.  I 
drew on, and brought together, different sectors, academic disciplines, and 
theoretical models.  This approach could facilitate the paradigmatic shift required to 
build intersectional justice.  I will outline the potential of the different elements of my 
methodological contribution.   
The events that I organised brought together people from different sectors and 
different walks of life.  Activists, academics, and allies who do not routinely interact, 
converged to learn from the experiences of disabled asylum seekers and to seek to 
address the associated injustices.  In this way, people whose voices are rarely heard 
by the mainstream establishment became the lynchpin with which both to develop 
better understanding and to build a stronger movement for change.  As argued 
above, the social order may appear intractable if the dominant voices are 
uncontested.  However, revolutionary systemic change becomes a possibility that is 
actively created when access barriers are removed, and the lived experiences of 
previously marginalised voices are heard and respected.   
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My methodological approach brought together academic literature from the areas of 
disability studies, migration, and intersectionality. These distinct areas of study 
provide important insights for addressing the injustices experienced by disabled 
asylum seekers.  The social model of disability involved academic and activist 
contributions, resulting in a paradigmatic shift which shapes the contemporary 
discipline of Disability Studies.  The development and promotion of a social model 
of asylum would build on these achievements, as well as those from studies of 
migration and intersectionality.  
My work also drew on distinct theoretical models.  I drew particularly on the work of 
disability activists and academics (including: Oliver, 1983; Finkelstein, 2007; Oliver 
and Barnes, 2012; Clifford, 2020).  These writers take a historical materialist 
approach, arguing that disability is a product of capitalism and that justice cannot be 
achieved in isolation from contesting the capitalist roots.  I concur with these 
conclusions, however, using poststructural discourse theory, I have sought to 
understand the discursive roots of current inequalities.  I argue that effective 
contestation of material inequalities requires dislocation of discursive roots.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, former Prime Minister Tony Blair did not immediately 
impose the welfare reform which he advocated in 1999, despite imposing broadly 
similar restrictions on asylum seekers at this time (Immigration and Asylum Act, 
1999).  A shift in hegemonic understanding of disability was required before similar 
policies would be imposed on citizens.  The New Labour government’s co-option of 
demands from the disabled people’s movement for ‘choice and control’ facilitated a 
discursive shift from the collective responsibility of the social model, to a neoliberal 
focus on individual responsibility and reduction of state services.  The welfare reform 
introduced by the Conservative and the Liberal Democrat Coalition was 
underpinned by the discursive development of the biopsychosocial model.  These 
reforms could not have been tolerated without this discursive shift away from 
collective responsibility.  For these reasons, I argue that poststructuralist discourse 
theory provides a useful contribution to understanding and contesting the injustices 
associated with disability and forced migration.  
When the focus of contestation is restricted to adjusting the balance between 
political logics of generosity and defence, the legitimacy of distinctions in human 
worth is implicitly affirmed.  The potential appeal, or Lacanian ‘enjoyment’ 
(Stavrakakis, 2005), associated with short-term, achievable relief associated with 
acts of generosity, may be alluring.  However, if attention is continually focused on 
symptoms, then the relentless nature of battles can reinforce fatalistic perceptions 
of the social order.  Action focused on policing or pragmatic consensus may thereby 
impede a moment of politics (Rancière, 1999) and the development of a broad-
based movement of resistance.  Without arguing against work to relieve immediate 
symptoms of injustice, it is essential to distinguish this from action targeted at the 
systemic change necessary to address causal problems.  Theoretical analysis 
usefully highlights this distinction.  
The merging of academic and activist ambitions in my research design resulted in 
the organisations of events which, not only provided further input to my research 
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analysis, but also enabled my academic research including the theoretical analysis 
to contribute to wider discussion.  These events and the media attention generated, 
brought experiences of intersectional injustices to the attention of a wider audience 
than I could have achieved through academic means in isolation.  The interest 
raised by these events resulted in further media contact and facilitated my attempts 
to organise further meetings with the local authority and the voluntary sector.  As 
discussed in Chapter 7, my attempts to secure practical change from the local 
authority, highlight the wider barriers to the systemic change required to achieve 
intersectional justice.  A movement built on the merging of the achievements and 
experiences of the disabled peoples movement, the asylum sector, and allies, could 
assert significantly greater influence than an individual researcher or any of these 
sectors in isolation.  Furthermore, new collaborations and raising the profile of 
experiences that have been marginalised from public attention, can increase 
awareness of possibilities beyond minor adjustments of the current hegemony.  
These research methods enabled my thesis to have significantly greater impact than 
that routinely obtained through a doctoral thesis, which is rarely accessible to large 
numbers of people.  For these reasons, I seek to expand on this approach and build 
wider collaborations for future publicly engaged academic research.    
8.4 Limitations 
Notwithstanding the contributions made by this study, I acknowledge several 
limitations.  As I have stressed, my perception, like anyone else’s, stems from my 
subject position.  Therefore, I can never hope to understand all possibilities.  For 
this reason, I sought contributors with diverse subject positions.  However, there are 
undoubtedly many perspectives which I have not included.  My analysis builds on 
the input from people who contributed, without assuming these people represent all 
people in any sector.   
My focus has been predominantly on the asylum sector, with less consideration 
given to the barriers within the disabled people’s movement.  Contributions from 
disabled people have been from activists or members of disabled people’s 
organisations, rather than from disability charities, which might be considered 
equivalent to the asylum voluntary sector.  Hegemonic barriers are not restricted to 
any one sector.  However, more specific analysis of intersectional barriers and 
possible solutions within the disabled people’s movement and disability charities 
would require separate analysis.   
The most significant ethical dilemma I have faced during this study is whether it 
would be more useful to put all my energy into attempting to support individuals to 
meet their immediate needs, rather than to write an academic study.  This is of 
course the same dilemma faced by the asylum voluntary sector when choosing to 
prioritise focus on reduction of symptoms, rather than causes, of injustice.  There 
have been significant amounts of campaigning, awareness-raising, and support to 
individuals during the study, but my focus has been on understanding the causes, 
and thereby contributing to more effective resistance.  Without contestation, there 
will be never-ending examples of injustice.  Nonetheless, I am aware that for people 
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facing the immediacy of struggles for survival, contestation of systemic causes takes 
too long.    
This project makes a successful contribution to uncovering the discursive roots of 
current injustices associated with disability and forced migration.  However, a key 
part of my motivation was to contribute to addressing these injustices.  I am 
unconvinced that this has been achieved.  Oliver and Barnes (2012, p.182) criticise 
poststructuralists who use ‘academic language in a way that disables rather than 
enables those without an academic background’.  This criticism could be widely 
applied to academic discourse, rather than exclusively targeted at poststructuralism, 
which does not negate the value of theoretical contribution.  My next step is to 
rewrite this thesis in a more accessible form to contribute to struggles for social 
justice.  
Conclusion and next steps 
My analysis concludes that far from making ‘no sense’, individual examples of 
apparently irrational injustice are the logical consequence of hegemonic distinctions 
of entitlement.  Despite assertions of the need to address disadvantages associated 
with disability and forced migration, the solutions presented by people with different 
subject positions fail to contest the existence of inequalities of access to the services 
and support required to meet human needs.  Entitlement to such services has 
become dependent not on need, but on precarious criteria of human worth.  People 
with impairments that limit productivity, or who seek sanctuary without capacity for 
significant economic contribution, are thereby hegemonically framed as a burden, 
the impact of which must be reduced for the benefit of the wider population.  
Hegemonic acceptance of the inevitability, if not the legitimacy, of distinctions of 
entitlement is such as to present the existence of disadvantage associated with 
disability and migration status as if it were intractable.  However, lack of effective 
contestation of these conditions is not evidence of inevitability.  Poststructural 
analysis highlights the contingency of the existing social order.  I therefore conclude 
that to address the restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum 
seekers would require dislocation of the discursive basis of the existing social order.  
The enormity of this task is not reduced by pragmatic initiatives designed to reduce 
the impact of current disadvantage for certain people.  Instead, such initiatives 
reinforce hegemonic acceptance of the legitimacy of distinctions of entitlement.    
A system based on neoliberal capitalism positions economic productivity as the 
paramount goal, with state expenditure framed as a burden to be reduced.  
However, as my analysis has shown, it would be incorrect to suggest that disabled 
asylum seekers and refugees are always, or inevitably, disadvantaged in the current 
system.  Some initiatives exist to reduce the restrictions of the immigration system 
for people labelled as ‘vulnerable’.  The criteria of such vulnerability may include 
disabled people.  However, such initiatives maintain hegemonic discursive 
inequalities intact.  If provision of support relies on political logics of generosity 
towards those framed as worthy, this reinforces the apparent legitimacy of logics of 
defence towards a wider population of migrants or disabled people.  This analysis 
211 
 
concludes that the restrictions and inequalities experienced by disabled asylum 
seekers cannot be solved by identifying certain individuals framed as exceptions to 
wider restrictions, or by adjusting the criteria for eligibility to services and support.  
Contestation must move beyond adjusting the balance between political logics of 
generosity and defence, to dislocate the assumed legitimacy of inequalities of 
human worth and the primacy of the nation-state which are inherent in hegemonic 
social logics.  Lack of contestation of these discursive representations of the 
problem results in apparent solutions being focused on minor adjustments and 
policing rather than hegemonic challenge and a moment of politics.  Intersectional 
injustices experienced by disabled asylum seekers cannot be addressed without 
dislocating systemic distinctions of human worth. 
The failure of all sides documented in this thesis, to provide substantive contestation 
of intersectional restrictions and inequalities provides warnings for the development 
of effective resistance.  However, hegemonic discourse is inherently contingent and 
therefore has continuous potential for transformation.  There has been significant 
change during the period of undertaking this investigation.  Public reaction to media 
representations of the Syrian conflict influenced government action towards those 
affected.  It temporarily appeared as if a moment of politics might emerge.  However, 
the moment was quelled by the assertion of generosity, rather than equal rights, or 
‘a part for those with no part’ (Rancière, 1999).  The contingency of the social order 
has never been more apparent.  I conclude this thesis during the 2020 Covid19 
pandemic, which has disproportionately impacted disabled people (Lund and Ayers, 
2020).  This study has exposed the fallacy of hegemonic notions that intersectional 
issues of disability and forced migration are intractable minority issues of marginal 
wider relevance.  My analysis has shown that despite acknowledgement of injustice, 
there is resistance to hegemonic contestation, with current initiatives instead 
reinforcing hegemonic discursive inequalities.  In this context, the persistence of 
injustice is inevitable.  However, the study also highlights the need for intersectional 
exchange of experiences and achievements.  This study has highlighted that the 
denial of support to any sector of the population facilitates similar restrictions being 
extended to a wider population.  Therefore, an act of solidarity is also an act of self-
preservation.  
The paradigmatic shift required to build intersectional justice requires collaborative 
learning and actions of solidarity.  The experiences of disabled asylum seekers 
could provide the impetus to develop a broad-based movement of mutual solidarity 
through which to contest intersectional injustice and contest the distinctions of 
human worth which have become hegemonic in contemporary neoliberal society. 
The political situation in the UK is in a state of crisis requiring urgent remedy, such 
that future direction is unclear.  This potential flux makes it particularly timely to 
consider what underpins the injustices of the existing social order and how 
alternatives might be developed.  Systemic change and hegemonic contestation 
may appear too ambitious, however, as Clifford (2020, p.300) writes: ‘We have no 




Appendix 1: Anonymised list of contributors to this 
study 
Contributor  Date * Gender Method of 
recording  
Form of impairment 
Disabled asylum seekers *** (further identifying features have been removed for 
purposes of anonymity) 
das 
1 10/12/2017 m own notes physical and hearing 
impairment 
2 15/01/2018 f own notes physical impairment 
3 30/08/2018 m own notes mental health support 
needs 





5 20/12/2017 m own notes physical impairment and 
learning difficulties 
6 01/11/2017 m own notes learning difficulties 




mental distress and 
physical impairment 





























13 18/09/2018 m own notes mental distress 
14 01/12/2017 m own notes physical impairment 
15 01/02/2018 m own notes chronic health issue 










18 2018 f,f,f,m,m own notes Focus group 
 
Contributor  Date * Gender Method of 
recording  
Area of responsibility 
Voluntary sector employees  
Immigration    vsi 






broader issues of hate 
crime 





service for migrant 
community 




support specific to 
survivors of torture 





campaigning on behalf 
of people in detention 




service provision for 
destitute asylum 
seekers 
Voluntary sector employees 
Disability vsd 














Local authority employees  
Resettlement - laer 




Experience working with 
asylum seekers and 
resettled Syrian 
refugees 
2 01/11/2017 m,f,f own notes Experience working with 
asylum seekers and 
resettled Syrian 
refugees 




Experience working with 
asylum seekers and 
resettled Syrian 
refugees 
Local authority employees – social work 
laesw 




3 social workers, 
involved with asylum 
seekers with care needs 





with social worker 
responsbile for providing 
care for asylum seekers 
 
Civil servants  
Home Office and DWP - cs 




focus group of 
employees working in 
asylum and immigration 
service provision 










4 26/03/2018 f interview 
transcription 







Legal professionals  
lp 










3 Sep-18 f email solicitor 















Unpaid activists or volunteers 
disabled citizens    udc 




student and volunteer 




activist with many years 
involvement in both 
disabled people’s 
movement and asylum 
sector 




activist with many years 
involvement in disabled 
people’s movement but 
new to asylum sector 
4 
 
m, f own notes asylum seeker and 




new to intersectional 
issues 




campaigner with history 




Immigration sector   uis 




volunteer working with 
asylum seekers 




volunteer in local 




















national level forum for 
Home Office and NGO 
staff working in the 
asylum sector.  Some 
meetings are just the 
NGO staff, others are 
with Home Office staff 
included.   











District Council initiative.  
Elected Councillors, 
Council officials, 








16/11/2017  own notes Small town initiative - 
public meeting for 
anyone interested in 
learning about support 
being provided to Syrian 




Events organised as part of this research process 









coverage.   
This took place in Bristol 
but included people 
from different parts of 
the country and 
received national media 
coverage.   
Roundtable meetings at Bristol City Hall, bringing disabled citizens and 
asylum seekers together with Bristol City Council, social care staff, asylum 










meetings.   
City Council meetings 
focused on social care 









history of our 
struggles 
This event was 
collaboratively 
organised by disabled 
people in Bristol, with 
funding from 
Universities of Bristol 
and Bath.    
*date of first or biggest research involvement.  Many people were 
involved on many subsequent occasions 
 ** accommodation type and migration status are only known if the 
person chooses to mention it  




Appendix 2:  Loose basis of topic guide 
Introduction  
Welcome, thank for coming. 
Introduce self and research purpose 
Recording – say if anything want unrecorded.  
Anonymity in my research,  
Confidentiality of focus groups 
Free to refuse to answer any questions / no right or wrong answer, just aiming for 
some discussion of ideas, experiences, possible solutions. 
Loose basis for questions:  
Needs 
➢ What see as the main needs and problems faced by disabled asylum seekers 
and refugees?   
➢ How the needs of disabled asylum seekers and refugees are currently met? 
➢ Whose needs are most easily met?  What prevents needs of others being 
met?  What determines this? 
o Prompt: do any of these make any difference?   
▪ Different forms of migration status (asylum seeker, refused 
asylum seeker, refugee, VPRS) 
▪ Nature of asylum claim 
▪ Nature of impairment? – physical, sensory, mental health… 
▪ Nationality / Gender / age 
▪ Social skills / ability to cook / play music /Luck / Who a person 
meets? 
▪ Language skills / ability to push for needs? 
Barriers 
➢ What access barriers are there to meeting these needs? 
➢ What causes the barriers?  
➢ Do any people get greater support?  
➢ What causes differences in how people are treated?  
Interviews and group discussions to explore what determines how the needs of 
disabled asylum seekers are met in the immigration system and disability sector /  
who is prioritised / barriers that are experienced / what action is taken to overcome 
barriers / if and what needs to change.   
Topic guide formed prompts for discussion when needed.  Adapted for civil 




➢ Who provides or should provide support – Home Office / contracted providers 
/ vol. orgs / public support? 
What difference does it make? 
➢ Are any adaptations made for disabled asylum seekers?  By whom?  What?  
➢ How barriers could be addressed?  
➢ What is the problem?  
Solutions 
➢ What else needs to change?  And how?   
➢ Who would need to act and why?  
 
What, if anything, do you think needs to change for the needs of disabled asylum 
seekers and refugees to be met?    
What / who would need to act?  How and why?  
would there be any risks or disadvantages of giving greater priority to disabled 
asylum seekers?    
What needs to change / who would need to lead in making this change?  
• Thinking about own role what like to change in relation to d.a.s.  -  in 
terms of personal role or contributing to wider change?  
• What do you think is possible to achieve?  
• Who else /what else would need to happen for the wider change to 
take place? 
• Reason for any differences between what would like and what think 









Appendix 3:  Recruitment fliers translated into 
multiple languages.  
Are you an asylum seeker or refugee?  
Do you have an impairment, long-term injury or illness that 
affects your everyday life?   
For example: this could be physical such as difficulties with your 
legs, arms or back.  It could be sensory, maybe you don’t see or 
hear as much as other people.  It could be that you experience 
mental distress or that you find it hard to understand or 
remember complicated information.  
Do you face barriers in your life because of these issues?  Are you 
Disabled?  
If so, would you be willing to talk to me about your experiences and 
ideas?   This is part of my research at University of Bath.    
I can provide interpreters and pay for any costs.  We can meet in a café 
or somewhere that you choose.  Anything you say will be confidential.  
You don’t have to commit to staying in the group, you can drop out at 
any time.  
If you are interested in finding out more, please contact: 







 هل أنت طالب لجوء أو الجئ؟ 
 إصابة مستديمة، أو أي مرض يؤثر في حياتك اليومية؟هل تعاني من أي إعاقة، أو 
، كمشاكل في الساقين أو الذراعين أو الظهر، كما يمكن بدنيًاقد يكونذلك  على سبيل المثال: 
أو  نفسيًا، كعدم التمكن من الرؤية أو السمع بقدر اآلخرين، أو قد يكون ذلكحّسيًاأن يكون 
 التواصل مع اآلخرين.  ، بحيث يشّكل صعوبة في التركيز أو ذهنيًا
 ؟ذوي االحتياجات الخاصةهل تواجه أي عقبات في حياتك بسبب هذه المشاكل؟ هل أنت من 
تكوين  وأفكارك؟إنني بصدد  بشأن تجاربك  التحدث معي  إذن، فهل ترغب في  إذا كان األمر كذلك، 
 مجموعة صغيرة لمناقشة الوسائل التي يمكن بها تجاوز هذه العقبات. 
ر مترجمين فوريين والتكفلبأي تكاليف أو نفقات. ويمكننا أن نلتقي في أحد المقاهي أو في يمكنني توفي
أي مكان آخر تختاره. وأؤكد لك أن كل ما تقولهسيُعاملبسرية تامة.كما أنك غير مضطر إلىالمشاركة 
 في المجموعة، بل ويمكنك االنسحاب منها متى شئت. 
 ألمر،فيُرجى االتصال: إذا كنت ترغب في معرفة المزيدحول هذا ا







ىستید؟  پناىج یا میاجر آیا  
نی ط جراحت بیماری، دارای آیا است؟  داده قرار تأثیر تحت را شما ًزانو ر زندگی کو ىستید لایتی معل یا مدت ٌلا  
مثلا  تاشذ، حسی است ممکه  .کمر یا دست پا، واحی در مشکل ماوىذ تاشذ جسمیاست ممکه مشکل ایه :مثال  
سایر  تا ارتثاط  یا تمرکس تاشذ اًنی ریا ًحی ر است ممکه یا  .تثیىیذ یا یُذ تشى تُی خ ت سایریه ماوىذ اُویذ وت  
سازد اُر دش شما ترای را  افراد . 
ٌستیذ؟  ان نات آیا است؟ شذي شما زوذگی در اُوعی م ایجاد تاعث مشکل ایه آیا  
گر مه کىیذ؟ صحثت مه تا تاري ایه در تَفکرتان تجارب ایه ٍذرتاري ک ٌستیذ مایل آیا است، مثثت شما پاسخ اگر  
 يَ 
ام کردي ایجاد اُوع م  ایه ترداشته میان از يُ  وح ُرد م در تحث ترای را ُچکی ک . 
ُ  ق  در اُویم ت  می  .کىم پرداخت را  ای ٌسیى وُ  ٌرگ مٌ  د  قرار اختیارتان در  را را مترجماوی اُوم یت م خاو  يٍ  
در  ماوذن ترای ٍذی تع یٌچ  .ماوذ ذٌ  اُ  خ تاقی محرماو شما اٌی حرف  .کىیم ملقات مٌ  تا شما اوتخاب ت جایی یا  
شما جُ  مت يَ  گر  
کىیذ ترک را يَ  گر اُویذ ت می اُستیذ خ ک زمان رٌ  دُ  ت ذٌ  اُ  وخ . 
ا  تیشتر اطلعات کسة ترای کىیذ اقذام زیر طریق  از لطفا : 
Kurdish 
ئاوارەیت؟ یان دەکەیت پەنابەرێتی مافی داوای  
لەسەر  کاریگەریی هەیە نەخۆشیەکەت یان درێژخایەن برینداریی نوقسانی، هیچ  
 ژیانی 
بکات؟ دروست رۆژانەت  
هەستەوەری  دەکرێت  .پشتت  یان قۆڵت قاچهکانت، له کێشه  وەک  بێت، تەییجەس دەکرێت :نمونە بۆ  
زهنی  یان دەروونی دەکرێت  .نهبێت تر خهڵکی وەک بیستنت یان  بینین توانای لهوانهیه بێت،  
بکهیت دروست خهڵک  لهگهڵ پهیوەندی یان  بکهیت تهرکیز نهتوانیت واتلێدەکات که بێت، . 
؟ کەمئەندامیت ئایا کێشانهوە؟  ئهو  بههۆی  خۆتدا ژیانی  له  دەبینهوە بهربهست رووبهڕووی ئایا  
خۆت؟  بیرۆکهکانی و ئهزموون  دەربارەی بکهیت لهگهڵ قسهم دەکهیت ئارەزوو بهڵێ،  ئهگهر  
 من
بکهین  بهربهستانه ئهو البردنی چۆنێتی باسی که دەکهم دروست بچووک کۆمهڵهیهکی . 
شوێنێکی  ههر یان کافێیهک له  دەتوانین   .ئهستۆ بگرمه تێچووەکان و بکهم  دابین وەرگێڕ دەتوانم  
که  تر  
پابهندبیت  نیه مهرج  .دەمێنێتهوە نهێنی  به دەیڵێیت  تۆ  که شتێک  ههر  .ببینین یهک دەتهوێت تۆ  
 به 
بکشێیتهوە بێت کاتێک ههر دەتوانیت کۆمهڵهکه، له بهشداریت . 
به بکه پهیوەندی تکایه  بزانیت، زیاتر  زانیاریی حهزدەکهیت ئهگهر  : 
Somali 
Ma tahay magangaliye doone ama qaxooti? 
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Ma leedahay maqalka oo ku dhib ah ama dhawac muddo-
dheer ama jirooyiin saameyaa nolol maalmeedkaaga?   
 
Tusaale ahaan: tani waxay noqon kartaa jirka sida dhibaatooyinka 
lugahaaga, gacmahaaga, ama dhabarka. Waxay noqon kartaa 
dareenka; waxaa laga yaabaa inaad arki karin ama aad maqli 
karin dadka kale. Ama waxay noqon kartaa neerfaha ama 
xaaladda caafimaadka dhimirka taas oo ka dhibaato kugu ah 
adiga ama la xiriirta dadka kale.  
 
Ma la kulantaa dhibaatooyinka nolosha sababtoo ah arrimahaan?  Ma 
tahay naafo? 
  
Haddii ay saa tahay, ma rajeynaysaa inaad aniga igala hadasho wax ku 
saabsan waayo aragnimadaada ama fikradahaada?  Waxaan 
sameeynayaa koox yar si looga wada hadalo si loo saari lahaa 
dhibaatooyinka    
 
Waxaann  ku siin karaa turjumaano waxana bixin karaa qiimo walba. 
Waxaan ku kulmi karnaa maqayad ama meel kale oo aad 
jaceshahay.  Wax walba oo aad dhahdo waxay noqon doonaan sir.  Ma 
u baahnay inaad ku lug yeelato kooxda, waxaad ka bixi kartaa waqti 
walba. 
 





Appendix 4:  Consent Form 
Consent form  
 
An exploration of the causes, impact and possible alternatives to the relative 
entitlements associated with disability and forced migration. 
 
Researcher: Rebecca Yeo 
 
I have been given an information sheet on the purpose of this research project, what 
is expected of me and my right to withdraw. 
 
I understand this study is related to Rebecca Yeo’s research at University of Bath.  
I have also been given a chance to ask questions and clarification was given to me 
on all of the questions I have raised. 
 
I am aware that this information is to be kept confidential between myself and the 
researcher (as well as academics related to this study).  I know my name is not to 
be used in the report and I am guaranteed anonymity. 
 
I have given my consent to participate in this study with a full knowledge about it. 
 
 




Signature: ______________________________________________  
 
 




Information for contributors 
Information Sheet  
 
An exploration of the causes, impact and possible 
alternatives to the relative entitlements associated with 
disability and forced migration. 
 
Researcher: Rebecca Yeo 
 
Doctoral student, Department of Politics and International Studies, University 
of Bath.  
 
This sheet briefly explains the purpose of the study.  Please ask if you have 
any question or would like any further information either now or in the future.  
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
• This study looks at issues of disability in the asylum and immigration 
system.  
• The aim is to better understand the difficulties currently associated with 
disability and forced migration, and to gather ideas as to how difficulties 
might be addressed. 
• I am interviewing policymakers, service providers and community groups 
working with asylum seekers and refugees.  I am also working with disabled 
asylum seekers and refugees, bringing their views and experiences to a 
wider audience.  
 
Why have you been invited?  
• I am keen to understand your perspective regarding issues of asylum, 
immigration and / or disability  
• Your expertise will help to shape the study.  
 
What will participation involve? 
• Interviews and presentations may be recorded for purposes of note taking 
only.  All recordings will be destroyed after use.  
 
 
What happens to the information in the project? 
• All data will be made anonymous and kept confidential, unless there are 
particular areas that you specifically agree to publicise.   
 
What happens next? 
If you are happy to be involved in this study, please could you sign the attached 
consent form.  
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There is no obligation to be involved if you would prefer not to be.  
Contact details: 
If you have any questions/concerns or would like further information, during or 
after the investigation, please contact: 
Rebecca Yeo      or: Aurelien Mondon 
R.A.Yeo@bath.ac.uk   a.mondon@bath.ac.uk 
Researcher      Supervisor.  Senior Lecturer.  
Department of Politics and International Studies 
University of Bath 
Claverton Down 
Bath BA2 7AY 
Telephone: +44 (0)1225 388388 
 
Many thanks for your interest.  
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